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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Knight v Avonrun Automotive Ltd [1992] UKEAT 278_91_2207 (22 July 1992)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1992/278_91_2207.html
Cite as: [1992] UKEAT 278_91_2207
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MS B DEAN
MR J C RAMSAY
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant No attendance by or on behalf of the Appellant
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal by way of a preliminary hearing by the Applicant, Mr Douglas Knight, who brought proceedings against his employers Avonrun Automotive Ltd alleging unfair dismissal. We therefore seek at this preliminary hearing to see whether there is a point of law which merits hearing with both the parties here. Mr Knight has unfortunately been taken ill and he has written asking that we should deal with this matter in his absence. We have read the documentation before us, consisting of the Notice of Appeal; the Originating Application; Notice of Appearance and the decision of the Industrial Tribunal, and we have considered it with care.
The issue before the Industrial Tribunal was whether in fact, Mr Knight had been dismissed, or whether his employment had been terminated by mutual agreement, the Tribunal decided that the latter was the case.
The Respondent Company sell motor vehicles and carry on business at sites, including a site at Pembury and a site at Edenbridge in Kent. The Applicant, Mr Knight, was employed as the Parts Manager at the Pembury site, and he had been with them for a substantial number of years, indeed since 1969. The recession came, and in the November of 1990 the Company decided that instead of having a Parts Manager at each of its sites, it was going to have to reduce the numbers so employed, that decision was reached on the basis of redundancy and unfortunately Mr Knight's position was to be made redundant. As a result of that conversations and discussions took place between himself and Mr Thompson, who was one of the Directors of the Company. The Tribunal in paragraph 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 accept in the main the Applicant's evidence so that in fact there was virtually no dispute about the matter.
There was only one dispute on fact and that is dealt with in paragraph 10. The Tribunal say this:
"Mr Thompson's evidence did not differ in many respects from that given by the applicant. One significant feature of Mr Thompson's evidence, however, was that he said that he was prepared to discuss with the applicant alternative employment within the respondent company, but that the applicant was not prepared to develop that discussion, presumably, in Mr Thompson's view, because he might lose face in the eyes of those of his subordinates who knew about the situation."
anyhow, they find in favour of Mr Thompson's evidence on that score.
The Tribunal then direct themselves, perfectly correctly in law, they in fact relied on the Judgment of Mr Justice Arnold, as he then was, in Sheffield v. Oxford Controls Ltd [1979] ICR 396, and the reasoning of the Tribunal is to be found in paragraphs 13 and 14. In paragraph 13 they say this:
"We have come to the conclusion that, in this case, the operative factor of the applicant's decision to terminate his employment was the emergence of terms which were satisfactory. Although we accept almost in its entirety the applicant's evidence, we consider that he was in error in thinking, if he did, that Mr Thompson made it clear to him that if he did not resign, he would be dismissed in one way or another. Indeed, his account of his conversation with Mr Thompson, in which he said that his `faults would be noted and written down', shows that it was expressly contemplated that the applicant would remain in the respondents' employment. We accept Mr Thompson's evidence that it did not follow that the applicant would be dismissed or that his terms of service would be altered so as to amount to dismissal if no agreement was reached with regard to terms of resignation."
They then examine the advice he had taken, together with the substantial increase in the sum offered to him and continue thus:
"We find that the agreement which he reached with the respondents was one which he entered into freely and that it was the applicant's acceptance of the terms which he negotiated which caused the termination of his employment."
The Notice of Appeal raises a number of matters, but in the light of those findings of fact, and in the light of the direction in law given to itself by the Industrial Tribunal, which was wholly correct and not open to criticism, we are unable to discern any error of law in that decision.
This appeal is dismissed at this stage.