I N T E R N A L
At the Tribunal
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC
MRS M L BOYLE
MR J A SCOULLER
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MRS E A P POPLAND- CZIKAI
on behalf of the Appellant
JUDGE D M LEVY QC: We have heard argument for an one hour and three-quarters this morning on a preliminary hearing of an appeal by Mr Graham Noel Popland, who has been represented today, as he was below, by his wife Mrs Emma Popland-Czikai.
The appeal follows a three-day hearing held at Birmingham on the 19th, 20th and 21st July 1993, when the Industrial Tribunal unanimously held that the Appellant was fairly dismissed from his employment as an Assistant Manager of the Management Service Department of the Respondent, Valor Heating Limited.
The facts are fully and fairly set out in paragraphs 3 to 18 of the decision of the Tribunal which was entered in the Register and sent to the parties on the 22nd September 1993. Essentially, the dispute between Mr Popland and the Respondents arises from a change which the Respondents found necessary to introduce into their Company. They wanted to reduce the Department in which the Appellant worked from three to two and after investigations, into which the Industrial Tribunal enquired at great length, the Appellant was found to be the unlucky person.
The criticisms of the Industrial Tribunal decision are summarised in a five page appeal submission through which Mrs Popland-Czikai has taken us today.
We have carefully considered all that she has said but on analysis it seems to us that every one of the points which she says is a point of law, is in fact, a point of fact, which was carefully considered by the Tribunal below. If we do not go into them it is not out of disrespect to Mr Popland, or his representative today, but it simply was the fact that everything that was dressed up as a proposed point of law, is, a point of fact. By way of example, it was suggested that something was wrong because there was an approach made to the Applicant as to whether he would like to volunteer for a redundancy. That was because he had made known to the Management that he might have thought of leaving his job. In paragraph 21(a) of their findings the Tribunal said:
"We are satisfied that the applicant alone was asked whether he wished to volunteer purely because he had indicated an interest in another job. There is nothing sinister to be read into it. The respondents acted reasonably."
It was suggested to us that the Respondents having approached one person for proposed redundancy were under a duty to approach the other two for proposed redundancy to see what they thought about it. That is something which was considered below and was not thought necessary.
Each of the points of Mrs Popland-Czikai can be similarly analysed and rejected. At the end of the day it seems to us clear beyond peradventure that the Tribunal had in its mind throughout the provisions of Section 57 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978 and, so far as relevant, Section 59 and they came to a decision which was immaculate. It may not have been a decision which if left to the Tribunal themselves, they would have picked Mr Popland as the worker who was to be made redundant, but it was not for the Tribunal to reach the decision as to whom they would select. What they had to decide was whether the Respondents to the proposed appeal acted reasonably in all the circumstances.
Carefully as we have considered everything that has been submitted to us, we are satisfied that there is not a case to go forward on a point of law and in the circumstances we propose to let this appeal go no further.