I N T E R N A L
At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MR E HAMMOND OBE
MR J C RAMSAY
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR A W BRIGHT
(Appellant in Person)
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): This is an appeal by way of a preliminary hearing by Mr Bright from a decision of an Industrial Tribunal sitting at London (South) under the Chairmanship of Mrs Calvert, who heard his case on three days in January 1992.
Mr Bright was alleging that he had been the victim of racial discrimination and had been victimised by a Trade Union, the GMB London region, and by five individuals Mr Walters, Mr Cope, Mr Tarling, Mr Birsinger and Mr Harrington.
At the end of the hearing the applications against Mr Cope, Mr Tarling and Mr Birsinger were dismissed and it was found that Mr Walters and the GMB London region had discriminated against the Applicant in that they had victimised him contrary to Section 21(A) and Section 11(3)(c) of the Race Relations Act 1976. By way of compensation they were ordered to pay him £75.
The investigation fell into three parts. Mr Bright was complaining, first, that he was not allowed representation for a Tribunal hearing against Islington for unfair dismissal because he had brought an action against the GMB for racial discrimination. So that is direct victimisation there. Secondly, that he had not been paid money to which he was entitled because he had been victimised. Thirdly, that he had been refused attendance at a meeting held on the 3rd April 1990 in relation to disputes over the poll-tax, and that meeting had taken place in Islington.
The Tribunal gave a careful reasoned decision over some twelve pages dealing with each of those complaints. They were essential issues of fact. There was no difficult point of law and we can find no error of law in the direction which the Tribunal gave itself. They decided against Mr Bright on the first issue, namely the question of representation. It also decided against him on the payment to be made to him under the Trade Union rules. As to the third, and last instance, namely a meeting held jointly with NUPE on the 3rd April 1990, they found that Mr Walters knew of the earlier proceedings and that he had been treated on that occasion in such a way as to give him a right to complain and they found in his favour. They did not accept some of the excuses and explanations put forward by Mr Walters and naturally, as he was an official of the GMB, the GMB were liable. So that Mr Bright succeeded against the Trade Union and Mr Walters, he failed against the rest.
One of the Respondents, Mr Cope, is a lay member of the panel of members for the region of London (North), it was therefore thought advisable that the case should be moved to London (South) and it was, and it was heard in London (South).
Mr Bright makes one point on his appeal, namely that there was a delay by the removal of the case from London (North) to London (South) and also the fact that the Tribunal knew that Mr Cope was a member of the panel in London (North). It seems to us this was really inevitable, because any chairman seeing this case would have wondered why it had been transferred from London (North) to London (South), and we can not think that that made any difference to the decision albeit that Mr Bright suggests that Mr Cope was dealt with in a rather kindly way because he was a member. We see no indication of that on the documentation and we are not satisfied that there is any ground there at all.
The main point put forward by Mr Bright is that Mr Tarling was a witness who was discredited, and that Mr Bright was prevented from cross-examining Mr Tarling because he hoped that by cross-examining Mr Tarling he would be able to succeed in his case both against Mr Tarling, but more importantly, against Mr Cope, who seems to have been one of Mr Bright's prime targets.
What occurred, as Mr Bright points out in his Notice of Appeal, is that Mr Tarling was challenged by Mr Bright about part of his evidence, namely his attendance at a disciplinary meeting, and there was a direct conflict of evidence. It is quite clear that after enquiries were made the matter was put back, for the moment; Mr Bright was right, and Mr Tarling was clearly quite wrong. He was so wrong that the Tribunal made it perfectly clear that they were no longer going to rely on the evidence of Mr Tarling, it was not going to count. He had been sent away, his wife was apparently ill, or anyhow in a clinic, and he was not asked to return. Mr Bright says he asked for him to be returned to be cross-examined. This may have been refused, if it was it was essentially within the discretion of the learned Chairman of the Tribunal. So that here the situation is that Mr Tarling's evidence was disregarded.
Mr Tarling is mentioned in the Reasons, the judgment, but it does not seem to us that his evidence was relied upon, Mr Bright suggests that the Tribunal relied upon it. It does not seem to us that they were relying on Mr Tarling's evidence whatsoever. The comments made about Mr Tarling in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the decision are uncomplimentary, they did not think that he was a very efficient administrator, and if anything, that is a criticism rather than an acceptance of anything that Mr Tarling had said. It follows therefore here, that Mr Bright has succeeded, he has been awarded his £75. He is intent on continuing his pursuit of Mr Tarling and Mr Cope, but we do not think there is any error of law and that pursuit, we feel, must now come to an end.
There is no point of law here, there is no error of law and this was an issue of fact. Mr Bright was complimented on the way he presented his case before the Tribunal and we thank him for being succinct before us. But there is no point here and this appeal must be dismissed at this stage.