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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Mukoro v European Bank For Reconstruction & Development & Anor [1994] UKEAT 813_92_1101 (11 January 1994)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1994/813_92_1101.html
Cite as: [1994] UKEAT 813_92_1101
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (P)
MRS R CHAPMAN
MR S M SPRINGER MBE
2) J LANDRIAULT
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR M U S EGOLE
(Solicitor)
M U Samuel Egole & Co
2nd Floor
Brighton House
9 Brighton Terrace
London
SW9 8DJ
For the Respondents MR M HUMPHRIES
(Solicitor)
Linklaters & Paines
Mitre House
160 Aldersgate Street
London
EC1A 4LP
MR JUSTICE MUMMERY (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at London (South) on the 2nd September 1992 and notified to the parties on the 14th September 1992. The Industrial Tribunal at a preliminary hearing dismissed a complaint of racial discrimination by Mr Matthew Mukoro against the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and against its Personnel Officer, Mr Landriault.
The complaint was of racial discrimination. The basis on which the complaint was dismissed was that the Bank and its officers enjoyed immunity against the complaint.
The Notice of Appeal was dated 22nd October 1992. The grounds of appeal mention specifically the alleged effect of Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome and the fact that the immunity in question had been granted after the date of some of the acts of discrimination complained of.
The matter was listed for hearing today. Mr Egole, who has appeared on behalf of Mr Mukoro, the Appellant, has applied for an adjournment. This was opposed by Mr Humphries who appeared for the Bank. The grounds of the adjournment were that the Legal Aid Certificate granted to Mr Mukoro was only issued on the 15th December. The solicitor who was acting for Mr Mukoro was in a different firm, Mackerel, Turner, Garratt. Mr Egole's firm was first instructed on the 4th January. Mr Egole's submission is that the appeal should be adjourned because he has not had sufficient time to instruct Counsel to give an opinion on Mr Mukoro's prospects of the appeal being successful. The condition and limitation attached to the Legal Aid Certificate is to obtaining further evidence and thereafter Counsel's opinion on the merits. In those circumstances Mr Egole asks for an adjournment of suitable length to enable Counsel's opinion to be taken and the appeal to be prepared.
The application is opposed by Mr Humphries, who pointed out that the decision appealed was given as long ago as September 1992. No adequate explanation has been provided by Mr Mukoro, or Mr Egole on his behalf, as to the reasons why Legal Aid was not granted until the 15th December. Mr Humphries also pointed out that the result of an adjournment will be costs wasted on his client's part which will not be compensated by a legal aided Appellant with a nil contribution. Otherwise there will be no prejudice Mr Humphries' preference, if there is to be an adjournment, is that it will be of a suitable length to enable the case to be prepared without a prospect of a further application for an adjournment.
When we asked Mr Egole for an explanation as to the delay in obtaining Legal Aid he was only able to give us limited assistance, because neither he nor his client had the relevant papers and correspondence in Court. What he was able to tell us on instructions was that Mr Mukoro first applied for Legal Aid within two or three weeks of the decision of the Industrial Tribunal. There had been correspondence and it had been necessary for him to pursue the matter beyond the first application for Legal Aid, which had not been successful.
In those circumstances we have decided, reluctantly, to grant the adjournment. The adjournment is granted reluctantly, because the application for it has been made at the last minute. This is not fair to the Respondent, who has fully prepared for an effective hearing today by delivering a detailed skeleton argument and by preparing a comprehensive file of relevant legal materials. It is also not fair to the Tribunal to be faced with last minute applications for adjournments. The Members of the Tribunal have read the papers. Most of today has been set aside for the hearing. Today will now be wasted as far as this case is concerned. This is a serious matter when this Tribunal is faced with a very large backlog of appeals. We grant the adjournment because there is an important point involved in this case from Mr Mukoro's point of view. If the Industrial Tribunal is right and both Respondents enjoy immunity, his case can never proceed any further on the merits. That is a serious matter. It is a matter on which, in our view, he is entitled to obtain Counsel's opinion and, depending on that, to argue this preliminary point on the appeal.
We will grant the adjournment on this basis: that the matter will be re-listed for hearing on the first available date, two months from today. We attach a condition. In the absence of the relevant documents concerning the Legal Aid application and information about the dates on which the application was made and refused initially, we think it right to require Mr Mukoro to swear an affidavit, which is to be lodge here within 14 days. The affidavit is to state what steps were taken by Mr Mukoro to obtain Legal Aid, with a chronology of the various events which occurred in the course of the application. There should be exhibited to the affidavit relevant correspondence with the Legal Aid authorities. We make it clear that, if that affidavit is not lodged within 14 days, or if it is lodged within that time and is not regarded by this Tribunal as satisfactory in its explanation of the delay, the Tribunal may bring back the matter for hearing at an earlier date than the two months. We also make the direction that a skeleton argument is to be lodged on behalf of Mr Mukoro at least 14 days before the date notified to him as the hearing date. That is a proper condition to attach. Mr Mukoro has the benefit of the skeleton argument prepared by Mr Humphries on behalf of the Bank. It is only right that Mr Mukoro should reciprocate by giving advance notice of the outlines of his argument.