Part X
terminating agreements
10.2 Here we discuss
(1) due process – the notice requirements;
(2) termination by occupiers; and
(3) abandonment.
10.3 The need for due process arises where the landlord seeks to terminate the agreement.[1] It has long been accepted that, where an occupier has not voluntarily left[2] a dwelling, re-possession by the landlord is such an important matter – not only for the occupier but also for members of the occupier’s family – that an opportunity should be provided, prior to eviction, for a court to determine whether possession sought by the landlord should be ordered. Further, the court should not act without the occupier being given notice of the landlord’s intention to seek possession.[3] Obtaining a court order also gives the landlord access to court bailiffs in carrying out any eviction, which provides a desirable safeguard against the risks inherent in physical evictions by landlords in person.
10.4 Much of the focus of the recent civil justice reforms has been to ensure that parties settle their disputes without going to court.[4] In the case of possession proceedings the court cannot be relegated to the forum of last resort.
10.8 When repossession of domestic rented housing is contemplated, two key matters need addressing. First is the need for clarity. There must be a clear warning that the home may be lost (together with an idea of what, if anything, can be done to lift the threat). Second, occupiers – taken as a whole – are less likely to take up their rights to challenge evictions than might be expected. One key reason is their lack of knowledge of their rights.[5] There therefore needs to be a clear statement to the occupier that they may be able to challenge the possession proceedings and that they should seek advice quickly.[6] The requirement for a notice enables this prior warning to be given to the occupier in a clear and effective way.
10.9 Some might argue that this would be best provided for by a protocol requiring this information to be provided, with adjournments at the landlord’s expense for the occupier to seek advice if the information has not been given. This would have the advantage for the landlord that it would not operate as a defence to the proceedings. However, many landlords come to court unrepresented. They may be unaware of any protocol. It would be hard to incorporate a protocol into the contract. Notice requirements are, in our view, clearer. The court already has power in many cases to dispense with the notice if it is just and equitable to do so.[7] This allows some discretion to mitigate the effects of what is otherwise a complete defence to proceedings.
10.12 The lengths of the period of notice need to be different to reflect differences in the circumstances in which the notices are used. In particular we think it will be necessary to have faster procedures where possession is sought on the basis of a breach of the agreement[8] or the social policy grounds than where it is sought on estate management grounds.[9] Faster procedures still will be needed for possession cases brought on the basis of anti social behaviour.[10] The length of notice in the notice-only procedure in type II agreements is another factor to consider.[11]
10.19 The question of the period of notice where the landlord of a type II agreement seeks possession on the notice-only basis is raised in Part VIII.[12]
10.20 The periods suggested here are all based on the assumption that the landlord will not be able to start proceedings until after the date stated in the notice. Below,[13] we raise for consideration whether the date stated in the notice should be the date on which the landlord hopes to obtain an order for possession. If that proposal were to be found attractive, the periods suggested above would need to be increased. We would equally welcome the views of consultees as to what those increased periods should be.
10.21 A current source of confusion is that some statutory notice provisions apply instead of the common law rules, while others adopt modified versions of the common law rules.[14] In line with our aim of modernisation and clarity, we believe that notice periods should be defined in the provisions of the legislation that we are proposing. The rules would be incorporated into the compulsory terms of the contract. Those terms can be drafted so as to impose greater certainty than is currently provided by the common law rules.
10.22 The only circumstances where the common law rules would continue to apply would be in relation to the limited number of agreements relating to residential premises which fall wholly outside the statutory framework we now propose (they would also continue to apply to notices served by occupiers[15]).
10.27 We think that any landlord notice should relate to a genuine wish on the part of the landlord to end the agreement. We are attracted by the “use it or lose it” model found in the Housing Acts 1985 and 1988, whereby any notice becomes ineffective if proceedings are not issued within one year.[16] We do not, however, see the need for such a long period. It would seem more sensible to insist on a shorter period, say three months.
10.33 If there was support for this idea, we would envisage that despite having been given notice, occupiers would still need to be warned of the impending issue of proceedings – as required by the Civil Procedure Rules.[17] The landlord would follow the normal Woolf principles in not issuing proceedings without a pre-action warning letter and without checking whether proceedings would in fact be necessary. The flexibility of the Civil Procedure Rules means that it is possible to issue proceedings with no or minimal warning in urgent cases.
10.34 One model for this approach is found in section 83(3)(a)(ii) of the Housing Act 1985.[18] It provides that proceedings may be commenced immediately, on the same day as the issue of the notice. But the provision still requires that the possession order cannot be granted before a specified date. If this model was applied more broadly, the various notice periods we suggested above would need adjustment and would apply to the proposed possession date.
10.38 We want notices to make a number of key points
(1) warning the occupier of possible loss of their home;
(2) indicating the reasons – if any – why possession is being sought;
(3) encouraging them to seek advice on whether they have any legal rights to stay;
(4) advising the occupier to avoid unnecessary court proceedings (and possible costs penalties) by letting the landlord know of his or her response to the notice as soon as possible; and
(5) stressing the value of attendance at court should a hearing take place.
10.40 These requirements would replace the present situation where in some cases the contents of notices are very fully laid down,[19] and in others there are only minimal requirements.[20]
10.41 Our proposals on written contracts should mean occupiers already have the key information set out there. There could also be a requirement that a copy of the written agreement should be enclosed with the notice.[21]
10.46 We invite views as to the contents of notices relating to both type I and type II agreements and whether a single form of notice for both agreement types can be developed.[22]
10.49 Although they may not always realise it, tenants are subject to the same rules relating to notices to quit a periodic agreement as landlords who fall outside the statutory scheme. Such notices must be in writing and the period of notice must be at least 28 days.[23] There appears to be no reason to change these basic requirements. The principle would need to be expanded to apply to contractual licensees.
10.52 One issue relating to notices to quit is notices issued by one of two or more joint occupiers.[24] We are not dealing which this topic here because it is more appropriate for our later consultation paper on succession and transmission of agreements.
10.58 A separate issue is whether the occupier should be told in the agreement of their right to leave without notice in acceptance of a repudiatory breach by the landlord and whether the contract should provide a form of immediate notice for the occupier to signal their acceptance.[25]
10.68 Rather, we think that there needs to be available a summary procedure to deal clearly with abandonment. Such a procedure is now available in sections 17 to19 of the Housing (Scotland) Act 2001.[26] When the property appears abandoned, the landlord can first secure it and then regard the agreement as terminated on receiving no response to prescribed notices served on the property. The landlord can regain possession without threat of proceedings for unlawful eviction and harassment. Importantly it provides a mechanism for the occupier to apply to court to put right any mistakes.
[2]There is no need for a court order where the occupier leaves voluntarily nor where the occupier has abandoned it; see paras 10.49 to 10.69 below.
[3]The same considerations apply in the field of mortgage arrears, though there is no clear statutory authority for making lenders use court proceedings to repossess. However, in practice, lenders almost inevitably want the authority of a court order and accept the need for due process.
[4]See paras 6.176 to 6.185 above.
[5]Our proposals for a written contract in plain English may help put that right, at least in part, but the contract may have been entered into a long time before and the details may be forgotten by the time possession proceedings are started against the occupier.
[6]However, see paras 10.38 10.48 below, as to whether notice on the notice-only basis should contain this prescribed information, given that the current notice to assured shorthold tenants under the Housing Act 1988, s 21 does not.
[7]See Housing Act 1985, s 83(1)(b) and Housing Act 1988, s 8(1)(b). There is no equivalent in the Rent Act 1977, the assured shorthold tenancy notice in the Housing Act 1988, s 21 or the introductory tenancy notice in the Housing Act 1996, s 128.
[8]Two weeks under Housing Act 1988, s 8(4B).
[9]Two months under Housing Act 1988, s 8(4A).
[10]The Housing Act 1996 amended both secure and assured regimes to allow immediate notice: Housing Act 1985, s 83(3) and Housing Act 1988, s 8 (4). However, for no apparent reason there is a discrepancy in that the Housing Act 1985 adds a requirement, not present in the Housing Act 1988, that the date sought for possession cannot be earlier than four weeks from the notice.
[11]See paras 8.36 to 8.38 above.
[12]See paras 8.36 to 8.38.
[13]At paras 10.31 to 10. 37.
[14]Eg it is confusing that Housing Act 1988, s 5(1) provides that landlords’ notices to quit “shall be of no effect”, but s 8(4A)(b) says the period of statutory notices in certain circumstances should be the same as that of the notice to quit.
[15]See paras 10.49 to 10.55.
[16]Cf Housing Act 1985, s 83(3)(b) and s 83(4)(b) and Housing Act 1988, s 8(3)(c).
[17]CPR Pt 1, r 1, together with CPR Practice Direction – Protocols, para 4, imposes the obligation not to issue proceedings without appropriate warning. The obligation is backed up by a range of sanctions, including costs orders and case management powers. Cf also the LCD, Consultation Paper on the General Pre-Action Protocol (October 2001).
[18]Oddly not reproduced in the Housing Act 1988.
[19]See the Secure Tenancies (Notices) Regulations 1987, SI 1987 No 755, made under the Housing Act 1985, s 83, and the Assured Tenancies and Agricultural Occupancies (Forms) Regulations 1997, SI 1997 No 194, made under the Housing Act 1988, s 8.
[20]Cf Housing Act 1988, s 21.
[21]Alternatively it could be enclosed with a pre-action warning or claim letter – cf para10.33 above. At any rate it should be attached to the particulars of claim, given that the landlord will be suing on a written agreement – cf CPR Practice Direction 16, para 7.3(1).
[22]One consequence of our proposals would be that the confusion currently caused by the slight but important differences, for which we see no need, between a notice served under section 21(1) of the Housing Act 1988, during an assured shorthold tenancy fixed term, and one served under section 21(4), relating to a statutory or contractual periodic agreement, could be abolished.
[23]Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 5.
[24]Hammersmith and Fulham London Borough Council v Monk [1992] 1 AC 478; Hounslow London Borough Council v Pilling [1993] 1 WLR 1242; Harrow LBC v Johnstone [1997] 1 WLR 459; Notting Hill Housing Trust v Brackley [2001] EWCA Civ 601, [2001] All ER (D) 164 (Apr). Cf also Andrew Arden, “From Greenwich to Harrow: A Trip Down Memory Lane” [2002] JHL 8.
[25]Cf Hussein v Mehlman [1992] 2 EGLR 87.
[26]See paras 4.14 to 4.18.