Jersey Unreported Judgments

Costs - application for security for costs.

[2020]JRC138

Royal Court

(Samedi)

9 July 2020

Before     :

Advocate Matthew John Thompson, Master of the Royal Court.

 

Advocate M. St. J. O'Connell for the Representor.

Advocate E. B.  Drummond for the Respondent.

		Paras
1.	Introduction	1
2.	Background	2-7
3.	Submissions	8-21
4.	Decision	22-37
5.	Costs	38-41

judgment

the MASTER:

Introduction

1.        This judgment contains my decision in respect of the respondent's application for security for costs. 

Background

2.        The background is set out in my judgment handed down on 18^th June, 2020, at paragraphs 2 to 6 which I adopt.  That judgment itself followed on from the judgment of Commissioner Clyde-Smith in this matter dated 10^th March 2020.  I referred to the relevant paragraphs of that judgment in my previous judgment dated 18^th June, 2020 reported at Kinstellar LLC v Eagle Properties (No 14) Limited [2020] JRC 117

3.        In support of the respondent's application, the respondent filed the fourth affidavit of Philip Maletroit.  Initially the respondent advanced two grounds namely:-

(i)        That the representor was a company resident outside the jurisdiction; and

(ii)       The respondent would face difficulties and delays in enforcing a costs order against the representor in the Ukraine. 

4.        By the time of the hearing, the respondent only relied on the second ground.  The relevant parts of Mr Maletroit's affidavit are set out in paragraphs 17 and 18 which state as follows:-

"17.     If Eagle is successful in its defence of Kinstellar's claim, it is likely that Eagle would obtain a costs order in favour of Eagle against Kinstellar. As Kinstellar has no assets in Jersey, Eagle would need to enforce that costs order in Ukraine. Without waiving privilege, I am informed by Eagle's lawyers, and believe that:

(1)       Foreign judgments are capable of being enforced in Ukraine provided (i) that there is an applicable international treaty to which Ukraine is a party of or (ii) there are grounds of reciprocity. 

(2)       As to the former, there is no applicable bilateral treaty or convention as between Jersey and Ukraine in relation to the recognition and enforcement of judgments; 

(3)       As to the latter, there is a presumption that the reciprocity principle will apply. Indeed, there is precedent in Ukrainian case law that there is a principle of reciprocity in respect of Ukraine's relations with the UK, and the Ukrainian courts have allowed enforcements of judgments made by the UK courts on several occasions, albeit we are unaware of any precedent in relation to the position of Jersey (as a separate and distinct jurisdiction from the UK). 

(4)       An application for enforcement on grounds of reciprocity must be sought before a Ukrainian local court at the location of the debtor. An application for enforcement should be filed with the competent Ukrainian court directly by Eagle. Eagle may apply for the enforcement within 3 years after the costs order becomes final. 

(5)       An application for enforcement on grounds of reciprocity is a new court action (similar to "enforcement at common law" in Jersey). 

(6)       If unopposed, the first instance court's consideration of the application would usually (pre-pandemic) take between one and a half and three months, at a cost of between $15,000 to $20,000.  There are currently delays in the operation of state authorities due to the quarantine that has been introduced in Ukraine as a result of Covid-19. 

(7)       If the application is opposed, and defences are filed, the application could take up to one and half years to determine, and consequently the costs would be higher (how much higher would depend on the nature of the defences raised). 

(8)       If the application for enforcement is allowed, a Ukrainian court will issue a writ of enforcement to be further filed with the bailiff. 

(9)       But a ruling made by the first instance Ukrainian court to allow/dismiss the application for enforcement can be appealed to a higher court. 

(10)     During the course of the arbitration, Eagle was involved in over 20 actions in the Ukraine. Eagle's experience in those actions was that the decisions of the Ukrainian court of first instance were often erratic, seemingly contrary to law or authority.  Even in the cases where decisions were overwhelmingly in favour of Eagle it was often only on appeal or following cassation that Eagle was able to obtain a decision in accordance with its rights.  This meant that even for seemingly straightforward applications, costs and delay were a familiar feature of proceedings in Ukraine. 

18.      There is thus a risk that Eagle will not be able to recover any costs award against Kinstellar upon successfully defending the litigation without further significant difficulty, costs and delay." 

5.        The representor in response filed the fourth affidavit of Kostiantyn Likarchuk, Managing Partner of the representor.  The relevant paragraphs are as follows:-

"13.     If the Court makes and order against Kinstellar to pay security for Eagles' costs, it will likely lead the management being reluctant to proceed with this enforcement action even notwithstanding the strength of Kinstellar's claim due to Eagle's conduct aimed at prolonging this litigation, increasing cost and being inclined to do so indefinitely, having a stifling effect on Kinstellar's application for an order that it may enforce the Final Award in Jersey."

6.        In addition I refer to paragraphs 18 to 19 as follows:-

"18.     With regard to the statement at paragraph 18 of PM4 that there is a risk that Eagle will not be able to recover any costs award against Kinstellar, it is plainly incorrect.  At paragraph 17(3) of PM4 it is rightly noted that a presumption of reciprocity will apply in Ukraine with regard to judgments of Jersey courts, i.e. if Jersey courts have been reciprocal with regard to the Ukrainian courts' judgments, Ukrainian courts will operate on the presumption that reciprocity does exist between Jersey and Ukraine.  PM4 does not identify any instance of Jersey courts not having been reciprocal towards Ukraine. 

19.      The statements at paragraph 17(10) of PM4 regarding characterisations of decisions of Ukrainian courts are not accepted.  It is exactly this line of discussion, which may, if the Court agrees with it, lead to the establishment of non-reciprocal mood in the relationship between Jersey and Ukrainian judiciaries.  Eagle chose to invest in Ukraine in 2011 and it is disgraceful that it allows such comments with regard to Ukrainian judicial system."

7.        The affidavit also described the financial position of the representor.  The figures in the affidavit however related to the income of all legal practices using the name "Kinstellar" which is a larger group.  In response to a request from me during the hearing, Advocate O'Connell subsequently clarified that the representor was a separate legal entity and operated the Kiev office only although it was also part of the larger Kinstellar Group.  The representor was described as being a 16 lawyer office with a revenue of approximately €3.5 million. 

Submissions

8.        Advocate Drummond for the respondent contended as follows:-

(i)        It was self-evident that the representor was a plaintiff and the respondent was simply defending the claims brought against it and had a good arguable case as accepted by Commissioner Clyde-Smith. 

(ii)       This was not therefore a case where there was a counterclaim being brought where it is possible for security for costs of a counterclaim to be sought.  Rather the respondent was raising a defence by way of set-off. 

(iii)      The relevant factors in A. E. Smith for an exercise of discretion involving a corporate plaintiff were a helpful guide in deciding whether to grant security for costs based on difficulties of enforcement of a costs order in another jurisdiction. 

(iv)      He cited the approach taken in England CPR 25.13 which indicated that the English courts would take into account any "obvious realities" in deciding whether there were obstacles or difficulties to enforcement of a costs order.  The fourth affidavit of Mr Maletroit described such difficulties. 

(v)       The court was not in a position to reach a view on the merits given that arguable defences had been raised. 

(vi)      He did not consider that the threshold for a claim being probably stifled was met.  He also reminded me that whether there was any stifling in part depended on the amount of security required to be provided. 

(vii)     In terms of the amount of security sought, the schedule attached to his skeleton argument provided sufficient detail having regard to the observations in Geneva Trust (GTC) SA v Tchenguiz [2019] JRC 110A dated 12^th June, 2019 and was his best estimate of the likely costs to be incurred. 

9.        Advocate O'Connell for the representor contended that the respondent was in reality the plaintiff because it was the one who had elected to raise new issues to avoid paying the costs award.  He reminded me that these issues were not defences within the terms of the Arbitration (Jersey) Law 1998.  In this case he argued that the respondent had instead used the Royal Court's inherent jurisdiction to initiate arguments which was why he classified the respondent as a plaintiff and therefore not entitled to security for costs. 

10.      In particular, what underpinned the set-off was a counterclaim that was much larger than the claim.  The respondent was not entitled to seek security for costs in respect of a counterclaim. 

11.      As alternative position, if there was a distinction between the counterclaims and set-off based on the pledge and the challenge to the right of the representor to enforce the costs award based on the validity of a deed of assignment, the latter was a discrete point which only required expert evidence on Ukrainian Law on a very narrow issue. It did not justify the amount of costs claimed. 

12.      In relation to the merits, Advocate O'Connell also criticised the representor for not providing any evidence or response to challenge the detailed analysis of Mr Likarchuk in his second affidavit at paragraphs 54 to 76 on why the assignment was valid.

13.      The representor was also critical of the respondent's conduct for initially advancing an argument when it resisted payment on an erroneous basis.  At that stage there was no mention of the validity of the assignment which only came later.  Yet, there was no explanation as to why this original case was dropped. 

14.      He also maintained his position that the pledge argument was weak. 

15.      It was a high threshold to persuade the Jersey Court that the procedures of a foreign court were unreliable.  The affidavit of Mr Maletroit at paragraph 17(10) came nowhere near that threshold.

16.      What the court was facing was a claim of €800,000 plus interest with a counterclaim in excess of £30 million which operated as set-off. 

17.      In respect of stifling, given the financial position of the representor there was clear evidence that the claim would probably be stifled if security was sought was ordered.  

18.      The amount of costs claimed was also not proportionate.  For a claim of €800,000 plus interest, the amount sought by way of security for costs of nearly £400,000 was excessive and was being deployed as a tactic. 

19.      In reply Advocate Drummond referred to paragraph 50 of Commissioner Clyde-Smith's judgment where the Commissioner did not doubt the bona fides of the respondent in raising the defences it had put before the court. 

20.      His client did not need to file any expert evidence in response to the assignment issue at this stage, because the Royal Court had ruled that they were good arguable defences. 

21.      The affidavits of both parties agreed on the procedure and how long enforcement might take.  The length of time enforcement might take justified security being ordered. 

Decision

22.      I start by reference to the relevant legal principles.  These were summarised, as both counsel accepted, in Café De Lecq v Rossboroughs Brokers Limited [2011] JLR 31.  The relevant extract is paragraph 20 as follows:-

"20     A presumption or principle as found by the Master that Jersey-resident plaintiffs, whether natural or corporate, should not be required to provide security is inconsistent with the decision in Leeds in that it discriminates between plaintiffs on the ground of their residence. We agree with Mr. Journeaux that such a general presumption based on residence would be unlawful. In our view, the protection hitherto given to resident plaintiffs must now be extended to all plaintiffs so that the practice following Leeds should be as follows, namely that consistent with the policy that there should be access to the courts for all, rich or poor, and without detracting from its wide discretion to order security where justice so requires, it will be the general practice of the court not to require plaintiffs (wherever resident) to provide security because there is reason to believe that they will be unable to meet orders for costs against them save in the case of:

(i) Corporate plaintiffs (wherever resident), where security may be ordered on such grounds following the principles set out by the Court of Appeal in A.E. Smith (9); and

(ii) Non-resident plaintiffs, who may be required to provide security to meet the legitimate objective of protecting the ability of defendants to enforce costs judgments outside the jurisdiction, such applications to be assessed on an individual basis."

23.      The reference to Leeds in the above citation is a reference to the decision of the Jersey Court of Appeal in Leeds United Limited v Admatch [2009] JLR 186.  The relevant paragraphs of that judgment for the purposes of my decision are at paragraphs 19 to 21 and paragraph 23 which state:-

"19     We agree with the Deputy Bailiff that protecting the interest of a defendant in being able to enforce a judgment for his costs if he succeeds is, in principle, a legitimate objective of the practice. However, like the English Court of Appeal in Nasser (4), we are unable to accept that a blanket presumption that such protection is appropriate where the plaintiff is resident outside Jersey is a proportionate way of achieving that objective.

20       In the first place, we do not accept the Deputy Bailiff's view that, if a plaintiff's claim is not stifled by an order for security, he suffers no substantial prejudice by providing it. The plaintiff is forced to lay out funds equal to the other side's costs in addition to paying his own, at a time when the court is rarely in a position to form any view of the merits. The provision of cash security by the usual method of paying it into court has implications for his cash flow which are likely to be significant, even if they are not ruinous. It ties up funds which would otherwise have been used in his business or deposited at interest. If the security is not funded from cash balances, it will cause him to incur borrowing or guarantee charges.

21       Secondly, in considering the prejudice to the defendant in having no security, the Deputy Bailiff looked at the matter globally, pointing to the worst possible cases. We do not doubt that there may, in some cases, be serious difficulties about enforcing a judgment for costs. The foreign law may be obscure. Its procedures may be slow or expensive. To the extent that these things are true, the experience will no doubt be stressful. But the question is not what may happen in the worst cases, but what is likely to happen in this case.

23       Some of the Deputy Bailiff's observations suggest that the court should not have to decide in each individual case whether it is likely to be difficult for the defendant to enforce a judgment for costs, because the result will tend to complicate applications for security, making additional demands on court time and adding to interlocutory costs. We accept that this may happen in some cases, although we doubt whether it is generally true. It has not been the experience of the courts in England in the wake of Nasser (4). Indeed, it seems more probable that, if defendants have to establish that there is a real need for security for costs before making the application, the volume of such applications will fall, especially in the large proportion of claims where the non-resident plaintiff is British. However, even if this were not the case, we would reject the proposition on principle. One of the more reliable signs that a measure is disproportionate to its objective is that it is applied in accordance with a blanket rule, instead of being confined to cases where it is actually necessary. Under a proportionate system of procedure, a British plaintiff would not be required as a matter of course to put up security for costs in cases where it is unnecessary, simply because, if it were a Spanish plaintiff, investigation might show that security was necessary."

24.      In relation to the evidence before me, neither party relied on any independent evidence with each counsel criticising the other for the lack of such independent evidence.  However, there was a large part of agreement because Mr Likarchuk accepted that a presumption of reciprocity would apply in the Ukraine with regard to judgments of the Jersey Courts.  Nor did he challenge the time limits set out in Mr Maletroit's affidavit at paragraph 17 as to how long enforcement might take. 

25.      What was not explained by either party was when the Ukrainian Court might refuse to recognise a judgment of the Royal Court on the basis of reciprocity if the respondent had to take steps to enforce a cost order made in these proceedings by the Royal Court against the representor.  The present proceedings are a claim where the representor has invoked the jurisdiction of the Royal Court to enforce the costs award.  If a costs order was made against the representor because its claim to enforce the costs award failed, such an order would be a consequence of the representor taking part in proceedings before the Royal Court.  What has not been put forward by the respondent is why the Ukrainian Court in those circumstances would refuse to enforce a costs order against a party who had voluntarily taken part in proceedings.  If the position were the other way around, absent allegations of fraud or any pending appeal against the costs order, the Royal Court would not permit a party against whom an adverse costs order was made by a court where it voluntarily appeared and argued its case on the merits to re-litigate the proceedings or to challenge an adverse costs order (see Brunei v Fidelis Nominees Ltd 2008 JRC 152 at paragraphs 12-19).  The respondent has failed to explain why the same approach would not be taken in Ukraine and why therefore any contested hearing would occur at all. 

26.      To the extent that Mr Maletroit sought to rely on Eagle's own experiences before the courts in the Ukraine in relation to a number of applications that were made in connection with the arbitration proceedings, I do not know what the issues were in these applications and what difficulties the respondent faced.  There is therefore insufficient detail in his affidavit for me to conclude based on the experiences in one dispute to conclude that a costs order made by the Royal Court against the representor would not be enforced and that there would be further extensive proceedings in Ukraine in order to enforce any such costs order. 

27.      Nor is it appropriate to conclude that the Ukraine courts are unreliable generally simply based on the respondent's experience in the present dispute.  By analogy in cases on whether or not the courts in another country are an appropriate forum (see by way of example the comments of the Royal Court and the Court of Appeal in Gheewala -v- Compendium Trust Company Limited and Others [1999] JLR 154 and Gheewala v Compendium Trust Company Limited and Others [2003] JLR 627, significant evidence is required to reach such a conclusion. Mr Maletroit's affidavit does not meet that threshold where the principle of reciprocity is accepted. 

28.      The same conclusion is reached by following the approach adopted by the English Court in CPR 25.13 as follows:-

""... If security is sought on the grounds that there will be obstacles to enforcement, the obstacles need to be sufficiently substantial to amount to a real risk of non-enforcement

(Bestfort Developments LLP v Ras Al Khaimah Investment Authority [2016] EWCA Civ 1099; [2018] 1 WLR 1099; [2017] CP Rep 9). [...]

Obstacles to enforcement give rise to the risk of non-enforcement and therefore security granted on this around should be ordered by reference to the costs of the proceedings (De Beer v Kanaar & Co [2003] 1 WLR 38 and Bestfort, above). The starting point should be that the defendant is entitled to security for the entirety of his costs: it is wrong in principle to reduce the amount as if on a sliding scale depending upon the degree of risk of non-enforcement; however, security might be reduced, or disallowed altogether, because of discretionary factors, such as delay or stifling (Chernukhin v Danilina [2018] EWCA Civ 1802). [...]

If security is granted solely on the grounds that enforcement will be burdensome, the amount of security ordered should be assessed by reference to that extra burden of enforcement(subject to any discretionary factors, such as delay or stifling) [...]

Formal evidence is not always required in order to prove the obstacles or difficulties of enforcement which may arise. Whilst there must be a proper basis for considering that such problems exist, the court will take note of obvious realities (Thistle Hotels Ltd v Gamma Four Ltd [2004] EWHC 322; and see, further, Kahangi v Nourizadeh [2009] EWHC 2451 (QB)).""

29.      In my judgment, the evidence before me does not persuade me that there are "obvious realities" to conclude that there are obstacles or difficulties in enforcement.

30.      In relation to this part of the argument, I am not therefore persuaded by the respondent that a costs order made by the Royal Court in these proceedings, should the respondent's arguments prevail, would not be recognised by the courts in the Ukraine and enforced without further argument.  On this basis it is not appropriate to order security for costs. 

31.      If I am wrong on that view, and on the assumption that the relevant threshold is met, in view of the arguments put before, I would not have ordered security for costs in respect of the pledge argument in any event.  In my judgment although the defence raised is that of set-off, what gives rise to the defence is a counterclaim as analysed at paragraphs 32 and 34 of my previous judgment as follows:-

"32.    Like Commissioner Clyde-Smith at paragraph 46 of his judgment, I analyse the present position as being equivalent to a claim where there is no defence to the claim itself but where the defendant seeks to advance a counterclaim operating as a set-off.  The fact that the claim is to enforce an arbitration award does not make any difference to the above analysis.  Whatever the undisputed claim, where a counterclaim is raised which exceeds the amount of the claim so a set off may apply, the court may require a payment into court of the claim as a condition of permitting the counterclaim to continue.  That power is exercisable under the current summary judgment rules where the court in permitting a counterclaim to be pursued can as a condition require a payment into court.

34.      The fact that there is no counterclaim against the representor does not affect this analysis. The set off arises from a counterclaim against Mr Parfenyuk.  The effect of the assignment means that the respondent is limited to arguing that it has a much larger counterclaim against Mr Parfenyuk and so the representor cannot be in any better position as assignee than Mr Parfenyuk as assignor. The nature of the set off however flows from the counterclaim the respondent asserts against Mr Parfenyuk."

32.      What the respondent seeks to set-off is a counterclaim that is much larger than the claim and the unusual facts of this case I do not consider that it is appropriate to permit the respondent to recover security for costs in respect of an argument which at its heart is a counterclaim. 

33.      In deciding whether to order require security for costs the question of delay in raising the pledge argument is also a relevant factor set out at paragraph 52 of my previous judgment and militates against the granting of security. Paragraph 52 states as follows:-

"52.    It is only in respect of the warranty claim that the second respondent was found liable.  The position now adopted by the respondent is therefore contrary to the position it adopted during the arbitration claim. This different position was only adopted by the respondent during the argument on costs.  The costs award dealing with this argument at paragraph 62 was quoted at paragraph 48 of Commissioner Clyde-Smith's judgment.  What is clear to me is that to the extent that the respondent has not advanced earlier the arguments it now seeks to raise in respect of the pledge issue and to the extent that the respondent has changed its position since the arbitration proceedings, these are relevant factors in favour of the representor's application."

34.      In respect of security for costs of the assignment issue, I would also have taken into account the fact that no evidence in response had been filed to the second affidavit of Mr Likarchuk and the analysis it contains.  There is force to that analysis and, although expert evidence has not been exchanged, that does not mean that the respondent could not have responded by a further affidavit.  At present, based on the affidavits before me I consider that the representor has the better of the argument.  I would therefore not have been minded to order security in relation to the assignment issue.  I should add that Mr Likarchuk's second affidavit was only placed before the Royal Court the day before judgment was handed down and in relation to costs submissions.  It did not therefore form part of evidence before the Royal Court leading to its judgment of 10^th March.  The lack of a response to it means that security for costs on this issue is not justified in any event.  The issue is in any event not complex and is simply an issue of Ukrainian law.  Costs in respect of this issue alone should not exceed £25,000 based on an exchange of expert evidence and a 1 day trial. 

35.      In respect of the quantum of the respondent's costs, I do not regard the sums claimed as proportionate.  What is claimed is nearly £400,000 of costs to defend an €800,000 claim.  The amount of these costs mainly relates to the pledge argument and also underlines my view that the respondent is trying to prove a defence of set-off through a significant counterclaim.  Even then I consider the amount set aside for discovery and witness evidence is overstated as the argument primarily turns on expert evidence.  Much of the documentation that is relevant would have been produced in the arbitration proceedings.  Very little time is therefore required for discovery.  Any witness statements will also be focused on a discrete issue namely the meaning of the pledge agreement.  I am also not persuaded by the amount of time said to be required to obtain expert evidence.  The primary task is providing instructions for the experts based on material that already exists.  For these tasks much of the time spent will also be that of the fee earner not the partner.  The partner's time increases where a trial is to take place not during the preparation of evidence.  I also regard the time proposed for directions hearings and a pre-trial review as too large a figure. I would allow 10 hours for each.  Nor is a paralegal required at trial.  The time for a payment into court is not allowed as the respondent lost this application and was ordered to pay costs.  A contingency figure of £28,000 is also not justified and I would only allow £5000.  Taking all these factors into account, if the threshold for a payment in was met and it was justified for the pledge argument contrary to the conclusions I have reached, standing back and looking at matters in the round and applying my experience a figure of £150,000 would be a more appropriate quantum figure  for this action. 

36.      In relation to stifling, if I were to have ordered security in the amount sought, I consider this would probably have stifled the claim given the size of the business of the representor.  If, on the other hand, I had ordered security in a much lower sum then I do not consider that a much smaller sum would have stifled the claim, given the financial position of the representor as it was explained to me.  An order for security for costs of £150,000 in my judgment would also stifle the claim given the size of the representor's business based on its turnover.  Accordingly I would have reduced as a matter of discretion the amount of security to £50,000 if security for costs for both arguments raised was justified in principle.  If I had been persuaded that security for costs for the assignment issue was justified but not the pledge issue, I would have ordered US$10,000 being the half the additional cost of enforcement referred to by Mr Maletroit. 

37.      However, for the reasons set out above I am not persuaded to order security for costs in this case because I do not consider that the grounds relied on to do so are made out.  If I am wrong in that conclusion, for the reasons set out above I would not have exercised my discretion to make an order for security in any event in respect of either argument relied upon by the respondent. 

Postscript and Costs

38.      Subsequent to oral argument and an earlier draft of this judgment being circulated to the parties but prior to the formal handing down of the judgment, the respondent was placed into a creditors' winding-up.  Two points arise from this. 

39.      Firstly I was concerned whether or not I could make a costs order.  I considered I could do so because firstly this was the respondent's application.  Secondly, it would be unfair if the representor could not pursue a payment for costs in the liquidation of the respondent because it did not have a costs order in its favour. 

40.      The second point arises is the effect of Article 159(4) of the Companies (Jersey) Law 1991 (as amended) on these proceedings and whether or not leave should be given for these proceedings to continue and if so on what terms.  I therefore indicated that I wished the liquidator of the respondent to inform the representor and the court by Friday, 24^th July, 2020 whether the liquidator wished to continue its challenges to the representor's claim and whether he wished to continue the third party proceedings. 

41.      In relation to the appropriate costs order itself I ordered costs on the standard basis although the representor sought costs on the indemnity basis.  The view I took was that this was no more than a hard fought application and there was nothing in it that took the case out of the ordinary to justify indemnity costs. 

Authorities

Kinstellar LLC v Eagle Properties (No 14) Limited [2020] JRC 117

Geneva Trust (GTC) SA v Tchenguiz [2019] JRC 110A

Arbitration (Jersey) Law 1998

Café De Lecq v Rossboroughs Brokers Limited [2011] JLR 31

Brunei v Fidelis Nominees Ltd [2008] JRC 152

Leeds United Limited v Admatch [2009] JLR 186

Gheewala -v- Compendium Trust Company Limited and Others [1999] JLR 154

Gheewala v Compendium Trust Company Limited and Others [2003] JLR 627

Companies (Jersey) Law 1991