Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Chakraborty v London Borough Of Islington [1993] UKEAT 846_92_2505 (25 May 1993)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1993/846_92_2505.html
Cite as: [1993] UKEAT 846_92_2505
[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]
At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MR J RAMSAY
MRS P TURNER OBE
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR L CHAKRABORTY
(In Person)
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): Mr Chakraborty appeals to us against a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (North), who after a hearing in September 1992 decided that the evidence of his complaint of racial discrimination should be limited in point of time, they should be limited to facts and matters which occurred after the 15th June 1989. The reason for that is that Mr Chakraborty had been employed by the Respondents, the London Borough of Islington since 1968. He had applied from time to time for appointment to the position of Senior Clerk of Works.
One of the occasions, when he had applied and been disappointed, was on the 15th June 1989. In respect of that disappointment and what had occurred he had complained to an industrial tribunal in 1989 and his case had been heard on the 29th and 30th January 1990 by a different tribunal. On that occasion it was under the Chairmanship of Mrs Don, who had rejected his allegations. This time Mrs Prevezer thought, having looked at the reasons given by the earlier tribunal, that Mr Chakraborty had had all his complaints prior to the 15th June 1989 heard and dealt with by the earlier tribunal and therefore in September 1992, the present decision was reached that he should not be allowed to go back in time alleging incidents and harassment prior to that date.
Mr Chakraborty appeals against that and he submits that whereas both tribunals were looking at the period of time set out in Section 68(1) of the Race Relations Act 1976, namely the three monthly time limit, nevertheless, the Tribunal had not considered subsection (6) and subsection (7)(b) of that Section. The latter refers to an Act extending over a period to be treated as done at the end of that period and subsection (6) deals with the discretion to extend time if it was thought to be just and equitable so to do. This Tribunal had not decided Section 68(6) whether it was just and equitable to extend it but looking at their decision we imagine that it could not have been their intention to extend it.
However, the only point of appeal now is whether they were right in limiting the evidence to that which occurred since the effective date for the issues before the earlier Tribunal. Mr Chakraborty says, well if I can't go back over the whole history then my present case is really doomed to failure. Whether that is right or wrong, the fact remains that he lost his allegation of harassment and racial harassment and discrimination on those matters preceding the 15th June 1989. That matter has been thrashed out and dealt with. It seems to us that the learned Chairman was perfectly entitled, together with the Tribunal, a full tribunal, to reach the conclusion that the fair and just way of dealing with this matter was to limit the evidence in the way in which it was limited, because otherwise it would simply be re-opening the earlier matters on which an adjudication had already been made. That was well within the discretion of the Tribunal and we can find no error of law in that decision. This appeal therefore must be dismissed.