United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal

BAILII case number: [1993] UKEAT 357_93_2110

Appeal No. EAT/357/93

I N T E R N A L

EMPOLYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL

58 VICTORIA EMBANKMENT, LONDON EC4Y 0DS

At the Tribunal

On 21 October 1993

Before

HIS HONOUR JUDGE J BULL QC

MR D G DAVIES

MR K M YOUNG CBE

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MR A J GRAHAM          APPELLANT

(1) MISS J WADE (2) CRISIS          RESPONDENTS

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Transcript of Proceedings

JUDGMENT

PRELIMINARY HEARING

Revised


 


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APPEARANCES

For the Appellant IN PERSON


 


JUDGE BULL QC: In this case Mr A J Graham who has acted in person throughout, appeals to us ex parte against the decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London North on 18 December 1992, Full Reasons having been sent to the parties on 12 January 1993.

The point at issue is short. Mr Graham complains of racial or sexual discrimination on 28 December 1991 but his Application was presented in June 1992 outside the 3 months time limit imposed under section 68(1) of the Race Relations Act and section 76(1) of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.

Mr Graham asks us to consider a precedent in criminal law arising from his own experience. May we try to make it plain that we have considered this with great care but different parts of the law have different rules as to time limits. We are bound in this case by statute to apply the rules in this field of the law which in effect impose a 3 month time limit, with a discretion, where the Industrial Tribunal considers it just and equitable to extend that time limit.

Mr Graham has with good sense accepted that he is out of time. What he says in effect is that his case is one where the Industrial Tribunal ought to have found it just and equitable to extend the time limit, and for that reason he says, this Tribunal ought to interfere. The Industrial Tribunal heard evidence from the Appellant to explain why his Originating Application was out of time and whether there were any reasons which he advanced which would render it just and equitable for that Industrial Tribunal to extend the time limit. It is of course their duty and not our duty to arrive at the facts behind any such failure to abide by the time limit and to exercise their judgment on the facts to determine whether the statutory tests which enable them to extend the time limit are met.

We have listened with care to what Mr Graham said. We recognise that he feels very strongly and is aggrieved by the decision of the Industrial Tribunal and by other decisions over which we have no control whatsoever and no jurisdiction to concern ourselves with. We have to say that we can see no error of law or indeed any other error in the way in which the Industrial Tribunal approached this matter and we are therefore driven to the conclusion that there is no point of law raised by the Appellant and thus we cannot allow this matter to go forward. This appeal must therefore be dismissed.