[2004] NISSCSC A4/03-04(II) (24 February 2004)
Application No: A4/03-04(II)
I refuse leave to appeal.
Having considered the circumstances of the case and any reasons put forward in the request for a hearing, I am satisfied that the application can properly be determined without a hearing.
There is no arguable case that the Tribunal's decision was wrong in law.
The Tribunal was properly constituted. The Tribunal analysed the evidence rationally and in accordance with common sense. It made all necessary findings of fact material to its decision. There was evidence to support each of those findings. On those findings of fact, the Tribunal was entitled to make the decision that it did. There is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal misunderstood or misapplied the law. The full statement of the Tribunal's decision contains a detailed explanation of the reasons why the Tribunal made the decision that it did. There was no breach of the principles of natural justice.
In particular:
The exact diagnosis of the injury is not the primary issue in this case and it is not reasonably arguable that the Tribunal failed to appreciate that there was an injury.
In these circumstances the Tribunal carried out its proper function which was to assess the extent of the claimant's disability.
The Tribunal made an assessment, which in the circumstances was entirely proper and reasonable, of the limitations imposed on the claimant as a result of the injury.
It must be borne in mind that a tribunal is entitled to draw its own inferences and reach its own conclusions and however profoundly a Commissioner, as an appellate tribunal on an appeal from a tribunal on a point of law, may disagree with its views of the facts, he or she is not able to upset the tribunal's conclusions unless:
(a) there is no or no sufficient evidence to found them – which may occur when the inference or conclusion is based not on any facts but on speculation by the tribunal, or(b) the primary facts do not justify the inference or conclusion drawn but lead irresistibly to the opposite conclusion, so that the conclusion reached may be regarded as perverse.
In this case I neither express disagreement nor agreement with the Tribunal's inferences and conclusions. However, even if I were in disagreement, that does not render the decision erroneous in point of law as the Tribunal's conclusions are based on sufficient evidence, its assessment of the evidence was reasonable and the primary facts found justify the conclusion.
(Signed): J A H MARTIN QC
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
24 February 2004