United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1995] UKEAT 245_95_1603

Appeal No. EAT/245/95

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 16th March 1995

THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE BUCKLEY

MISS A MADDOCKS OBE

MR T C THOMAS CBE

---

BSG PROPERTY SERVICES          APPELLANTS

(1) TUCK & OTHERS

(2) MID BEDS DISTRICT COUNCIL          RESPONDENTS

---

Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

Revised


 


---

APPEARANCES

For the Appellants MR W PAWLAK

(of Counsel)

Messrs Motley & Hope

The Manor House

Shortmead Street

Biggleswade

Bedfordshire

SG18 0AT

For the Respondents MR T LINDEN

(of Counsel)

Messrs Brian Thompson

& Partners

Congress House

Great Russell Street

London WC1B 3LW


 


MR JUSTICE BUCKLEY: This a very short point. It arises in this way. There is a pending case in the Industrial Tribunal at Bedford, the Chairman, Mr Drysdale. The present Appellants to this Tribunal took a preliminary point which was determined against them and they have a pending appeal to this Tribunal against that decision.

In the nature of things, it would be common knowledge, that that appeal is unlikely to come on at the very earliest before the end of this year.

The present Appellants applied to Mr Drysdale, the Chairman, to adjourn the substantive hearing before the Industrial Tribunal. That is due to come on in a matter of days and a two day hearing has been fixed. The Appellants want that adjourned pending the determination of the appeal on the preliminary point by this Tribunal. Their reasoning is entirely understandable and obvious, namely that if they should win in this Tribunal, whenever the appeal should come on, the substantive hearing would be rendered unnecessary. And Mr Pawlak says, with great force, well why should we go in the next day or so to a two day hearing with the expense that will occasion, when it may be unnecessary.

Now, the decision is not ours, the decision was the Chairman's. He is charged with the duty of making decisions about the conduct and procedure of cases before his Tribunal. It is not suggested that any point of law could conceivably arise. And therefore, the Appellants have had to fall back on the allegation of perversity. In other words, they must satisfy us in the context that there is nothing to be said the other way or in favour of the Chairman's decision.

Well we cannot say that, we are not saying that we would have decided the same way, we not suggesting that we would not. We were not placed in that position. We recognise Mr Pawlak has a strong argument. But to say that there is nothing to be said the other way is, in our judgement, going too far. The Chairman would not have perhaps had dates in mind, but he would have known that the hearing in the Tribunal was likely to come on very quickly, that if that was adjourned, it would have to be adjourned for the best part of a year. If the appeal fails that would have been a complete waste of a year in the general context of the case. And that when the matter, if that eventuality arose, then went to a hearing in the Industrial Tribunal, further grounds of appeal might arise and it would then be yet another year or by then hopefully less, before the matter came up here. The whole progress of the case, looked at in the round, could get complicated and delayed in that way.

Now, as I have said, how we would have judged the merits of those arguments is neither here nor there. The only question is whether we can say that the Chairman's decision was perverse and we feel unable to say that. There is clearly something to be said the other way and without seeking to judge the matter any further, that is enough to dismiss an allegation of perversity.

So this appeal must be dismissed.