EAT/202/94
At the Tribunal
THE HONOURABLE LORD COULSFIELD
MR K M HACK JP
MR E HAMMOND OBE
(2) ESSEX COUNTY COUNCIL
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant IN PERSON
LORD COULSFIELD: This is a preliminary hearing in connection with an appeal by an Applicant against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal given on 5 January 1994.
The Applicant applied to the Tribunal claiming that he had been unfairly dismissed, In his Notice of the grounds of his application, he contended that his selection for redundancy was unfair because his job continued to exist and was being done by other employees; and that the manner of implementation of the redundancy was unfair in certain respects. The Respondents admitted that he had been dismissed but denied that the dismissal had been due to redundancy and contended that it had been due to some other substantial reason.
The Appellant had been employed at a school under two successive fixed term contracts, the second of which expired without being renewed. The Industrial Tribunal held that the expiry of the second contract without renewal was a dismissal within the terms of the legislation. They went on to hold that the dismissal was due to redundancy and that it was fair. In dealing with the question of redundancy the Industrial Tribunal deal with the evidence of the head teacher of the school. The position was that the Appellant was employed as a part-time teacher and the evidence of the head teacher was that it was necessary to appoint a full-time teacher for certain reasons. The Industrial Tribunal have accepted that evidence and held that essentially the new holder of the post was carrying out a different job from that of the Appellant and therefore that the Appellant was redundant.
With regard to the fairness of the dismissal for redundancy, the Industrial Tribunal point out that the Appellant had been aware in May, when the new post was advertised, and he was, indeed, invited to apply for it, that his post would change or cease from September 1991 when the new teacher was appointed. The Appellant applied for the new post and was not appointed to it.
The Industrial Tribunal decision therefore deals with the issues raised in the application and the answers on behalf of the Respondent. So far as the grounds of appeal which were laid before us by the Appellant in person, today, are concerned certain of them relate not to the substance of the Industrial Tribunal's decision on the matters to which we have referred but to the procedure which was followed by the Industrial Tribunal and to certain limitations which the Appellant maintains were placed upon the evidence which it allowed to be heard.
So far as the actual decision on the question of redundancy and fairness of the selection of the Applicant for redundancy is concerned, the Applicant's submission to us was that there was no redundancy because the work which he was formerly doing was still being done but had been divided among a number of other employees. One difficulty about that argument is that it appears to be contrary to the case which was being made on behalf of the Appellant. In any event however, it is not a reason for holding that an Industrial Tribunal was in error in holding there was a redundancy to say that work which was previously done by the Applicant is still being done by other persons. One of the common redundancy situations is where there is a reduction in staff and work previously done by a number of persons is carried out by a smaller number.
So far as the question of procedure is concerned, as we have mentioned the Industrial Tribunal had dealt with the position about the Appellant's prior notice of the change in the nature of the job and in our view there is no ground for thinking that there was any matter which the Industrial Tribunal failed to take account of in this respect.
The Appellant has complained that he was asked to give evidence first at the Industrial Tribunal and was placed at a tactical disadvantage; and that he was restricted in raising a number of matters arising from documents dated subsequently to the date of his dismissal but relating to matters which pre-dated the dismissal. He told us that there had been a suggestion that he had resigned. He pointed out that there was a document prepared after the date of his dismissal which bore to be a proposal for a dismissal by reason of redundancy which was inappropriate in the circumstances. He told us that there was a letter from the head teacher dated in March 1992 which contained scurrilous and unfounded statements about his competence and professional conduct and he contended that these were all matters which he should have been allowed to investigate before the Industrial Tribunal because of the light that they threw upon the conduct of the Respondents, and of their officers, and of those who gave evidence on their behalf.
Similarly he suggested that he should have been allowed to question the Respondent's witnesses about a report of an alleged dishonesty which led to the Appellant being arrested and in due course tried on certain charges of which he was acquitted on the direction of the presiding Judge. He said that there were documents which showed that the First Respondents, at least, regarded the matters involved in these charges as connected with the subject matter of the Industrial Tribunal hearing. He also suggested that what had been done amounted to a campaign of intimidation against him designed to induce him to drop the Industrial Tribunal proceedings.
We have considered all these matters, but it seems to us that given that the nature of the issue before the Industrial Tribunal, which was a very limited one indeed, the Industrial Tribunal were entitled to take the view that these issues were wholly irrelevant to it. It is not impossible that the Appellant might have been able to present his case in a different way and to put forward an application on different grounds. However the Industrial Tribunal requires to deal with the case on the application and answers before it and while it is a very important part of the Tribunal's function that it should hear all relevant evidence and deal fully with that evidence in giving its decision, it is equally part of the Tribunal's duty to confine its attention to matters which are relevant and it is perfectly entitled to exclude evidence which it considers irrelevant.
The Appellant has not convinced us that there is any prima facie ground for complaining that the Industrial Tribunal fell into an error of law either in relation to the substantive decision to which we have referred or in relation to the conduct of the proceedings.
This application is therefore dismissed.