At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)
(IN CHAMBERS)
JUDGMENT
APPEAL AGAINST REGISTRAR'S ORDER
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant THE APPELLANT IN PERSON
For the Respondents MR JONATHAN WEST
(Solicitor)
Messrs Boyes, Turner & Burrows
Solicitors
10 Duke Street
Reading
RG1 4RX
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal against the order of the Registrar of the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 24th March 1995. After considering the application in the letter from Mr B A J Davis for an extension of time in which to file a Notice of Appeal, and after considering the response of Rover Group Limited, the respondents to the appeal, the Registrar decided to refuse the extension.
After he was notified of the decision. Mr Davis informed the Employment Appeal Tribunal by letter of 7th April 1995 that he wished to take the matter further.
On hearing the appeal from the Registrar, I have to decide whether there is in this case a good excuse for the appeal being seven days out of time. The rules require that an appeal from an Industrial Tribunal should be instituted within 42 days from the date on which the extended written reasons for the decision were sent to the appellant. There is no dispute about the relevant dates.
The hearing of Mr Davis's claim of unfair dismissal against Rover Group took place in the Industrial Tribunal held at Reading on 10th November 1994. At the hearing Mr Davis was represented by his union representative, Mr Evans. Mr West represented Rover Group Limited.
The Tribunal unanimously decided that Mr Davis had not been unfairly dismissed. The extended reasons for that decision were notified to the parties on 30th November 1994.
The Notice of Appeal by Mr Davis is dated 12th January 1995, but was not received by this Tribunal until 18th January 1995; seven days later than the 42 days from the notification of the decision.
At the hearing of the appeal today, Mr Davis has represented himself. Mr West has appeared for Rover Group Limited.
Mr Davis has given an explanation for his failure to comply with the time limits. His explanation is this. He was away in Australia from 30th November 1994 until 31st December 1994. This means that he was away when the decision would have been received from the Industrial Tribunal. When he returned it was still the New Year holiday period. As soon as he knew of the decision on his return, he telephoned this Tribunal to get the necessary papers for instituting an appeal. He returned the Notice of Appeal completed the day after he had received the appeal papers from this office.
Mr Davis accepts that he did not make any arrangements, before he went to Australia at the end of November 1994, for this matter to be dealt with by Mr Evans, or by anybody else in his absence. It appears he did not contact Mr Evans on this matter on his return. He seems to have treated the matter with some urgency on his return, but the unfortunate fact is that he did not act fast enough.
I have to decide whether the explanation is a good excuse. I accept Mr Davis's explanation of the reason why his appeal is late. But, in my view, it does not amount to a good excuse for not complying with the rules. He could have made arrangements, before he left for Australia for a prolonged period, to have this dealt with in his absence. On his return, he could have served the appeal within the 42 days by acting more speedily that he did or by obtaining from the Employment Appeal Tribunal an extension of time for serving the Notice of Appeal. He did not do this. In those circumstances there is, in my view, no basis on which I can disagree with the decision of the Registrar refusing an extension.
As pointed out by Mr West in his submissions, Mr Davis was not handling his case in person before the Industrial Tribunal. He had advice and representation from a union representative. He was in a position to be advised about the time limits for appealing.
When the Industrial Tribunal send out the decisions to the parties, they also send accompanying documents which make it clear that the time limit is 42 days from the notification of the decision.
Mr Davis had opportunity to have this matter dealt with in his absence abroad, or to have this matter dealt with more speedily on his return. He failed to do that, in those circumstances I have to apply the time limits strictly. Time limits are time limits, 42 days is 42 days. This appeal was out of time. In those circumstances I have reached the conclusion that the Registrar's Order was correct. I therefore dismiss the appeal.
I add this. Mr Davis has been critical to some extent of the way in which the case was presented for him at the Industrial Tribunal. He has new evidence, which he says puts a different aspect on the case. He has referred to the evidence of two witnesses on a point which, he says, is relevant to the decision of the Tribunal.
In my view, the matter of new evidence is not relevant to the extension of the time for appealing. I point out to him that if he does have new evidence, which was not available for use at the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal, and has only become available since that hearing, or if he can show that it is evidence that he could not have reasonably have known of or foreseen at the time of the hearing, he may have grounds for applying to the Industrial Tribunal for a review of its decision under Rule 11 of the Industrial Tribunal Procedure Rules. He is out of time for asking for a review. It would be necessary for him to ask for an extension of that time. He would have to convince the Chairman of the Tribunal that this really was new evidence that would have a bearing on the result and was evidence that he could not have known about or foreseen at the time. I express no view on that, because it has not been relevant for me to enquire further into the nature of the new evidence.