I N T E R N A L
At the Tribunal
Before
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J BULL QC
MR D G DAVIES
MR K M YOUNG CBE
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant IN PERSON
JUDGE BULL QC: This is a Preliminary Hearing of Mr Phillips' appeal to us against the decision of the Industrial Tribunal which sat at Manchester on 10 February 1993. Full Reasons for the decision were sent to the parties on 10 March 1993.
In addition to his Notice of Appeal, Mr Phillips has written a letter dated 4 April 1993 enclosing a number of documents all of which we have read. The issue is in a short compass whether the Appellant was an employee for the purposes of Section 153(1) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978? The unanimous decision of the Industrial Tribunal was that he was not an employee. Against that decision he brings this appeal.
The facts are short. Together with someone he called Anthony Dalton, on the advice of his accountant, Mr Phillips formed a small private company. That company was named Allclad Industrial Roofing Ltd. It was incorporated in 1985. There were but two directors: Mr Phillips himself, and a Mr Dalton. They were the only shareholders, employing no staff but using subcontractors. Their work was industrial roofing.
It is said by Mr Phillips, and we wholly accept what he says, that he worked twice as hard as almost anyone else because he worked on roofing by day, and did the office work such as the estimates and the paperwork in the evenings. Sadly the firm went into liquidation. He is baffled because he, having paid Class 1 stamps, says that it is inconsistent with his status as found by the Industrial Tribunal as not being an employee. He also finds that the way in which he was treated by the Inland Revenue for tax purposes is again inconsistent with the decision of the Industrial Tribunal.
The Industrial Tribunal at Manchester took great care to identify the facts and they set out in paragraph 19 their findings. They then applied what it seems to us is the correct test in law in reaching the conclusion which they did. The Tribunal enquired into the facts. It is their duty and not our duty to arrive at the facts. Statute provides that we are only to consider questions of law and there is no appeal upon the facts.
Mr Phillips addressed us with great courtesy and we understand the anguish which he feels, but we cannot see any error of law in the way the Tribunal directed itself and since there is no point of law we regret that we are driven to the conclusion that we cannot allow this appeal to proceed further and it must be dismissed.