At the Tribunal
HIS HONOUR JUDGE P CLARK
MR W MORRIS
MISS S M WILSON
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR R O'NEILL
(Appellant in person)
JUDGE CLARK: This is an interlocutory appeal by the appellant Mr O'Neill against a refusal by an Industrial Tribunal Chairman to grant witness orders in respect of a number of witnesses who were listed in a letter sent on Mr O'Neill's behalf to the Industrial Tribunal and dated 4th July 1995. The ground on which the Chairman refused to make the orders, is that he was not satisfied that any of the proposed witnesses could provide relevant evidence. He continued:
"Moreover a party is not allowed to cross examine any witnesses he may call."
and that was a specific reference to the fourth category of witness in the applicant's letter of 4th July 1995, which begins:
"4. We also wish to cross-examine the following Quick's employees ..."
they are then named.
We take the principles on which witness orders may or not be ordered from the decision of the National Industrial Relations Courts, Sir John Donaldson presiding, in Dada -v- Metal Box Company [1974] ICR 559. It is a matter of discretion for the Industrial Tribunal as to whether or not witness orders are made, and there are really two questions. The first is: can the potential witness give prima face relevant evidence. Secondly, is it necessary to issue an order? This Chairman refused to make the orders on the first ground.
An appeal to this Tribunal can only be on a point of law. In interlocutory appeals of this sort, it is necessary for a successful appellant to show that no reasonable Industrial Tribunal Chairman properly directing himself, would refuse the order, or otherwise it must be shown that he has wrongly exercised his discretion.
The material on which the Chairman had to make his order is the letter of 4th July 1995. It is apparent to us that that letter does not set out the grounds on which it is said that those people can give relevant evidence. On that basis alone, we cannot fault the Chairman's direction. Let alone, say that, it was a perverse order to make.
On that simple basis we find that we have no jurisdiction to allow this appeal, and it must be dismissed.
We would simply add this, although we are not an advice bureau, that this is an interlocutory matter, and a situation may arise during the course of the substantive hearing of the appellant's complaint of unfair dismissal, that because of the way in which the employer puts his case, whereby it may be necessary for witnesses to be called. Then it is open to the appellant to repeat his application. However, we strongly suggest that if that course is to be taken, he first makes enquiries to see whether or not the individuals he thinks he may want to call are prepared to attend voluntarily.