Northern Ireland - Social Security and Child Support Commissioners' Decisions

[1995] NISSCSC A2/95(SUPP BEN) (23 March 1995)

 


Application No. A2/95(SUPP BEN)

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992

SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS

(NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992

SOCIAL SECURITY (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS)

(NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992

SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFITS (NORTHERN IRELAND) ORDER 1977

SUPPLEMENTARY BENEFIT

Application by the above-named claimant for

leave to appeal to the Social Security Commissioner

on a question of law from the decision of

Belfast Social Security Appeal Tribunal

dated 23 March 1995

DETERMINATION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER

1. This is an application by Mrs McC... for leave to appeal against the decision of Belfast Social Security Appeal Tribunal, whereby it was decided that she had no right of appeal against the Adjudication Officer's decision in respect of her entitlement to supplementary benefit. The Tribunal found as a fact that Mrs McC... received supplementary benefit as part of her husband's assessment unit and that she was never the claimant for supplementary benefit purposes. In the light of these findings the Tribunal correctly stated in their reasons for decision that Commissioner's decision C7/93(Supp Ben) prevented Mrs McC... from pursuing an appeal concerning supplementary benefit in respect of any period during which she was not the claimant.
2. The grounds relied upon by Mrs McC... in applying for leave to appeal to the Commissioner are set out in a letter dated 22 August 1995 from her solicitors, Messrs M? & F? of ?. In that letter it is stated that Decision C7/93(Supp Ben), upon which the Tribunal had relied, was wrongly decided. Whether that be so or not, it was the decision of a Tribunal of Commissioners and as such it was binding upon the Appeal Tribunal in this instance. What, in effect, is being attempted by this application is the upsetting of Decision C7/93(Supp Ben) notwithstanding that the time for appealing against it has long since expired. That would by no means be an impossible exercise, because if there were clear grounds for doing so, there would be nothing to prevent a further Tribunal of Commissioners from being convened to reconsider the issues raised in that case:- see GB Commissioner's Decision R(U) 4/88. The only problem would be that in this jurisdiction the members of the new Tribunal of Commissioners would of necessity be the same as those who gave the decision in C7/93(Supp Ben). I am, however, not persuaded that the grounds relied upon by the applicant are of sufficient substance to cast any doubt upon the validity of the decision in C7/93(Supp Ben), or raise any point which might lead a future Tribunal of Commissioners to reach a different conclusion.
3. The applicant's grounds for suggesting that C7/93(Supp Ben)(the M? case), was wrongly decided are as follows:-

"1. Article 20 of the Supplementary Benefits (NI) Order 1977 read in conjunction with Regulation 1(2) of the Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations (NI) 1987 provides that the beneficiary of a claim for benefit is to be included in the term "claimant". Article 20(1) of the said 1977 Order provides that a person claiming, or in receipt of, supplementary benefit may appeal to the Appeal Tribunal against any determination of the Commission, or refusal by the Commission to review a determination with respect to any of the following matters:-

(a) The right to, or amount of, any supplementary benefits. Regulation 1(2) of the aforementioned 1987 Regulations states that "claimant" means the person who has claimed benefit under act (including, in relation to an award or decision, a beneficiary under the award or affect by the decision)".

2. Section 20 of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 provides claimants with a right to appeal against decision.

3. The Social Security Commissioners in M? were influenced by the fact that if the word "claimant" was given a wider meaning this would mean that each dependant would have to be given individual notice of decision in order to comply with the provisions of Regulation 20 and 63 of the Adjudication Regulations, that is, the aforementioned 1987 Regulations. It is suggested that this decision was reached per incurium as Regulation 63 of the 1987 Regulations provides that such notification would not be given if it is not practicable to do so or not reasonable to do so."

Grounds 1 and 2 were considered in detail by the Tribunal of Commissioners in Decision C7/93(Supp Ben). Nothing new has been advanced by way of argument, and I do not consider that any case has been made out for a reappraisal of the conclusions reached.

So far as ground 3 is concerned, the question of the possible effect of the application of the wider meaning of the word "claimant", to Regulations 20 and 63 of the Adjudication Regulations was only one of the points relied upon by the Tribunal of Commissioners in reaching their decision. It would be quite wrong to assume that this was in any sense the deciding factor. In an event, it is incorrect to suggest that Regulation 63 provides for any general power to dispense with written notification to a claimant "if it is not practicable to do so or not reasonable to do so". The power to omit notification on the grounds of impracticability only applies to a determination awarding income support which is implemented by a cash payment - see Regulation 63(3); and it is only in respect of a determination terminating entitlement, that notice shall not be required if the reason for the transaction is already known to the claimant or it is otherwise reasonable in the circumstances not to give such notice - see Regulation 63(4). Finally, even if Regulation 63 did make provision for a general power to dispense with notification in writing to all persons included in the definition of "claimant". I do not see how, in the absence of special circumstances, it could be said that it would be "impracticable" or then again "unreasonable" to notify a claimant's spouse or children, if they came within that definition. I am accordingly of the opinion that the grounds for criticism of Decision C7/93(Supp Ben) are without substance.

4. Having given this matter full consideration the conclusion which I have reached is that there is no valid ground for holding that the decision of the Social Security Appeal Tribunal is or may be erroneous in point of law. Leave to appeal is accordingly refused.
5. Mrs McC... requested an oral hearing of her application, but having considered the circumstances of the case and the reasons put forward for the request, I am satisfied that a hearing is not required. The request has therefore been refused.

(Signed): R R Chambers

CHIEF COMMISSIONER

(Date):