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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Wells v Gregson & Ors [1995] UKEAT 1168_94_1402 (14 February 1995)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1995/1168_94_1402.html
Cite as: [1995] UKEAT 1168_94_1402
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At the Tribunal
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MR K M HACK JP
MR R TODD
(2) I U-E LTD T/A UNITED STATES (3) INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant IN PERSON
JUDGE LEVY QC: We have heard today, on preliminary procedures, an application ex parte by Audrey Cynthia Wells who, happily, is now a Doctor of Philosophy. On 6 February 1992 she commenced proceedings in the Industrial Tribunal against Dr Richard Gregson and another for relief on the grounds of sexual discrimination.
The proceedings had something of a chequered history because there was some debate as to whom Dr Gregson, the First Respondent, reported as his employer: was it the United States University or was it I U-E Limited, whose name appears on the bottom line of a document called "Agreement of Employment dated 13 December 1991", setting out the terms under which Miss Wells was employed. That was a matter of debate below. At one time the United States International Europe was named as a Respondent. That was deleted to insert "I U-E Limited".
When the time came for the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal on 17 December 1993, I U-E appeared and after hearing argument the Tribunal dismissed that body from the proceedings as not being directly interested in the subject of the Originating Application. That apparently took the morning of the hearing, and, in the afternoon of the hearing, the Tribunal looked into the complaint of Miss Wells, as she then was. At the end of the hearing they dismissed the application as against Dr Gregson.
From that decision Dr Wells wishes to appeal and has, indeed, lodged a Notice of Appeal dated 7 March 1994. As we have attempted to explain to her in the course of hearing her submissions, we cannot accept evidence on an appeal from an Industrial Tribunal. We are bound by the evidence which was heard below.
On this occasion we do have the benefit of very full notes of the Chairman of what went on below. The two matters of which she primarily complains is, first of all, that I U-E Limited should not have been dismissed from the proceedings, but there is a finding (which we find on page 24 of the bundle) by the Chairman that I U-E Limited was a separate organisation from USIU and we are satisfied, having looked at the notes of evidence, that there was evidence before the Tribunal in the evidence of David Rogalski which could have entitled the Tribunal to come to that result. Therefore, an appeal against that decision, being as it is, based on a clear finding of fact, could not possibly succeed.
The other complaint which Dr Wells makes is that dismissing the complaint against Dr Gregson was perverse and against the weight of the evidence. Again, we have looked through the evidence and we have looked through the documents through which Dr Wells has carefully taken us.
We are satisfied that there was ample evidence from which the Tribunal could have come to the decision to which it came. In those circumstances, we simply do not have any grounds for interfering. No Employment Appeal Tribunal could possibly set aside the judgment which was made below.
One of the particular matters with which Dr Gregson made complaint was in the very full notes of evidence the learned Chairman got a name wrong. This is at page 32 of her bundle. The transcript of the Chairman's notes reads:
"I got services of doctor LeBlaur (woman) to teach electrical circuits in Spring 1992".
Dr Wells submits that that was a mistake for Miss Le Blanc. A mistake it might have been, but with great respect to Dr Wells, we cannot see that a mistake in a transcription by the Chairman can make any difference whatsoever to the result of this hearing.
We have of course sympathy, as we do to any Appellant who loses her case below. We cannot decide cases here on sympathy. We can only allow appeals to go forward where there is a point of law to be decided. There is no point of law and accordingly, we dismiss this appeal.