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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Mabry v Bath Association Of Mind [1992] UKEAT 469_91_3010 (30 October 1992)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1992/469_91_3010.html
Cite as: [1992] UKEAT 469_91_3010
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MR E HAMMOND OBE
MRS M E SUNDERLAND JP
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant NO APPEARANCE BY
OR ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal by Mrs Mabry from a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at Bristol under the Chairmanship of Mr Toomer, who heard her application for eight days during the Summer of 1991, and ultimately found against her in the sense that although they found that she had been unfairly dismissed they found her contribution towards dismissal to be 100% so that she was awarded no compensation.
She was represented by Mr Bell of her Trade Union, NALGO, and Bath "MIND", the Respondents were represented by their Secretary, Mr Lovelace.
It is right, because Mrs Mabry is not appearing before us but who will read this judgment, to explain that this Tribunal only has jurisdiction if there is raised a point of law. In other words we are looking at this ex-parte hearing to see whether we can isolate and discern an error of law, the principles of law being applied by this Tribunal. Otherwise we have no jurisdiction. The Tribunal is the judge of fact and the findings of fact, unless perverse, are not open to reversal.
The decision extends over some seven pages. It is a careful analysis of what, on any view, is a sad history of a relationship between this Applicant and the Association. It extends from November 1987 until finally she was dismissed in October 1990.
In her Originating Applications - there are two of them - in the first one, which was dated 2nd October 1990, she alleged that she had been unfairly dismissed on the 6th August of that year. In her second one, which is dated the 21st January 1991, she alleged that she had been unfairly dismissed on the 3rd November 1990.
The problems started when Mrs Mabry was critical of the way in which the Centre was being run. The history is set out in detail in paragraphs 6 to 17 of the decision. As Mrs Mabry will have a copy of that we do not intend to repeat all those facts. The time came when her behaviour was such that the relevant Committee decided that she must be dismissed. One of the points raised by Mrs Mabry is that her employment came to an end on the 31st October 1990 not on the 3rd November, and therefore her actions after the 30th October were not relevant. It is clear, that she, as we have already pointed out, alleges that the dismissal was on 3rd November, possibly on the 1st, when she was refused re-admission. There must have been some arrangement by which her employment extended to that day but in any event, even if it did come to an end on the 31st October, it came to the end of the contractual term, and it seems to us therefore there will be no question of unfair dismissal.
There was here, nevertheless, a finding of unfair dismissal because of a procedural fact and her behaviour was found to be totally responsible for that dismissal. So that setting out those principles rather than reciting all the facts, it seems to us here that there is no error whatsoever in the approach of the Tribunal, who heard the evidence and saw the parties over eight days. This appeal must be dismissed at this stage, which it is.