QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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HI-LITE ELECTRICAL LIMITED |
Claimant |
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WOLSELEY UK LIMITED |
Defendant |
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DAB PUMPS SpA |
Third Party |
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Neil Moody QC (instructed by Kennedys) for the Defendant
Charles Dougherty (instructed by DWF LLP) for the Third Party
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Ramsey :
Introduction
Background
Court Proceedings
The issues in these proceedings
(1) Was the fire caused by a manufacturing defect for which Wolseley and, in turn, Leader was responsible or was it caused by damage to the float switch cable caused during installation by Hi-Lite or in service?
(2) Should Hi-Lite have installed an RCD?
(3) If an RCD had been fitted would it have prevented the fire?
(4) What effect did any failure to install an RCD have on causation or other matters?
(5) Is any loss arising from the fire too remote?
(6) If the fire was caused by a breach of contract by Wolseley and also by poor installation on the part of Hi-Lite then can there be an apportionment of liability between Wolseley and Hi-Lite?
The witness evidence
The Expert Evidence
The Expert Joint Statement
"we therefore agree that an unusual or abnormal feature promoted the premature failure. We are aware of several theoretical possibilities:
(a), a defect in manufacture of the float and cable assembly;
(b) damage during transport/storage
(c) damage in service
(d) damage during installation
(e) erroneous installation, in particular abnormally short float switch cable length."
The Expert Reports
Expert evidence at trial
(1) Evidence relating to the float switch cable
"I recall a few days before the fire, feeling a small electric current going through my arm as I put my arm into the tank of water to empty the water to gain access to the filter. I felt the shock travel up my arm. It only happened once. I recall this was 2 or 3 days before the fire. I did not mention it to anyone until after the fire, when I mentioned it to Lillie, the salon Manager."
(2) Expert evidence relating to the RCD
"For installations of increased shock risk such as those in Part 6, additional measures may be required such as:
(i) Automatic disconnection of supply shall be by means of a residual current device having a rated residual operating current I?n not exceeding 30mA.
(ii) supplementary equipotential bonding, and
(iii) reduction of maximum fault clearance time."
Analysis of the Expert Evidence
The cause of the fire
Introduction
Submissions
"It is admitted that the Fire originated in the W300. The fire was caused by arcing in the float cable caused by a fatigue failure. The fatigue failure was in turn caused by the fact that the cable was shortened by Mr Fletcher so that it was less than 10cm long, and/or because the cable was damaged in the course of installation and/or service."
"8.15 We agree that a failure of the float switch cable after 9 weeks service was premature. However:
8.15.1 In Mr Champion's and Mr Bullen's opinion a fatigue failure after only 9 weeks service implies an excessive flexing frequency (number of cycles) of operation, leading to an excessive stress probably arising from a shortened length of free cable to the float switch, or damage to the float switch cable, or some combination of some or all of these factors;
8.15.2 Mr Coates is of the opinion that the premature failure is indicative of a defect in, or damage to, the cable."
Decision
The approach of the courts
"The question, and the sole question, which Your Lordships have to decide is whether, on the basis of those primary findings of fact, Bingham J. and the Court of Appeal were justified in drawing the inference that the ship was, on a balance of probabilities, lost by perils of the sea.
In approaching this question it is important that two matters should be borne constantly in mind. The first matter is that the burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the ship was lost by perils of the sea, is and remains throughout on the shipowners. Although it is open to underwriters to suggest and seek to prove some other cause of loss, against which the ship was not insured, there is no obligation on them to do so. Moreover, if they chose to do so, there is no obligation on them to prove, even on a balance of probabilities, the truth of their alternative case.
The second matter is that it is always open to a court, even after the kind of prolonged inquiry with a mass of expert evidence which took place in this case, to conclude, at the end of the day, that the proximate cause of the ship's loss, even on a balance of probabilities, remains in doubt, with the consequence that the shipowners have failed to discharge the burden of proof which lay upon them."
"Lord Brandon of Oakbrook, giving the only substantive opinion, described the approach of the trial judge as erroneous by reference to the inappropriateness of applying what was described as the dictum of Mr Sherlock Holmes. First, a trial judge was not compelled to choose between two theories, where the evidence was unsatisfactory; he could decide the case on the basis that the claimant had not proved his case. Secondly it was not possible to proceed on the basis of eliminating the impossible and deciding that the remaining explanation, however improbable, must be the cause, unless all the relevant facts were known; that state of affairs did not exist, as the ship had sunk in deep water. Thirdly, the concept of proof on a balance of probabilities had to be applied with common sense. It required a judge, before he found a particular event occurred, to be satisfied on the evidence that it was more likely to have occurred than not. If the judge concluded that the occurrence of an event was extremely improbable, a finding by him that it nevertheless was more likely to have occurred than not did not accord with common sense. He concluded:
"In my opinion Bingham J. adopted an erroneous approach to this case by regarding himself as compelled to choose between two theories, both of which he regarded as extremely improbable, or one of which he regarded as extremely improbable and the other of which he regarded as virtually impossible. He should have borne in mind, and considered carefully in his judgment, the third alternative which was open to him, namely, that the evidence left him in doubt as to the cause of the aperture in the ship's hull, and that, in these circumstances, the shipowners had failed to discharge the burden of proof which was on them.""
"As a matter of common sense it will usually be safe for a judge to conclude, where there are two competing theories before him neither of which is improbable, that having rejected one it is logical to accept the other as being the cause on the balance of probabilities. It was accepted in the course of argument on behalf of the appellant that, as a matter of principle, if there were only three possible causes of an event, then it was permissible for a judge to approach the matter by analysing each of those causes. If he ranked those causes in terms of probability and concluded that one was more probable than the others, then, provided those were the only three possible causes, he was entitled to conclude that the one he considered most probable, was the probable cause of the event provided it was not improbable."
Wolseley and the Birmingham Proceedings
"For the avoidance of doubt all of the material is disclosed to you so that you may consider Obsession's claim against Hi-Lite and then indicate whether there are any additional matters which Hi-Lite should raise in its defence..."
Wolseley's Defence and the expert evidence
(i) "Wolseley is investigating the cause of the Fire. It is not admitted that the Fire was caused by the W300 or that, if it was caused by the W300, the mechanism of the Fire was as found by HH Judge McKenna. Hi-Lite is required to prove the cause of the Fire."
The approach in this case
Manufacturing Defect
Damage in installation or service
Conclusion
Should Hi-Lite have fitted an RCD?
The effect of fitting an RCD
The effect of a failure to fit an RCD
"Further, in my view it also does not matter whether you regard the doctrine of "new intervening act" as part of the law of "causation" or "remoteness of damage". The doctrine of "new intervening cause" is used by the courts as one of a number of means by which to decide whether a defendant, whose breach of a duty of care to a claimant has been established, will be responsible for certain consequences of that negligence and the damages that are claimed to flow from those consequences."
"The question of the effect of a novus actus 'can only be answered on a consideration of all the circumstances and, in particular, the quality of that later act or event'. Four issues need to be addressed. Was the intervening conduct of the third party such as to render the original wrongdoing merely a part of the history of events? Was the third party's conduct either deliberate or wholly unreasonable? Was the intervention foreseeable? Is the conduct of the third party wholly independent of the defendant…?"
(1) That, although an evidential burden rests on the defendant insofar as it contends that there was a break in the chain of causation, the legal burden of proof rests throughout on the claimant to prove that the defendant's breach of contract caused its loss.
(2) That, in order to comprise a novus actus interveniens, so breaking the chain of causation, the conduct of the claimant "must constitute an event of such impact that it 'obliterates' the wrongdoing…" of the defendant: Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (19th ed.), at para. 2-78. The same test applies in contract. For there to be a break in the chain of causation, the true cause of the loss must be the conduct of the claimant rather than the breach of contract on the part of the defendant; if the breach of contract by the defendant and the claimant's subsequent conduct are concurrent causes, it must be unlikely that the chain of causation will be broken. In circumstances where the defendant's breach of contract remains an effective cause of the loss, at least ordinarily, the chain of causation will not be broken.
(3) That it is difficult to conceive that anything less than unreasonable conduct on the part of the claimant would be capable of breaking the chain of causation. It is, however, also plain that mere unreasonable conduct on a claimant's part will not necessarily do so.
(4) That the claimant's state of knowledge at the time of and following the defendant's breach of contract is likely to be a factor of very great significance.
(5) That the question of whether there has been a break in the chain of causation is fact sensitive, involving as it does a practical inquiry into the circumstances of the defendant's breach of contract and the claimant's subsequent conduct.
Remoteness
Apportionment
"The problem which this court faces, on claim and counterclaim alike, is in my judgment a problem of causation of damage. On the claim, the question is how far the damage to its goods which the lessee has suffered was caused by the corporation's negligence notwithstanding the lessee's own breach of covenant. On the counterclaim, the question is how far the damage to the corporation's building which the corporation has suffered was caused by the lessee's breach of covenant, notwithstanding the corporation's own negligence. The effect is that on each question, apportionment is permissible. This is the same result as the 1945 Act would produce, but it is not reached through the Act, because the obstacle which the 1945 Act was passed to override is not there on either claim or counterclaim in the present case."
"... I regard as particularly significant the number of outlets in the relevant half of the roof for which the corporation and the lessee were respectively responsible, and on a broad assessment I would apportion liability as to 90% to the corporation and as to 10% to the lessee."
"If the 1945 Act has no application, what is the position on the two claims? The evidence clearly indicates that the damage to the plaintiff's premises was attributable to two concurrent causes, both operating contemporaneously. One was the defendant's negligence and the other was the plaintiff's breach of covenant. I agree with the finding of Dillon LJ that simply as a matter of causation, based upon the amount of water which was wrongfully on the roof, the plaintiff's breach of covenant was a factor of one-tenth of that united cause, and the defendant's negligence a factor of nine-tenths. If the collapse had been caused by the combined negligence of the defendant and some third party, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover all its damages from the defendant, leaving it to get contribution from its fellow tortfeasor: see Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd [1948] AC 549 at p 563 per Lord du Parcq. But that does not apply when the other cause comes from the plaintiff himself.
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Where one is dealing with two contemporaneous causes, each springing from the breach of a legal duty but operating in unequal proportions, the solution should be to assess the recoverable damages for both on the basis of causation."
"Similarly, we think that the facts and circumstances of the present case are such that it can and should be easily distinguished from those in [Tennant]. We merely add respectfully our view that the scope and extent of this last mentioned case would have to be a matter of substantial argument if the principle there applied were to arise for consideration in another case."
"That is clearly intended to be a warning against following the Tennant case uncritically but is itself plainly obiter, and it is therefore not entirely clear to me where it leaves a first-instance judge who is bound to follow Tennant unless it can be distinguished, which in my view can be done only rather artificially and unsatisfactorily, since the crucial justification there for apportionment seems to have been not reciprocal liability (which might rather have been a reason for set-off) but the fact that on both claim and counterclaim the concurrent cause arose not from the act of a third party but from that of the claimant itself."
"On the other hand, in category (i) cases there is no decision in which contributory negligence has been held to be a partial defence. There are powerful dicta to the effect that it cannot be: see the judgment of the court in Tennant Radiant Heat Ltd. v. Warrington Development Corporation [1988] 1 E.G.L.R. 41 , in Bank of Nova Scotia v. Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd. [1990] 1 Q.B. 818 , 904, and the observations of Nolan L.J. in Schering Agrochemicals Ltd. v. Resibel N.V. S.A. (unreported), 26 November 1992; Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No. 1298 of 1992, noted in (1993) 109 L.Q.R. 175 , 177.
The defendant's argument that, because the plaintiff owed duties to its employees it was therefore under a duty in its own interest to see that the defendant fulfilled its obligations under the contract, is inconsistent with many cases in which it has been held that employers and others liable to third parties for failure of plant or equipment are entitled to rely on warranties given by their suppliers: see for example Mowbray v. Merryweather [1895] 2 QB 640 ; Sims v. Foster Wheeler Ltd. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 769 , 777 and Lambert v. Lewis [1982] A.C. 225
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That a contracting party is entitled to rely on the other party to a contract to carry out his undertaking and to act carefully in doing so was emphasised by Devlin J. in Compania Naviera Maropan S.A. v. Bowaters Lloyd Pulp and Paper Mills Ltd. [1955] 2 Q.B. 68 , 77, where he said:
"Indeed, I think business, whether maritime or otherwise, might be gravely impeded if the ordinary principle were not allowed to operate freely - and by the ordinary principle I mean that, generally speaking, a man is entitled to act in the faith that the other party to a contract is carrying out his part of it properly. It does not lie in the mouth of the promisor to say that a promisee has no right to assume that a promise has been faithfully carried out and should make his own inquiries to see whether it is or not. If everything done under contract has to be scrutinised and tested by the other party before he can safely act upon it, many transactions might be seriously held up...""
"In my judgment therefore in the present state of the law contributory negligence is not a defence to a claim for damages founded on breach of a strict contractual obligation. I do not believe the wording of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 can reasonably sustain an argument to the contrary. Even if it did, in the present case the nature of the contract and the obligation undertaken by the skilled contractor did not impose on the plaintiff any duty in its own interest to prevent the defendant from committing the breaches of contract. To hold otherwise would, I consider, be equivalent to implying into the contract an obligation on the part of the plaintiff inconsistent with the express terms agreed by the parties."
Conclusion