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the scope of the scheme
9.1
As we made clear in Part III a principal objective of our
project is to develop a scheme of regulation that is considerably simpler than
the current law. Much
of complexity of
the present law arises
from the rules about the scope of the schemes currently on the statute
book. The
Housing Act 1988, the Housing Act 1985 and the Rent Act 1977 detail categories of tenancy that fall within the
schemes they
create and those that fall outside. Arrangements falling outside the schemes may still come within the
scope of theand Protection from Eviction Act 1977, unless theyare classified as
“excluded tenancies and licences”. And even these may be subject to indirect regulation
resulting from the provisions of the Criminal Law Act 1977.[1]
9.3 The topics discussed here are
(1) the relationship with other statutory schemes;
(2) whether the lease-licence distinction should be a test for determining the scope of the scheme;
(3) other definitional issues affecting the scope of the scheme;
(4) statutorily excluded categories of agreement; and
(5) Crown tenancies.
9.4 In general we have taken the view that categories of tenancy covered by other statutory schemes should be excluded from our proposals. On this basis we envisage that the following categories of tenancy should remain excluded from our proposed scheme.[2]
(1) Business tenancies.
(2) Licensed premises.
(3) Tenancies of agricultural holdings.
(4) Long leases.
9.5 We anticipate there will be little controversy that our proposals should not attempt to cover business tenancies.[3] There are potential difficulties where premises are subject to mixed residential and business use.
9.6 The evolution of the regulation of agreements with mixed residential and business use is as complex as the evolution of the rest of housing law.[4] Initially business use was irrelevant. The Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 s 12(2)(c)(ii) provided.
the application of this Act to any house or part of a house shall not be excluded by reason only that part of the premises is used as a shop or office or for business, trade, or professional purposes.[5]
9.7 Part II of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 provides business tenants with some statutory protections. With the decontrol of residential tenancies under the Rent Act 1957, tenancies with joint residential and business use became protected by the 1954 Act. The Rent Act 1965, which restored statutory protection for residential tenants, excluded business tenancies.[6] This exclusion has been maintained through subsequent statutory regimes.
9.8 If the whole of the premises is used for business purposes the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II clearly applies. Where there is partial business use together with residential use the position is less clear. A series of cases culminating in the joint appeals Cheryl Investments Ltd v Saldanha and Royal Life Saving Society v Page[7] held that the 1954 Act applies to tenancies with mixed residential and business uses if the degree of business use is significant.
9.16 Nevertheless if an agreement for renting a home includes agricultural or other land which is not subject to the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, or the Agricultural Tenancies Act 1995, we consider that it should be subject to our proposed statutory scheme. This would change the current law that a tenancy of a dwelling let with agricultural land exceeding two acres is excluded from the assured tenancy scheme.[8] This should be so, regardless of the purpose of the letting.[9]
9.18 Long leases are clearly excluded from the secure tenancy regime.[10] They are indirectly excluded – by the low rent rule[11] – from the assured tenancy regime. We do not consider that long leases should fall within the scope of our proposed statutory scheme. Long leaseholders are akin to owner-occupiers and are subject to a range of other statutory provisions. [12]
9.19 We prefer the straightforward approach of the Housing Act 1985, section 115 which defines a long lease as one “granted for a term certain exceeding 21 years, whether or not it is (or may become) terminable before the end of that term by notice given by the tenant or by re-entry or forfeiture.” The definition of a fixed term exceeding 21 years[13] is useful as it conforms to a number of statutory provisions governing long leases. It makes the purpose of the exclusion very clear, and does not require updating in the way that references to rent levels inevitably do.
9.21 In Part VI, we provisionally proposed that, subject to the discussion in this Part, our scheme should apply to all contracts for rent which conferred the right to occupy premises as a home.[14] This provisional proposal raises a number of issues that fall to be considered in determining the overall scope of our scheme. Here we discuss the question of retaining the lease-licence distinction as a test for determining the scope of the scheme. Other issues, such as the requirement for “rent”, and the requirement for the premises to be a person’s home, are discussed in the next section.
9.24 Historically the distinction between a lease and a licence has largely been a matter affecting the private rented sector. Following the model of the Rent Acts, section 1 of the Housing Act 1988 only applies to a “tenancy under which a dwelling-house is let…”. An early case[15] held that use of the word “let” signified that for the legislation to apply, a valid tenancy had to exist. Where there was a genuine licence, the protective legislation did not bite.
9.25 A series of cases in the 1980s established that the courts should decide that licences, which were in reality tenancies, were shams.[16] A consequence of the case law, however, is that landlords can never be entirely certain – unless a legal challenge is made in court – whether a purported licence will be found to be genuine, or a sham.
9.26 In Street v Mountford[17]the House of Lords made it clear that the three hallmarks of a tenancy were (a) exclusive possession, (b) for a term, (c) at a rent. The nature of the agreement was not to be determined by the label the parties give to it but by what the agreement signifies in law. The distinction between exclusive possession and exclusive occupation was that whilst exclusive occupation signified the sole right to use the premises, exclusive possession allowed the tenant to use the premises let to him to the exclusion of all others. As Lord Templeman put it in Street v Mountford the tenant can “keep out strangers and keep out the landlord”.[18]
9.27 The assured shorthold tenancy substantially changed landlord practice. Since landlords are able to charge market rents, and since tenants have relatively limited security of tenure, this has become the preferred form of letting.[19]
9.28 Section 79(3) of the Housing Act 1985 includes licences within the scope of secure tenancy, whether or not granted for a consideration. However, in Westminster City Council v Clark[20]the House of Lords heldthat a licensee could only qualify as a secure tenant if he or she had been granted exclusive possession of a separate dwelling house. This had the effect of making the lease-licence distinction more significant for the secure tenancy regime than perhaps Parliament had intended.[21]
9.29 There are certain arrangements, generally regarded as exceptions to Street v Mountford,[22] where exclusive occupancy is granted, but which have been construed by the courts as not granting the exclusive possession essential for the creation of a tenancy, thereby ensuring they did not attract statutory protection. One key characteristic of exclusive possession is control of the property that is the subject of the agreement. The exceptions to Street v Mountford in essence involve acceptance of the idea that the landlord should retain control over the property despite granting exclusive occupation.
9.30 Rights to occupy almshouses[23] have been construed as providing personal rights to the occupiers rather than property rights. An almsperson occupies an almshouse as a beneficiary of a trust. Accordingly, although an almsperson may make periodic payments for accommodation, he or she is not a tenant and is not entitled to security of tenure under the Housing Act 1988.[24] For the purposes of the Housing Act 1985 (which includes within its ambit licences which grant exclusive possession[25]) there is a specific exclusion of almshouse licences from the secure tenancy regime.[26]
9.31 Another example where the purpose of the accommodation involves a need for the landlord to retain control arises with old people’s homes. The landlord must be able to terminate agreements at the point where the landlord can no longer provide the occupier with necessary support. In Abbeyfield (Harpenden) Society v Woods[27]the occupier of a room in an old people’s home was held to be a licensee. This was explained in Street v Mountford by categorising the occupier as a lodger because of the level of personal services provided.
9.32 Service occupancies can also fall outside of the definition of a lease, even if the normal requirements of rent, term and exclusive possession are met.[28] A person living in tied accommodation will not have a tenancy if it is necessary for him or her to live in the premises in question in order to carry out the employment duties or occupying the premises is a requirement imposed for the better performance of employment duties. Such occupancies are construed as service licences and are therefore excluded from the Housing Act 1988. They are specifically excluded from the secure tenancy regime by paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1985.
9.33 A service licence that is expressly terminable on the cessation of employment comes to an end without any requirement of notice.[29] It was decided in Norris v Checksfield[30] that these types of service licence were not periodic licences and therefore were additionally excluded from the notice requirements of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.[31]
9.35 In Bruton v Quadrant Housing Association[32] the House of Lords reasserted the principles set out in Street v Mountford.[33]The landlord, Quadrant Housing Association, provided short-term accommodation for the homeless and others in need of housing. Mr Bruton occupied a flat, part of a block owned by the London Borough of Lambeth and licensed to the housing association. The borough did not have the legal power to grant a lease or other proprietary interest to the housing association.[34] Mr Bruton signed an agreement that explained that the property was being offered on licence. Mr Bruton then sought to enforce the implied repairing obligations contained in section 11 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985. The implied terms in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 only apply to tenancies.[35] The landlord denied that it had granted a tenancy.
9.37 The extent of the control which management exercises over the room provided is also used to establish that hotel rooms are provided on licence. If the hotel management reserve the right to move the occupiers from room to room then even though the occupier will in general have exclusive use of the room the occupier will not have exclusive possession. In addition the provision in many hotels of a high level of service involving regular entry to the room prevents agreements from being leases. In Brillouet v Landless,[37] for instance, the facilities provided prevented the appellant from demonstrating that he had exclusive possession.
9.39 We have thought very carefully about whether the lease-licence distinction should retained as a means to determine which agreements should fall within our proposed scheme, and those which should fall outside. Considerable conceptual difficulties are caused by the distinction between exclusive occupation and exclusive possession.[38] It is not readily understandable by the public at large.
9.49 We provisionally propose excluding hospitals defined under the National Health Service Act 1977.
9.52 It should be stressed that other claims for exclusion from our scheme should be closely scrutinised by the Secretary of State.[39] We seek to prevent the growth of a large body of exceptions, thereby reintroducing the very complexity we are striving to avoid.
9.54 There are many situations where landlords wish to rent to those under the age of 18. Uncertainty is caused by the fact that leases cannot be granted to a person under the age of 18. A minor cannot hold a legal estate in land.[40]
9.55 While minors can enter validly binding contracts, where a rental agreement is under the assured tenancy regime they will have reduced security of tenure because they can only have a contractual licence, not a tenancy (the position is somewhat different in the public sector[41]). There are special rules to protect the position of minors, but they are bound to pay for necessaries[42] supplied under a contract. Landlords find the position confusing and are reluctant to treat minors on the same basis as over 18-year-olds.
9.58 As noted at the start of the previous section, in Part VI, we provisionally proposed that, subject to the discussion in this Part, our scheme should apply to all contracts for rent which conferred the right to occupy premises as a home.[43] Here we consider the extent to which this definition might be simpler than the existing statutory definition sections and thus avoid some of the judicial interpretation these provisions have attracted.[44]
9.60 Our objective in requiring that “rent” be an essential feature of our statutory scheme is to ensure that the statutory scheme covers all those arrangements which are commonly accepted as falling within the scope of arrangements for renting housing, and excludes those which do not. The basis of renting agreements is that the right to occupy is purchased not by the payment of a substantial capital sum, as occurs with the purchase of a freehold or leasehold, but where payments are made on a regular basis (weekly, fortnightly, monthly) without a substantial pre-payment of capital.[45]
9.61 The word rent is directly linked, in many people’s minds, to the concept of tenancy. If our focus on the contract is agreed, and assuming that the distinction between a lease and a licence will not determine the boundary between agreements within our proposed scheme, and those outside, it should be clear that “rent” should not be linked to the concept of tenancy, but be defined more broadly.[46] We also think that “rent” should include other forms of consideration, such as payments in kind. In short, whether a payment is “rent” should be regarded as a matter of substance, rather than of form. This is why we have put the word in inverted commas.
9.63 We invite views on whether it is necessary to provide a definition of rent.
9.65 Once long leaseholds exceeding 21 years are excluded from our scheme,[47] we do not think it is necessary to exclude other agreements at low rents. Once rent is payable, then there is an enforceable contract and our statutory scheme should apply.
9.70 We provisionally propose that agreements at no rent would fall outside our proposed scheme.
9.72 The present law uses the term “dwelling”. But the House of Lords in Uratemps Ventures v Collins[49] recognised the idea of the home as the appropriate focus for housing legislation when they recently considered the meaning of the word. As Lord Irvine LC put it:
Dwelling is not a term of art, but a familiar word in the English language, which in my judgment in this context connotes a place where one lives, regarding and treating it as home.[50]
The first step is to identify the subject matter of the tenancy agreement. If this is a house or part of a house of which the tenant has exclusive possession with no element of sharing the only question is whether, at the date when the proceedings were brought, it was the tenant’s home. If so it was his dwelling. [51]
9.74 We provisionally propose that the word “home” be used in preference to the word “dwelling”.
9.77 Under the current law, both the assured and secure tenancy regimes require the tenant to occupy the dwelling house.[52] Clearly a tenant cannot be expected to be continuously present within the premises. Temporary absence does not mean that the premises have ceased to be occupied. However where there is a lengthy absence, this can lead to the inference that the property is no longer occupied. Then the tenant has to demonstrate that the property remains his residence, that he intends to return[53] and that there is physical evidence of that intention on the property.[54] This causes uncertainty that we regard as unnecessary and undesirable. So long as the occupier continues to abide by his or her contractual obligations, we see no reason why our scheme should not continue to apply.[55]
9.84 Currently there are statutory requirements that the dwelling must be let as a separate dwelling. The assured tenancy regime provides that where the tenant shares accommodation with someone other than the landlord, as long as there is some part of the accommodation that he or she has exclusive occupation of,[56] the tenant will still be protected under the rather cumbersome route of section 3 of the
1988 Act.[57] If the tenant is sharing with a sub-tenant then section 4 of the Housing Act 1988 provides protection for the tenant.
9.85 “Separateness” is only relevant in the context of the Housing Act 1988 where the tenant shares with the landlord. The tenant does not have “separate” accommodation if in addition to the accommodation he has exclusive possession of, he shares living accommodation. At this point, cooking facilities become relevant. In Uratemps Ventures v Collins[58] Lord Millett said:
For this purpose a kitchen is a living room, at least if it is possible to occupy it and not merely cook and wash up in it; so that a right to occupy a kitchen (as distinct from a right to make some limited use of its facilities) in common with the landlord will take the tenancy out of the Acts.[59]
9.86 Therefore the word “separate” can take out of protection tenancies which would otherwise be protected. However the resident landlord exclusion[60] provides a more extensive exclusion from statutory regulation.
9.87 “Separateness” is significant for the purposes of the Housing Act 1985 even where there is no resident landlord as there is no provision equivalent to the Housing Act 1988, section 3. Therefore there cannot be a secure tenancy where living accommodation is shared with other tenants. Where a tenant has a bedsitting room with a small bathroom attached as in Central YMCA Housing Association Ltd v Saunders[61] but shares kitchen facilities the tenant is excluded from the protection of the secure tenancy regime.
9.92 The current assured and secure tenancy regimes contain long lists of statutory exclusions.[62] If our objective of simplifying the current law is to be achieved, we are anxious to reduce the number of statutory exclusions from our scheme. One of the reasons for placing some categories of tenancy outside the current regimes is a recognition that the landlord should be able to regain possession quickly. Thus the proposals for the reform and simplification of this area of law are to a degree dependent upon whether the six months’ moratorium on the ability of a landlord to obtain a possession order from the court is or is not a feature of type II agreements.[63]
9.96 Agreements made with those who enter property as trespassers are currently excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977[64] and the Housing Act 1985.[65] The lease-licence distinction operates to exclude such occupancies from the Housing Act 1988. There are sound social policy reasons for such exclusions.
9.98 We noted above[66] that the residents of almshouses – who traditionally have been granted licences rather than tenancies – are specifically excluded from the Housing Act 1985, and are indirectly excluded from the Housing Act 1988 by the lease-licence distinction. They are not however excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Thus an almshouse management would have to obtain a court order to lawfully regain possession of accommodation which the licensee is unwilling to leave.
9.101 We also noted above[67] that hostels are excluded from the assured and secure tenancy regimes. The Protection from Eviction Act 1977 excludes public sector hostels provided on a dormitory basis with the provision of board or the facilities for the preparation of food,[68] but includes other hostel arrangements.
9.108 These are discussed in the context of our proposals for a general probationary agreement.[69]
9.118 There is, currently, uncertainty whether the provisions of the Protection for Eviction Act 1977 apply to students.In Mohammed v Manek,[70]the Court of Appeal held that the use of hotel rooms to accommodate homeless persons on a temporary basis was excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 since the premises were not occupied as a dwelling. Students are also accommodated on a temporary basis. Thus it could also be argued that lettings to students also fall outside the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. However it is difficult to see how this interpretation of dwelling is reconcilable with that of the House of Lords in Uratemps Ventures v Collins.[71]
(1) land acquired for development,
(2) temporary accommodation for employment seekers,
(3) short-term arrangements, whereby temporary accommodation is leased to a local authority by a private landlord, and
(4) temporary accommodation during works for non-secure tenants.[72]
These arrangements are not excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.
9.125 Accommodation for asylum seekers provided under Part VI of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 is excluded from security of tenure by paragraph 12A of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1988 and paragraph 4A of Schedule 1 to the Housing Act 1985. Such accommodation is also excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.[73] The management of accommodation of asylum seekers means that landlords will require a simple method of termination during the first six months of the agreement.
9.135 Thescopeof the current exclusion is complicated as a result of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. Only occupancies where the resident landlord actually shares accommodation[75] with the tenant are excluded from the requirements of the Protection from Eviction Act.
9.138 If there is no moratorium, we provisionally propose that anagreement should be excluded from our scheme and from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 where the landlord shares accommodation[76] with the occupier and occupies the property as his only or principal home; or a member of the landlord’s family shares accommodation with the occupier and occupies the premises as his only or principal home.
9.142 Lettings by educational institutions[78]and local authorities to students who are pursuing, or intending to pursue a course of study have long been excluded from statutory regulation. The purpose of the exclusion is to ensure that accommodation specifically provided by educational institutions remains available for the use of successive generations of students.
9.143 Currently the security status of such lettings to students is at best unclear. We accept that these landlords need to act promptly against recalcitrant students. Our proposals on anti social behaviour may be relevant here.[79] More generally universities and local authorities should be able to ensure through the terms of the contract that they keep appropriate control over their student occupiers. This could include not only provisions about behaviour and the treatment of property, but also provisions that the right to occupy was suspended during vacation periods.
9.148 Under certain circumstances local housing authorities have a statutory obligation to provide temporary accommodation for homeless persons under Part VII of the Housing Act 1996.[80] This accommodation may either be provided from their own stock or by registered social landlords or from the private sector.
9.149 Where temporary housing is provided, it is generally not excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.[81] Therefore landlords currently have to give occupiers four weeks’ notice to quit and seek a court order in order to evict.
9.152 Certain lettings are currently excluded from the secure tenancy regime within the Housing Act 1985 because of the temporary nature of the provision made.[82]These arrangements are not excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act 1977.[83]
9.162 We can summarise our proposals for excluding agreements from the scheme as follows.
(1) Irrespective of a decision on the six months’ moratorium, the following would be excluded
(a) holiday lets,
(b) temporary agreements with trespassers, and
(c) supported housing provision in “hostels”.
(2) Additionally, if there is a six months moratorium, the following would have to be excluded
(a) all agreements by resident landlords,
(b) agreements by housing co-operatives,
(c) lettings to students by universities and local authorities,
(d) temporary accommodation for the homeless,
(e) other lettings for defined temporary purposes,
(f) accommodation for asylum seekers, and
(g) service occupancies.
(3) Alternatively, if there is no six months’ moratorium, only the following would be excluded
(a) agreements where the occupier shares accommodation with a resident landlord or a member of the family and the accommodation is the only or principal home of the resident landlord or a member of the family, and
(b) possibly accommodation provided for asylum seekers.
9.164 One group of tenancies, Crown tenancies, (including tenancies of Government departments,[84] but not including tenancies under the management of the Crown Estate Commissioners which were brought into statutory regulation as a result of the Rent Act 1980) are currently excluded from statutory regulation.
[2]Mobile homes are governed by the Mobile Homes Acts 1975 and 1983, and are not considered further.
[3]Defined in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. Proposals for the reform of the law of business tenancies, using the procedures created by the Regulatory Reform Act 2002, are currently under consideration.
[4]Cf Michael Haley, “The statutory regulation of business tenancies: private property, public interest and political compromise” [1999] LS 207.
[5]The extent of the protection was made clear in Vickery v Martin [1944] KB 679.
[6]Rent Act 1965, s 1(3).
[7][1978] 1 WLR 1329.
[8]Housing Act 1988, Sched 1, para 6.
[9]Currently lettings of dwelling-houses which are let together with other land, which is not agricultural land, are included in the ambit of the Housing Act 1988 by virtue of s 2 of the Act. However such lettings are only included if the main purpose of the letting is the provision of a home for the tenant.
[10]Housing Act 1985, Sched 1, para 1 specifically excludes long tenancies.
[11]Housing Act 1988, Sched 1, para 3. A low rent is one that is less than two-thirds of the rateable value if the tenancy was entered into before April 1 1990, or if entered into after that date at a rent of £1000 or less per annum if the property is in Greater London, or if it is elsewhere £250 or less per annum.
[12]Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, s 2(4); Leasehold Reform Act 1967, s 3(1); Landlord and Tenant Act 1987, s 59 (3); Local Government and Housing Act 1989, Sched 10, para 2(3).
[13]There will be a requirement to register leases of seven years or more once the Land Registration Act 2002 comes fully into effect. We consider it remains appropriate that leases for less than 21 years should continue tocome within our statutory scheme so that the rights and obligations of both parties to the agreement are clear.
[14]See para 6.8 above.
[15]Oakley v Wilson [1927] 2 KB 279.
[16]Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809; AG Securities v Vaughan [1990] 1 AC 417.
[18]Ibid, at p 816.
[19]Jill Morgan, “The Casualisation of Housing” (1996) 18 JSWFL 445.
[21]For further discussion of Westminster City Council v Clarke see D Cowan, “A Public Dimension to a Private Problem” (1992) Conveyancer 285.
[23]An almshouse is a “house provided for the reception or relief of poor persons”, per Channel J in Mary Clark Home Trustees v Anderson [1904] 2 KB 645 at p 651. See for further information on almshouse charities, John Alder and Christopher Handy, Housing Associations: The Law of Social Landlords (3rd ed 1997) at p 78.
[24]Gray v Taylor [1998] 1 WLR 1093.
[25] Housing Act 1985, s 79(3).
[26]Schedule1, para. 12.
[27][1968] 1 WLR 374.
[28]Street v Mountford [1985] AC 809 at p 818 per Lord Templeman, “A service occupier is a servant who occupies his mater’s premises in order to perform his duties as a servant. In those circumstances the possession and occupation of the servant is treated as the possession and occupation of the master and the relationship of landlord and tenant is not created.”
[29]Ivory v Palmer [1975] ICR 340.
[30][1991] 1 WLR 1241.
[31]Section 5(1A) of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977 requires that notice to determine a periodic licence must be in writing and contain the prescribed information, and must be given not less than four weeks before the date on which it is to take effect.
[34]Housing Act 1985, s 32.
[35]Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, s 13.
[36]In large numbers of cases agreements to occupy hotel rooms will be excluded from our scheme as holiday lets; see para 9.95 below.
[37](1996) 28 HLR 836.
[38]Professor Mark Pawlowski, “Contractual licences, personal tenancies and tenancies at will” (2001) 5 LTRev p 117 argues (at p 118) that “… there is little to distinguish the licence from a contractual (personal) tenancy, and a contractual licence from a tenancy at will. Most significantly, the hitherto decisive factor of exclusive possession has been eroded significantly in both the Dutton and Bruton cases. The result is to leave the distinction between leases and licenses even more muddy and to prompt the question whether the time has now come to abandon these fine distinctions in favour of a more rational scheme of occupational rights in leasehold law.”
[39]Who will be responsible for the statutory list of exclusions.
[40]Law of Property Act 1925, s 1(6).
[41]Housing Act 1985, s 79(3).
[42]The Sale of Goods Act 1979, section 3 provides “(2) Where necessaries are sold and delivered to a minor … he must pay a reasonable price for them. (3)… ‘[N]ecessaries’ means goods suitable to the condition in life of the minor … and to his actual requirements at the time of the sale and delivery.” Necessaries are those things without which a person cannot reasonably exist and include food, clothing, lodging, education or training in a trade and essential services. In most circumstances involving the renting of one property by a minor we consider that a contract for renting would be construed as a contract for a necessary.
[43]See para 6.8 above.
[44]We have been assisted in our thinking by the broader approach adopted in many Commonwealth countries: above Part IV.
[45]We exclude the requirement to pay a deposit from this.
[46]The definition of rent in the Housing Benefit (General) Regulations 1987 (as amended) provides an example of this approach.
[47]See para 9.20 above.
[48]Housing Act 1988, Sched 1, para 2 excludes from the assured tenancy scheme properties where the rent is in excess of £25,000 per annum. The original justification for this exclusion was that the statutory scheme was designed to provide protection for the most vulnerable in the housing market, and that those people who were able to afford to rent high value properties had no need of the protection.
[50]Ibid, at [3]
[51]Ibid, at [58].
[52]Housing Act 1985, s 79; Housing Act 1988, s 1. The detailed wording is rather different.
[53]Where there is sub-letting of the premises, then it is going to be very difficult for the tenant to demonstrate the necessary intention: Ujima Housing Association v Ansah (1998) 30 HLR 831. Note that in Waltham Forest Community Based Housing Association v Fanning [2001] LTR 41 Rougier J pointed out the irreconcilable dicta on the meaning of “occupying as only or principal home” Housing Act 1988, s 1, in the context of sub-letting. In Crawley BC v Sawyer (1988) 20 HLR 98 and Hussey v Camden LBC (1995) 27 HLR 5, sub-letting of the whole is held to be incompatible with statutory protection. This was not the conclusion in Ujima v Ansah.
[54]Brown v Brash and Ambrose [1948] 2 KB 247.
[55]We discuss in Part X below the distinct issue of what should happen where the occupier walks away from the home, no longer paying the rent or performing his or her obligations under the contract.
[56]See AG Securities v Vaughan [1990] 1 AC 417 where the occupiers who shared a flat were found not to be tenants as they did not have exclusive occupation of their bedrooms.
[57]The Housing Act 1988, s 3(1) provides that
“where a tenant has the exclusive occupation of any accommodation (in this section referred to as “the separate accommodation”) and –
(a)the terms as between the tenant and his landlord on which he holds the separate accommodation include the use of other accommodation (in this section referred to as “the shared accommodation”) in common with another person or other persons, not being or including the landlord, and
(b) by reason only of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) above, the separate accommodation would not, apart from this section, be a dwelling-house let on an assured tenancy,
the separate accommodation shall be deemed to be a dwelling-house let on an assured tenancy … .”
[59]Ibid at [58].
[60]See paras 9.110 and 9.138 above.
[61](1991) 23 HLR 212.
[62]These are summarised in paras 3.18 to 3.37 above.
[63]See para 8.27 above.
[64]Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 3A(6).
[65]Housing Act 1985, s 79(4).
[66]See para 9.30 above.
[67]See para 9.34 to 9.36 above.
[68]Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 3A(8).
[69]See paras 11.16 to 11.39 above.
[70](1995) 27 HLR 439.
[71][2001]UKHL 43; [2001] 3 WLR 806. See the earlier discussion at para 9.72 and 9.73.
[72]Housing Act 1985 Sched 1 paras 3, 5 to 7.
[73]See s 3A(7A).
[74]As Scarman LJ put it in Bardrick v Haycock, Vernon and Robinson (1976)2 HLR 118 “… the mischief at which the section was aimed was the mischief of that sort of social embarrassment arising out of close proximity – close proximity which the landlord had accepted in the belief that he could bring it to an end at any time allowed by the contract of tenancy.”
[75]Accommodation is defined in Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 3A(5) to exclude an area used for storage or a staircase, passage, corridor or other means of access.
[76]As defined in the Protection from Eviction Act 1977: see note 74 above.
[77]For further information on fully mutual housing associations see John Alder and Christopher Handy, Housing Associations: The Law of Social Landlords (3rd ed 1997) pp 55 to 58.
[78]The landlords who are excluded are listed in the Assured and Protected Tenancies (Lettings to Students ) Regulations 1998 (SI 1998 No 1967 as amended).
[79]See below Part XIII.
[80]The temporary housing duties under the Housing Act 1996 are the duties pending inquiries under s 188, duties to the intentionally homeless under s 190, duties pursuant to a local connection referral under s 200 or discharge of the full duty to accommodate those who are homeless, eligible, in priority need, and not intentionally homeless under s 206.
[81]However see the discussion of Mohammed v Manek (1995) 27 HLR 439 above at para 9.118.where
the Court of Appeal held that the use of hotel rooms to accommodate homeless
persons on a temporary basis was excluded from the Protection from Eviction Act
1977 since the premises were not occupied as a dwelling. It is difficult to see how this
interpretation of dwelling is reconcilable with that of the House of Lords in Uratemps Ventures v
Collins[2001] UKHL 43[2001] 3 WLR 806. (Cross reference to
the earlier discussion.)
[82]See para 3.26 above.
[83]See para 3.30 above.
[84]Housing Act 1988, Sched 1, para 11. The National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990, Sched 8, para 19 excludes protection for certain tenants whose landlord is either the Secretary of State or an NHS trust.