At the Tribunal
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D LEVY QC
MR K M HACK JP
MRS P TURNER OBE
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellants MR R VINCENT
(Consultant)
Cygnet Industrial Relations
Consultants
Swan Court
Mansel Road
Wimbledon
London SW19 4AA
JUDGE LEVY QC: Mr Detlef Jan Wnuk had been employed by and been a director of Cradlecraft Engineering Ltd, ("the Company") since January 1988. It was about that time that the Company was incorporated. On 7 July 1993 his employment was terminated, allegedly for redundancy. He commenced proceedings in the Industrial Tribunal on 9 March 1993. The Company entered its appearance sometime later. There was a hearing before Industrial Tribunal at London (South) on 25 April 1994 and 6 and 7 September 1994. The Tribunal unanimously decided that Mr Wnuk had been unfairly dismissed and ordered payment of £11,000 by the Company to him in compensation. From that decision the Company appeals by a Notice of Appeal received by this Court on 29 December 1994.
Mr Vincent, who appears for the Company this morning on the Preliminary Hearing ex parte, submits there are two grounds on which the appeal should be allowed to go forward. The first is the decision of the Tribunal that Mr Wnuk was dismissed for some other substantial reason than redundancy does not mean that there was not a redundancy situation and therefore the Industrial Tribunal should have gone into the redundancy position more fully. The Industrial Tribunal after a 3 day hearing gave clear and cogent reasons as to why they found there was a substantial other reason for the dismissal. There was, in fact, a hidden agenda. The two other directors wanted to get rid of Mr Wnuk. There was ample evidence for that finding of fact. In the light of that finding of fact we think it was unnecessary for the Industrial Tribunal to investigate the position that Mr Wnuk could properly have been made redundant and that any appeal based on that point is bound to fail.
The second ground on which Mr Vincent made submissions is the quantum of the award made to Mr Wnuk. He says that there were, in the Industrial Tribunal, matters in the background such as Mr Wnuk had been involved in a fight with another employee sometime shortly before his dismissal and maybe there should have been a lessening of the sum awarded to him because he contributed to his dismissal by his conduct.
In the course of argument we have referred Mr Vincent to the well-known decision of Mr Justice Phillips in Fougere v Phoenix Motor Co Ltd [1976] ICR 495. That case shows how reluctant an Industrial Tribunal is to enquire into an award of compensation when it has been made at the end of a hearing and it also stresses the fact that if compensation were to be worked out accurately to the very last penny it would require prolonged hearings, elaborate interlocutory procedures and all sorts of refinements which would be wholly out of place in a procedure which is meant to be quick, open to the unrepresented and simple. Mr Vincent recognised the difficulties which would be in his way if he failed on the first ground of his appeal. We think he was wise to do so. An appeal on quantum is also one which we think is equally bound to fail.
In the circumstances we think it appropriate to dismiss this appeal at this stage. We would, however, like to thank Mr Vincent for his careful submissions.