At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MORISON
LORD GLADWIN OF CLEE CBE JP
MR K M HACK JP
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Respondents MR DONALDSON
(Representative)
MR JUSTICE MORISON: This is an appeal by Miss Humphreys who we shall call if we may as the `employee', from a decision of an Industrial Tribunal held at London (South) on 16th March 1994. By their decision the Tribunal unanimously dismissed the employee's complaint of unfair dismissal which she had presented against her employer, Adam & Co, Plc, who we shall refer to if we may as the `employers'.
The employee pursuant to a letter dated 10th September 1990, had been employed by the employers from October 1990 as assistant supervisor banking operations. Her duties included the opening and closing of accounts and the originating and setting up of standing orders and direct debit payments, the printing of cheque books, dealing with enquiries, reconciling accounts and other duties specified in paragraph 3 of the decision.
In her capacity as assistant supervisor banking, she reported to a Mrs A Rose, who had joined the company in July 1988. She worked in the same section with a Miss Pane who had joined the bank in January 1991, that is a matter of months after the employee had joined.
As a result of some fraudulent foreign dealing operations, the bank in 1992 sustained huge losses and as result the question of redundancy arose. After the foreign exchange dealing room was closed, attention was directed to the operations department. There being a considerable reduction in the need for work for that department as a result of the closure of the foreign exchange dealing room.
The employers had not previously had to face the question of redundancy. Therefore they set about the task by applying certain criteria. They chose four criteria. The first of which was length of service. Under it the conclusion that would have been drawn was that Miss Pane would have to go, she being the person with the least length of service. But the second criteria which was taken into account, was the attendance record of the three staff, and on that it is clear that the employee's record was worse than that of either Mrs Rose or Miss Pane. The third criteria which was adopted was conduct. Again, having regard not only to the events of January 1992 but what had happened subsequently, the employers could reasonably and did reasonably conclude that the employee's record in that respect, was worse than the other two. The fourth, and last criteria that they applied, was the question of ability. Again, bearing in mind that this was to some extent bound to be a subjective judgment, the employers conclusion that the employee was considered to be the least of the three people in terms of ability, was one which they were entitled to arrive at, although it should be said and emphasised, that the employee was considered to possess good abilities, but "not as good as those of Mrs Rose and Miss Pane."
Therefore having regard to those four criteria. Mr Donaldson on behalf of the bank arrived at the conclusion that the employee should be made redundant. He consulted, albeit for a short period of time, with the employee about the prospect of redundancy, and applied his mind to the question of re-deploying her within the bank. It will be apparent that from the circumstances to which we have referred, that was not a task which was likely to be productive. The employers have a slow turnover of staff, which no doubt they would consider as something to be proud of.
It was the employee's case at the Industrial Tribunal that she thought that there may have been some kind of spiteful element in her selection for dismissal, but that contention was firmly rejected on the evidence and the facts by the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal applied its mind to all the relevant considerations that arise in a redundancy situation, having regard to the wide language of Section 57(3) of the Act.
The employee appealed from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal, by a short and in many respects, inadequate Notice of Appeal dated 22nd May 1994. She has not despite requests from the Employment Appeal Tribunal, further particularised her Notice of Appeal so as to justify a continuation of her appeal. But we have formed the view that there are no grounds whatever which could be relied upon for a successful challenge to this full and careful decision.
We should emphasise that this Employment Appeal Tribunal can only deal with and put right points of law which arise on a Tribunal's decision. We cannot and do not reinvestigate the facts. That means that we cannot reverse the Tribunal's conclusions that they have arrived at, for example in relation to her complaint that the employers may have been influenced by spite.
In these circumstances we propose to deal with this appeal as though it were a substantive appeal, and not based on any procedural or technical nicety, and we are encouraged to take that view, bearing in mind that the employee did not and does not have legal representation.
Having looked with care at the totality of the decision, we are all of the view that there are no grounds upon which an appeal could be successfully launched against this decision, which, as I have said, is succinctly and clearly expressed in the written decision of the Tribunal. Accordingly we dismiss the appeal in substance, and that is the order which we make.