At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE PILL
MS S R CORBY
MISS C HOLROYD
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant IN PERSON
MR JUSTICE PILL: This is an Appeal from the decision of the Industrial Tribunal held at Bristol on 11 May 1994. It was held that the Applicant, Mr K. D Robinson, was not entitled to bring the Application which he had sought to bring by an application dated 18 March 1994. He stated in that Application that he had ill-health, details of which are set out and states:
"I had to resign on 1st April 93 because they would not allow me back".
Mr Robinson was a long-standing employee of the Respondent Company, Neopost Ltd. He began his employment in June 1976. He was a hard working man and we accept fully that during those years he gave good service to his employers. It is noted in the Tribunal decision that at the time of dismissal Mr Robinson was suffering severe pain and disability as a result of degenerative changes to his right knee. That is confirmed in a medical report dated 18 January 1994, which was before the Tribunal and is before us.
The Tribunal set out Section 67(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978:
"(2) ...an industrial tribunal shall not consider a complaint under this section unless it is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination or within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of the period of three months".
The Tribunal Decision records that the complaint was presented to it on 23 March 1994, which is about 11 1/2 months after the dismissal. Mr Robinson's submissions are set out in the Decision. He has made the same submissions to us and we have invited him to indicate where it is, in his view, that the Tribunal has erred in law. Mr Robinson appears in person and has presented his case clearly and helpfully. He does not suggest that the facts set out in the decision are wrong. His submission is that the law is such that he is in a category of persons as contemplated by Section 67(2) and subsequent authorities who may, and he says, should be permitted to bring complaints after what he has to accept is a considerable delay.
Mr Robinson has referred to the case of Dedman v British Building and Engineering Appliances Ltd [1974] ICR 53, and to Wall's Meat Co Ltd v Khan [1978] IRLR 499. Both those cases are mentioned in the Tribunal's decision. Mr Robinson has also referred to the case of Hutchinson v Westward Television [1977] which we have considered. He has mentioned a further case, Kilnow v Brown [1978], but we have been unable, during our retirement, to find any such case, though we are not doubting Mr Robinson's good faith.
We have however, had regard to Khan's case and in particular the well known statement of Brandon L.J. in that case which is indeed set out in the decision of the Tribunal. We have also considered the current addition of Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment law where this subject is dealt with and Khan's case, along with others has a prominent place.
It must also be borne in mind what is stated at paragraph T, 188 of Harvey, namely:
"It is important to bear in mind that the question of what is or is not reasonably practicable is essentially one of fact for the industrial tribunal to decide, and the appellate courts will be slow to interfere with the tribunal's decision".
We fully accept that Mr Robinson has a substantial physical disability. There is every reason to be sympathetic in that regard. We note that the Reasoned Decision of the Industrial Tribunal states in the words of the Chairman: "I feel great sympathy for the applicant". Mr Robinson puts it in this way. His physical condition following his dismissal was such and indeed still is such, that he would not, certainly during the time and immediately after his dismissal, have been able to attend at an Industrial Tribunal Hearing, and that was a reason why he should not make the application. He should have been allowed to make the Application, that being his physical condition and state of mind, out of time. We repeat that he does not challenge what the Chairman has said in relation to the basis on which the claim was put, and is put.
We have examined the decision of the Tribunal with care and we must of course bear in mind our own function as an Appeal Tribunal. We can find nothing whatever wrong with the reasoning which the Chairman of the Industrial Tribunal has followed. We can find nothing whatever wrong with the conclusion which he reached. It was a conclusion which, on the wording of the statute and upon the authorities decided under the statute, he was entitled to reach.
This is a Preliminary Hearing, having sympathy for the Applicant as we have, we nevertheless have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the Appeal must be dismissed at this stage. There is no arguable point of law which merits further hearing of this appeal.
We only add that we did permit Mr Robinson to address us on certain matters which he believes to be of concern in relation to the conduct of the Respondent company and we have heard Mr Robinson refer to a move supported, he says, by many members of Parliament in relation to the company. We must however, have regard to the statute and the authorities cited under it, to the role of this Appeal Tribunal and the requirements which must be followed if a claim is to be brought. The Appeal must be dismissed.