[2004] NISSCSC A2/04-05(IS) (11 October 2004)
Application No: A2/04-05(IS)
I refuse leave to appeal.
Having considered the circumstances of the case I am satisfied that the application can properly be determined without a hearing.
There is no arguable case that the Tribunal's decision was wrong in law.
The Tribunal was properly constituted in accordance with the provisions of regulation 36 of the Social Security and Child Support (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1999. The Tribunal analysed the evidence rationally and in accordance with common sense. It made all necessary findings of fact material to its decision. There was evidence to support each of those findings. On those findings of fact, the Tribunal was entitled to make the decision that it did. There is nothing to suggest that the Tribunal misunderstood or misapplied the law. The full statement of the Tribunal's decision contains a detailed explanation of the reasons why the Tribunal made the decision that it did. There was no breach of the principles of natural justice.
In particular:
It is not reasonably arguable that the Tribunal considered the incorrect period of time when it was coming to a conclusion about the claimant's mental state.
The Tribunal clearly considered the case in light of the principles set out in Commissioner's decision C12/98 IS, reported as R1/00(IS), at paragraphs 12 to 14, in that it dealt with the issues whether the claimant could have made the claim earlier and also dealt with the issue whether the claimant could have obtained help to make his claim.
It must be borne in mind that a tribunal is entitled to draw its own inferences and reach its own conclusions and however profoundly a Commissioner, as an appellate tribunal on an appeal from a tribunal on a point of law, may disagree with its views of the facts, he or she is not able to upset the tribunal's conclusions unless:
(a) there is no or no sufficient evidence to found them – which may occur when the inference or conclusion is based not on any facts but on speculation by the tribunal, or(b) the primary facts do not justify the inference or conclusion drawn but lead irresistibly to the opposite conclusion, so that the conclusion reached may be regarded as perverse.
In this case I neither express disagreement nor agreement with the Tribunal's inferences and conclusions. However, even if I were in disagreement, that does not render the decision erroneous in point of law as the Tribunal's conclusions are based on sufficient evidence, its assessment of the evidence was reasonable and the primary facts found justify the conclusion.
(Signed): J A H MARTIN QC
(Dated): 11 October 2004