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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Ledger v London Borough Of Hammersmith & Fulham [1993] UKEAT 397_91_3103 (31 March 1993)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1993/397_91_3103.html
Cite as: [1993] UKEAT 397_91_3103
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At the Tribunal
HIS HONOUR JUDGE J PEPPITT QC
MR D O GLADWIN CBE
MISS A P VALE
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE BY
OR REPRESENTATION
ON BEHALF OF THE
APPELLANT
For the Respondents MR J SWIFT
(OF COUNSEL)
Head of Legal Services
London Borough of
Hammersmith & Fulham
Riverview House
Beavor Lane
London W6 9AR
JUDGE PEPPITT QC: This is an appeal from a decision of the South London Industrial Tribunal given on 25 March 1991. The Tribunal found that the applicant had not been dismissed unfairly or otherwise but had herself resigned. The Appellant is not present to present her appeal but by a letter to us dated 25 March, has asked us to consider it in her absence.
The facts can be stated shortly. The Appellant was employed by the Respondents as a home help between 1984 and the termination of her employment in the circumstances which we shall shortly describe. She was obviously a conscientious caring person but in the eyes of her employers tended to make her own rules and not pay strict observance to the requirements of those to whom she reported. As a result of a number of misdemeanours alleged against her a disciplinary hearing was appointed on 31 August 1990 in the course of which some, but not all of the misdemeanours were found proved and the Appellant was issued with a written warning. As a result of receipt of that written warning the Appellant resigned on 19 September 1990, her resignation taking effect six weeks later on 21 October 1990.
The Industrial Tribunal found that the Respondents had properly observed the disciplinary procedures. They found as a fact that this was not a case where it could be said that the Respondents had constructively dismissed the Appellant. Those findings are findings of fact with which we have no power to interfere. We have read with some care the Appellant's Notice of Appeal and the documents advanced in support of it. In broad terms the appeal is based upon contentions of fact, that is that the complaints made against her which were found proved on 31 August 1990 were in fact unfounded. As we have indicated we can only interfere in the event of our finding errors of law or if the decision of the Tribunal is perverse in the sense that no reasonable Tribunal could have reached it.
We can find no errors of law in the Decision and we are far from saying that the findings of the Tribunal in the circumstances of this case were perverse in the sense which we have described. Accordingly there are no grounds upon which we are entitled to interfere with this decision and the appeal will be dismissed.