United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1995] UKEAT 832_95_2211

Appeal No. EAT/832/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 22nd November 1995

HIS HONOUR JUDGE P CLARK

MR R H PHIPPS

MR N D WILLIS

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MR Y BHATT          APPELLANT

AIRCRAFT SERVICE LTD          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant MR Y BHATT

(Appellant in Person)


 


JUDGE CLARK: The respondent carries on the business of servicing British Airways aircraft at Terminal 4, Heathrow. Mr Bhatt was employed by them on 13th June 1994 and dismissed on 9th September 1994, having failed his 3 month probationary period. It seems that he had earlier been employed by the respondent for a short period in March and April 1992.

Following his dismissal, on 24th November 1994, he presented a complaint to the Industrial Tribunal alleging:

"(i) Harassment, (ii) Injustice, (iii) Victimisation, (iv) Bias, (v) Physical and mental abuse, and (iv) Discrimination."

The Industrial Tribunal, sitting at London (North) on 6th June 1995 (Chairman Mrs Martin) examined each of these complaints and the evidence on which the appellant sought to base them. They made findings of fact and concluded that none of the allegations made by Mr Bhatt amounted to race discrimination or victimisation under the Race Relations Act 1976. His complaint was dismissed.

Against that decision Mr Bhatt now appeals.

This is a preliminary hearing held to determine whether his appeal raises any point of law which ought to be argued at a full hearing before this Tribunal. In support of his Notice of Appeal Mr Bhatt makes various complaints which are amplified in a 9 page letter which he wrote to the Industrial Tribunal on 2nd July 1995. He has supplemented those matters by oral argument today.

His first complaint is that the Chairman demonstrated bias by preferring the evidence of a witness, Lesley McGurk, to that of the appellant over an incident in which he alleged that Ms McGurk, his supervisor, had kicked him, and she denied it. Taking this point first, it is the function of the Industrial Tribunal to make findings of fact where a material conflict of evidence arises. It cannot be a ground for complaint of bias simply that the appellant's evidence was not preferred. In paragraph 6 of their reasons the Tribunal say:

"Having heard Ms McGurk's evidence and having observed her demeanour, the Tribunal ... has had no hesitation in believing Ms McGurk's denial that such an incident ever occurred."

It seems to us that Industrial Tribunals in discharging their fact finding function are entitled to take into account not only what witnesses say, but how they appear to the Tribunal when they are giving their evidence, and we conclude there is nothing in this point.

The other matters raised by the appellant can be characterised as an attempt to re-run the issues which were placed before the Industrial Tribunal and determined in favour of the respondent. In particular, he complained that the argument presented against him by the respondent's witnesses was not true. It is not our function to retry the Industrial Tribunal proceedings. Our role is limited to intervening where an error of law is made out. In this case we are quite satisfied that no arguable point of law arises in the appeal and it must be dismissed.