[2005] NISSCSC C1_0304(II) (27 May 2005)
Decision No: C1/03-04(II)
DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER
"Mr G… appeals the 7% assessment of disablement made on 6.9.2001 and relies on the report from Dr Grey 5.5.1999, Mr Price 21.6.1999 and Mr Caldwell 9.10.2000. As explained in Document 11, these really add nothing to the information available to the Medical Officer on 6.9.2001.
The assessment takes into account the injuries sustained in the accident on 9.10 June 1995 and his description of how he has been affected on a daily basis, but we also have to take into account the Medical Officer's clinical findings including no muscle wasting, which would indicate that he is not leading as sedentary a life as he states, and that he lives alone, does his housework, walks and drives. The assessment for an unlimited period seems reasonable to us.
We would agree with the Medical Officer, having considered Dr Grey and Mr Price's report that the right sided sciatica and low back pain in 2000 is not connected to the accident in 1995 and cannot be taken into account in the assessment of disablement."
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT ON 9-10.6.1995
Appeal from the decision of the Departmental Officer made on 24.3.2002.
1. DOCUMENTS CONSIDERED:
Departmental submission, scheduled documents, appellant's letter of 23.9.2002 and AT6.
2. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS [including evidence considered and details of the adjournment application (if any)]
With the available papers and his letter of 23.9.2002.
We feel able to proceed in his absence.
3. MEDICAL EXAMINATION:
None – he did not attend."
(1) He has submitted that the Examining Medical Officers' findings are unrealistic, given that the examination took place at home and not in a work or other environment.
(2) He submits that the Examining Medical Officers were wrong to conclude that the claimant's sciatica was unrelated to the incident.
(3) His loss of earnings has been erroneously ignored.
(a) there is no or no sufficient evidence to found them – which may occur when the inference or conclusion is based not on any facts but on speculation by the tribunal, or
(b) the primary facts do not justify the inference or conclusion drawn but lead irresistibly to the opposite conclusion, so that the conclusion reached may be regarded as perverse.
In this case I neither express disagreement nor agreement with the Tribunal's inferences and conclusions. However, even if I were in disagreement, that does not render the decision erroneous in point of law as the Tribunal's conclusions are based on sufficient evidence, its assessment of the evidence was reasonable and the primary facts found justify the conclusion.
"53. In our judgment, the parties are correct in submitted (as they do) that, when faced with an appeal following a decision under Section 9 or Section 10, an appeal tribunal must start by identifying the decision under appeal. The legislation is clear in providing that, in the case of a decision under Section 10, it is the Section 10 decision itself which is the subject of the appeal. In the case of a decision under Section 9, whatever the substance of the position may be, it is the original decision which is required to be treated as under appeal. The identification of the decision under appeal is vital because, in deciding the appeal, the appeal tribunal cannot take into account circumstances arising after the date of that decision (Section 12(8)(b)).
54. In the case of an appeal following a revision or refusal to revise where no ground for revision was required, the appeal is in both form and substance an appeal against the original decision …
55(3) Turning to the position on an appeal following a decision to revise (or not to revise), or to supersede (or not to supersede), that decision will either have changed or have left unchanged the claimant's entitlement to benefit. The reality is that the concern of the claimant (and indeed the Secretary of State) on such an appeal will be with whether the claimant's entitlement to benefit ought or ought not to be changed, … Parliament intended that the appeal tribunal should have the power to decide the question of substance as whether the claimant's entitlement to benefit should be changed, and if so how…."
Taking into account these statements set out in the Tribunal of Commissioner's decision, it is clear that the Tribunal in the present case has erred by failing to identify the decision under appeal. The appeal is against the decision as revised. Accordingly in the present case it ought to have been against the decision of 3 October 2001 rather than, as it purported to be, against the revision of 24 March 2002.
(signed): John A H Martin QC
Chief Commissioner