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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Norton v Trevelyans (Birmingham) Ltd [1992] UKEAT 102_91_1003 (10 March 1992)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1992/102_91_1003.html
Cite as: [1992] UKEAT 102_91_1003
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MRS M L BOYLE
MR J A SCOULLER
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
Revised
APPEARANCE
For the Appellant MR F NORTON
(The Appellant in Person)
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): By an Originating Application dated as long ago as the 4th December 1989 Mr Norton alleged that he had been unfairly dismissed by his employers Trevelyans (Birmingham) Ltd. The date of dismissal was 27th May 1988 and his Originating Application was some 18 months later. The issue before this Industrial Tribunal which sat on the 12th December 1990, under the Chairmanship of Mr Delgado at Birmingham was whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear his claim. They were considering the provisions of Section 67(2) of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.
This litigation has had a history. There was an earlier hearing before a Tribunal in Birmingham promulgated on the 8th February 1990 when by a majority the Tribunal held that they had jurisdiction. There was an Appeal by the employers to this Court and the Decision of this Court of the 18th September 1990 was that there had been an error in the approach of the majority of that first Tribunal and the matter should be re-heard. It was the learned Regional Chairman who was in the minority in that first case. This then was the re-hearing on the 12th December 1990 and the Decision unanimously was that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction.
Mr Norton had been employed from April 1972 until that 27th May 1988, a period of sixteen years. This Company was in the engineering field, they were sheet metal process workers. In May 1988 allegations were made concerning Mr Norton and two others that they had been stealing from the Company. There was a letter of suspension, during which the Company would seek further information to satisfy themselves whether or not to continue his employment. He did not reply to that letter on advice, and as a result his employment came to an end on that 27th May. Criminal proceedings ensued and in October 1989 Mr Norton was acquitted.
The hearing of the disciplinary proceedings ensued and subsequently Mr Norton applied for benefit and was represented by the Citizens' Advice Bureau. There was an appeal and that was dealt with through that system of tribunals.
The issue arose, in its simplest form, before this Industrial Tribunal as to whether Mr Norton was aware of his rights to issue proceedings in the Industrial Tribunal in connection with his dismissal. In paragraph 13 they say this:
"We find it difficult to believe that with the passage of time since the legislation he was not aware there was a forum which could and does deal with matters relating to dismissal. We cannot accept that any ignorance or confusion on his part made it not reasonable practicable to present his complaint within time, nor that he should await the outcome of criminal proceedings. That certainly is not an excuse for delay."
So they refuse to accept the criminal proceedings as an excuse for delay. They did not believe that he was not aware of his rights.
In paragraph 11 the Tribunal say that it was quite understandable that he might be preoccupied with the criminal matters, but they then go on to say this:
"We find there were sources available from which he could have sought advice about unfair dismissal had he wished to do so. There were two firms of solicitors; there was the Citizens Advice Bureau on the first occasion; he made visits to the Department of Employment and it is known that although they do not tender advice they have leaflets and booklets which deal with unfair dismissal. We are satisfied there were several avenues available from whom advice or information would have been obtained despite his preoccupation with criminal matters. His omission to do so does beg the question whether he had considered taking action about unfair dismissal."
So that there, following on the earlier finding, we find that
(a)he knew;
(b)he had ample opportunity to take advice and to ensure that his application was in time.
So far as the question of his belief that the Benefit Office, which was dealing with his Social Security claim, was also dealing with his claim for unfair dismissal, that explanation was rejected and the Tribunal find specifically on that matter in paragraph 12. It follows therefore, that the Tribunal take the view that they did not accept his claim that he did not know; he had ample opportunity and they reject Mr Norton's explanation that he thought the Benefit Office was dealing with his claim for unfair dismissal. So that when they come to their conclusion in paragraph 14 based on those findings of fact they say:
"we are unable to say it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint to be presented before the end of the period of three months. We the applicant did not expire the question of unfair dismissal until it was too late. We do not accept he genuinely believed that he had instructed proceedings for unfair dismissal when he appealed against partial refusal of benefit the hearing of which was deferred until his trial. We find no circumstances which can lead us to take the view it was not reasonably practicable for a complaint to have been presented within time or within a reasonable time thereafter. We find no reasons which would entitled us to give him the benefit of the saving clause."
I am afraid that it is just a case that Mr Norton's case was not accepted. Those are all issues of fact.
We have explained to Mr Norton that we cannot help him unless there is an error of law, and however sympathetic we may feel to his circumstances, there is no error of law here. Therefore we find ourselves quite unable to help. This Appeal must be dismissed.