United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1995] UKEAT 277_95_0512

Appeal No. EAT/277/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 5th December 1995

Before

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE KEENE

MRS T A MARSLAND

MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP

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B          APPELLANT

A          RESPONDENT

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellants NO APPEARANCE BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE           APPELLANTS

For the Respondent MR J LEPORT

(Solicitor)

Lincoln Chambers

Market Place

Banbury

Oxfordshire

OX16 8UA


 


MR JUSTICE KEENE: We have before us in this matter an application by letter on behalf of the Appellant to adjourn the hearing of this appeal. The letter has arrived by facsimile today and without any advance notification to the Respondent or to this Tribunal.

It seeks an appeal because of the circumstances of the case, those circumstances being first, the financial difficulties of the Appellant brought about allegedly by the activities of the Respondent during his time as manager. The Appellant, which is a club, is in discussion with the Charities Commission in respect of its future and the financial arrangements. The other point made in the letter seeking the adjournment of today's hearing is the fact that the Respondent is now serving a term of imprisonment in relation to a number of offences including a conviction for rape of one of the young volunteers at the Appellant club. We have been told by Mr Leport who appears on behalf of the Respondent today that the Respondent received a nine year sentence a short while ago. As yet it has not been made clear that he will get leave to appeal against his conviction, but an application for leave has been made. The Appellant's letter suggests that one of the reasons for an adjournment is that it would be sensible for this appeal to await the outcome of any criminal appeal which may be to take place. Implicit in that is also the suggestion that it would be sensible at least to await the outcome of the application for leave to appeal in the criminal proceedings before this appeal against the Industrial Tribunal's decision is heard.

We are bound to say that we see some force in that. We approach this matter on the basis that this adjournment ought to be granted, the only alternative to it being to dismiss the appeal for want of prosecution. The appeal ought to be adjourned unless to do so would cause injustice.

It does seem to us that the only potential injustice which could be caused by an adjournment would be the expenses which have been incurred today by the Respondent who has come because no advance warning was given of this present application. No other injustice has been suggested by Mr Leport, although he does refer to the inevitable undesirability of appeals like this being delayed. That factor does not seem to us to be quite as much a disadvantage as in many cases in other jurisdictions because of course the facts of this particular case are already established by the Tribunal's decision and one is no longer dependent therefore as in some jurisdictions on memories of witnesses and troubled by the danger of those memories fading.

Having considered this matter at some length, we have come to the conclusion that this application for an adjournment should be allowed so that this matter will stand adjourned sine die.

We are conscious of the expenses incurred today by the Respondent. It may be appropriate that the Appellant should pay the costs thrown away by today's adjournment and the short notice of the application given by the Appellant's solicitors. However, it may also be that the Appellant and its solicitors have some explanation which they can proffer for the late indication of this application to adjourn. In those circumstances, we do not propose to make any order for costs as such today, but unusually we will make an order for the costs of today's hearing to be reserved, so that the matter can be dealt with by the Appeal Tribunal which actually hears this appeal. That is not to indicate that they will feel inclined to make any order for costs, but we merely flag the matter up so that it is drawn to their attention.

We will also give liberty to apply to the Respondent, whether that be in relation to costs or in relation to the hearing of the substantive appeal, because of course we are conscious that this a matter which may never come before an Appeal Tribunal and in those circumstances it should be open to the Respondent, at least, to argue that costs should be awarded to him.

So that is our order. Appeal adjourned sine die. Costs of today reserved to the Appeal Tribunal, with liberty to apply.