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United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> United Kingdom Employment Appeal Tribunal >> Northcote v Hobart Manufacturing Co Ltd [1991] UKEAT 428_90_1007 (10 July 1991)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/1991/428_90_1007.html
Cite as: [1991] UKEAT 428_90_1007
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At the Tribunal
Before
THE HONOURABLE MR JUSTICE WOOD MC (P)
MISS J W COLLERSON
MS P SMITH
Transcript of Proceedings
JUDGMENT
PRELIMINARY HEARING
Revised
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant MR E NORTHCOTE
(IN PERSON)
MR JUSTICE WOOD (PRESIDENT): Mr Northcote, the Appellant, is a member of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants and was thought by an Industrial Tribunal to be highly articulate and a man of great intelligence. Having listened and heard him today we would corroborate that statement and we are grateful to him for the way he has put his case.
He was employed for a period during 1988, and indeed earlier, by the Respondent "The Hobart Manufacturing Company Limited" to help them with some of their accounting systems. There came a time when there was a quarrel and he left their employment.
He issued an Originating Application of the 9th March 1989, in which he poses the question "Was I constructively dismissed on the 7th November 1988?". There is no other indication on the claim other than he was claiming unfair constructive dismissal and thereafter the usual remedies would be available to him. He pleaded some particulars, which are now before us and those were before an Industrial Tribunal.
The answer of the Company was that there had been no dismissal; that the Applicant had walked out at an hour's notice and left their employment and that his application was out of time. By a subsequent document, a letter, there was virtually, an alternative plea saying that he was not dismissed and that their conduct was not such as to entitle him to claim constructive dismissal and that if the Tribunal found that he was, in law, dismissed they argue that the reason was not due to redundancy but was for some other substantial reason.
Originally the Tribunal heard his case in April 1989 and it is quite apparent, because the Applicant appeared in person and the Company were represented by a Mr Core, that the issue before the Tribunal was whether on the basis of an unfair constructive dismissal claim, the Originating Application was within the three month period. It was argued that it was six weeks out of time.
The importance of noting those facts was that it must have been clear to everyone and being argued before the Tribunal that this was a clear, straight forward unfair dismissal, it was not a redundancy claim. It could not be put forward as a redundancy claim, the period would have been six months, the Originating Application would have been within time. It was not a redundancy claim on papers, it was clearly, by inference, not a redundancy issue in front of the Tribunal in April 1989.
Mr Northcote appealed and by a Consent Order of this Court, which I signed, the matter was remitted to the same Tribunal because, clearly, Mr Northcote was maintaining that his case should have been considered on the basis of redundancy, and the true basis was a basis of redundancy. For whatever reason the Company thought that it was best and quickest to have it dealt with in that way.
The same Tribunal sat, yet again, in March 1990 to consider the issue of redundancy. Apparently, on this occasion, Mr Northcote called a Mr Parker, who is a member of the staff of the firm and gave evidence himself. At the end of his case the Tribunal indicated that a submission might be made, that there was no evidence of redundancy and Mr Core accepted that suggestion; he argued it and no doubt both sides argued it, and the Tribunal decided that there was no case to answer. It must have been a very clear matter because it is somewhat rare for an Industrial Tribunal to take that course.
The Judgment of the Tribunal of March 1990 stretches over some 3½ pages and it sets out the history of the matter, it gives the history at very much greater length than I have given, it does go into the details of what occurred at the time of the parting in November 1988, and also into the history of the tasks which were being carried out and the various temporary natures of this employment. Having heard Mr Parker; having looked at the whole history of the matter and the documentation, the Tribunal found that there was no evidence whatsoever that there was a redundancy in this case.
Mr Northcote has argued the case before us and he points to an error of fact in that he says a Mr Wade was not director he was only a manager; that does not seem to us to be a fatal flaw, even if his criticism is correct. Then he pointed to two other matters, which he submitted indicated that there was a redundancy. It must be remembered that this was at all times temporary employment, as Mr Northcote has emphasised to us, and the Tribunal in paragraph 12 summarise their views of the facts and say this:
"Today the Tribunal have had every opportunity of hearing from the applicant and Mr Parker. The evidence has been one way and all one way. The evidence of Mr Parker was that there was no redundancy situation."
pausing there, Mr Parker you will remember was called by Mr Northcote, I continue with the paragraph:
"The evidence of the applicant was that he was working on a task that was going to last for a further month or so. The evidence was overwhelming that the applicant throughout his employment worked on a number of different projects. He became discontented. Then he had a row with Mr Wade and walked out. From what he stated in evidence it does not look as though he was justified in doing so but that is neither here nor there.
What the Tribunal have had to consider is whether when he left the respondents it was by reason of redundancy. There has not been a shred of scintilla of evidence that there was a redundancy situation or that the reason that the applicant left was due either to a diminution or cessation of work."
That is the summary of the findings of facts of the Industrial Tribunal.
One must look to see if there is any error of law because Mr Northcote is well aware that if there is no error of law then there is no basis upon which this Court can interfere with the Decision of an Industrial Tribunal. He raises three matters; first of all he submits that the Industrial Tribunal were wrong in failing to order all witnesses out of Court and in only allowing the witness giving evidence to attend in Court. The procedure before an Industrial Tribunal is essential for it to decide, it tends to be informal and the learned Chairman here decided to follow the normal practice, which is to allow witnesses to remain in Court. Indeed, in ordinary civil proceedings in the High Court that is the usual procedure, we can see no error there; secondly, it is said that the learned Chairman refused to allow Mr Northcote to ask Mr Gallacher to produce documents without putting him in the witness box when he was there under a subpoena duces tecum; that again is perfectly normal practice if you want a witness to produce the documents then the witness is put in the witness box to produce them. Of course the disadvantage then, as Mr Northcote realised, is that Mr Gallacher could be cross-examined by Mr Core and might very well have given evidence that was not advantageous to Mr Northcote, the Applicant; there is no error of law there. Lastly, he comments that the Tribunal in its Decision indicated that it thought that this Court had been misled by the way in which the consent order was placed before it in November 1989. The phraseology of "misleading this Court" is perhaps not entirely accurate. What the Tribunal intended to indicate was that there was absolutely no basis whatsoever in the redundancy claim and to suggest that the redundancy was the true basis of the claim was somewhat disingenuous. We see no reason for interfering with the Decision of the Tribunal on that basis.
Having given our best attention therefore, to the points raised, and having read all the documentation we are quite satisfied here that there is no error in this Decision and this Appeal must be dismissed at this juncture.