United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1994] UKEAT 548_93_1102

Appeal No. EAT/548/93

I N T E R N A L

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 11 February 1994

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE D M LEVY QC

MR D G DAVIES

MISS A MACKIE OBE

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MISS D JEFFERSON          APPELLANT

THAMES VALLEY POLICE AUTHORITY          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant MR C C HENNEY

(SOLICITOR)

Messrs Henmans

116 St Aldates

Oxford

OX1 1HA


 


JUDGE LEVY QC: This is an ex parte application in an appeal by Ms M D T Jefferson against a unanimous reserved decision of the Reading Industrial Tribunal which held that the Applicant was fairly dismissed by the Thames Valley Police Authority.

There was a fairly comprehensive judgment by the Industrial Tribunal which we have read and carefully considered. The principal claim on which Mr Henney on behalf of the Applicant says the appeal should go forward is that on the final interview and dismissal there was no consideration given to alternative employment to the Appellant. He draws our attention to the decision of the Court of Appeal in P v Nottinghamshire County Council [1992] IRLR 362, particularly to the passage from the judgment of Balcombe LJ at page 365, paragraph 20 which concludes:

"Accordingly I am satisfied that, in an appropriate case and where the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking permit, it may be unfair to dismiss an employee without the employer first considering whether the employee can be offered some other job, notwithstanding that it may be clear that he cannot be allowed to continue in his original job."

It is clear beyond peradventure to ask that the employer here did consider whether the employee could be offered an alternative job and came to the conclusion, from reasons which are well expressed in the documentation which we have read, that she could not in the circumstances be fitted in to that other job.

We turn to the last two paragraphs of the Full Reasons which reads as follows:

"Given the belief based upon a reasonable investigation, was the decision to dismiss the applicant one that can properly be said to fall within the reasonable responses of a reasonable employer? Certainly before the decision to dismiss any employee is considered, the employer would not normally be considered to have acted reasonably unless he has considered the possibility of alternative employment for the relevant employee. In this case the only possibility was a secondment to the office of the clerk to the Policy Authority. In view of Mr Bayfield's willingness to take the applicant on, on the condition that if the applicant proved unsuccessful he could return the applicant to the typing pool, we wondered as to whether in the circumstances that option should have been undertaken rather than dismissing the applicant.

We bear in mind that the respondent had been met with an applicant who to the end was unswerving in determining that she would do what she considered was correct irrespective of the wishes of the respondent or any lawful superior. It was in those circumstances that the respondent felt that seeking alternative employment was an unrealistic course to pursue in the light of the applicant's response, both before Mr Harverson, Mr Wilkinson and the Chief Constable. We unhesitatingly have come to the conclusion that whatever view the Tribunal may have formed had it been making a decision on behalf of the respondent, the decision that was taken by the respondent to dismiss the applicant came within the band of reasonable responses of a reasonable employer faced with the information ascertained and believed by the respondent at the time it took the decision to dismiss the applicant."

We feel those words, very carefully considered, show that everything was gone into below which could possibly have been gone into and the decision was one which the Tribunal was bound to make.

In the circumstances we must dismiss this appeal.