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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Pandya v Department Of Health & Social Security [1995] UKEAT 249_94_1703 (17 March 1995)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1995/249_94_1703.html
Cite as: [1995] UKEAT 249_94_1703
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At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)
MR E HAMMOND OBE
MR J C RAMSAY
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant APPELLANT IN PERSON
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This appeal first came before the Employment Appeal Tribunal on 21 February 1994, when it was dismissed because no arguable point of law was disclosed in the papers, which included written representations from Mr Pandya. As he did not attend the hearing, he was given leave to apply within 28 days of that order for an oral hearing. He applied for an oral hearing. That is taking place today. The decision appealed against is the decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting at London South on 22 November 1993. The full reasons for the decision of the Tribunal were notified to the parties on 7 December 1993. The Tribunal unanimously decided that it had no jurisdiction to entertain the claims brought by Mr Pandya for unfair dismissal and race discrimination. Those claims were brought against the Department in his originating application. Mr Pandya appealed against that decision by a Notice of Appeal dated 15 December 1993. The grounds of his appeal were natural justice and that he was unaware that he had rights under The Race Relations Act until he made his complaint. He asked the Tribunal to agree that his complaint against the Department of Health should be heard.
The Tribunal dismissed Mr Pandya's complaints on two grounds. The first was that, insofar as he was complaining of unfair dismissal, it was his own admission that he did not have two years employment to entitle him to bring such a claim. That is referred to in paragraph 6. For the reasons given in the first judgment, he cannot bring a claim of unfair dismissal, when he accepts that he has less than two years service. As to the claim for race discrimination, the Tribunal held that they had no jurisdiction to hear that, because the act of discrimination complained of had taken place in April 1987. The originating application was not received in the Industrial Tribunal until 2 March 1993, nearly 6 years out of time.
Under The Race Relations Act Section 68, it is provided that an Industrial Tribunal shall not consider a complaint under Section 54, unless it is presented to the Tribunal before the end of the period of 3 months, beginning when the act complained of was done. This was out of time to an excessive extent. The Tribunal has a discretion under Section 68(6) to consider a complaint which is out of time if in all the circumstances of the case it considers that it is just and equitable to do so. The Tribunal have a discretion as to whether they should extend time. They exercised the discretion in this case not to extend time. They gave the reasons for that in paragraph 4 of the Decision:
"... In the experience of each member of the Tribunal this delay is unprecedented in its length..."
They said the grounds put forward by Mr Pandya in relation to his out of time claim did not justify the inordinate delay. They said they could not accept that simply because an employee states that after a very long period of time, he has only just discovered his rights in detail. He should not be allowed to pursue a claim against an employer, who, because of the passage of time, no longer has any records concerning the employee in question.
Before us, Mr Pandya repeated the point that he had not realised until a late date that he had a right to bring a case of race discrimination, without satisfying the requirement of 2 years continuous service. That, on its own, is not a reason for extending time. The Tribunal were, in our view, entitled to exercise their discretion to refuse an extension of time. There was no error of law in the exercise of the discretion. There was no error of law in their conclusion. That appeal is dismissed, as disclosing no reasonably arguable point of law.