United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1993] UKEAT 61_93_0511

Appeal No. EAT/61/93

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 5th November 1993

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE J BULL QC

MR T S BATHO

MR J D DALY

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LANTERN GROUP LTD          APPELLANTS

MRS C R FAIRBRASS          RESPONDENT

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellants MRS L ENGLEDEW

(Administrative Partner)


 


JUDGE J BULL QC: This is the preliminary ex parte hearing of an appeal by the Lantern Group (a partnership) against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal sitting at Bedford on 16th November 1992 by which it awarded the sum of £3,993.57 by way of compensation for unfair dismissal of the Applicant Mrs Carol Rose Fairbrass.

Mrs Fairbrass was a VDU Operator at the Appellants' firm who are motor vehicle breakdown recovery specialists, and in addition, build recovery vehicles. They employ some 50 people in all, most at South Mimms but some, about eight at the material time, at Hertford.

Mrs Fairbrass worked first at South Mimms, and whilst there, from February 1989, the Industrial Tribunal found that there was no complaint about her work. It appears from their findings that Mrs Fairbrass took an annual holiday in the summer of 1991, during the course of which she unfortunately broke her wrist and returned with that disability. She was absent from work from the start of the month of September until the 4th November. During that period of her absence the Appellants had updated their system of computerised accounts dealing with the various forms which were necessary in their business. When Mrs Fairbrass returned to work, and it was found by the Industrial Tribunal that she was shown what to do in order to implement the new system, but in a somewhat piecemeal fashion.

The complaint which is made against the Tribunal on behalf of the Appellants, by Mrs Engledew, which she has done with great courtesy, and if I may say so, some ability, in that they failed to take into account matters which she asserts they ought to have considered. She, with great frankness, tells us that upon reflection she recognises that these matters do not raise any point of law, but she has at our request, rehearsed them for us. She further told us, and we have great sympathy with her, that she was not feeling well at the time of the hearing before the Industrial Tribunal and may not have been able to put before that Tribunal all the matters and all the arguments, which undoubtedly she would have done, as she has done before us, had she been feeling in a better frame of mind and better physically at the time of the hearing. She complains that Mrs Fairbrass had, in fact, constant and ongoing training. Mrs Engledew, admits to us that although there was no specific oral warning, it was made plain to Mrs Fairbrass that her job was, in the Appellants' words "on the line". In addition, Mrs Engledew points out that because of the difficulties she experienced with Mrs Fairbrass she was obliged to move that lady from her existing position, to another position, so that she could focus upon the errors in her work. The errors continued and in the end Mrs Engledew says that she felt she could not continue any further. However, it is for the Tribunal to find on the facts whether the employers have behaved reasonably or unreasonably, fairly or unfairly and the statute provides that we are only to consider questions of law not facts: there is no appeal on facts.

We have looked at these points carefully, but we regret that we can detect no error of law in the Industrial Tribunal's findings, and most certainly we cannot say that in any respect which is put forward, or indeed any other respect that occurs to us, this Industrial Tribunal acted in a way, or reached a conclusion which no reasonable Tribunal could have done.

Therefore, despite the courtesy with which Mrs Engledew has put her points before us, we are driven to the conclusion that there is no error of law here and that this appeal must be dismissed.