OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2011] CSOH 60
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A680/07
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OPINION OF LORD HODGE
in the cause
VERATHON MEDICAL (CANADA) ULC
Pursuer;
against
AIRCRAFT MEDICAL LIMITED
Defender:
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Pursuer: Currie QC et Higgins; Maclay Murray & Spens LLP
Defender: Lake QC; DLA Piper Scotland LLP
30 March 2011
[1] On 1 February 2011 I issued an opinion ([2011] CSOH 19),
which has given rise to these motions for expenses. In that opinion I refused
the pursuers' application to amend their patent, assoilzied the pursuers from
the conclusions of the counterclaim in which the defenders sought to challenge
the validity of the pursuers' patent, and granted the defenders absolvitor in
the action for infringement of the pursuers' patent.
[2] The pursuers sought (i) the expenses of the counterclaim, (ii)
the certification as skilled witnesses of Dr Ron Walls, Dr Christopher Frerk
and Professor Colin Roberts, each of whom gave evidence at the proof,
and (iii) an award of an additional fee under Rule of Court 42.14(3)
having regard to each of the factors specified in parts (a)-(g) of that Rule.
[3] The defenders opposed that motion. If the court were to award
expenses to the pursuers, the defenders opposed the award of an additional fee
only to the extent that regard should not be had to factors (d) and (g).
Factor (d) of rule 42.14(3) is "the place and circumstances of the
cause or in which the work of the solicitor in preparation for, and conduct of,
the cause has been carried out." Factor (g) is "the steps taken with a
view to settling the cause, limiting the matters in dispute or limiting the
scope of any hearing."
[4] The defenders sought (i) the expenses of the principal
action, (ii) the expenses of the counterclaim, (iii) the expenses of the
pursuers' minute under Rule of Court 55.5 to amend their patent, (iv) the
certification as skilled witnesses of Dr John Henderson, Professor Peter Denyer
and Dr Ian Muirhead, and (v) the award of an additional fee having
regard to each of the factors specified in parts (a) to (g) of Rule of Court 42.14(3).
[5] The pursuers did not oppose the defenders' motion in relation
to items (i), (iii) and (iv) of the preceding paragraph. They opposed the
defenders' application for the expenses of the counterclaim (item (ii)) and
their application for an additional fee, (item (v)) but only in relation to
factors (d) and (g).
[6] The main issue between the parties was, as Mr Currie
stated, the expenses of the counterclaim.
(I) The expenses of the counterclaim
[7] In his
submission in support of his motion, Mr Currie made six points. First, he
argued that the counterclaim was a distinct ground of action. Secondly, he
pointed out that the defenders had tabled twenty two pieces of prior art in
relation to laryngoscopes and eight pieces of prior art in relation to cameras
in support of their challenge to the validity of the pursuers' patent. The
pursuers had had to address each of these pieces of prior art in their
pleadings, their expert reports and their evidence. His instructing solicitors
had examined the transcripts and had estimated that about 40% of the evidence
had been common to the issues of infringement and validity, 37.5% had related
to validity alone and 7% to infringement alone. The balance concerned the Glidescope
and the applications to amend.
[8] Thirdly, notwithstanding the extensive citation of prior art,
the defenders in their final submissions had relied on only eight pieces of
prior art in their challenge to the validity of the pursuers' patent. This, he
submitted, demonstrated that much of the cited prior art had no bearing on the
case.
[9] Fourthly, on the defenders' construction of the pursuers'
patent they failed to prove its invalidity. The onus was on them to do so.
Fifthly, he submitted that it was not relevant that the court had expressed the
view that if the construction of the patent which the defenders opposed had been
correct, it would have been minded to hold the patent invalid because of the
Wood patent and the AVIL device. He pointed out that the defenders had
asserted that other prior art, including the Bullard laryngoscope and other
devices with anatomically shaped blades, invalidated the pursuers' patent, even
on their interpretation of its scope.
[10] Sixthly, he submitted that the court should have regard to the
wider context of the defenders' opposition to the pursuers' patent. They had
opposed the pursuers' patent before the European Patent Office (EPO) in
February 2006. After the EPO amended the patent in October 2007,
both sides had appealed that decision. The EPO Board of Appeal upheld the
amended patent in May 2010. Thus in the face of these failed challenges,
the defenders chose again to challenge the pursuers' patent in these Scottish
proceedings.
[11] In the circumstances he submitted that there was no reason to
depart from what he described as the "rough and ready" rule that expenses
follow success. It would, he argued, be unfair to award the defenders the
expenses of the counterclaim. He suggested that one possibility to reflect the
context of the challenge in infringement proceedings would be to discount an
award of expenses in favour of the pursuers.
[12] Mr Lake accepted that the defenders had not succeeded in
the counterclaim but submitted that that should not determine the award of
expenses. The issue for the court was how to achieve justice between the
parties.
[13] Of central importance in that regard was the consideration that
it was only because of the very broad interpretation which the pursuers placed
on their patent that the defenders had mounted their challenge to the patent.
In their attempt to establish that the defenders' Series 5 laryngoscope
infringed their patent the pursuers had had to argue that the Series 5's
curved blade or arm was "substantially straight". The primary defence to that
assertion was that the Series 5 did not have that integer of claim 1
of the pursuers' patent. But, faced with a damages claim of г37 million,
the defenders took that view that, if the pursuers' patent were to be given
such a wide meaning, it would have been obvious in the light of the prior art.
The decision of the court bore out that judgement.
[14] The challenge based on the Wood patent had been confined to
the contingency that the pursuers' interpretation of their patent was
accepted. But he accepted that the defenders had also mounted their challenge
to validity based on the Bellhouse patent and the Belscope and that that prior
art was cited to support a case of obviousness on either party's interpretation
of the pursuers' patent.
[15] He invited the court to have regard to the procedural history
of the challenges. The defenders had relied on the Bellhouse patent and Belscope
in opposition to the pursuers' patent before the EPO. In the Opposition
Division the EPO had been inclined to regard the pursuers' patent as obvious
but had allowed the pursuers to amend their specification to remove that
obviousness. Both parties appealed that decision. The pursuers commenced the
present action in Scotland shortly after the decision of the EPO
Opposition Division. Mr Lake submitted that, if the pursuers had not
raised this action of infringement, the defenders would not have challenged the
validity of the patent in proceedings in the United Kingdom. It was only once the pursuers raised the
proceedings, in which they asserted that the defenders' Series 5
laryngoscope infringed all of the integers of their patent, that the defenders
fully understood the breadth of the construction of the patent which the
pursuers were advancing. In that context the Bullard laryngoscope, the AVIL
device and the Wood and Moritex patents were relevant.
[16] While considerable time had been spent on evidence about the
prior art, much of the evidence which the pursuers adduced from Dr Walls
about the uses made of that prior art was irrelevant to the issues before the
court. The evidence about the pursuers' subsequent product, the Glidescope,
was equally irrelevant.
[17] It was important to recall that it was only when the EPO
decision of May 2010 was issued, in the course of the proof in this case,
that a camera became an integral part of the pursuers' patent. That amendment
superseded the defenders' reliance on the Siker laryngoscope for an argument of
anticipation and rendered the defenders' arguments about cameras of secondary
importance.
[18] In these circumstances Mr Lake submitted that it was not
appropriate or consistent with justice that the pursuers should be awarded the
expenses of the counterclaim; the defenders should be awarded at least a
proportion of their expenses in relation to the counterclaim.
Discussion: The expenses of the counterclaim
[19] The
counterclaim was the result of the infringement action. I accept Mr Lake's
submission that if it had not been for the infringement action, the defenders
would not have challenged the validity of the pursuers' patent in the courts of
the United Kingdom. I am therefore satisfied that to hold
that expenses follow success would be to take too narrow a view of the relevant
circumstances.
[20] I also accept Mr Lake's contention that while the
application for revocation in the counterclaim was not successful, that was
because I did not accept the extended interpretation which the pursuers sought
to place on certain integers in claim 1 of their patent. Had I accepted
the pursuers' interpretation, I would have revoked the patent on the ground of
obviousness having regard to the Wood patent and the AVIL device. I refer to
paragraphs [159] and [165] of my earlier opinion. I do not accept Mr Currie's
submission that that is irrelevant. On the contrary, it is highly relevant as
it demonstrates that the defenders were justified in mounting a challenge to
validity of the pursuers' patent if it bore the meaning which the pursuers
asserted. It is not a realistic view of the circumstances, in which the
defenders were facing a г37 million claim for damages, to criticise them
for challenging the validity of the pursuers' patent and not simply defending
the action for infringement on the basis of their interpretation of that
patent.
[21] There were numerous devices discussed in the evidence,
including the Siker laryngoscope, the Bellhouse patent and Belscope and the
Bullard laryngoscope. The evidence about the Siker laryngoscope was rendered
irrelevant or at least peripheral by the amendment of the pursuers' patent by
the EPO. Nonetheless, the evidence in support of the counterclaim was not
confined to an assertion of invalidity only if the patent bore the meaning for
which the pursuers contended. The defenders' challenge therefore went beyond
what was needed to protect their product from the allegation of infringement.
[22] I accept that a significant part of the proof was spent on the
challenge to the validity of the pursuers' patent. I do not rely on the
calculation, to which I referred in paragraph [7] above, as it was not
tested in discussion. But my recollection of the evidence would suggest that a
significant minority of the time taken in the proof was devoted to the
challenge to validity alone. This consideration however is of limited
importance as I have held that the infringement action brought about the
counterclaim and that the counterclaim would have succeeded if the pursuers had
been correct in their interpretation of their patent.
[23] I am satisfied that it would accord with justice in the
circumstances if the defenders were to be awarded a significant proportion of
their expenses in relation to the counterclaim. I can only make a broad
judgement as to the proportion which it is appropriate to award having regard
to (i) the extent of the evidence which was adduced to support a challenge
which would not have succeeded on either party's interpretation of the
pursuers' patent and (ii) the changes which the EPO made to the text of that
patent in the course of the action. Doing the best that I can, I award the
defenders seventy five per cent of their expenses in relation to the
counterclaim.
(II) The motions for an additional fee
[24] Mr Currie
supported his application for an additional fee with regard to factor (d) on
the following grounds. Because the pursuers' attorneys were based in Seattle and there was an eight-hour time difference, the
Scottish solicitors had had to work at night to communicate with them by
telephone and email. Solicitors had also had to consult with Dr Walls in Boston, USA, and with Professor Roberts in Cornwall. In relation to factor (g) he cited the work
undertaken by the pursuers' solicitors (i) to clarify with the defenders'
agents (a) whether the defenders relied on the commercial embodiments of
certain patents, and (b) the precise characteristics of the skilled person or
persons whom the defenders were proponing, (ii) in obtaining examples of the
Series 5 device, and (iii) in identifying the documents, the publication
of which the pursuers did nor did not admit.
[25] Had I decided to make an award of expenses in favour of the
pursuers I would have included factor (d) in the award of an additional
fee. Indeed, having heard what Mr Currie had to say in relation to that
factor, Mr Lake withdrew his opposition. I would not have included factor (g)
as I was not persuaded that in the context of this action what was done was out
of the ordinary.
[26] Turning to the defenders' application for a special fee, I am
not persuaded that I should include either of factors (d) or (g) in my
certification. In relation to factor (d), Mr Lake submitted that the
defenders' solicitors had had to search for a witness to replace Professor Denyer
after his sad illness and untimely death and that they had had to liaise with
Professor Weiss in Zurich. In relation to factor (g) both parties
had collaborated in agreeing the joint minute. In my view in the context of
this proof Mr Lake has not made out a good case for the inclusion of those
factors. I recognise, however, that the Auditor, who may have access to more
information on these matters than was available to me at this hearing on
expenses, is free to take a different view.
Conclusion
[27] I therefore refuse the pursuers' motions and make the following
orders in favour of the defenders:
(1) I award the defenders the expenses of the principal action;
(2) I award the defenders seventy five per cent of their expenses in relation to the counterclaim;
(3) I award the defenders the expenses of the pursuers' Minute seeking amendment of their patent in terms of Rule of Court 55.5;
(4) I certify that (a) Dr John Henderson, (b) Professor Peter Denyer, and (c) Dr Ian Muirhead were skilled witnesses, that it was reasonable for the defenders to employ them to make investigations and to report, and that Dr Henderson and Dr Muirhead gave evidence; and
(5) I allow the defenders an additional fee, having regard to factors (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) of Rule of Court 42.14(3).