Northern Ireland - Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions

[1996] NISSCSC A13/96(DLA) (17 May 1996)

 


A13/96(DLA)

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 SOCIAL SECURITY (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS) (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992 DISABILITY APPEAL TRIBUNAL
Application by the claimant for leave to appeal to the Social Security Commissioner on a question of law from the decision of the Disability Appeal Tribunal dated 4 October 1995
DETERMINATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER
1. In this case the claimant seeks leave to appeal against the decision of the Disability Appeal Tribunal sitting at Belfast, whereby it was held that he was not entitled to either the care or the mobility component of disability living allowance.
2. The grounds upon which the claimant relies, as set out in his notice of application, are as follows:-

"1. The 1992 Act distinguishes by kind, not degree, of disablement:-

S.73.1.(a) 'either/or'.

2. The Act fails to define terms constructing the DLA; the

appellant offers constructive definitions.

3. The Act is interpreted so as unreasonably to restrict the

'meals test' by failing to include 'preliminary arrangements'.

4. The decision does not apply recent case law (Stocks;

Halliday; Halliday) in S.73.1.(d) of the Act; social

deprivation, 'normal social life', etc.

5. The hearing did not provide full medical records of the

appellant's condition, and partially constructed the

evidence from reports, so breaching the rules of justice

as not 'seen to be the case'. It did not comply with

assurances by the DLA administration that errors/omissions

in claim forms would be rectified in Tribunal proceedings

and so not prejudice outcomes."

3. A study of the case file shows that, from the outset, the claimant has advanced detailed written arguments in support of his claim to the allowance. I do not propose to set out those arguments in full; but I can see nothing to suggest that they were not taken fully into account by the Adjudicating Authorities which have been involved with this claim. Some of the points raised have no merit whatsoever. For example, the claimant has always maintained that it is wrong to disregard an inability to shop for supplies, when the "cooking test" is being considered. The argument is clearly incorrect. The legislation specifically provides that, in order to qualify on this ground, a claimant must be "so severely disabled physically or mentally that he cannot prepare a cooked main meal for himself if he has the ingredients", (my underlining):- see section 72(1)(a)(ii) of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits (Northern Ireland) Act 1992, (the Contributions and Benefits Act). The claimant has also consistently argued that the legislation is in itself defective, and that the Adjudicating Authorities should in some way amplify or supplement the various conditions of entitlement so as to lower the threshold and thus ensure that he qualifies for the allowance. They have no power to take any such action, and in this instance the Disability Appeal Tribunal would have erred in law if they had attempted to do so.
4. In my opinion the Appeal Tribunal gave full consideration to all the issues in the case and I do not accept that in any respect they failed to apply the relevant case law. So far as the alleged absence of full medical records is concerned, it was open to the claimant himself to provide such evidence as he considered necessary for the proper presentation of his case, and he did not request the Tribunal to obtain any additional records. There was accordingly in my view no question of any breach of "the rules of justice" in this respect.
5. One further point requires mention. In their reasons for decision on the mobility component, the Tribunal made it clear that they did not accept that, because of his agoraphobia, the claimant required to have someone with him when walking out of doors. It was that conclusion, which I may say was in my opinion fully justified by the evidence, which formed the basis of the decision that the claimant did not satisfy the conditions of entitlement set out in section 73(1)(d) of the Contributions and Benefits Act. The Tribunal then unnecessarily added the comment that even if the claimant's evidence were to be believed they were "not satisfied that the function of someone accompanying him to walk out of doors, actually constitutes "guidance or supervision", given that no active guidance or supervision is necessary to enable him to walk, on his own statement, but merely the presence of accompanying person." In my view this is not the correct approach, and if the Tribunal's decision had depended upon it, they would have erred in law. The Disability Handbook at paragraph 15.5.3 clearly recognises agoraphobia as a condition which may lead to a requirement for supervision out of doors; possibly to assist in the case of a panic attack. In the event, the Tribunal's comment on this particular point was superfluous to their decision, and as such it does not afford grounds for the granting of leave to appeal.
6. Altogether, the conclusion which I have reached is that the grounds relied upon by the claimant in his application for leave to appeal are without substance. I have also considered whether there is any other valid ground for holding that the decision of the Disability Appeal Tribunal is or may be erroneous in point of law, and have reached the conclusion that there is not. Leave to appeal will accordingly be refused.

(Signed): R R Chambers

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

17 May 1996