[1994] NISSCSC C18/93(AA) (27 May 1994)
C18/93(AA)
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992
SOCIAL SECURITY CONTRIBUTIONS AND BENEFITS
(NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992
SOCIAL SECURITY (CONSEQUENTIAL PROVISIONS)
(NORTHERN IRELAND) ACT 1992
ATTENDANCE ALLOWANCE
Appeal to the Social Security Commissioner
on a question of law from the decision of
the Disability Appeal Tribunal
dated 27 April 1993
DECISION OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSIONER
"An application for review of a decision by the Attendance AllowanceBoard made within 3 months of that decision being given, and which is
not determined by the Board by 5 April 1992, falls for determination as
a second tier adjudication. Because the application was made on
13 February 1992 I can review the decision of the Board dated
18 December 1991 which certified that Mrs P... C... was not
entitled to Attendance Allowance."
The letter conveying the Adjudication Officer's decision to the claimant also informed her that she had a right of appeal to an independent Tribunal if she thought that the decision was wrong, and it was in exercise of that right that the claimant appealed to the Disability Appeal Tribunal which duly sat to hear and determine the appeal on 27 April 1993. In accordance with normal procedure the Adjudication Officer had prepared a written submission for the hearing of the Disability Appeal Tribunal, and it was in this submission that it was first stated that the Attendance Allowance Board had in fact, on 4 April 1992, reviewed the decision of 18 December 1991 but had not revised it. This so-called decision on review by the Board dated 4 April 1992 had not been promulgated and the claimant had known nothing about it; but it was submitted that it nevertheless meant that the Adjudication Officer had exceeded his jurisdiction in purporting to determine the disability question under regulation 22(3) and (4) of the Social Security (Introduction of Disability Living Allowance) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1992, which provided as follows:-
"22(3) Any question referred for determination by the Board,under section 105(3) or 106(1) which has not been determined by
5 April 1992, shall be determined as soon as is reasonably
practicable thereafter in accordance with paragraph (4).
(4) For the purposes of paragraph (3), the question shall
be determined -
(a) except in a case to which sub-paragraph (b) applies, by
an Adjudication Officer; or
(b) where the application for a review of a decision of the
Board is made within 3 months of that decision being
given, as a second tier adjudication."
"Regulation 39(2) and (3) of the Adjudication Regulations providethat Attendance Allowance Board decisions on review should be
notified unless the claimant or Department foregoes the right to
notification. We consider however, that a decision has still been
made even if it has not been notified. That being so we consider
the Medical Board review decision was validly made. The
Adjudication Officer had therefore no power to adjudicate on this
case - application for review having been made pre 16.3.992 and
the review application having been determined on 4.4.1992 -
Regulation 22(3) of the Disability Living Allowance (Introduction)
Regulations does not apply."
"The Tribunal erred in law by:(i) Misdirecting itself as to the law in holding that the
Attendance Allowance Board had validly made a determination
on 4 April 1992 when this decision was not sent to the
claimant.
Regulation 39(2) requires the Board to notify the claimant
and Department of the determination on review unless the
claimant or Department consents to forego this.
No valid determination had been made, therefore the AO
could have continued the adjudication process under
Regulation 22(3) and (4) of the Introduction of DLA
Regulations.
To hold as the Tribunal did creates the absurd situation
where a Board decision not communicated to the claimant
cannot be subsequently challenged forego this. [sic]
The Tribunal's decision leads to the absurd result that
the AO has no jurisdiction to complete the appeals process."
"It is submitted that the Tribunal acted in accordance with thelaw. It is further submitted that communication of the Tribunals
decision is not part of the determination which is in accordance
with Regulation 39(2) of the Social Security (Adjudication)
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1987. It is not a condition
precedent of a determination that there must be communication of
same.
Finally, the Department would rely on the legal maxim "onmia
praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta"."
Although the claimant was the appellant, I asked Mrs Fitzpatrick to open the proceedings by addressing me on the subject of the validity of the Attendance Allowance Board's purported determination of 4 April 1992, which had been held by the Disability Appeal Tribunal to render the Adjudication Officer's later decision of 16 July 1992 null and void. Mrs Fitzpatrick adhered to the view that, although the Board's "determination" of 4 April 1992 had not been communicated to the claimant, it was nevertheless a valid decision. In support of this argument she relied upon regulation 39(2) and (3) of the Social Security (Adjudication) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 1987, which she seemed to regard as authority for the proposition that a decision on review of the Attendance Allowance Board did not in all circumstances have to be communicated to the parties concerned. Reliance was also placed on decisions of the GB Commissioners in R(P) 1/85, R(U) 7/81 and R(SB) 4/83, in all of which the opinion had been expressed that the validity of a decision did not depend upon its being communicated to the claimant. At my request Mrs Fitzpatrick discussed the question of the steps now open to the claimant to challenge the decision that she was not entitled to attendance allowance; bearing in mind that there was no right of appeal to the Commissioner against the Board's original decision of 18 December 1991, and that the claimant had never received notification of any decision on review. Mrs Fitzpatrick was unable to say how, why, or in what circumstances, the determination of 4 April 1992 had come to be made. She accepted that the normal procedures had not been followed in relation to that decision and she did not consider herself able to express any view as to whether its author had intended it to be a valid determination.
Apart, however, from the fact that the claimant was not, and can now never be, notified of the "determination" of 4 April 1992, there are, in my opinion, other indications that it was not intended to be an effective decision. In the normal course of events a claimant who seeks a review of the refusal of his claim to attendance allowance is sent a copy of all medical reports upon which the Board's decision was based, and is invited to comment on the reports and to submit any other evidence which he wishes the Board to take into account. Failure to afford the claimant an opportunity to comment on the medical reports would constitute a breach of the rules of natural justice sufficient to render any subsequent determination by the Board erroneous in point of law. I therefore cannot imagine that in this instance the Board would have considered it proper to proceed to determine the application for a review without following this normal procedure.
One further, although not perhaps very significant, factor which would suggest that the purported "determination" was not intended to be a proper decision was that it was not accompanied by any reasons such as would normally be found in a decision on review. For all of these reasons the conclusion which I have reached is that this is not a case concerning the failure to promulgate an otherwise effective decision; but rather that the "determination" of 4 April 1992 can never have been intended to be a valid or effective decision. It is of course impossible to be certain what was in the mind of the person who signed the "determination"; but, like the Tribunal of GB Commissioners in the unreported case CI/141/1987, (at para 37), I consider that it can, at best, only have been a provisional draft, and I agree that the question whether a decision has become effective depends upon intention. I therefore take the view that the present case differs from those cited by Mrs Fitzpatrick.
(Signed): R. R. Chambers
CHIEF COMMISSIONER
27 May 1994