OUTER HOUSE, COURT OF SESSION
[2007] CSOH NUMBER
|
CA101/00
|
OPINION OF
LORD DRUMMOND YOUNG
in the cause
CITY INN LIMITED
Pursuer;
against
SHEPHERD
CONSTRUCTION LIMITED
Defender:
(Bristol
action: proof)
ннннннннннннннннн________________
|
Pursuer: Keen, QC, Higgins; McGrigor Donald
Defender: Borland; Pinsent
Masons
30 November 2007
[1] The pursuers and the
defenders are respectively the employer and the contractor under a contract
dated 15 October and 11 November 1998 for the construction of a
hotel at Temple Way, Bristol. The contract incorporates the conditions of
the Standard Form of Building Contract (Private Edition with Quantities) (1980
edition) together with a substantial number of additional provisions, including
an Abstract of Conditions and a Schedule of Amendments specially prepared for
the purposes of the contract. The
contractual completion date specified in the Abstract of Conditions was 25 January 1999. In terms of clause 24 of the Conditions
of Contract and the Abstract of Conditions liquidate and ascertained damages
were payable at the rate of г30,000 per week for the period between the
completion date and the date of practical completion. Initially the architect was RMJM Scotland
Limited. That firm also acted as
structural engineer and mechanical and electrical engineer. On 2 December 1998, however, RMJM was
dismissed and Keppie Architects was appointed as
contract architect. At the same time Blyth & Blyth was appointed
as structural engineer and mechanical and electrical engineer.
[2] The
date of possession specified in the Abstract of Conditions was 26 January 1998, and the defenders took
possession of the site on or about that date. Thereafter works proceeded. On 27 April 1999 Keppie
Architects, who at that time were the contract architect, issued a certificate
of practical completion certifying that practical completion of the works had
been achieved on 29 March 1999. On 9 June 1999 the architect issued a
certificate revising the completion date to 22 February 1999. On the same date the architect issued a
certificate of non-completion certifying that the defenders had failed to
complete the works by the completion date.
The result of those certificates was that the defenders were awarded a
four-week extension of time but, in terms of clause 24 of the Conditions of
Contract, the pursuers were entitled to deduct liquidate and ascertained
damages for the five-week period from 23 February 1999 (the revised
completion date) to 29 March 1999 (the date of practical completion)
at a weekly rate of г30,000. On that
basis of the pursuers deducted г150,000 from monies due to the defenders.
[3] Thereafter
certain disputes arising between the parties were referred to
adjudication. The adjudicator, Mr John D Spencely, determined that the defenders were entitled to a
further five-week extension of time and directed the pursuers to repay them the
sum of г150,000. That determination is
not, of course, conclusively binding, and the matters argued before the
adjudicator fall to be determined in the present proceedings as if no
determination had been made by the adjudicator. The pursuers contend that the defenders are
not entitled to any extension of time beyond the contractual completion date, 25 January 1999. They make this contention on two distinct
bases. First, they rely on the terms of
clause 13.8 of the contract conditions, which is one of the special amendments
added by the parties. That clause, in
summary, provides that when an architect's instruction is liable to delay the
completion date, the contractor is not to execute the instruction without
following certain defined procedures. If
the contractor fails to do so, he is not entitled to any extension of
time. The pursuers submit that the
defenders did not follow the procedures specified in clause 13.8, and are
accordingly, for that reason alone, not entitled to any extension of time. Secondly, the pursuers contend that as a
matter of fact none of the instructions issued by the architect caused any
delay in completion. As a secondary
argument they submit that, if any delays were caused by architect's
instructions, those delays were concurrent with delays arising from matters
that were the defenders' fault; as a result it is contended that the defenders
are not entitled to any extension of time.
[4] The
defenders contend that they are entitled to an extension of time of 11 weeks
in total, with the result that the contractual completion date should be fixed
at 14 April 1999. That period of 11 weeks is broken down
as follows. First, it is said that a
delay of three and half weeks was caused by the late issue of an architect's
instruction varying the form of gas membrane incorporated into the substructure
of the hotel. Secondly, it is said that
a delay of five weeks beyond the contractual Completion Date was caused by the
late issue of an architect's instruction varying the roof cladding of the hotel
from the built-up system on which the contract was based to an alternative
system known as the Stramit Speedeck
system; three and a half weeks of that period are said to have been concurrent
with the foregoing three-week delay.
Thirdly, it is said that a six-week delay was caused, following the
dismissal of the original design team by the pursuers in November 1998, by
the late issue of a significant number of instructions for variations and
additional work and late confirmation of details in the work. In relation to clause 13.8 of the contract,
the defenders contend that it only has application to instructions that are
liable to cause delay because of their content; it has no application to
instructions that are liable to cause delay simply because they are issued too
late for the contractor's programme. In
the present case, it is said, the delays were with one exception caused by the
lateness of the architect's instructions, not by their content. In addition, the defenders contend that in
the circumstances of the contract the pursuers in part, through the actings of the contract architect, have waived compliance
with clause 13.8, or alternatively that the pursuers are personally barred from
relying on clause 13.8. The pursuers
dispute the defenders' construction of clause 13.8; they submit that the distinction
between the lateness and the content of instructions is not well founded. They further contend that no waiver or
personal bar occurred in the circumstances of the case. In addition, they contend that the system of
roof cladding specified in the contract was not the built-up system claimed by
the defenders but was rather the Stramit Speedeck system. The
result is that the architect's instruction to use the Stramit
Speedeck system was not a variation and does not give
rise to a claim for an extension of time.
[5] Against
the foregoing background, the pursuers have raised the present action in which
they conclude for a range of remedies.
First, they seek declarator that the
Completion Date is 25 January 1999 and that the defenders were
not entitled to the four-week extension granted by the architect. On that basis they conclude for reduction of
the Certificate of Notification of Revision to Completion Date issued by Keppie Architects on 9 June 1999; that was the document
through which the architect granted the four-week extension. They further conclude for payment of
liquidate and ascertained damages in terms of clause 24.2 of the Conditions of
Contract; those are said to be due in respect of the period from 25 January 1999 to 29 March 1999, and amount to г270,000 in
total. The pursuers further seek partial
reduction of two Interim Certificates, Nos 19 and 21,
issued by Keppie Architects on 25 February 2000 and
13 July 2001, and repetition of the amounts that are said to have been
erroneously paid to the defenders in terms of those two certificates; those
amounts total г121,811.39, inclusive of value added tax. The defenders have lodged a counterclaim in
which they seek declarator that they are entitled to
an extension of time of 11 weeks, with the Completion Date accordingly being 14 April 1999.
Consequentially, they seek reduction of the Certificate of Notification
of Revision to Completion Date issued by Keppie Architects
on 9 June 1999 and reduction of the Certificate of Non-Completion
issued by Keppie Architects on the same date. Finally, the defenders seek payment of the (amended)
sum of г27,069; that sum, they claim, is direct loss and expense suffered by
them of which they are entitled to reimbursement under clause 26 of the
Conditions of Contract. That sum
represents two weeks' prolongation costs, and it recognizes that the
adjudicator has already made an award of prolongation costs for nine of the 11-week
extension of time claimed by the defenders.
[6] After
a period of adjustment the action proceeded to a debate before Lord Macfadyen (reported at 2002 SLT 781). That debate covered a number of issues
arising out of the parties' pleadings.
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that Lord Macfadyen considered the construction of clause 13.8 of the
contract conditions. He concluded that
it applied to late instructions which because of their content gave rise to a
need to adjust the contract sum or to grant an extension of time, but that it
did not apply to late instructions which, merely because of their lateness,
gave rise to a need to adjust the contract sum or grant an extension of
time. I refer to this issue further at
paragraphs [140]-[144]. A reclaiming
motion was marked against Lord Macfadyen's
decision. This was heard by the Second
Division and was refused (reported at 2003 SLT 885), although the decision
proceeded to some extent on different grounds.
The reclaiming motion did not, however, cover the question of whether
clause 13.8 extended to late instructions which because of their lateness gave
rise to a need for an adjustment of the contract sum or an extension of time.
[7] I
intend to begin by setting out the contractual provisions that govern the
parties' claims and considering the proper approach to the construction of such
a contract. Thereafter I will deal with
the evidence that was led, first in general terms and thereafter in relation to
each of the three matters relied on by the defenders in order to justify an
extension of time. Those three matters
are: first the architect's instruction given on 23 March 1998 to use an
alternative form of gasproof membrane; secondly the
instructions given by the architect in relation to the roof steelwork and roof
coverings; and thirdly the series of instructions issued by Keppie
Architects after they became contract architect on or about 2 December
1998. After considering the
justification for an extension of time, I will consider the construction of
clause 13.8, and the issues of waiver and personal bar that arise in relation
to that clause, in order to determine whether the defenders are entitled to an
extension. Finally, I will consider the
defenders' claim in the counterclaim for direct loss and expense that is
alleged to have been caused by the various architect's instructions.
The relevant
contractual provisions
[8] The
parties' contract incorporates the conditions of the Standard Form of Building
Contract (Private Edition with Quantities) (1980 edition), subject to a
substantial number of amendments. Clause
24.1 of that form of contract states that if the Contractor fails to complete
the Works by the Completion Date then the architect shall issue a certificate
to that effect. Clause 24.2.1 provides
for the payment of liquidated and ascertained damages in the event that the Contractor
fails to complete the Works by the Completion Date; these are payable for the
period between the Completion Date and the date of Practical Completion. The parties fixed the amount of liquidated
damages at г30,000 per week.
[9] This
is, however, subject to the power of the architect to grant an extension of
time under clause 25. Clause 25.2.1.1
provides as follows:
"If and whenever it
becomes reasonably apparent that the progress of the Works is being or is
likely to be delayed the Contractor shall forthwith give written notice to the Architect
of the material circumstances including the cause or causes of the delay and
identify in such notice any event which in his opinion is a Relevant
Event".
Clause 25.3.1 then provides:
"If, in the opinion of
the Architect, upon receipt of any notice, particulars and estimate under
clauses 25.2.1.1 and 25.2.2,
.1 any of the events which are stated
by the Contractor to be the cause of the delay is a Relevant Event and
.2 the completion of the Works is likely to be delayed thereby
beyond the Completion Date the Architect shall in writing to the Contractor
give an extension of time by fixing such later date as the Completion Date as
he then estimates to be fair and reasonable.
The Architect shall, in fixing such new Completion Date, state:
.3 which of the Relevant Events he has
taken into account and
.4 the extent, if any, to which he has had regard to any
instruction under clause 13.2 requiring as a Variation the omission of any work
issued since the fixing of the previous Completion Date,
...".
Clause 25.3.3 further provides as follows:
"After the Completion Date,
if this occurs before the date of Practical Completion, the Architect may, and
not later than the expiry of 12 weeks after the date of Practical Completion
shall, in writing to the Contractor ...
.1 fix a Completion Date later than that previously fixed if in
his opinion the fixing of such later Completion Date is fair and reasonable
having regard to any of the Relevant Events, whether upon reviewing a previous
decision or otherwise and whether or not the Relevant Event has been
specifically notified by the Contractor under clause 25.2.1.1...".
Relevant Events are specified in clause 25.4 (see
clause 1.3). So far as material clause
25.4 provides as follows:
"The following are the
Relevant Events referred to in clause 25:
...
.5 compliance with the Architect's
instructions
5.1 under clauses...
13.2, 13.3 (except compliance with an Architect's instruction for the
expenditure of a provisional sum for defined work)...
...
.6 the Contractor not having received in
due time necessary instructions (including those for or in regard to the
expenditure of provisional sums), drawings, details or levels from the Architect
for which he specifically applied in writing provided that such application was
made on a date which having regard to the Completion Date was neither
unreasonably distant from nor unreasonably close to the date on which it was
necessary for him to receive the same".
Clauses 13.2 and 13.3 deal
respectively with variations and the expenditure of provisional sums.
[10] Clause
26 makes provision for loss and expense caused to the Contractor by matters
materially affecting regular progress of the Works. Clause 26.1 is in the following terms:
"If the Contractor
makes written application to the Architect stating that he has incurred or is
likely to incur direct loss and/or expense in the execution of this Contract
for which he would not be reimbursed by a payment under any other provision in
this Contract ... because the regular progress of the Works or of any part
thereof has been or is likely to be materially affected by any one or more of
the matters referred to in clause 26.2; and if and as soon as the Architect is
of the opinion... that the regular progress of the Works or of any part thereof
has been or is likely to be so materially affected as set out in the
application of the Contractor then the Architect from time to time thereafter
shall ascertain... the amount of such loss and/or expense which has been or is
being incurred by the Contractor; provided always that:
1.
the Contractor's application shall be made as soon as it has
become, or should reasonably have become, apparent to him that the regular
progress of the Works or of any part thereof has been or was likely to be affected
as aforesaid, and
2.
the Contractor shall in support of his application submitted
to the Architect upon request such information as should reasonably enable the Architect
to form an opinion as aforesaid, and
3.
the Contractor shall submit to the Architect... upon request
such details of such loss and/or expense as are reasonably necessary for such
ascertainment as aforesaid ".
Clause 26.2 provides as follows:
"The following are the
matters referred to in clause 26.1:
.1 the Contractor not having received in due time necessary
instructions (including those for or in regard to the expenditure of
provisional sums), drawings, details or levels from the Architect for which he
specifically applied in writing provided that such application was made on a
date which having regard to the Completion Date was neither unreasonably
distant from nor unreasonably close to the date on which it was necessary for
him to receive the same;
...
.7 Architect's instructions issued
under clause 13.2 requiring a
Variation or
under clause 13.3 in regard to
the expenditure of provisional sums...
...".
Interpretation
of clauses 24 and 25: general considerations
[10] The
effect of provisions such as are found in clauses 24 and 25 of the present JCT
Standard Form was set out by Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
in Percy Bilton
Ltd v Greater London Council, [1982] 1 WLR 794, at 801:
"1. ...The general rule is that the main contractor
is bound to complete the work by the date for completion stated in the
contract. If he fails to do so, he will
be liable for liquidated damages to the employer.
2.
That is subject to the exception that the employer is not
entitled to liquidated damages if by his acts or
omissions he has prevented the main contractor from completing his work by
completion date....
3.
These general rules may be amended by the express terms of
the contract.
4.
In this case, the express terms of clause 23 of the contract
[corresponding to the present clause 25] do affect the general rule. For example, where completion is delayed '(a) by force majeure, or (b) by reason
of any exceptionally inclement weather' the architect is bound to make a
fair and reasonable extension of time for completion of the work. Without that express provision, the main contractor
would be left to take the risk of delay caused by force majeure
or exceptionally inclement weather under the general rule".
Although these remarks relate to the 1963 JCT Standard
Form, the general approach described that passage is equally applicable to the
1980 version of the contract. It follows
that the extension of time provisions such as are found now in clause 25 are of
critical importance in ensuring that the contractor is not subjected to
liquidated damages for events that are outwith his
control.
[11] Such
clauses are important for a further reason.
Under the JCT Standard Forms the employer is entitled to liquidated and
ascertained damages in the event that the contractor fails to complete the
works in time; in the present case such a provision is found in clause 24 of
the contractual conditions. Such clauses
are construed strictly, and if the contractor is prevented from completing in
time through the actings of the employer the
liquidated damages clause will be the treated as inapplicable. This point was made by Salmon LJ in Peak Construction (Liverpool) Ltd v
McKinney Foundations Ltd, [1970] BLR 111, at 121:
"A clause giving the
employer liquidated damages at so much a week or month which elapses between
the date fixed for completion and the actual date for completion is usually
coupled, as in the present case, with an extension of time clause. The liquidated damages clause contemplates a
failure to complete on time due to the fault of the contractor. It is inserted by the employer for his own
protection; for it enables him to recover a fixed sum as compensation for delay
instead of facing the difficulty and expense of proving the actual damage which
the delay may have caused him. If the
failure to complete on time is due to the fault of both the employer and the contractor,
in my view the clause does not bite. I
cannot see how, in the ordinary course, the employer can insist on compliance
with a condition if it is partly his own fault that it cannot be fulfilled....
I consider that unless the contract expresses a contrary intention the
employer, in the circumstances postulated, is left to his ordinary remedy; that
is to say, to recover such damages as he can prove flow from the contractor's
breach. No doubt if the extension of
time clause provided for the postponement of the completion date on account of
delay caused by some breach of fault on the part of the employer, the position
would be different. This would mean that
the parties had intended the employer could recover liquidated damages notwithstanding
that he was partly to blame for the failure to achieve the completion
date. In such a case the architect would
extend the date for completion, and the contractor would then be liable to pay
liquidated damages for delay as from the extended completion date.
The liquidated damages and
extension of time clauses in printed forms of contract must be construed
strictly contra proferentem. If the employer wishes to recover liquidated
damages for a failure by the contractors to complete on time in spite of the
fact that some of the delay is due to the employer's own fault or breach of
contract, any extension of time clause should provide, expressly or by
necessary inference, for an extension on account of such fault or breach on the
part of the employer".
Salmon LJ refers to fault or breach of contract on the
part of the employer. Nevertheless, it
is clear that his analysis applies equally to cases where the employer, through
the contract architect, instructs a variation.
A further point is of some significance.
It seems implicit in Salmon LJ's analysis that
an extension of time should still be available in cases where delay has been
caused partly by the fault of the contractor and partly by the fault of the
employer; reference is made to the employer's being "partly" to blame
for the failure to achieve the completion date.
The precise approach that should be followed in cases where delay is
caused by concurrent causes, one of which is the fault of the contractor and
one of which is not, is a matter of some importance in this case, and I return
to it below.
[12] The
general approach to the interpretation of clause 25 was the subject of detailed
discussion by Colman J. in Balfour Beatty
Building Ltd v Chestermount Properties Ltd, 1993,
62 BLR 1, at 25:
"[I]t is right to
examine the underlying contractual purpose of the completion date/extension of
time/liquidated damages regime. At the
foundation of this code is the obligation of the contractor to complete the
works within the contractual period terminating at the completion date and on failure
to do so to pay liquidated charges for the period of time by which practical
completion exceeds the completion date.
But superimposed on this regime is a system of allocation of risk. If events occur which are non-contractor's
risk events and those events caused the progress of the works to be delayed, in
as much as such delay would otherwise cause the contractor to become liable for
liquidated damages or for more liquidated damages, the contract provides for
the completion date to be prospectively or, under clause 25.3.3,
retrospectively, adjusted in order to reflect the period of delay so caused and
thereby reduce pro tanto the amount of liquidated
damages payable by the contractor.
Likewise, if the works are reduced by an omission instructed by the architect
it may be fair and reasonable to reduce the
contract period for completion prospectively or retrospectively and therefore
to advance the completion date. In view
of the inherent difficulties in predicting with precision the impact on the progress
of the works of non-contractor's risk events, particularly when operating
simultaneously with contractor's risk events the architect is given a power of
retrospective adjustment of the completion date. The underlying objective is to arrive at the
aggregate period of time within which the contract works as ultimately defined
ought to have been completed having regard to the incidence of non-contractor's
risk events and to calculate the excess time if any, over that period, which
the contractor took to complete the works.
In essence, the architect is concerned to arrive at an aggregate period
for completion of the contractual works, having regard to the occurrence of
non-contractor's risk events and to calculate the extent to which the
completion of the works has exceeded that period".
A further issue arose in the same case, namely whether
in fixing a the new completion date under clause 25 the architect should ignore
the previous completion date and start his assessment of the extension of time from
the date when the variation instruction was given, or should start with the
existing completion date and postpone it to the extent considered fair and
reasonable having regard to the delay caused by the requirement to execute the
variation instructions. Colman J.
favoured the latter approach (described as a "net" method). He said (at page 29):
"[O]ne again returns to the purpose of the architect's powers
under clause 25. He looks back after the
most recently-fixed completion date and, under clause 25.3.3, perhaps after
practical completion, assesses the extent to which the period of contract time
available for completion ought to be extended or reduced having regard to the
incidence of the relevant events. His
yardstick is what is fair and reasonable.
For this purpose he will take into account amongst other factors the
effect that the relevant event had on the progress of the works. Did it bring the progress of the works to a
standstill? Or did it merely slow down
the progress of the works? The function
which he performs under clause 25.3.3 must as a matter of construction be in substance exactly analogous to that which he performs
under clause 25.3.1. The difference is
that under the former clause he does it after the completion date and not
before it. But in both cases his
objective must be the same: to assess whether any of the relevant events has
caused delayed to the progress of the works and, if so, how much. He must then apply the result of his
assessment of the amount of delay caused by the relevant events by extending
the contract period for completion of the works by a like amount and this he
does by means of postponing the completion date.
It will be perfectly obvious
that unless the amount of time by which he postpones the completion date
corresponds with the amount of delay time caused by the relevant events, the contractor
will become potentially or actually liable for an amount of liquidated damages
commensurate with a period which does not
correspond with the amount of delay beyond the previously fixed completion date
attributable to events of which he takes the risk under the contract".
[13] The
foregoing discussion of clause 25 was described as a "valuable
interpretation" by Dyson J in Henry
Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel
(Manchester) Ltd, 1999, 70 Con LR 32 at paragraph 12. Certain features of the discussion are
noteworthy. First, the scheme of
sections 24 and 25 recognizes an allocation of risk: the contractor is bound to
complete the works by the completion date except to the extent that delay is
caused by events that are not at the contractor's risk. In general, as can readily be seen from the
terms of clause 25.4, these are either events such as inclement weather which
are extraneous to both parties or are events such as a variation which
originate in a decision of the employer or the architect; the architect is for
this purpose the employer's agent.
Secondly, the architect's objective is to estimate the period within
which the contract works as ultimately defined ought to have been completed,
having due regard to the occurrence of non-contractor's risk events. The completion date is extended by that
amount. Thirdly, this process involves
certain inherent uncertainties. For
example, a contractor's risk event and a non-contractor's risk event may
operate concurrently in such a way that delay can be said to result from both,
or indeed either. Another possibility is
that a non-contractor's risk event merely slows the progress of the works,
rather than bringing them to a halt.
Because of these uncertainties, the architect is given power to adjust
the completion date retrospectively, because it is clearly only with hindsight
that the causative potency of each of the sources of delay can be properly
assessed. Fourthly, the inherent
uncertainties in the process are recognized in the scheme of clause 25. The architect is not expected to use a coldly
logical approach in assessing the relative significance of contractor's risk
events and non-contractor's risk events; instead, as the wording of both clause
25.3.1 and clause 25.3.3.1 makes clear, the architect is to fix such new
completion date as he considers to be "fair and reasonable". That wording indicates that the architect
must look at the various events that have contributed to the delay and
determine the relative significance of the contractor's and non-contractor's
risk events, using a fairly broad approach. Judgment is involved. It is probably fair to state that the architect
exercises discretion, provided that it is recognized that the architect's
decision must be based on the evidence that is available and must be reasonable
in all the circumstances of the case.
The decision must, in addition, recognize that the critical question is
to determine the delay caused by non-contractor's risk events, and to extend
the completion date accordingly.
Fifthly, the completion date as so adjusted is not to be fixed without
reference to the original completion date; instead, as Colman J. points out in
the second of the passages quoted above, it is fixed by extending the contract
period by an amount that corresponds to the delay attributable to the non-contractor's
risk events.
[14] Further
authority on the application of clause 25 is found in Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison
Hotel (Manchester) Ltd, supra. In
that case Dyson J., after referring to the analysis of Colman J. in Balfour Beatty, continued:
"13. [I]t is agreed that if there are two
concurrent causes of delay, one of which is a relevant event, and the other is
not, then the contractor is entitled to an extension of time for the period of
delay caused by the relevant event notwithstanding the concurrent effect of the
other event. Thus, to take a simple
example, if no work is possible on a site for a week not only because of
exceptionally inclement weather (a relevant event), but also because the contractor
has a shortage of labour (not a relevant event), and if the failure to work
during that week is likely to delay the works beyond the completion date by one
week, then if he considers it fair and reasonable to do so, the architect is
required to grant an extension of time of one week. He cannot refuse to do so on the grounds that
the delay would have occurred in any event by reason of the shortage of labour.
...
15 It seems to me that it is a question of fact in any given
case whether a relevant event has caused or is likely to caused delay to the
works beyond the completion date in the sense described by Colman J. in the Balfour Beatty case. In the present case, the [employer] has...
both a negative and a positive defence to the [extension of time] claim. The negative defence amounts to saying that
the variations and late information etc relied on by the claimant did not cause
any delay because the activities were not on the critical path, and on that
account did not cause delay. The
positive defence is that the true cause of the delay was other matters, which
were not relevant events, and for which the contractor was responsible. In my view the respondent is entitled to
advance these other matters by way of defence to the [extension of time]
claim. It is entitled to say (a) the
alleged relevant event was not likely to or did not cause delay e.g. because
the items of work affected were not on the critical path, and (b) the true
cause of the admitted delay in respect of which the claim for an extension of
time is advanced was something else. The
positive case in (b) supports and fortifies the denial in (a). The respondent could limit its defence to the
claim by relying on (a), but in my view there is nothing in cl
25 which obliges it to do so. Likewise,
when considering the matter under the contract, the architect may feel that he
can decide the issue on a limited basis, or he may feel that he needs to go
further, and consider whether a provisional view reached on the basis of one
set of facts is supported by findings on other issues. It is impossible to lay down hard and fast
rules. In my judgment, it is incorrect
to say that, as a matter of construction of clause 25, when deciding whether a
relevant event is likely to cause or has caused delay, the architect may not
consider the impact on progress and completion of other events".
[15] Two
important points emerge from these remarks.
In the first place, in the application of clause 25, a relevant event
may still be taken into account even though it operates concurrently with
another matter that is not a relevant event.
In other words, the "but for" rule of causation, that an event
A will only be a clause of a result B if B would not have occurred but for A,
has no application. In the example given
by Dyson J. in paragraph 13, the delay would have occurred as a result of the
shortage of labour by itself, regardless of the bad weather. On the approach to causation found in the
general law of contract and delict, it could not be
said that the bad weather caused the delay because the delay would have
occurred in any event. Under clause 25,
however, the architect may take the bad weather into account to the extent that
he considers it fair and reasonable to do so.
This perhaps emphasizes the general notion underlying clause 25, that it
is designed to an achieve fairness as between the contractor and the employer,
and the architect is given a reasonably wide discretion in order to achieve
that result. In the second place,
despite the width of the discretion given to the architect, before he can take
any particular occurrence into account as a relevant event for the purposes of
clause 25, he must be satisfied that the occurrence was a cause of the delay in
completing the contract. This is
illustrated by the example given in paragraph 15 of Dyson J.'s
opinion.
[16] Dyson J.'s opinion in Henry
Boot Construction (UK) Ltd v Malmaison Hotel
(Manchester) Ltd was considered by Judge Richard Seymour QC in Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond
(No 7), (2001) 76 Con LR 148, at paragraph 31. In that passage Judge Seymour gave a further
explanation of what is meant by "events operating concurrently". He drew a distinction between on one hand a
case where work has been delayed through a shortage of labour and a relevant
event then occurs and on the other hand a case where works are proceeding
regularly when both a relevant event and a shortage of labour occur, more or
less simultaneously. Judge Seymour
considered that Dyson J. had only been concerned with the latter situation, and
not with the former; in the former situation the relevant event had no effect
upon the completion date. I have some
difficulty with this distinction. It
seems to turn upon the question whether the shortage of labour and the relevant
event occurred simultaneously; or at least it assumes that the shortage of
labour did not significantly predate the relevant event. That, however, seems to me to be an arbitrary
criterion. It should not matter whether
the shortage of labour developed, for example, two days before or two days
after the start of a substantial period of inclement weather; in either case
the two matters operate concurrently to delay completion of the works. In my opinion both of these cases should be
treated as involving concurrent causes, and they should be dealt with in the
way indicated in clause 25.3.1 by granting such extension as the architect
considers fair and reasonable.
[17] It is
in any event clear from older authority that the fact that delay has been
caused by matters for which the contractor is responsible will not deprive the contractor
of his right to claim an extension of time for delay caused by a relevant
event. That is essentially the ratio of Wells v Army and Navy Co-operative Society,
1903, 86 LT 764. A more modern statement
of this principle is found in S.M.K.
Cabinets v Hili Modern Electrics Pty Ltd, [1984]
VR 391, a decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria. In that case, Brooking J., whose opinion was concurred in by the other judges of the court, stated (at
398):
"The sole remaining
matter is that of the soundness of the ground on which the arbitrator in fact
rejected the defence of prevention [that is, acts of the employer that prevent
the contractor from completing on time].
He evidently considered that where acts or omissions of a proprietor do
in fact substantially delay completion, the proprietor nonetheless cannot be
sent to have prevented the contractor from completing by the relevant date
unless the contractor would have been able to complete by that date had it not
been for the supposed prevention.... But it has been accepted for more than one
hundred years that this is not the law.
The cases are all one way".
Cases were then cited from Australia, England, New Zealand and Canada; these included Wells.
In relation to Wells, Brooking
J. said (at 399):
"The principle of the
decision is not as clear as one would wish, but appears to be that if the
supposed prevention was such as would in ordinary circumstances have made it
impossible for the contractor to complete in time, then prevention has in law
occurred, notwithstanding that the contractor may in fact have disabled himself
by his own delays from completing by the due date".
[18] While
delay for which the contractor is responsible will not preclude an extension of
time based on a relevant event, the critical question will frequently, perhaps
usually, be how long an extension is justified by the relevant event. In practice the various causes of delay are
likely to interact in a complex manner; shortages of labour will rarely be
total; some work may be possible despite inclement weather; and the degree to
which work is affected by each of these causes may vary from day to day. Other more complex situations can easily be
imagined. What is required by clause 25
is that the architect should exercise his judgment to determine the extent to
which completion has been delayed by relevant events. The architect must make a determination on a
fair and reasonable basis. Where there
is true concurrency between a relevant event and a contractor default, in the
sense that both existed simultaneously, regardless of which started first, it
may be appropriate to apportion responsibility for the delay between the two
causes; obviously, however, the basis for such apportionment must be fair and
reasonable. Precisely what is fair and
reasonable is likely to turn on the exact circumstances of the particular
case. A procedure of that nature is in
my opinion implicit in the wording of clause 25.3.1 and .3; both of these
provisions direct the architect to give an extension of time by fixing a
Completion Date that he considers to be fair and reasonable.
[19] The
foregoing construction of clause 25 is in my opinion supported by the approach
taken to concurrent causes of delay in Federal tribunals in the United States. In Chas.
I. Cunningham Co., IBCA 60, 57-2 BCA P1541 (1957), the Board of Contract
Appeals considered the legal consequences where a contractor has claimed for an
extension of time but is himself in default.
The main opinion of the Board, delivered by one of its members, Mr
Slaughter, states the law as follows:
"It is well settled
that the failure of a contractor to prosecute the contract work with the
efficiency and expedition requisite for its completion within the time
specified by the contract does not, in and of itself, disentitle the contractor
to extensions of time for such parts of the ultimate delay in completion as are
attributable to events that are themselves excusable, as defined in [the
relevant extension of time clause, corresponding to clause 25]. Where a contractor finishes late partly
because of a cause that is excusable under this provision and partly because of
a cause that is not, it is the duty of the contracting officer to make, if at
all feasible, a fair apportionment of the extent to which completion of the job
was delayed by each of the two causes, and to grant an extension of time
commensurate with his determination of the extent to which the failure to
finish on time was attributable to the excusable one. Accordingly, if a event that would constitute
a excusable cause of delay in fact occurs, and if that event in fact delays the
progress of the work as a whole, the contractor is entitled to an extension of
time for so much of the ultimate delay in completion as was the result or
consequence of that event, notwithstanding that the progress of the work may
also have been slowed down or halted by a want of diligence, lack of planning,
or some other inexcusable omission on the part of the contractor".
This approach recognizes the fact that culpable and
non-culpable causes of delay will frequently coexist and interact, and permits
the contracting officer, equivalent to the architect under the JCT Forms, to
apportion the delay between the culpable and non-culpable causes. That seems to me to be the only way in which
a fair result can be achieved in such cases, and in my opinion such an approach
is contemplated by the wording of clause 25.
I should add that the decision of the Board of Contract Appeals in Chas. I. Cunningham Co. was followed in
Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., ANBCA 11300, 68-1 BCA (CCH) P7054 (1968).
[20] Counsel
for the pursuers founded strongly on the opinion of the court in John Doyle Construction Ltd v Laing Management (Scotland) Ltd, 2004 SC 73. That case
dealt with a claim for direct loss and expense under the equivalent of clause
26 of the JCT Standard Form 1980. It was
concerned in particular with the way in which a contractor could establish a
global claim, where it is impossible to demonstrate individual causal links
between events for which the employer is responsible and particular items of
loss and expense. Normally, when a
global claim is pursued, the contractor must demonstrate that the whole of his
loss and expense results from matters that are the responsibility of the
employer. The court pointed out that
that requirement might be mitigated in three ways. First, it may be possible to identify a
causal link between particular events for which the employer is responsible and
individual items of loss. Secondly, the
question of causation must be treated by the application of common sense to the
logical principles of causation, and if it is possible to identify an act of
the employer as the dominant cause of the loss that will suffice. Thirdly, it may in some cases be possible to
apportion the loss between the causes for which the employer is responsible and
other causes. In my opinion these
principles have only limited application to the present case. They are concerned with claims for loss and
expense, and consequently may have some bearing on the defenders' claim for
prolongation costs (see below, at paragraphs [162]-[167]). They do not, however, appear directly
relevant to the granting of an extension of time. The contractual wording relating to an
extension of time is different from that relating to claims for loss and
expense. In particular, in the form of
contract that is presently under consideration, there is no reference in clause
26 to the architect's making such award as is "fair and
reasonable". For the reasons
discussed above, I attach considerable importance to those words in the interpretation
of clause 25, especially in its practical application. In addition, the
conceptual structure of the two clauses is quite different, and the events that
trigger an extension of time and a claim for loss and expenses are likewise
distinct. Consequently I do not think
that the decision in John Doyle
Construction is of general assistance in the construction of clause 25,
subject to one exception, which is discussed in the following paragraph. Perhaps the one theme that is common to
clauses 25 and 26 is that a practical common sense approach should be adopted to the interpretation of building contracts, but it
is hardly necessary to refer to authority for that proposition.
[21] In the
course of their submissions counsel for the pursuers advanced a number of legal
propositions. First, it was said that
for a contractor to establish an entitlement to an extension of time in respect
of delay arising out of a relevant event he must establish that the delay was
caused by the relevant event, as opposed to any other pre-existing or
concurrent matter for which the contractor himself is responsible; and he must
establish the extent of such delay. In
my opinion that proposition is too broadly stated. It is correct that the contractor must
establish that delay was caused by a relevant event, and the extent of the
delay; nevertheless, I am of opinion that concurrent causes should be treated
in the manner discussed in paragraph [18] above. The second proposition advanced for the
pursuers was that, if a relevant event can be shown to be the "dominant or
operative" cause of a delay, the party responsible for that event will be
held responsible for the delay. I agree
that it may be possible to show that either a relevant event or a contractor's
risk event is the dominant cause of that delay, and in such a case that event
should be treated as the cause of the delay.
A similar principle was recognized in
Doyle, at paragraph [15] of the opinion of the court; the principle is
derived from older case of Leyland Shipping
Company Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd, [1918] AC 350. Those cases refer to the "dominant"
or "proximate" cause. The
pursuers' submission went further, and referred to the "dominant or operative"
cause of the delay. In my opinion this
extension is not legitimate. Indeed, I
have difficulty in seeing what the word "operative" adds to the
notion of causation; a cause can only be relevant if it is operative, and that
is as true of concurrent causes as it is of single or "dominant"
causes.
[22] The
pursuers' third proposition was that a variation instructed during a period
when the contractor is already in delay will not absolve the contractor of
responsibility for that pre-existing delay, unless it
is proved that the delay resulted from the variation. As stated, this is correct. Nevertheless, the "delay" that
matters is delay to the Completion Date.
If the contractor is, through his own fault, in delay before a relevant
event, that may explain delay that follows the Completion Date. Alternatively, it may be possible for the contractor
to demonstrate that he would have made up the delay caused by his own fault,
and that the delay beyond the Completion Date results from the variation. It is all a question of fact. The pursuers' fourth proposition was in two
parts: first, it is a defence to a claim that a variation or late instruction
caused delay to establish that the matter to which the variation or late
instruction was issued was not on the critical path; secondly, it is also a defence
that the claimed delay was in fact due to other events. The first of these contentions was not, I
think, in dispute, although the parties were sharply in dispute as to where the
critical path lay in the progress of the contractual works. The second contention, however, is perhaps
stated rather simplistically. In
practice causation tends to operate in a complex manner, and a delay to
completion may be caused in part by relevant events and in part by contractor
default, in a way that does not permit the easy separation of these
causes. In such a case, the solution
envisaged by clause 25 is that the architect, or in litigation the court, must
apply judgment to determine the extent to which completion has been delayed by
relevant events. In an appropriate case
apportionment of the delay between relevant events and contractor's risk events
may be appropriate. Precisely when and
how that should take place is a question that turns on the precise facts of the
case.
The time for issuing
instructions
[23] A
further legal issue is relevant to the present case: this relates to the time
at which the architect is obliged to issue instructions in terms of clause
25.4.6. The relevant event specified in
that clause is "the contractor not having received in due time necessary
instructions". The expression
"in due time" was said in Percy
Bilton Ltd v Greater London Council, supra, to mean "in a reasonable time": Lord
Fraser of Tullybelton at [1981] 1 WLR 800-801. The meaning of the latter expression was
discussed by Diplock J. in Neodox Ltd v Borough of Swinton and Pendlebury, (1958) 5 BLR 38, at 42:
"What is a reasonable
time does not depend solely upon the convenience and financial interests of the
[contractors]. No doubt it is in their
interest to have every detail cut and dried on the day the contract is signed,
but the contract does not contemplate that.
It contemplates further details and instructions being provided, and the
engineer is to have a time to provide them which is reasonable having regard to
the point of view of him and his staff and the point of view of the [employer],
as well as the point of view of the contractors.
In determining what is a
reasonable time as respects any particular details and instructions, factors
which must obviously be born in mind are such matters as the order in which the
engineer has determined the works shall be carried out..., whether requests for
particular details or instructions have been made by the contractors, whether
the instructions relate to a variation of the contract which the engineer is
entitled to make from time to time during the execution of the contract, or
whether they relate to part of the original works, and also the time, including
any extension of time, within which the contractors are contractually bound to
complete the works".
The first of the specific factors mentioned by Diplock J. is not strictly relevant to the present case,
since under the parties' contract the architect is not given power to determine
the order in which the works should be carried out. Instead, the contractor determines the
programme. Nevertheless, the contractor's
programme is clearly relevant in determining what is a
reasonable time for giving any particular instruction. The other three factors are all
relevant. In relation to the last, the
time within which the contractor is contractually bound to complete the works,
a difference arose between the parties.
Counsel for the defender submitted that the contractual completion date,
allowing for any extension, must always set a criterion against which the
timing of instructions should be judged.
Counsel for the pursuers, by contrast, submitted that, where the contractor's
progress was such that he clearly would not complete by the contractual
completion date, it was sufficient that the instructions were in sufficient
time to meet his actual progress. In my opinion the current contractual
completion date must normally be relevant, for two reasons. First, there is the possibility that the contractor
will take special measures to accelerate progress. That is no doubt subject to an exception when
the Completion Date is past, but in that event it may be that instructions
should have been given prior to the Completion Date. The second reason is more general: the
contractual provisions expressly envisage that information will be provided by
the architect to the contractor to enable completion in accordance with the
contractual Conditions (clause 5.4), and those conditions include the important
obligation (clause 23) to proceed regularly and diligently with the works and
to complete the works on or before the Completion Date. Nevertheless, all of the factors mentioned by
Diplock J., subject to the qualification mentioned
above in relation to the first, are potentially relevant in determining what is a reasonable time for the provision of information. Ultimately that question is a question of
fact, and will depend upon the whole circumstances of the particular case.
Competing
approaches of parties' expert witnesses
[24] I
must now consider the factual issues that arise in this case. The defenders
relied on expert evidence from their own programming expert, Mr Alan Whitaker,
and on evidence from two witnesses of fact, Mr Kevin Cornish, who was the
defenders' senior site manager for most of the duration of the contract, and Mr
David Dibben, who at the time of the contract was the
defenders' regional manager for South West England and South Wales. The pursuers relied solely on the evidence of
their programming expert, Mr Nigel Lowe.
They did not lead any witnesses of fact.
In relation to the witnesses of fact, I should state that I found both Mr Cornish
and Mr Dibben to be credible and generally
reliable witnesses. Mr Cornish, in
particular, impressed me as having a good knowledge and understanding of what
had happened as the contract works progressed.
Before I examine the evidence in detail, however, I consider it
appropriate to consider the different approaches taken by the parties' two
expert witnesses. For the defenders, who
led at the proof, evidence was given by Mr Alan Whitaker. Mr Whitaker was a Chartered Civil
Engineer and a member of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. He graduated as a Bachelor of Technology in
Civil Engineering; thereafter, from 1966 to 1988, he had worked for a number of
major contractors as an engineer, site agent or contracts manager. The projects on which he worked were clearly
very diverse; they are set out in Appendix A to his report No 7/156 of
process. His experience extended to
design and construction in industrial building projects. It is fair to say that his involvement was
generally with large and intricate construction projects. In 1988 he established an independent
practice, Alan E Whitaker & Associates, to provide computer-based planning
services in the construction industry.
This involved the provision of critical path analysis. As an independent consultant, Mr Whitaker
was involved in a number of substantial projects. His practice continues in that area, but from
1993 onwards most of his work has been in the preparation, negotiation and
settlement of claims, and acting as an expert witness in arbitration and
litigation. He clearly had substantial
experience in that area. Mr Whitaker
produced a first report in the present case dated 30 October
2003 (No
7/156 of process) and a
supplementary report dated 8 March 2004 (No 7/8 of process). For the pursuers, evidence was given by Mr
Nigel Lowe. Mr Lowe is a
construction contract consultant; he is a director of Nigel Lowe Consulting Ltd. He has qualifications in building and is a
fellow of the Institute of Civil Engineering Surveyors, a member of the Royal Institute of
Chartered Surveyors and a member of the Chartered Institute of
Arbitrators. He worked in the
construction industry from 1961, and was employed by a number of large building
companies as a surveyor and project manager.
He entered private practice in 1981, and since then has acted as a
consultant in relation to construction contracts, dealing with the technical
aspects of such contracts, including claims and delay analysis. He has extensive experience of building
contract claims. Mr Lowe produced an initial report
on the present case (No 6/15 of process), a further report dealing with Mr Whitaker's
first report (No 6/16 of process), and a further report dealing with Mr Whitaker's
second report (No 7/351 of process).
Both Mr Whitaker and Mr Lowe were clearly well qualified to
speak about the issues that arose in the case, and both gave their evidence in
a clear and straightforward manner. In
choosing between their evidence, I have been guided by the details of their
evidence and what seems to me to be the inherent likelihood of their respective
views against the known facts about the construction of the hotel. I should record that counsel on both sides
criticized the impartiality of the witnesses on the other side, including the
expert witnesses. I did not find any
justification in these criticisms. I
formed the clear view that all of the witnesses were doing their best to
present their evidence in a fair and impartial manner, and on issues of fact I
found them to be generally reliable.
Mr Whitaker
[25] As
I have mentioned, Mr Whitaker produced two reports. His position changed in number of respects
between the two reports. He explained
that this had occurred because he had obtained a significant amount of further
information during the intervening period.
In particular, the pursuers had disclosed the diaries and weekly reports
of the clerk of works. He had met
Mr Nigel Lowe, the pursuers' expert, and had discussed the as-built
programme with him. In addition, he had
been given access to further documents in the possession of the defenders and
had been provided with further information by the defenders and by Mr Kevin Cornish,
who had been their senior site manager on the project. I think that the information provided by Mr Cornish
is important; as indicated in the last paragraph, I considered him an
impressive witness.
[26] Mr Whitaker
described his approach as follows (No 7/8 of process, paragraphs
1.5-1.11). He first examined the
programme against which the works were being constructed and tested it for
reasonableness and completeness. He then
examined the factual evidence to determine where time on the project was
critically lost and identify the cause or causes of that loss of time. He concluded that three weeks had been lost
during weeks 6, 7 and 8 of the contract; the cause of the loss in Mr Whitaker's
opinion was additional work instructed in connection with the gas venting
scheme (see paragraph [41] below). He
was further of opinion that five weeks were lost between weeks 27 and 32 of the
contract. He considered that the cause
of this loss of time was a late instruction by the architect, RMJM, to vary the
roof coverings from a built-up system to the Stramit Speedeck system. The
lost time was in part concurrent with the effect of the loss of time caused by
the gas venting works. The effect of the
late instruction was that work on the roof steelwork began late; the design of
the steelwork was dependent upon the roofing system that was used. In addition, the start of the roof coverings
was similarly delayed by five weeks, because the late instruction had led to
delay in the procurement of the roof coverings.
Finally, Mr Whitaker thought that six weeks were lost between weeks
44 and 52 of the contract. This was
caused by the lateness of a substantial number of architect's instructions
varying the works following the dismissal of a RMJM and their replacement as architect
by Keppie Architects.
Mr Whitaker's overall view was that 11 weeks (6 weeks plus 5 weeks)
were critically lost during construction.
On that basis, he considered that a fair and reasonable measure of any
extension of time to which the defenders might be entitled was 11 weeks.
[27] Mr Whitaker
was critical of the as-built critical path analysis used by Mr Lowe; I
deal with his specific criticisms that analysis at paragraphs [36]-[39]
below. In evidence, Mr Whitaker
stated that he had considered undertaking a critical path analysis, but decided
not to do so. He did not have access to
an electronic version of the defenders' original programme for the project, and
because of this it was impossible to identify the defenders' original critical
path through the programme.
Nevertheless, making use of his experience in programming, Mr Whitaker
had attempted to replicate what he surmised might be the logic of the
defenders' original programme; he stated, however, that he had no great
confidence that his version of that programme was either correct or
complete. Mr Whitaker stated that
to continue with a critical path analysis based on logic that he knew not to be
completely correct would have meant that he could not be sure of the evidence
that he was giving to the court. Rather
than following such a course, he adopted the method described in the last
paragraph. In his initial report (No
7/156 of process, at paragraph 2.11) he stated that the task was to identify
where critical time had been lost on the project, and that in order to do that
it was necessary to understand the construction process involved in that
project. In this way it was possible to
identify "events in that construction process which logic, experience and
common sense tell you will be critical to completion of the works". Mr Whitaker explained that he meant by
that that delay to any of these critical points would mean delay to completion
of the works as a whole unless exceptional measures were taken to recover lost
time. Mr Whitaker identified events
in the construction programme that he considered to be critical; these are
discussed subsequently. Mr Cornish
was asked about the various events that Mr Whitaker identified as critical
and confirmed in relation to each that he also considered them to be critical
for completion of the works.
[28] The
pursuers criticized Mr Whitaker's approach to the case. They referred in particular to his failure to
undertake a critical path analysis of the present project. That might be explained by the fact that Mr Whitaker
preferred to use the as-planned v as-built method. Nevertheless, the weakness of that method was
that, as Mr Whitaker acknowledged, it does not identify the critical path
and therefore needs to be used with great care and understanding of the
processes in the whole of the project.
The pursuers submitted that an expert could only give a meaningful
opinion as to which activities in a project are critical on the basis of an
as-built critical path analysis, such as that carried out by Mr Lowe. For that reason it was suggested that I
should treat with caution, and indeed scepticism, Mr Whitaker's
opinion. The pursuers also pointed out
that Mr Whitaker had significantly changed his opinion in relation to the
delay arising from the gas venting scheme between his original report of
October 2003 and his later report of March 2004 (No 7/8 of process). In justifying this, Mr Whitaker had
relied on the fact that in preparing his initial report he had a limited amount
of time and relied on Mr Lowe's as-built programme for his analysis; at
that time he had not seen the Clerk of Works' diaries and weekly reports. The pursuers were nevertheless critical of Mr Whitaker
on the basis that he provided a detailed opinion on the basis of inadequate
information.
[29] In
my opinion the pursuers clearly went too far in suggesting that an expert could
only give a meaningful opinion on the basis of an as-built critical path
analysis. For reasons discussed below
(at paragraphs [36]-[37]) I am of opinion that such an approach has serious
dangers of its own. I further conclude,
as explained in those paragraphs, that Mr Lowe's own use of an as-built
critical path analysis is flawed in a significant number of important
respects. On that basis, I conclude that
that approach to the issues in the present case is not helpful. The major difficulty, it seems to me, is that
in the type of programme used to carry out a critical path analysis any
significant error in the information that is fed into the programme is liable
to invalidate the entire analysis.
Moreover, for reasons explained by Mr Whitaker (paragraphs [36]-[37]
below), I conclude that it is easy to make such errors. That seems to me to invalidate the use of an
as-built critical path analysis to discover after the event where the critical
path lay, at least in a case where full electronic records are not available
from the contractor. That does not
invalidate the use of a critical path analysis as a planning tool, but that is
a different matter, because it is being used then for an entirely different
purpose. Consequently I think it
necessary to revert to the methods that were in use before computer software
came to be used extensively in the programming of complex construction
contracts. That is essentially what Mr Whitaker
did in his evidence. Those older methods are still plainly valid, and if
computer-based techniques cannot be used accurately there is no alternative to
using older, non-computer-based techniques.
[30] In
relation to the pursuers' other criticisms of Mr Whitaker, I do not draw
an adverse inference from his change of position in relation to the effects of
the gas venting instruction. His change
of position was made clearly in his second report, and the reasons for it were
stated in detail. His change of position
was based on the receipt of further information. To change one's opinion in the light of
further information seems to me to show openness of mind and a basic fairness
of approach. Moreover, Mr Whitaker
did indicate that his first report was produced under significant time
constraints. Overall, I found Mr Whitaker's evidence to be generally
cogent and persuasive, and for the most part I have adopted his analysis.
[31] The
pursuers also criticized the defenders' overall position on programming. They pointed out that Mr Whitaker had
only been provided with a hard copy of the defenders' original construction
programme, not with a computer version. The programme had, however, been based
on a computer programme known as Suretrack; this is a
programme that is commonly used in the construction industry. Mr Whitaker had agreed that one reason
for generating a construction programme using Suretrack
software was to enable the revisal and updating of
the construction programme as works proceeded.
Mr Whitaker had also indicated concern that the defenders had not,
during the contract works, updated their Suretrack
programme, although he stated that that was not untypical. He acknowledged that critical part analysis
used proactively is "a fantastic tool", in that it can demonstrate as
works proceed whether there is any flaw in the logic of the programme. The use of a programme such as Suretrack permits the contractor to update his programme as
construction progresses and to allow for the impact of events on the
construction programme. Mr Lowe's
evidence was that in his experience most contractors who use such software will
continue to use it as the works proceed to monitor the progress of the
works. In failing to do so, the
defenders had hampered the presentation of the case and had also significantly
hindered the experts in their analysis of the instructions and delays on the
overall progress of the works. The
absence of the programme also made it much more difficult to discover the contractor's
original logic. In September 1999
the defenders produced delay charts using Suretrack
for the purposes of adjudication proceedings, which suggested that the
programme had existed at that time.
[32] I
accept that understanding what had happened during the progress of the works
might have been a great deal easier if the defenders' original Suretrack programme had been available, and in particular
if it had been updated as the works proceeded.
Nevertheless, I am bound to approach the case on the basis of the
evidence that is available. The
programme was not available; in any event, even if it had been available, it is
clear that it was not updated as the works proceeded, and for that reason I
doubt whether it would have been of any real assistance. While the defenders' loss of the programme at
a time when disputes had arisen between the parties might be regarded as
culpable, I do not think that that it is the loss of the programme that has
caused the difficulties; the fundamental problem is rather the failure to
update the programme as works proceeded.
The original programme is available in a hard copy, and a view of the
logic of the programme can be obtained from that. In my view, on the basis of Mr Whitaker's
evidence, failure to update the programme is relatively common, and it is easy
to understand why that is so. In all the
circumstances I do not think that I can draw any significant adverse inference
from the fact that the defenders' records were less good than they might have
been in other circumstances.
Mr Lowe
[33] Mr Lowe
carried out a critical path analysis of the project, and on that basis produced
a filtered as-built programme (No 7/161 of process). The critical path of a
construction contract is a sequence of activities through the project from
start to finish the sum of whose durations determines the overall duration of
the project. Consequently any delay to
the progress of an activity on the critical path may cause the duration of the
overall project to be extended. Thus a
critical path analysis depends upon a logical sequence of activities; each
activity falling on the critical path can only be performed when a certain
stage has been reached in a logically preceding activity. That stage varies; on occasion the succeeding
activity may be in a position to start as soon as the preceding activity has
started; in other cases it is necessary that the preceding activity should have
finished before the succeeding activity can start; in yet other cases it will
suffice if the preceding activity has been carried out in part to enable a
start on the succeeding activity. If an
activity is on the critical path to completion, any delay in starting the
activity or any increase in the length or duration of the activity will produce
a consequential effect on the date for completion. Mr Lowe carried out a critical path
analysis of the project as built, rather than an analysis of the planned
project. In an as-built analysis, it is
known what the contractor actually did; for example, it may be known that the contractor
in fact waited to complete one task before he started work on another, even
though logically there was no reason for waiting. In such a case the resulting delay would be
incorporated into an as-built programme.
That affects the logic of the programme, and links must be inserted to
show what was actually done, even though in theory a successor task could have
started earlier.
[34] In
evidence Mr Lowe stated that after producing his as-built programme he
began his analysis by identifying, by inspection, whether any of the logic
paths in the as-built situation were consistent with the planned situation as
shown in the defenders' construction programme.
He then looked at the records of the project to discover whether the
defenders had departed from their planned logic. One example of this that he noted was the use
of temporary sealing when construction reached the fourth and sixth floors
respectively; this was designed to make the building temporarily weatherproof,
to enable weather-dependent tasks to be carried out on lower floors. Thereafter Mr Lowe started from the date
when completion was actually achieved and identified the last activity before
completion. He then worked backwards
towards the start of the project to determine the logic links in the programme
as built, and then using those links he rescheduled the programme. This identified the critical path. It was accepted by the pursuers that an element
of subjective judgment was required in this exercise; nevertheless, Mr Lowe
indicated that in exercising that judgment he relied on his knowledge and
experience of programming in the construction industry. Mr Lowe described the method that he
used in handling the programme. Tasks
were linked in three ways: first, logic lags could be used to maintain the
correct time relationship between the tasks; secondly, it was possible to
insert contractor or employer defaults to fill in the time gap between what was
considered to be the reasonable logic and the time when an activity actually
began; and thirdly, it was possible to use start flags to constrain a task to
an actual start date. Mr Lowe also
stated that it is necessary in a programme to take account of four types of
restraints that may have an effect on progress.
These are technological restraints (based on the method of
construction), management restraints (based on decisions taken by the contractor),
health and safety restraints and resources restraints (caused by lack of
resources).
[35] Using
this method, Mr Lowe expressed the opinion that none of the matters relied
on by the defenders to support their claims for an extension of time had caused
any delay. He came to that
conclusion on the basis that none of those matters fell on the critical path
through the project; that critical path was set out in his as-built programme
(in No 7/61 of process). Mr Lowe's reasons for this conclusion are set out
at length in his reports.
[36] Mr Whitaker
criticized the method of delay analysis that Mr Lowe had adopted; in
particular, he was critical of the use of an as-built critical path
analysis. He stated that a critical path
analysis involves identification of the duration of the relevant activities,
based on the as-built records, and the logic links between those
activities. The identification of the
correct logic links was of vital importance.
Problems arose with a critical path analysis when logic links were
incorporated when they should not be there, or if logic links were inserted
which were not wholly correct, or if necessary links were omitted. If a mistake was made in one logic link, that was liable to produce an error in the
identification of the activities that were critical to completion of the works,
and that in turn could invalidate the critical path shown in the relevant
programme. If a number of erroneous
links were identified, Mr Whitaker stated that it would definitely be the
case that the critical path identified in the programme would not be correct.
[37] Mr Whitaker
identified what he considered to the errors in the logic links inserted by Mr Lowe
in his as-built programme (number 7/161 of process). He further suggested that Mr Lowe had
omitted certain important links from his programme. The errors referred to by Mr Whitaker
were as follows:
(i)
Line 8: AB Construct ground floor slab. The bar representing this activity was not
split to reflect that the ground floor slab was poured in two pours. In cross-examination, Mr Lowe accepted
that this would require the start of the activity to be linked to an earlier
activity; otherwise activities that were critical would become non-critical on
rescheduling, and the critical path might be altered.
(ii)
Line 12: AB construct 2nd floor to 3rd floor. This activity was not shown as critical on Mr Lowe's
programme, but in cross-examination he accepted that it should have been shown
as critical. Mr Lowe further
accepted that the link shown coming in to the activity from line 10 was
erroneous, as it omitted a floor of the building. Finally, Mr Lowe accepted that a link
was missing from his programme; he stated that there should be a start-start
(SS) link from line 11 to line 12.
(iii)
Line 13: AB construct 3rd floor to 4th floor. Mr Lowe accepted in cross-examination
that the link from line 11 to line 13 (13FS2d, signifying a finish-start link
with a time lag of two days) was erroneous; once again a floor was
omitted. Mr Lowe further accepted
that it was wrong to indicate that the start of the activity at line 13
depended upon the finish of the activity at line 11; instead, the link should
have been a SS link from line 12 to line 13.
(iv)
Line 14: AB construct 4th floor to 5th floor. This activity is shown as non-critical in Mr Lowe's
programme, but in cross-examination he accepted that this was wrong and that
the activity should be shown as critical.
Mr Lowe further accepted that the link to the start of line 14 from
the end of line 12 (14FS6d) was incorrect; instead the programme should have
shown a SS link from line 13 to line 14.
(v)
Line 15: AB construct 5th floor to 6th floor. Mr Lowe accepted in cross-examination
that the link to the start of line 15 from the end of line 13 (15FS1d) was
incorrect, and it was also incorrect to state, as the programme indicated, that
the criticality of the activity at line 15 depended on the activity at line 13. The link should rather have been a SS link
from line 14 to line 15.
(vi)
Line 15: AB construct 5th floor to 6th floor. A central feature of Mr Lowe's evidence
was the view that neither the roof steelwork nor the roof cladding was on the
critical path. The first link out of
line 15 was to the reinforced concrete stair flights at line 38 (38FF1d), that
link being shown as critical. Work on
the reinforced concrete stair flights is shown as finishing on 19 August 1998, at the level from the 4th to the 5th floor; that
accords with the Clerk of Works' diary (No 6/18 of process). At line 38 of Mr Lowe's programme the
first link onwards is 52FS-3d (finish to start less three days); the activity
at line 52 is stud partitioning and dry linings. That link is critical, as both of the
activities at lines 38 and 52 are critical.
The stud partitioning and dry lining work is recorded as having started
on 17 August 1998 in Mr Lowe's programme
and in the parties' joint minute. This
work started at 1st floor level according to the Clerk of Works' diary. In cross-examination Mr Lowe accepted
that there was no technical or construction relationship between the work on
the stair flights at the 4th to 5th floor level and the start of the stud
partitioning and dry lining work at 1st floor level. On that basis, the critical link between
lines 38 and 52 does not appear justified.
In any event, it is difficult to see why there should be any such relationship,
as a matter of common sense. Mr Whitaker's
evidence was to that effect, as was that of Mr Cornish.
(vii)
Line 49: AB load out plant room equipment. The plant room was situated at roof level,
under the cladding. The last part of
this activity was the hoisting in of the chillers, which took place on 30 November 1998. The last successor
link from line 49 identified in Mr Lowe's programme is 20FS19d, which is
shown as a critical link. Line 20
relates to as-built roof cladding. The
link from line 49 leads to a section of line 20, shown as critical, marked
"Steel trim". The logic of the
programme accordingly indicated that the contractor required to
wait 19 days from the chillers' being hoisted into the plant room before
the steel trimming work could be done.
The steel trimming work identified at line 20 in fact took place on 11 January 1999; that work was to the smoke
vents (Clerk of Works' diary, No 6/19 of process, 11 January 1999). The smoke vents are situated at each end of
the building, whereas the chiller compound is in the
middle. When he was cross-examined, Mr Lowe
accepted that there was no "reasonably practical relationship"
between the hoisting in of the chillers and the steel trimming work on the
smoke vents. That link accordingly
appears to be erroneous. Mr Lowe
accepted that, if that link were to be deleted and the programme rescheduled,
items which were shown as critical would become non-critical (day 25,
10.29). That of itself appears to cast
considerable doubt on the accuracy of Mr Lowe's programme.
(viii)
Line 20: AB roof cladding.
In Mr Lowe's programme this work is shown in a number of sections,
the last of which refers to "penetrations". The final successor link from this line is to
snagging, shown as 60FS0d. This link is
shown as critical. On the programme that
critical link is shown to snagging taking place on or about 22 February 1999. According to the Clerk of Works' diary,
snagging at that time was to the bedrooms; Mr Lowe accepted that snagging
in the bedrooms had been going on for some time before that (day 24,
3.18). On this basis there does not
appear to be a relationship between the end of the work on roof penetrations
and the snagging going on at that time. Mr Lowe
stated that the completion of the roof level penetrations was coincidental with
the time at which a sample room had achieved a satisfactory state, and referred
to pipe work through the building and the testing of the soil stacks to justify
a link. He accepted, however, that work
to the soil stacks would only have affected snagging if the stacks had failed
their test, which they did not. Consequently the logic link does not appear to
be based in fact. Moreover, in Mr Lowe's
programme there is no logic link from the soil stacks at line 43 to snagging at
line 60. It seems, therefore, that this
link was not justified. In his evidence Mr Whitaker
denied that there was any such link.
(ix)
Line 50: AB plant room installation. A link joins line 50 to soil stacks at line
43, the link being 50FS-1d. When
cross-examined, Mr Lowe accepted that it was probably not the case that
the contractor could only start installing plant in the plant room one day
before the completion of the soil stacks.
If that is so, the link would be incorrect.
(x)
Line 20: AB roof cladding.
The only link shown from this activity to any mechanical and electrical
activity is to soil stacks at line 43 (identified as 43FS9d). Mr Lowe considered that link to be
critical, but he thought that the only mechanical and electrical activity that
depended on the roof cladding was the testing of the soil stacks. Mr Lowe further stated (day 24, 3.45)
that there was no practical relationship between the roof cladding and the
second fix mechanical and electrical work.
He justified that position on the basis that the defenders had installed
temporary covers at 4th and 6th floor level over the 18 voids created by the
risers that run up through the building.
He conceded, however, that once the plant and equipment were in place at
the plant room level a roof would be necessary in order to take the covers off the
plant and equipment and to allow connections to be made down through the
building (day 25, 10.11). That would
require the temporary covers to be removed.
On this basis, it seems that the roof must be critical, at least once
the plant was put in place and the contractor wished to connect it to the
services running through the building.
This is a point of some importance, and I return to it at paragraph [38].
(xi)
Line 17: skim plaster finish to bedroom walls and
ceilings. The only successor link is to
line 57, decoration, and is shown as 57FS1d.
Both of these activities are shown as critical in Mr Lowe's
programme, and Mr Lowe accepted that the logic link between them is
critical. In cross-examination, however,
he conceded that this critical link was wrong (day 25, 10.36). He accepted that the link should have been
start to start rather than finish to start; it is
obvious why this is so, since decoration could clearly begin as soon as the
earlier parts of the skim plaster had dried.
Mr Lowe was then asked what would happen if the erroneous link were
deleted, the correct link inserted and the programme rescheduled; he believed
that the skim plaster activity at line 17 became non-critical. Mr Whitaker specifically disagreed with Mr Lowe's
programme at this point, as did Mr Cornish.
(xii)
Line 54: ceramic tiling.
Mr Lowe records the finish date for this activity as being 11 December 1998. One of the
successor links is to snagging, at line 60; this is stated as 60FS-5d. Mr Lowe stated that he had inserted this
link because there was nothing following ceramic tiling that needed to be done
apart from snagging. In
cross-examination it was suggested to Mr Lowe that this was incorrect
because it did not take account of work that required to be done in relation to
the en suite fittings. Mr Lowe
stated that the work on the en suite fittings was part of second fix joinery in
his programme, at line 56. Nevertheless, Mr Lowe showed second
fix joinery finishing on 4 March 1999, but according to the Clerk
of Works' diary work on the en suite fittings continued until 10 March 1999. That suggests that the programme is not
correct. Furthermore, in
cross-examination Mr Lowe accepted that there was a relationship between
the ceramic tiling work and the work on the en suite fittings, as those
fittings were attached to the ceramic tiling, with the result that the tiling
had to be in place first. Mr Lowe
did not, however, show any logic link between the ceramic tiling, shown as a
critical activity, and second fix joinery, where the en suite fitting work was
reflected. That appears to be a
significant link that is missing from the programme. I should add that both Mr Whitaker and Mr Cornish
rejected the link shown between line 54 and line 60 in Mr Lowe's
programme.
(xiii)
Line 52: AB stud partitions and dry linings. Mr Lowe's programme does not show any
link from this activity to any mechanical and electrical activity. He stated in evidence, however, that in the
area between the bedrooms and the bathrooms the stud partition walls would be
erected with the second fix electrical and plumbing work within them; metal
studs and one side of the plasterboard would be erected, followed by the
electrical and plumbing work, followed by the second side of plasterboard. On this basis Mr Lowe accepted (day 26,
10.22) that there was a relationship between the stud partitions and second fix
wiring, shown at line 44. No such link
is reflected in Mr Lowe's programme, although stud partitions and dry
linings are shown as a critical activity.
(xiv)
Line 30: install temporary windows -- timber frame and
polythene. In this case a link is shown
to first fix joinery, at line 53, in the form 53SS9D; that indicates that first
fix joinery cannot start until nine days after the start of the installation of
temporary windows and polythene sheets.
That link is between two critical activities, and should therefore be
regarded as critical. Mr Cornish,
however, considered that little work was involved in first fix joinery, and that
such work as there was not dependent upon the temporary windows; thus there was
no relationship between the two. Mr Whitaker
supported this view; first fix joinery referred to work in the bathroom area,
but this was not near the outer walls of the building and was therefore not
dependent upon the temporary windows. On
this basis it appears that the link shown by Mr Lowe is erroneous. Mr Lowe further showed a link between
temporary windows at line 30 and ceramic tiling at line 54, in the form
54SS12d. Both of these activities are
shown as critical. Mr Whitaker
stated that, before any tiling could be done, the contractor required first to
erect the stud partition walls on which the tiling was placed. If there were any link with the temporary
windows, accordingly, it would be expected that this would run through the stud
partitioning. No such link was shown,
however, and in fact the stud partitioning work started on 17 August 1998, prior to the start of the installation of the
temporary windows on 8 September 1998.
(xv)
Line 19: grout in steelwork.
A successor link is shown to roof cladding, at line 20, in the form
20FS-10d. When asked about this link, Mr Whitaker
stated that the logic link was erroneous because the roof cladding work was not
dependent upon the grouting of the steelwork, and the work in fact started one
week before the grouting of the steelwork.
On Mr Lowe's programme roof cladding is shown starting on 14 September 1998, one week before the start of grouting to the
steelwork.
[38] It
accordingly appears that a number of errors exist in Mr Lowe's programme;
these were largely accepted by him. In my opinion that inevitably makes his
as-built critical path analysis of very doubtful value. It is in my opinion clear that such a
programme is critically dependent upon the logic links between different
activities; that was accepted by both experts.
If that is so, I am of opinion that Mr Whitaker must be correct
when he states that an error in one logic link can vitiate the whole programme,
and errors in a number of links will almost inevitably vitiate the
programme. In this connection, certain
particular parts of Mr Lowe's evidence call for comment. First, in re-examination (day 13, 2.32) Mr Lowe
was asked about the link between line 17 and line 57 (paragraph (xi)
above). In cross-examination he had
accepted that the link should have been start-start rather than finish-start,
and accepted that that could render line 17 non-critical. In re-examination Mr Lowe was asked
whether this would alter the critical path from line 57 (decoration) onwards,
and he replied that he could not say that with certainty. He went on to say, however, that this would
not affect the non-criticality of the roof covering. Nevertheless, the important point is that Mr Lowe
did not know where the critical path lay following the decoration works. It is agreed in the parties' joint minute
that the decoration works were completed on 23 February 1999.
Secondly, although Mr Lowe was adamant that the roof covering was
not critical, he did ultimately accept that once plant and equipment were in
place at plant room level the roof would be necessary in order to take the
covers off the plant and equipment to allow it to be connected to the services
running through the building (see paragraph (x) above). That does suggest some degree of criticality,
at least, and this concession is consistent with Mr Whitaker's
evidence. The concession is also
supported by photographs of the roof during construction,
which were put to Mr Lowe during cross-examination; these showed
considerable amounts of standing water on the roof. Thirdly, in relation to the link between line
17 and line 57, the pursuers submitted that what Mr Lowe's analysis showed
was what actually happened on site, rather than what might have happened; the
delay merely showed that the decorators waited for two weeks between the two
tasks. Mr Lowe, however, accepted
in cross-examination that the link in question was erroneous and that, if it
was replaced by the correct link and the programme was re-scheduled, the skim
plastering activity at line 17 would become non-critical (day 26, 10.12). That seems to me to illustrate a clearly that
it is quite impossible to surmise what the programme might show if the correct
logic links were inserted; the existence of a substantial number of incorrect
links simply vitiates the programme.
[39] Counsel
for the pursuers submitted that Mr Lowe's evidence was not dependent upon
the use of the as-built critical path analysis.
He had analyzed the various delaying events and their effect on the
works in the context of the progress that the works had achieved on site at the
relevant time. The as-built critical
path analysis had been used as a separate tool to analyze the project. Counsel submitted that the most that could be
taken from the defenders' criticism of the critical path analysis is that it
could not be relied upon from 23 February 1999 onwards; that date marked the
completion of the decoration works (line 57).
That would not affect Mr Lowe's analysis of either the gas venting
works or the roof cladding. In addition,
counsel submitted that, in relation to the works instructed following the
appointment of Keppie in place of RMJM, Mr Lowe's
analysis of each item was carried out in the context of the overall progress of
the works on site at the relevant time, and therefore was not subject to any
overall criticism of his critical path analysis. In my opinion there is some force in the last
of these points; in relation to the works instructed following the appointment
of Keppie Mr Lowe's analysis did appear to
proceed in part on matters other than the formal critical path analysis found
in No 7/161 of process. Consequently, in
relation to these works I will consider the evidence of Mr Lowe in
relation to each specific item. I will
follow the same course in relation to the gas venting works and the roof
cladding, to the extent that Mr Lowe's evidence was not dependent upon his
formal critical path analysis. I do not
accept, however, that the criticism of the critical path analysis is confined
to the period after 23 February 1999; in my opinion the criticism goes
further, and extends to earlier periods.
Conclusion
[40] For
the foregoing reasons I generally prefer the approach taken by Mr Whitaker.
His views, as contained in his second report (No 7/8 of process), appeared to
me to the based on the factual evidence.
Moreover, his method of proceeding appeared to be based on sound
practical experience and on common sense; I also found the logical connections
that he drew in discussing programming to be entirely intelligible. So far as Mr Lowe is concerned, I do not
think that it is possible to base any reliable conclusions upon his formal
critical path analysis, for the reasons discussed above. Other parts of his evidence were of
assistance, however, particularly in relation to concurrent causes of delay; I
generally accept his evidence on the delaying effect of the lifts and the stair
balustrading.
I will now turn to the areas in which, according to the defenders,
critical delay was caused by instructions issued on of the pursuers. These were the gas venting system, the roof
still work and the series of instructions issued following the replacement of
RMJM by Keppie.
Gas venting
[41] In
the original specification of the contract works a gas proof membrane was to be
inserted at foundation level to prevent the emission of radon gas from the soil
under the building. The form of membrane
originally specified was a product known as Bituthene. On 23 March 1998 RMJM issued an architect's
instruction to use an alternative form of membrane known as Proofex. In his first report Mr Whitaker stated
that he considered that a delay of approximately 3 1/2 weeks had occurred in
starting work on the superstructure owing to the fact that that Architect's
instruction was issued late. In his
second report, however, Mr Whitaker changed his opinion, and expressed the
view that the cause of the delay was not the late issuance of the instruction
but the work content involved. This has
consequences for the application of clause 13.8 of the contract conditions: see
paragraph [140] below.
[42] It
was a matter of agreement between the experts that delays had occurred in the
construction of the substructure of the building. The experts were, however, in dispute as to
responsibility for that delay. The
crucial issue related to the delay in constructing the ground floor slab. Mr Whitaker took the view that this
activity was critical (first report, paragraph 2.12), because the reinforced
concrete frame of the building was constructed on that slab and was accordingly
dependent upon it. Mr Cornish's evidence was to
similar effect. I have no difficulty in
accepting that evidence. In his second
report Mr Whitaker expressed the opinion (paragraphs 2.6-2.10) that the
delay had been caused by additional work involved in the alternative gas
venting scheme. The ground floor slab, made of concrete, was reinforced by
concrete beams. In the tender scheme a
straightforward membrane was laid on top of the hardcore which supported the
ground beams and ground floor slab; the membrane was continuous, and passed
under both beams and slab. In that
situation, in Mr Whitaker's opinion, it is common practice to pour the
ground beams homogeneously with the ground floor slab. That obviously involves a single pour. The as-built records, however, disclosed that
part of the ground beams was constructed first, before the floor slab was
constructed above them. Mr Whitaker
was of opinion that that resulted from the revised scheme. In the revised scheme using the Proofex membrane, it was necessary to construct polythene
pipes through the ground beams to allow gas to pass out of the building. Those pipes involved a more complex form of
construction. The membrane required to
be cut to allow each pipe to pass through it, and a product known as Cordex Ventform was used around
the pipes; the arrangement is shown in drawing 1056(28)006D (No 6/138 of
process). Mr Whitaker described the
work involved as "intricate".
He stated that that work, including the separate construction of the
ground floor beams to allow the pipes to pass through them and through the
membrane, would have the effect of delaying the pouring of the ground floor
slab and would thus delay the start of the superstructure works. At paragraph 2.6 of his second report Mr Whitaker
produced a chart showing the planned and as-built programmes for the
substructure works and the first part of the superstructure works, namely the
construction of columns and walls to the first floor. This showed delay to commencement of the
columns and walls to first floor of 3 1/2 weeks. The actual duration of that work was three
weeks and two days, compared with five weeks planned; consequently the delay to
the completion of the activity was only two weeks and one day. Mr Whitaker expressed the opinion that
the most likely cause of the delay of 3 1/2 weeks to the start of
superstructure works was the additional work instructed in connection with the
gas venting scheme.
[43] In
evidence Mr Whitaker stated that the introduction of the gas venting
scheme had the direct effect of delaying the pouring of the first half of the
ground floor slab (day 10, 2.35). Mr Lowe
expressed the view that the ground beams and ground floor slab could have been
poured together despite the gas venting scheme; Mr Whitaker stated that
such a course would have risked damaging the gas membrane. Mr Whitaker's reason was that the
venting pipes would have been relatively unsupported when the concrete was
poured, and the connections at the ends of the pipes were delicate and would
easily be damaged. If those connections
had been disturbed, gas could permeate through the barrier that the membrane
was designed to create and enter the building; that would destroy the basic
purpose of the gas venting scheme. In
cross-examination (day 15, 12.55) it was suggested to Mr Whitaker that the
delay was actually caused by extra work required in the lift pit area in the
middle of the building; on that basis the defenders should have poured the
ground floor slab in three porous rather than two. Mr Whitaker rejected this suggestion; he
thought that the fact that the pour was not done in three sections was a
further indication that the cause of the delay was the work on the gas venting
scheme. In response to questioning by
the court (day 19, 12.15) Mr Whitaker stated that the extra work required
in the area of the lift pit was completed at about the same time as the
additional work required through the introduction of the gas venting scheme;
thus pouring the slab in three pours would not have assisted.
[44] Mr Lowe
(day 24, 12.07) described the work involved in installing the membranes and
pipes. The defenders required to cut a
hole through the membrane, slide the pipe through the hole, slide the first
part of the membrane collar on to the pipe and attach it, slide on the second
part of the collar and attach it, insert the Ventform
barrier material around the pipe, fill any voids with mortar, and wrap the
membrane over the Ventform. In my opinion that is plainly a relatively
elaborate procedure, and it is one that would not have been required if
construction had proceeded according to the tender drawings. Mr Dibben
stated (day 9, 10.40) that the requirement of gas venting introduced new work
into the contract on the critical path. The
construction of the building was complex on the ground, and the structural
elements were interrelated. Thus the
additional work immediately stopped operations that were occurring; the
defenders had to put the venting in before going on. That was summed up in a letter to the architect
dated 31 March 1998 (No 7/130 of process). Mr Dibben
further stated that the gas venting scheme delayed the ground floor slab, which
had a knock on effect on the critical path.
The letter of 31 March 1998 intimated that, in accordance with
clause 25 of the contract conditions, the progress of the work was likely to be
delayed because of the gas venting works.
It was indicated that the relevant drawing introduced additional works to
those in the tender documentation. This
necessitated a new sequence of construction relating to the substructure
works. That sequence was indicated in
detail; the new operations involved were the construction of formwork to the
ground beams and vent pipes prior to the concreting of the ground beams, the
striking of the formwork, the placing of the Cordex Ventform and sealing the pipes, and the laying of the Proofex membrane and protection board. Certain other activities also had to be resequenced. The
letter indicated that, in the defenders' opinion, the matters described would
delay completion of the works by three weeks beyond the Completion Date.
[45] RMJM
wrote to the defenders by letter dated 9 October 1998 (No 6/36 of process). In that letter they stated as follows:
"Based
upon the information provided by you in your letters of 25 August 1998 and 31
March 1998, the Architect's Instruction issued
to you and our projects records, we estimate the effect on the Contract
Completion Date to be as follows:
1. Compliance with Architect's Instruction
No. 1 of 27 January 1998 discharging the provisional sum for
gas venting works is a Relevant Event of the type described in clause 25.4.5.1.
2. The Relevant Event caused delay to
the works for a period of 2 weeks in the timing of the achievement of the
critical first floor slab consequent upon the revised erection sequence of the
lower structure".
The letter continued by stating that
RMJM had been advised that, by direct agreement with the pursuers, the
defenders had undertaken to absorb this delay; the result was that the architect
decided that no extension of time should be granted. I should state that no evidence was led
before the court to suggest that any agreement to absorb such delay had been
concluded. The pursuers aver that such
an undertaking had been given by Mr Dibben at a
meeting held on 8 April 1998.
The only witness who gave evidence on the matter was Mr Dibben (day 9, 10.50-11.35). His evidence about the meeting
was as follows. He had stated that the
gas venting membrane was additional work and central to the critical path. He had further said that the pursuers had
nevertheless taken some accelerated measures.
The pursuers' Mr Sandy Orr had stated, however, that he was not
prepared to accept that at that stage of the contract the defenders could be
incurring a potential delay. Mr Orr
said that he did not see this as the action of a partnering or team contractor;
he had said something like "You're not getting an extension of time out of
me". Mr Dibben
was clear that he did not agree to undertake to absorb any of the delay. No such undertaking had been recorded in the
minutes of the meeting. Mr Dibben was referred to the letter of 9
October 1998
and stated that he had been "flabbergasted" at the suggestion of an
undertaking to absorb delay. On this
matter I found Mr Dibben's evidence to be both
credible and reliable, and I accept it.
Moreover, it seems to me that if any such undertaking had been given it
was a serious matter, and I would certainly have expected to find it recorded
in the minutes of the meeting. It was
not so recorded, however. On this basis
I conclude that no such undertaking was given.
Subject to that, RMJM clearly considered that the defenders had been
delayed by the instruction relating to the gas venting scheme. Furthermore, they did not criticize the
defenders' decision to alter their intended sequence of construction.
[46] Mr Lowe
expressed the opinion that the delay in starting the superstructure was caused
by the defenders' decision to revise their original construction sequence (day
24, 12.29). He was not clear why the
revised sequence had been adopted. His
position seems inconsistent with that of RMJM, who were the contract architect
at the relevant time. On this matter, I
am of opinion that, if any substantial criticism of the defenders' decision
were possible, it would in all probability have been taken up by RMJM. The fact that it was not indicates that the
decision is likely to have been reasonable.
[47] Mr Lowe
further gave evidence that the delay in the construction of the ground floor
slab resulted from problems that were encountered with out of position
piles. This necessitated the redesign of
the pile caps at gridlines A3, A4, A12 and D3.
The ground floor slab was in fact poured in two halves, and three of the
piles in question, A3, A4 and D3, were in the area of the second pour. Consequently it is unlikely that they delayed
the first pour. It was the first pour that
was critical, however, because that permitted a start to be made on the works
above the ground floor slab. So far as
A12 was concerned, the problem was resolved on 9 April
1998; that
appears from the Clerk of Works diary (No 6/18 of process). The first half of the ground floor slab was
poured on 21 April 1998.
In these circumstances I am of opinion that the problems with out of
position piles did not delay the pouring of the ground floor slab; the only
pile that affected the first pour had been dealt with 12 days previously.
[48] In
these circumstances I conclude that the only explanation for the delay that has
been advanced is the change in the construction activities necessitated by the
gas venting scheme. No other tenable
alternative has in my opinion been put forward.
My conclusion is supported by the defenders' contemporary claim and by
the reaction of RMJM to that claim.
There was also evidence in the Clerk of Works' diary, in the period from
16 March 1998 onwards, that considerable work was involved in the
construction of the ground beams. This
is entirely consistent with the conclusion that I have reached. I am further of opinion that the instruction
of the gas venting scheme was a Relevant Event for the purposes of clause
25.4.5.1. Clause 13.8 of the contract
applies to such an instruction; I consider its application below at paragraphs [140]
onwards.
[49] The
next issue that must be considered is causation: whether the instruction
relating to the gas venting scheme caused completion of the Works to the
delayed beyond the Completion Date. In
my opinion it is clear that completion of the ground floor slab was a critical
activity, as it formed the base on which the whole superstructure was
constructed. That was the view of both Mr Cornish
(day 2, 11.35) and Mr Whitaker (second report, paragraph 2.11); Mr Whitaker
stated that a delay in the ground floor slab would inevitably delay completion
of the Works as a whole unless exceptional measures were taken to recover lost
time. That seems obvious; as Mr Whitaker
explained in his report (at paragraphs 2.9 and 2.10), the delay in the ground
floor slab delayed the construction of columns and walls to the first floor,
which in turn delayed the first floor slab, which in turn delayed columns and
walls to the second floor, and so on. Mr Whitaker's
opinion was that the length of the delay was 3 1/2 weeks (second report,
paragraph 2.10). That is relatively
close to the figure put forward in the defenders' letter to RMJM of 31
March 1998
(No 7/130 of process, paragraph 3.0). In
RMJM's letter of 9 October 1998 (No 6/36 of process) the view was
expressed that the gas venting instruction had caused a two-week delay. That letter was put to Mr Lowe, who
seemed to agree with it (day 24, 12.42).
[50] In
his second report, Mr Whitaker expressed the view (at paragraphs
2.11-2.16, under reference to the table at Page 7/8/10) that the defenders
recovered some of the time lost through the gas venting instruction; he thought
that by 17 June 1998 the defenders were between 1 1/2 and 2 weeks behind
programme, and were recovering lost time.
Mr Lowe accepted that the defenders had recovered some lost
time. Both experts agreed that at the
finish of the fifth floor slab one week of the initial delay of three weeks
four days had been recovered, reducing the delay to two weeks four days. Both experts also agreed that the sixth floor
slab finished four weeks late. Mr Cornish
(day 2, 12.04 onwards) stated that the defenders had worked longer hours and at
weekends to make up lost time as the superstructure proceeded; they had also
used additional resources. At that time
the defenders were intent on making up the time that had been lost. That had been expensive, however, and there
was no point in continuing to take exceptional measures if that became a
pointless exercise. Eventually it became
apparent that the project would be delayed by the problems with the roof
steelwork, which lay on the critical path.
At that stage it no longer seemed necessary to go to extraordinary
lengths to recover the situation, since that would have no effect on the critical
path of the project (day 3, 11.11). At
that point the defenders had stopped Sunday working and the working of longer
hours, because of the cost. Once the
project had been delayed by the roof steelwork, any such expenditure would be a
pointless exercise. That evidence is
supported by the summary that Mr Cornish made as project manager for the
site meeting held on 15 July 1998 (No 7/35 of process, at page
33). Mr Whitaker generally agreed
with this analysis (day 13, 2.09). The
evidence from Mr Cornish on this point was not contradicted, and is
supported by his contemporary record. I
accept it.
[51] I
have found the evidence of Mr Whitaker to be persuasive generally. His opinion was that the instruction of the
gas venting scheme caused delay to completion of the Works by 3 1/2 weeks. I am of opinion that that is supported by the
evidence summarized above; I accordingly conclude that the gas venting scheme
caused delay to completion by a period of 3 1/2 weeks.
Roof steelwork and cladding
[52] When
the defenders were invited to tender for the project the roof cladding
specification was based on a system known as Stramit Speedeck. This appears from section H31 of the Bills of
Quantities (No 6/28 of process). The Stramit system was an aluminium profiled
cladding system. Section H31 began as
follows:
"To be
read with Preliminaries/General conditions.
The Contractor
is invited to offer alternative proposals for this specification. Any alternative must achieve the technical
and visual performance inherent in this specification and relating drawings.
In any event
the Contractor or specialist will be required to assume full responsibility for
the design, construction and warranty of the roof enclosure".
The reference in that provision to
alternative proposals is an invitation to the contractor to provide Value
Engineering ("VE") proposals in relation to specified parts of the
Works. The intention was that the contractor
should put forward alternative systems of construction which would produce cost
savings; these would obviously be reflected in the Contract Sum. In the course of the tendering process the
defenders put forward a list of such proposals (No 7/17 of process); these
included the system of roof covering, where a proposal was made to use a built
up roof covering system rather than the proprietary Stramit
system. The proposal relating to the
roof covering system was VE Proposal 13; it provided: "Change specification of roof cladding
to built-up system". A saving of
г5,000 was placed against this item. In
total 32 VE proposals were made, which might result in a total saving of
г128,000.
Contractual status of VE Proposal 13
[53] The
first issue that arises between the parties in relation to the roof steelwork
and cladding is the contractual status of VE Proposal 13. The defenders contend that that proposal
formed part of the contract.
Consequently, when on 29 June 1998 RMJM instructed the defenders to use
the Stramit system, the defenders submit that that
amounted to a variation, and indeed a late instruction; that was a Relevant
Event for the purposes of clause 25, and would entitle the defenders to an
extension of time. The pursuers, by
contrast, contend that VE Proposal 13 did not form part of the contract. The defenders' obligation under the contract
was to use the Stramit Speedeck
system. Consequently the instruction of 29
June 1998
did no more than confirm the contractual position, and did not amount to either
a variation or a late instruction.
[54] Certain
clauses of the parties' contract are relevant to this issue. The most significant of these is clause 14,
headed "Contract Sum". This
clause forms part of the Schedule of Amendments specially prepared for the
purposes of the parties' contract; it replaces clauses 14.1 and 14.2 of the JCT
Standard Form. Its purpose is, broadly speaking, to replace the usual JCT
clause with a provision specifying a guaranteed maximum sum and taking account
of Value Engineering savings. Clause
14.1 provides as follows:
"The
Employer shall pay to the Contractor in consideration of the carrying out and
completion of the Works the guaranteed maximum price comprising, the Contract
Sum or such other sum as shall become payable hereunder at the time and in the
manner specified in the Conditions".
Clause 14.2 indicates the
significance of the guaranteed maximum price:
"Notwithstanding
anything contained in the Contract whether express or implied and/or any claim
at law the Employer's entire aggregate liability for any payment to the Contractor
of any sum of whatsoever in nature and howsoever arising for the carrying out
and completion of the Works shall be limited to and in no circumstances exceed
the guaranteed maximum price comprised in the Contract Sum save only where the
Conditions expressly provide for any increase in the Contract Sum".
Clause 14.3 then provides:
"The
quantity and quality of work included in the Contract Sum shall be deemed to be
that which is required to be carried out and completed in compliance with the
Contract Documents".
That indicates a clear relationship
between the work that is to be carried out under the Contract and the Contract
Sum; I consider this relationship to be important for reasons that are
discussed further below. Clause 14.5
provides for adjustment of the Guaranteed Maximum Price Contract Sum in respect
of three matters: provisional sums; contingencies and day work; and unforeseen
or unknown ground conditions. No mention
is made there of Value Engineering savings.
Clause 14.6 indicates the amount of the guaranteed maximum price:
"The
Guaranteed Maximum Price Contract Sum is г4,959,578 comprising all adjustments
made for Value Engineering savings and the like and is as set out in Appendix E
hereto".
Clause 14.7 deals with VE savings; it
provides:
"The
Value Engineering savings which form part of the Contract Sum are defined and
set out in Appendix F hereto".
Finally, clause 14.8 provides that
any Value Engineering savings other than those stipulated in clause 14.7 are to
be shared between the parties in an agreed manner.
[55] VE proposal 13 is specified in
Appendix F as follows:
"Omit stramit roofing as described in specification Clause
H31:140 and substitute with a built up roof cladding system as follows: --
╖
Topsheet in plastisol coated steel outer
sheet.
╖
Breather
membrane.
╖
Fibre
glass quilt insulation 100 mm thick.
╖
White
enamel faced under liner sheet with taped joints fixed with spacers to purlins.
Roof pitch
will need to be a minimum of 6░".
The saving brought out in respect of
the proposal is г5,000.
[56] Appendix
E sets out the calculation of the Guaranteed Maximum Price Contract Sum. The calculation proceeds as follows. It starts with the original tender sum of
г4,919,912. To that is added a
Guaranteed Maximum Price "premium" of г76,000. Three deductions are then made: current VE
savings amounting to г128,000; a saving of г100,000 if a Glasgow contract were awarded to the
defenders; and items not now to be included in the contract, amounting to
г13,334. Two additions are then made for
undefined provisional sums in respect of "Section 106 Works" and the
gas membrane; these additions total г105,000.
Finally the saving of г100,000 in respect of the Glasgow contract is added back, but is to be
deducted following the agreed negotiation of the Glasgow contract price. The result of the calculation is a proposed
Contract Sum of г4,959,578.
[57] It
is in my opinion clear from the foregoing provisions of the Contract that the
Contract Sum is calculated on the basis that the VE proposals set out in
Appendix E form part of the Works. That
is clear from clause 14.6, where it is expressly stated that the Contract Sum
includes all adjustments made for VE savings as set out in Appendix E, and from
Appendix E itself, where the calculation shows the deduction made for VE
savings. At this point it is important
to bear in mind the nature of the present contract; it involves the provision
of goods and services in consideration for a price, and generally speaking the
work that is to be provided under the contract will be reflected in that price.
This is a matter of great importance to the parties, because these matters will
determine the economic benefits that they obtain from the contract. It is,
moreover, a factor that is directly reflected in the terms of clause 14.3. It follows that if an item of work is
included in the Contract Sum it will normally form part of the contractual
Works. In the present case, therefore, I
am of opinion that the Works included the built up system of roof covering
indicated in VE Proposal 13. This
conclusion is supported by a practical consideration: if the VE proposals were
not included in the Works, the Contract Sum would have to be recalculated to
reflect the defenders' obligations as contractor. That would introduce an unnecessary complexity;
if the Works did not include the VE proposals, it would plainly make sense to
calculate the Contract Sum on that basis.
[58] Three
other provisions of the contract support the conclusion that the VE proposals
form part of the Works. First, if the
Works did not include the VE proposals, it is difficult to see the point of
clauses 14.6 and 14.7, both of which refer expressly to VE savings; clause 14
as a whole could have assumed a simpler form, as could the calculations in Appendix.E. Secondly,
clause 14.5 provides expressly for certain forms of adjustment. If the VE proposals contained in Appendix E
did not form part of the Works, it would be expected that they would be
referred to in that clause, either as provisional sums or in an analogous
manner. That was not done, however. Thirdly, clause 14.8 makes express provision
for VE savings other than those contained in Appendix E. That indicates that a clear distinction is
drawn in the contract between the Appendix E savings and other possible
savings, with the former being included in the Contract Sum and Works and the
latter being the subject of further adjustment.
[59] For
the pursuers it was contended that the contract specification provided for the
use of the Stramit system. The Bills of Quantities (No 6/28 of process)
provided at Bill 3, page 3/21-22, for metal profiled roof cladding, for which
the contractor or specialist subcontractor was to assume full design
responsibility, thus making it contractor design work. The contractor was invited to submit
alternative proposals; such an alternative proposal was embodied in VE Proposal
13. The pursuers' submission was that
the VE Proposals were not incorporated into the contract; only the terms of the
specification and Bills were so incorporated.
The VE Proposals could be accepted or rejected by the architect, but
only following the submission of detailed proposals by the contractor. The relevant procedures had been agreed
between the architect and the defenders at a site meeting held on 25
March 1998
(No 7/13 of process, paragraph 5.3); those were followed up by the defenders'
submission of their preliminary programme for Value Engineering proposals dated
3 April 1998 (No 7/19 of process).
That programme allowed periods for the submission of final proposals to
the client and for client approval. VE
Proposal 13 contained an outline proposal for an alternative to the Stramit system that was described in the contract
specification. That outline was very
brief, and a fuller specification would be required in order to allow the Architect
to consider whether the proposed alternative met the visual and structural
performance of the Stramit system. Consequently a detailed design proposal was
required from the defenders before the proposal could be accepted or rejected.
[60] The
difficulty with the foregoing argument is twofold: it fails to give effect to
the manner in which the Contract Sum is calculated, and it fails to give
content to the provisions of clause 14, read together with Appendices E and
F. In the first place, it is clear from
clause 14.6, read together with Appendix E, that the Contract Sum is calculated
on the basis that all of the VE Proposals are included in the Works. That is plain from the terms of Appendix E,
and also from clause 14.6 itself, which states that
the Contract Sum comprises all adjustments made for Value Engineering
savings. Clause 14.7 then states that
the Value Engineering savings which form part of the Contract Sum are set out
in Appendix F; these include VE Proposal 13.
The Contract Sum is, obviously, the consideration for the Works at the
time when the contract was concluded, and it is implicit in the notion of
consideration that the elements that are included in the calculation of the
Contract Sum will form part of the parties' contract. In the second place, if the pursuers'
argument on this point is correct, it is difficult to see the point of clause
14.6 and .7. These sub-clauses deal with
the VE savings in a specific manner, which is quite distinct from the treatment
of provisional sums in clause 14.5. If
the VE Proposals were not part of the Works agreed on in the Contract, it would
have made sense to deal with them in the same way as provisional sums, with a
subsequent adjustment to the Contract Sum if a VE Proposal were taken up. The incompatibility of the pursuers' argument
with the structure of clause 14 is further strengthened by the provisions of
clause 14.8, which deals with VE savings other than those stipulated in clause
14.7 should be dealt with distinctly.
That is an indication that the clause 14.7 VE
Proposals were part of the Works, unlike any other VE Proposals, which
would be dealt with by an adjustment to the Contract Sum.
[61] The
pursuers' argument on this topic proceeded on the premise that the VE Proposals
in Appendix F were "optional", in the sense that the architect still
had to decide whether to adopt them. In
support of this argument reference was made to the terms of the VE Proposals;
it was said that the proposals were fluid in nature, and were presented in
outline form. It is true that the VE
Proposals were optional, but I am of opinion that this factor is neutral in
deciding whether the VE Proposals were part of the Works. The "option" in relation to the VE
Proposals can be regarded as a power to adopt or a power to reject; if the
option is construed as a power to reject its existence is wholly compatible
with the proposition that the Appendix F VE Proposals formed part of the
Works. The outline nature of the
proposals themselves is not I think a decisive factor; the proposals had
clearly been considered by the defenders, and sufficient description was given
that the architect knew broadly what was proposed in each case. The option to accept or reject the proposals
could only be exercised at a later stage, when more detail was available. At that stage, if the VE Proposals were part
of the contract, a decision to reject would be a variation; if they were not
part of the contract, a decision to accept would be a variation. This factor accordingly seems to me to be
neutral.
[62] The
pursuers further referred to the manner in which the Guaranteed Maximum Price
Contract Sum was calculated in Appendix E.
They submitted that the contractor had arrived at the most competitive
price for the Works by pricing on the basis that the VE savings that it
proposed to make would be achieved. This
was described as a "business gamble" taken by the contractor, and it
was suggested that it was presumably one of the reasons why a sizeable
"Guaranteed Maximum Price premium" had been added to the Contract
Sum. The fact that the VE savings were included in the final Guaranteed Maximum
Price did not incorporate them into the contract; it rather placed an onus upon
the contractor to ensure that as many as possible of its VE proposals were
accepted by the employer in order to maximize the contractor's own profit.
[63] It
is no doubt correct to suggest that the contractor had arrived at its most
competitive price by taking the VE savings into account; reduction in the price
was the obvious purpose of the VE Proposals.
It is also correct to state that a "business gamble" is
involved, but that is true of any tender.
The Guaranteed Maximum Price premium seems to me to the just that: the contractor
agreed to a cap on the price for the Works, subject to certain defined
exceptions, but took a premium in exchange.
The VE savings were taken into account in determining the Guaranteed
Maximum Price, but that merely emphasizes the point made above: the savings
were reflected in the calculation of the total Contract Sum, with all the
consequences that that entails. That
seems to me to point to the proposition that the VE Proposals were included in
the contract Works. As to the suggestion
that the VE proposals were designed to maximize the contractor's profit, it
appears to me that they were designed essentially to reduce the tender price;
whether this resulted in a greater profit would depend upon a range of factors
as the contract proceeded. If the VE
Proposals formed part of the parties' contract, any rejection of a proposal
would amount to a variation, with a potential impact on the total amount
payable by the employer, and also a potential impact on the contractor's
profit. That it cannot be said that that
was any "onus" on the contractor to have VE Proposals accepted; they
might or might not increase its profit, although they would certainly make its
tender price more competitive.
[64] The
pursuers further submitted that the defenders' argument was incompatible with
clause 1 of the Scottish Building Contract.
That clause provides that "the Contractor shall carry out the Works
(as defined in Appendix 1 hereto) in accordance with the Drawings numbered as
per the Schedule annexed to this Contract; the Schedule of Amendments to the
Building Contract and the Bills of Quantities all as annexed and signed as
relative hereto". The definition of
"Works" in Appendix 1 refers to "The Contract Works shown and
described in the Contract Drawings and in the Contract Bills and including any
changes made to these in accordance with this Contract". No reference was made in these provisions to
any link between the extent of the Works and the Contract Sum. In my opinion
the fact that no express reference is made to any such link in the provisions
cited by the pursuers is not significant.
The link exists nevertheless; the Contract Sum is paid in consideration
of the performance of the Works, and that very elementary connection creates a
link. This conclusion is not altered by
the terms of the Contract. Moreover, I
am of opinion that reliance on the Bills of Quantities is not helpful. Clause 2.2.1 of the JCT Standard Form
provides that nothing in the Contract Bills should override or modify the
application of the Building Contract, the Conditions for the Appendix. The basic contractual provisions thus
override the Bills. This analysis is
further supported by clause 14.4 of the parties' contract, which states that
the Bill of Quantities is for guidance only.
[65] The
pursuers argued that the roofing work was Performance Specified Work. Performance Specified Work is identified on
page 28 of the parties' version of the Scottish Building Contract (No 6/1 of
process); the list includes Roofing Work, with a reference to Bill H33; this is
in fact a misprint for Bill H31. Bill
H31 deals with the roof cladding but not the roof steelwork. Clause 2.4.1.2 provides that Performance
Specified Work should accord with any relevant specification in the Contract
Documents; the Contract Documents are defined in Appendix 1 to the Scottish
Building Contract as "The Contract Drawings, the Contract Bills, the
Conditions, this Appendix and the Appendix II to the Building
Contract". Consequently, as I
understood the pursuers' submissions, the system of roof cladding must be that
provided for in the contract documents rather than the defenders' VE
Proposals. They relied in particular on
the provisions of Bill H31, which indicates what is required by way of roof
cladding, under reference to the Stramit system.
[66] Whether
or not the roof cladding was properly defined in the contract as Performance
Specified Work, I do not think that that has any bearing on the question that
is crucial for present purposes, namely whether the parties' contract specified
VE Proposal 13 or the Stramit system set out in the
Bill H33. If VE Proposal 13 was included
in the contract, it would override the Bills, in accordance with clause 2.2.1
of the JCT Form. In any event, when the contractor
puts forward a VE Proposal, it is obvious that he is putting forward an
alternative to the architect's proposals, and that that alternative is one that
may or may not be accepted. In that
event, the proper interpretation is in my opinion that the contractor's
proposal, when duly accepted by the architect, will supersede the criteria for
Performance Specified Work to the extent that it is inconsistent with those
criteria. That seems to render
categorization as Performance Specified Work irrelevant. In any event, I am of opinion that the
pursuers have failed to establish that the roof cladding was Performance
Certified Work. Performance Specified
Work is defined in clause 42.1; this provides that such work must be work which
is identified in the Appendix and is to be provided by the Contractor, and of
which certain requirements have been predetermined and are shown on the
Contract drawings and in the Contract Bills.
"Contract Drawings" are defined in Appendix 1 of the Scottish
Supplement as drawings referred to in the Building Contract which have been signed by the employer and the contractor or on
their behalf. In the present case no
such drawings were produced. It is the
pursuers who assert that the roof cladding was Performance Specified Work;
consequently any failure to produce drawings must in my view mean that it has
not been proved that the roof cladding fell into the category of Performance
Specified Work.
[67] Further
to their submission that the roof covering was Performance Specified Work, the
pursuers submitted that the defenders were in default, in that they had failed
to carry through the various procedures required in respect of such work. In this connection, the pursuers relied on
certain provisions of clause 2 of the contract conditions. Clause 2.4.4 of the contract conditions (a
clause forming part of the special conditions) places an obligation on the contractor
to provide the architect with all information necessary for Performance
Specified Work. Clauses 2.5.1 and 2.5.2
state that the contractor is to provide the architect with drawings,
specifications and details in respect of such work, in sufficient time for the architect
to comment on such work in line with the contractor's programme. Clause 2.7 provides that no extension of time
should be granted to the extent that there is any failure by the contractor to
provide such drawings and the like. The
procedures for use in respect of the VE Proposals were agreed at a site meeting
held on 25 March 1998 (No 7/13 of process, paragraph
5.3.2). Those procedures were also
reflected in AI 27 dated 22 June 1998 (No 6/129 of process); in that
Instruction the architect accepted certain VE proposals and rejected
others. At that time Proposal 13 was
listed as an outstanding item; it was further indicated that initial proposals
had been received and that RMJM were to respond. In respect of the rejected proposals, it was
stated in the Instruction that the information currently issued for
construction "remains valid".
While the pursuers placed some emphasis on the latter expression, I do
not think that it is of great assistance in determining what the parties'
contract contained, for two reasons.
First, the Instruction in question was issued some time after the
contract was concluded, and thus could do no more than indicate the architect's
understanding of the parties' rights and obligations. Secondly, I think it clear that the
expression is used merely as a way of stating that the contractor should use
the information contained in the Drawings and Bills rather than the alternative
put forward as VE Proposal; that is the limit of its significance. The pursuers went on to submit that VE
proposal 13 contained an outline proposal for an alternative to the Stramit system, but that further detail would be required
in order to allow the architect to consider whether or not the proposed
alternative met the visual and structural performance of the Stramit system.
Consequently a detailed design proposal was required from the contractor. That had not been provided in sufficient time,
and consequently the contractor was in default at the time when, the defenders
say, a late variation was issued through the instruction to use the Stramit system.
[68] In
this part of the argument the pursuers ran together provisions that related
specifically to Performance Specified Work and the procedures that were agreed
for dealing with VE Proposals. If I am
correct that the roof cladding was not Performance Specified Work, the
provisions relating to such work are not relevant. I think that the argument can be advanced,
however, on the restricted basis that the VE procedures were not followed by
the defenders (see No 7/351 of process, page 9). It is true that the VE
procedures set out in the minutes of the site meeting of 25
March 1998
(No 7/13 of process, pages 5-6) do not appear to have been strictly followed in
relation to VE 13. Nevertheless, it
seems to me that the critical feature of the procedures agreed at that meeting
was that a contractor presenting a VE proposal should do so "with enough
detail to effect a considered response". Thereafter the design team and the pursuers
are to consider the proposal and either refuse it or approve it in principle,
or approve it with comments; the contractor is then to develop a proposal in
more detail with the assistance of the design team, and final agreement is to
follow that (paragraph 5.3.2). VE 13 was
considered at the Value Engineering meeting held on 3 June (No 7/24 of process,
page 3, paragraph 2.10). The comment
against this item (quoted below at paragraph [72]) is that VE 13 was agreed,
subject to the defenders' confirming that it did not affect the lightning
protection and picking up any changes in the roof pitch on the fabricators'
drawings. Mr Dibben
was the only witness who attended the meeting.
He stated that, subject to the comments made in the above extract, it
was agreed to proceed with the VE proposal.
The pursuers submitted that the true meaning of the entry in the minutes
was that RMJM had agreed to the proposal in principle but that the defenders
were to provide further detail to back it up and to allow for a proper
consideration of the proposal by RMJM. In my opinion that submission is unfounded. In the first place, it is contrary to Mr Dibben's evidence; in the second place, it runs contrary to
the plain meaning of the wording used in the note at paragraph 2.10 of the
minutes, which indicates agreement subject to confirmation regarding the
lightning protection. It seems clear, therefore,
that by this stage RMJM considered themselves to be in
a position to agree VE 13. That
indicates that it was unnecessary to go through the more elaborate procedures
agreed at the site meeting of 25 March, and that RMJM were content not to go
through with those procedures.
Furthermore, it appears from the terms of AI 27 (No 6/129 of process),
issued on 22 June 1998, that RMJM accepted that they were
due to respond; the comment in that Instruction is "Initial proposal
received. RMJM to
respond". Mr Cornish
(day 2, 3.36) stated that in late June that had been no indications from RMJM
that a decision on the roof was impossible because the defenders had not sent
the necessary information. In these
circumstances I conclude that consideration of VE 13 was not held up by any
failure on the part of the defenders to follow through the formal procedures
relating to VE proposals.
History of instructions relating to the roof steelwork and cladding
[69] On
8 May 1998 RMJM issued a drawing 1056(26)003 (No 7/20B of process);
this was issued together with AI 17, and had the status of an instruction. The drawing showed the gable elevations of
the roof steelwork, and indicated a roof pitch of 2.3░. This was consistent with the Stramit system, but was not consistent with the form of
roofing proposed in VE Proposal 13; the latter specified that for the built-up
roof system the minimum roof pitch was 6░ (see Mr Whitaker, day 14,
3.25). The change in angle was
significant for the fabrication of the roof steelwork because it affected the
lengths of beams and columns and the details of the various joints (Mr Whitaker's
report, No 7/8 of process, paragraph 2.32).
Evidence to similar effect was given by Mr Cornish (day 2,
2.21). Mr Lowe agreed (day 25,
2.40). It seems to me that this point is
clear as a matter of elementary geometry.
[70] On
receipt of the drawing 1056(26)003, the defenders passed it to their steelwork
fabrication subcontractor, Zonner Industries
Limited. On 13 May
1998 Zonner sent the defenders a fax (No 7/30 of process) in
relation to the drawing. In that fax Zonner stated that they were unable to start working on
their own details for the steelwork because certain details were not given in
the architect's drawing. Mr Whitaker
(day 11, 11.16) explained the methods of working of steel fabricators; they
have to produce fabrication drawings showing all work that has to be done to
each steel member; that includes the precise length, the angle of the cut ends,
details of the plates that are welded to the end for fixing the beam to the
column, and details of holes for bolts.
Because of the computerized system of design that is used by
fabricators, it is impossible to produce the final cutting list until all of
the necessary information is available.
Consequently Zonner would require the
information listed in their fax in order to start their own design work. Mr Lowe in cross-examination broadly
agreed that the information requested would be necessary to permit the
steelwork fabricator to design the steelwork connections (day 25, 2.20
onwards). Mr Lowe further stated
that the necessary details would be provided by the structural engineer.
[71] In
response to Zonner's fax, RMJM acting in their
capacity as structural engineer sent the defenders a fax dated 15
May 1998 (No
6/354 of process). In relation to two of
the details requested by Zonner (connection details
and connection details for cantilevers to concrete), RMJM stated that a drawing
indicating the relevant joint loads would be issued "next week". It follows that at this time the design team
had not produced sufficient information to permit the steelwork fabricators to
start fabrication using the Stramit system. A site meeting took place on 20
May 1998. In the minutes (No 7/15 of process, paragraph
3.1.4) it is recorded that the defenders were keen to conclude value engineering
discussions and that RMJM agreed to issue instructions, which were to be
accepted or rejected within a week.
There is no suggestion in the minute that the architect required any
proposals or details from the defenders in relation to any of the VE Proposals
in order to allow such an instruction to be issued. At this time no decision had been intimated
on VE Proposal 13; consequently the undertaking to issue instructions applied
to that proposal.
[72] In
fact no instructions were issued by the architect during the course of the
following week. On 28
May 1998 the
pursuers' cost consultants, Gardiner & Theobald,
wrote to the pursuers with a report on value management strategy. On 29 May
RMJM as structural engineer issued certain further drawings to the defenders
(drawings 1056(26)002 and 004). These
drawings contained the connection load details requested by Zonner
in their fax of 13 May (Mr Whitaker, day 18, 2.27; Mr Lowe, day 25,
2.44). Those drawings were consistent with
drawing 1056(26)003, which indicated the roof pitch as 2.3░, consistently with
the Stramit system.
Thereafter, on 3 June 1998, a meeting was held to discuss Value
Engineering issues; the minutes are found at No 7/24 of process. The meeting was attended by Mr Dibben, who gave evidence about it (day 9, 12.20
onwards). At the outset of the meeting,
according to the minutes, a representative of Gardiner & Theobald indicated that this was probably the last major
chance that the project team would have to consider any VE savings; he further
suggested that the existing schedule of VE Proposals had to be agreed and
signed off or rejected. Item 2.10
provides as follows:
"VE Item
No 13 - Change roof cladding specification to a built up system.
Agreed. SCL [the defenders] to
confirm that it does not affect the lightning protection. SCL to pick up any changes in the roof pitch
on the fabricators drawings".
Mr Dibben
stated that, as recorded in the minutes, it was agreed that the defenders
should proceed with VE Proposal 13. Mr Cornish
also stated in evidence that that was his understanding of the position (day 2,
3.16). In the minutes no indication is
given that any further details or proposals were required from the defenders in
respect of VE Proposal 13; on the basis of the terms of the minutes and Mr Dibben's evidence, I conclude that at the VE meeting it was
decided that the Proposal 13 was to go ahead.
The minute further states, at paragraph 3.0, that RMJM were to issue Architect's
Instructions as appropriate to cover all of the items discussed.
[73] A
further meeting at which certain VE Proposals were discussed was held on 17
June 1998. Mr Cornish (day 8, 3.13) stated that VE
Proposal 13 was not discussed at this meeting.
Subsequently, however, on 22 June 1998, RMJM issued Architect's Instruction
No 27 (No 6/129 of process). In that
Instruction RMJM specified certain VE Proposals which had been accepted and
were to be incorporated into the contract works. On pages 4 and 5, VE Proposals that were said
to be "outstanding" were listed; these included the Proposal No
13. That does not seem consistent with
the minutes of the meeting of 3 June, and is contrary to Mr Dibben's evidence.
The Architect's Instruction nevertheless narrated, on page 5,
"Initial proposal received. RMJM to respond".
That appears to indicate that RMJM did not require further information
from the defenders to reach a decision on roof cladding. Thereafter, RMJM sent the defenders a letter
dated 24 June (No 7/25 of process; the letter was received on 27 June). In this they stated:
"I have
recommended to First Stop Hotels [the pursuers] that we retain the use of speedeck to the main roof.
I will advise you of an instruction as soon as I can".
In relation to that letter, Mr Cornish
commented (day 2, 3.32) stated that his reaction was
"exasperation". He stated that
the situation was that the defenders had no direction as to which way to go,
because RMJM had not made their mind up.
The next communication from RMJM to the defenders was a fax dated 29
June (No 7/26 of process). This stated
"I
confirm my telephone call of Friday 26 June advising that First Stop Hotels
have agreed that the roof specification as currently instructed (Stramit Speedeck) is not to be
replaced by any alternative".
[74] The
defenders wrote (No 7/27 of process) on the same date to their roofing subcontractor,
Kelsey Roofing Industries Ltd, to confirm that it was the defenders' firm
intention to enter into a subcontract with them for the roofing works. The letter went on to state that the
specification would be as discussed at a meeting of 17 June, and that the architect
had confirmed that the Speedeck roof option was to be
adopted. Mr Cornish indicated that no order had been placed with Kelsey
because that would depend upon the outcome of RMJM's
decision (day 2, 3.50); a subcontract had been concluded with Kelsey as soon as
the defenders knew what was to be built.
Mr Cornish was then asked whether he was satisfied that the regular
progress of the pursuers' works was affected by this. Mr Cornish replied in the affirmative,
and stated that all of the activities concerned were on the critical path. At this stage he had realized that it was
impossible to get the steel and cladding in time, and he was satisfied that
this factor affected critical activities.
Mr Cornish returned to this matter in re-examination (day 8,
3.18). He stated that meetings had been
arranged with Kelsey and Zonner, at which issues had
been raised regarding purlin spacings;
the defenders were pursuing RMJM to clarify structural details. Those details were needed by Kelsey and Zonner for their shop drawings. Load calculations were also needed from
RMJM. The purlin
fixings had in fact been raised by Zonner in their
fax of 13 May. In a subsequent fax of 15
May (No 6/354 of process) RMJM had indicated that the purlin
detail would be changed. The relevant
drawing (1056(26)003, revision A) was nevertheless issued to the defenders on 9
July 1998;
that appears from the drawing register (No 6/355 of process). The copy of that drawing found as No 7/20B of
process bears a date stamp which indicates that it was received by the
defenders on 10 July; that is consistent with issue on 9 July. That indicates that adequate information for
steelwork fabrication using the Stramit Speedeck system had not been issued by RMJM until 9 July.
[75] The
connection loads were provided by RMJM in a fax dated 13 July (No 7/32 of
process), and certain further details were provided in a fax from RMJM dated 17
July (No 7/34 of process). In relation
to these documents, Mr Cornish stated in evidence (day 8, 3.23) that it
was following the revisions of drawings at this time that Zonner
had everything that they needed. The
final version of the drawings, referred to in the fax of 17 July, indicated
co-ordination between the steelwork (Zonner's
responsibility) and the roofing work (Kelsey's responsibility); the further
detail provided at this stage was essential for the shop drawings. That evidence was not contradicted and I
accept it. I accordingly conclude that
the defenders' subcontractors were not in a position to prepare shop drawings
to enable fabrication to take place until after they received the information
provided with RMJM's fax of 17 July. On 20 July the defenders passed a copy of RMJM's fax of 17 July to Zonner
and Kelsey (No 7/33 of process); in that fax it was indicated that the relevant
drawings would follow as soon as they were received by the defenders. Kelsey responded to that fax by letter dated 30
July 1998
(No 7/28 of process, in which they indicated that they would progress the works
on the basis set out in the letter.
Application of clause 25 to roof of steelwork and cladding
[76] Clause
25 is set out at paragraph [9] above.
The defenders' claim for an extension in respect of roof steelwork and
cladding is made on the basis that there occurred a Relevant Event of the sort
specified in clause 25.5.5.6. In short,
it is contended that the architect, RMJM, failed to provide the necessary
instructions to the defenders in due time; there were the instructions to use
the Stramit system rather than the VE proposal that
was included in the contract (see paragraph [53] above). To establish such a claim the defenders must
show, first, that they made a specific application in writing to the architect
for such instructions; secondly, that such application was made on a date which
having regard to the Completion Date was neither unreasonably distant from not
unreasonably close to the date on which information was required; and thirdly
that they did not receive the necessary instruction in due time.
[77] The
defenders' original construction programme indicated that roof steelwork was to
start on about 27 July 1998 (No 7/19/2 of process). Mr Cornish gave evidence (day 2, 3.43)
that on that programme the time required for procurement of steelwork should
have been 12 weeks. On that basis
information should have been provided in mid May, on 11 May or during the week
or so afterwards; the latest possible date was 18 May. The successful subcontractor would have
required a 10 week lead-in period. Mr Whitaker
in his report (No 7/8 of process) expressed the opinion that a reasonable date
for receipt of the information relating to the roof was 11
May 1998
(paragraph 2.40, subparagraph 6 and the accompanying table). In evidence, Mr Whitaker stated (day 11,
12.26) that he agreed with Mr Cornish on this matter.
[78] The
defenders' application for information relating to the steelwork was contained
in an Information Required Schedule (No 7/114 of process), with an accompanying
Package Procurement Schedule. This
Schedule was dated 26 January 1998.
It stated at the outset that the date on which information was required
reflected the date for issue of construction drawings. In relation to roof steelwork, the Package
Procurement Schedule indicated that full information should be available by 8
April in order that tender documents might be issued by 15 April and an order
placed by 6 May. It was envisaged that
steelwork would start on site on 29 July.
In my opinion this document was a sufficient application in writing to
satisfy the second of the requirements of clause 25.4.6. So far as the third requirement is concerned,
that the timing of the written application should be reasonable, no suggestion
was made to the contrary, and I find that the application was neither
unreasonably distant from nor unreasonably close to the date on which
information was required.
[79] Neither
Mr Whitaker nor Mr Cornish maintained that full information relating
to roof steelwork should have been available by 8 April, the date in the
Package Procurement Schedule; both favoured a date of approximately 11
May. I accept their evidence on this
matter; I consider that such a date would have been reasonable in all the
circumstances. In this respect I rely in
particular on the evidence relating to the lead-in period required for
steelwork; 10 weeks was reasonable for this purpose. On this basis I conclude that the defenders
did not receive the necessary instructions from the architect in due time. The architect's instruction relating to the
roof cladding system that was to be adopted was only received on 29
June 1998
(see paragraph [73] above), and in fact full details were only provided later,
by 17 July (see paragraph [75]). Even on
the first of these dates, 29 June, I am of opinion that the instruction was not
issued in due time. Given a typical
lead-in period of 10 weeks, with an additional two weeks being required for the
tendering process, I consider that that instruction was wholly incompatible
with the defenders' programme, which at that time showed that steelwork was due
to start on 27 or 29 July 1998; the original construction programme stated that
roof steelwork was to start on 27 July (No 7/19 of process); the Package
Procurement Schedule forming part of the defenders' Information Required
Schedule (No 7/114 of process) indicates that roof steelwork was due to start
on 29 July; I do not regard the difference between these two dates as material
for present purposes.
Consequences of late instruction
[80] Steelwork
was delivered to the site on 1 September 1998, and Zonner
started erection the following day, 2 September. This was five weeks later than planned. Mr Whitaker expressed the opinion that a
five-week delay to the start of steelwork erection had been caused by the late
instruction issued by RMJM (report No 7/8 of process, paragraphs 2.39 and 2.40;
in evidence, day 11, 12.27). Zonner in fact managed to accelerate the fabrication of the
steelwork; at the site meeting held on 15 July the defenders had reported that,
as a result of the late decision in relation to roofing specification, it was
unlikely that roof structural steelwork would begin until 7 September (No
7/35/33 of process). In his evidence, Mr Cornish
agreed with Mr Whitaker's conclusions on this matter (day 3, 11.14
onwards). He stated that no order could
be placed with Kelsey, the cladding subcontractor, until a clear instruction
was obtained from the Architect in relation to the roof cladding system (day 2,
3.50). Mr Cornish was asked (day 3,
12.22) whether he was satisfied that the defenders had been delayed in
completion by the late Architect's Instruction relating to the roof
specification. He replied that he was totally
satisfied. He further indicated that he
was satisfied that the delay arose entirely from the lateness of the
instruction, as against its content.
[81] Mr Whitaker
expressed the view (report No 7/8 of process, paragraphs 2.17, 2.41) that the
roof steelwork and roof coverings were critical to the completion of the
works. He gave two reasons for this
conclusion. First, the roof coverings
provided a partial weather tight state so that fitting-out of the building
could progress. Secondly, the roof coverings
formed the plant room, where all the service plant and equipment was housed and
to which all of the pipework and electrical and
communications cables were connected. Mr Whitaker
stated (first report, No 7/1 5/6 of process, paragraph 2.12; in evidence, day
10, 12.12 onwards) that the erection of roof steelwork was a critical milestone
in the project; any delay in the steelwork would result in delay to completion
of the Works as a whole. The ability to
construct the roof cladding was directly dependent upon the roof steelwork, and
the cladding enclosed the plant room, which was of major significance in a
highly serviced building. Mr Cornish
agreed that direction of the roof steelwork was a critical activity, for
broadly similar reasons to those given by Mr Whitaker (day 2, 11.20 and
11.41).
[82] Mr Lowe
expressed a contrary view. He was of
opinion that the roof steelwork and coverings were not on the critical path,
and thus could not have caused delay to completion of the Works. The reason for this view was that, at the
instigation of Mr Cornish, temporary weatherproofing had been installed at
fourth floor level and then, as construction proceeded, at sixth floor level
(day 3, 11.44). In their Project
Manager's Summary for August 1998 the defenders advised the architect that they
intended to use temporary sheeting at sixth floor level to allow first fix
services to proceed on the fourth and fifth floors by 1 September (No 7/3 of
process). Thus adequate weatherproofing
had been installed to enable mechanical and electrical works to proceed at
lower levels. Those works hand started
on 31 July 1998, by comparison with a planned start date of 2
July 1998,
as a result of late completion of the reinforced concrete frame. Nevertheless, Mr Lowe was of opinion
that thereafter it had been possible to proceed with
the first fix mechanical and electrical works.
[83] On
this matter, I prefer the views of Mr Whitaker, as supported by Mr Cornish. It is clear that the hotel was a heavily
serviced building. The mechanical and
electrical plant was situated in the roof space; consequently the provision of
a roof covering was critical to the installation of that plant, which was
obviously highly susceptible to wet conditions.
This is made clear by photographs that were spoken to in evidence; in a
photograph at sixth floor level taken on 15 September 1998 a considerable amount of water is
seen lying on top of the building as a result of rain (No 6/39 of
process). In addition, the mechanical
and electrical plant and equipment required to be connected to the services
running through the building. These were
accommodated in a number of risers which ran down from the roof space, before
branching out into individual rooms and public areas. Those risers were obviously highly
susceptible to weather penetration.
While some degree of protection was obviously provided by the temporary
sealing, the plant and equipment in the plant room could not be connected until
the roof covering was in place. This
appears to me to be a matter of common sense.
In addition, this conclusion is supported by two further
considerations. First, in his evidence Mr Cornish
stated (day 3, 11.59) that the plant was originally placed in the plant room in
its wrapping or casing; once the liner sheet (the lower sheet) of the roof
cladding was in place, however, the protection was removed, the plant was
secured and the work of connection began.
That supports the general view that the roof coverings were critical. Secondly, the defenders' daily reports and
site diaries indicate the numbers of electricians and heating engineers
employed on site on each day of the construction of the mechanical and
electrical work. These figures were
analyzed by Mr Whitaker (No 7/8 of process, paragraph 2.43, and graph on
page 7/8/20). This analysis
disclosed that, one week after the start of the roof coverings, the numbers of
electricians and heating engineers doubled.
The number of electricians and heating engineers employed on site
remained high thereafter. The increase is shown very clearly in the graph on
page 7/8/20, which indicates daily totals of electricians and heating
engineers; in the week beginning 14 September the average number employed was
12 or 13, whereas in the following week, and every week thereafter until March
1999, the average was at least 20 and in most cases significantly more than
that. It is significant that the
increase was sudden rather than progressive.
In my opinion it is reasonable to draw from these figures the inference
that greatly increased levels of mechanical and electrical work were possible
as a result of the placing of the roof coverings. In my view this strongly supports the
conclusion that I have reached.
[84] In
his report (No 6/351 of process, page 1, at paragraph 1.7) Mr Lowe
advanced a number of arguments which, he said, led to the conclusion that the
defenders could not have proceed with the steelwork any earlier than they
actually did.
1. Mr Lowe relied first on the fact
that the fire escape stairs above sixth floor level had not been
constructed. In my opinion this point is
not relevant. Mr Whitaker stated
that it was obvious that, if the roof steelwork had been available any earlier,
the concrete stairs could easily have been finished (day 13, 2.10). Mr Cornish gave evidence that the fire
escape stairs were built off the critical path (day 5, 10.52). Moreover, in cross-examination (day 25,
11.16), Mr Lowe accepted that, if the stairs had not been completed, the
defenders could have started the steelwork in a different area and come back to
the area immediately adjacent to the fire escape stairs at the end. For these reasons I do not think that this
point is established.
2. Mr Lowe further relied on the
construction of the lift shaft above sixth floor level, which was not completed
until August. Mr Cornish gave
evidence that, if there had been a problem with this matter, he would have
ensured that propping was used to take the load from the steelwork, so that the
lift pit could be cast at a later date (day 5, 10.55). Mr Whitaker agreed with that suggestion
(day 13, 2.23). Mr Lowe disagreed
with these views. On this matter I
prefer Mr Cornish, who was actually on site at the material time, and Mr Whitaker. I accordingly conclude that this point is not
established.
3. Mr Lowe relied on the fact that
the upstand walls around the perimeter of the sixth
floor had not been constructed; these were required to bear the weight of the
structural steel in the roof. Mr Lowe relied in particular on the fact
that the upstand walls had not been completed until 28
August 1998.
In this connection, two points are significant.
First, the Clerk of Works' diary indicates that the only walls that were
not constructed on 28 August were those around the chiller
area; it seems clear that the walls around the perimeter were constructed
earlier. Secondly, Mr Lowe's
evidence was based on the fact that the walls were only completed on 28
August. Mr Cornish, however, gave
evidence (day 3, 12.10) that the defenders only needed one third of the upstand walls to be constructed to allow the erection of
the structural steelwork to begin. He
further stated that he would have taken any opportunity to construct the
steelwork earlier if that had been possible, and he rejected the suggestion
that the upstand walls had been responsible for the
late erection of the steelwork. Mr Whitaker
(No 7/8 of process, paragraph 2.49) stated that the perimeter walls on which
the steelwork was founded were all completed by 20 August. He further stated that steelwork erection could
have started before all of the perimeter beams were
cast so long as matching beams were built on either side. On that basis Mr Whitaker thought that
steel erection could have started as early as 10 August were it not for the
delay in fabrication caused by the late issue of the architect's instruction to
use a Stramit system.
Mr Whitaker spoke further to this matter in evidence (day 13, 2.29;
day 15, 2.51). Furthermore, the architect
stated in a letter to the defenders dated 19 October 1998 (No 7/157 of process) that
"Completion of the reinforced concrete edge beams sufficient to receive
the Roof Steelwork was achieved on 12th
August 1998". Mr Whitaker derived further support for
his view that the upstand beams were not critical
from the fact that the number of carpenters and steelfixers
engaged on the project reduced steadily during the last four weeks of
construction of the reinforced concrete frame (3 August-28 August). If the upstand
beams had been critical, he would have expected that the numbers of men
employed in those trades would have been maintained in order to ensure
completion of the reinforced concrete works as soon as possible (No 7/8 of
process, paragraph 2.50). I accept Mr Whitaker's evidence on these
matters. I accordingly consider it clear
that the roof steelwork could have started well before completion of the
perimeter walls; I am further of opinion that the perimeter walls were
completed on 12 August. On this basis I
conclude that there is no substance in the argument that steelwork erection was
delayed by the completion of the perimeter walls.
4. The fourth point made by Mr Lowe
was that the roof steelwork could not start earlier because falsework
and formwork used in constructing the sixth floor slab required to be removed
from beneath the sixth floor. Mr Whitaker's
view was that it was not necessary to remove the falsework
and formwork from below sixth floor level to allow steel erection at that level
(day 13, 2.34). Mr Cornish (day 3,
12.20) stated that the erection of steelwork could have proceed despite the falsework and formwork below sixth floor level. The falsework and
formwork could have been removed in three ways; the tables could have been
stripped in situ at fifth floor level; the tables could have been removed from
the building by crane to Church Street, a nearby street, and dismantled there;
or the tables could have been removed intact, placed on a flat bed lorry and
driven to a remote part of the site for dismantling. In my opinion it is clear that the existence
of the falsework and formwork at fifth floor level
would not have prevented the construction of the steelwork. I further conclude that it could have been
removed using one or other of the methods described by Mr Cornish.
5. Mr Lowe's fifth point was that
the roof space at sixth floor level was used by the reinforced concrete subcontractor,
E P Rothwell & Sons, to strip formwork and
formwork tables until the steel arrived on site. Mr Cornish gave evidence that Rothwell simply took advantage of the roof space because it
was known that the steel would not be available until a later date (day 3,
12.16). He further stated that, if it
had been necessary, the falsework and formwork could
have been dismantled in any of the three ways described in paragraph 4
above. Mr Whitaker's evidence was
broadly in agreement with Mr Cornish.
I accept Mr Cornish's evidence on this
matter, and I conclude that this point is not established.
6. The sixth argument relied on by Mr Lowe
was that, for the steel erectors to start work, it was necessary that an access
scaffold should be constructed to provide a safe system of working for them;
this would include a cantilever for the roof overhang. Mr Cornish gave evidence that the access
scaffold was built for the cladding contractor (day 5, 11.04), and in
particular to enable the construction of louvres. The steel erectors were permitted to use it,
but it was not for their benefit.
Without it, they could have proceeded with steel erection using
harnesses, lanyards or roof mounted cherry pickers; that would have been a safe
method of working. Mr Whitaker
agreed with that evidence (day 13, 2.40).
Mr Lowe disagreed with the position taken by Mr Cornish. He accepted, however, that cherry pickers
could be used if they could be put in place (day 25, 12.15). On this .I prefer the evidence of Mr Cornish
and Mr Whitaker. Mr Cornish
was on site at the relevant time, and I find that he gave his evidence by
reference to the actual conditions that he experienced. I am satisfied that one of the methods that
he suggested could have been used without difficulty.
7. Mr Lowe's final point related to
the provision of suitable cranage for the steel
erection. Mr Lowe suggested that
the tower crane on site could not service both the concrete walls at roof level
and the steelwork at the same level. Mr Cornish
gave evidence that the steel erectors would have been given preference over any
other trades; in any event the crane could have been used before 8 a.m. or after 4 p.m. (day 5, 11.07). In addition, Mr Lowe (day 25, 12.43)
accepted that a concrete pump could have been used for the concreting
works. On this matter I accept the
evidence of Mr Cornish, and I find that the point has not been established
Extension of time
[85] For the
reasons stated above, in particular at paragraphs [80] and [81], I am of
opinion that the Works were delayed due to the late instructions given by the architect
in respect of the roof steelwork. That
entitles the defenders to an extension of time, and the next question is how
long that extension should be. Mr Whitaker
dealt with this matter in his report No 7/8 of process, at paragraph 2.48:
"Having carefully
considered all of the above facts, I am of the opinion that the roof steelwork
and the roof cladding were critical to the completion of the Works. I am further of the opinion that these
critical tasks commenced 5 weeks later than planned and that being critical
tasks this caused a five week delay to completion of the whole of the Works".
Mr Whitaker developed this matter at paragraph
2.53. He was of opinion that the
defenders were delayed in the completion of the Works until 1 March 1999 as a result of the delay in issuing an instruction
relating to the roof steelwork. He
further considered that the delay was caused entirely by the lateness of the
instruction to vary the roof coverings; it did not result from the content of
the work instructed. In support of this
proposition Mr Whitaker produced a short as-built programme (at paragraph
2.53) which indicated that the duration of the installation of the roof
steelwork and roof coverings was in fact exactly the same as the duration
planned by the defenders, 181 days. I
accept Mr Whitaker's evidence on these matters. I find that the completion of the Works was
delayed by five weeks as a result of the late instruction relating to the late
instruction relating to the roof cladding system. I further find that the delay was caused by
the lateness of the instruction and not by its content. Finally, I should record that it is conceded
by the defenders that the 3 1/2 week delay resulting from the instruction of
the gas venting scheme is contemporaneous with the five week delay resulting
from the late instruction of the system of roof cladding.
Instructions following replacement of RMJM by Keppie
[86] After
the roof cladding had been put in place Mr Whitaker's evidence was that
work on the project became much more intensive (No 7/8 of process, paragraph
2.54). His view was based on the
defenders' daily diary and report sheets and the Clerk of Works' diary. Both the defenders and the Clerk of Works, Mr
Foley, reported at meetings that the Works were proceeding approximately 5
weeks late. On 4
November 1998
the defenders indicated that their target date for completion was 1 March 1999, and Mr Foley expressed the view
that the Works were 5 1/2 weeks behind programme (site meeting No 10, 4
November 1998,
No 7/42 of process). At the next site
meeting, No 11, held on 2 December 1998, the pursuers indicated that RMJM's appointment as architect, structural engineer and
mechanical and electrical engineer had been terminated by the pursuers with
immediate effect. Keppie
Architects had been appointed as architect and Blyth
& Blyth had been appointed as structural engineer
and mechanical and electrical engineer.
At paragraph 3.1.1 of the minute of the meeting (No 7/43 of process) it
is recorded that
"[The
defenders] noted the [pursuers'] change to the Design Team and felt that their
concerns at his change so late in the contract should be recorded. They would of course do their best to assist
the new design team members".
In his evidence Mr Cornish
stated that he wanted the defenders' concerns to be recorded because a lot of
unresolved issues existed and a new design team would be coming on to the
project without any initial knowledge of it; indeed they did not even have the
project drawings and documentation (day 3, 1.51 onwards). Mr Cornish added that it was obvious at that
site meeting that the new design team knew nothing about the job; they had
asked the defenders to photocopy all the documentation and courier it to them;
the defenders did that. Neither Mr Cornish
nor Mr Whitaker had ever encountered such a situation previously in their
careers. At the site meeting held on 2
December the defenders stated that they continued to be 5 1/2 weeks behind
programme and had issued a 57-week target programme. Mr Foley agreed that the Works were 5 1/2-6
weeks behind programme.
[87] The
defenders contend that, following the change of design team, a substantial
number of items were instructed late.
These, it is said, had an effect on the completion of the contract
Works, and constituted Relevant Events for the purposes of clause 25. The defenders' contention was first advanced
at site meeting No 13, held on 3 February 1999 (No 7/45 of process). At that meeting the defenders reported that
the anticipated completion of the Works could not be foreseen before 15 March
owing to various items listed in their report.
Those include the nine items discussed in the following paragraphs.
1. Final fix
items to en suites
[88] The
Works did not originally include the installation of fittings into the shower
rooms attached to the hotel bedrooms (referred to in the documentation as en
suites). At site meeting No 9, held on 7
October 1998,
the minutes record (No 7/46 of process, at paragraph 3.15) that the defenders
provided a schedule of fixtures and fittings to enable the fit-out of the
interior to be discussed to ensure that responsibility for supply and installation
was clear and to plan the installation programme. The minutes further
record that installation for each item needed to be confirmed by the pursuers,
and that RMJM were to co-ordinate matters.
The schedule produced at that meeting referred to certain final fix
items in the en suites (No 7/40 6/14 of process). In the action column, it was recorded that
further action was required by the pursuers (to confirm installation) and RMJM
(to co-ordinate matters). Mr Lowe
in cross-examination (day 26, 11.04) accepted that the obligation to provide
information and instructions lay on the defenders. Mr Cornish (day 3, 2.24) stated that he
was anxious to have this subject clarified, and that is why he had produced the
schedule at the site meeting on 7 October. He was further anxious to establish
responsibility for the supply of the items to be fitted, because frequently an
employer would obtain these itself and issue them to
the contractor. Mr Cornish referred
to the matter again in a letter to RMJM dated 30 November (No 7/47 of
process). In evidence, he explained that
the lack of clarity regarding fittings created a problem because of the need to
deal with 168 bedrooms in the hotel, with consequential problems of out-of-sequence
working and additional snagging (day 3, 2.29).
Mr Lowe generally agreed with this attitude (day 26, 11.10). On 16 December Mr Cornish sent a fax (No
7/49 of process) to Keppie indicating that the final
fix items to the en suites could not be deferred any longer. An instruction was requested.
[89] On
13 January 1999 Keppie issued an
instruction in relation to the final fix items to the en suites (No 7/50 of
process). The items in question were,
for each bathroom, a holder for the lavatory roll, a towel rack, a grab bar, a
robe hook, a glass shelf and a shaving mirror.
That instruction was superseded by a further
instruction issued on Friday, 22 January (No 7/51 of process). The latter instruction was in fact issued on
the last working day before the Completion Date, which was Monday, 25
January. The instruction of 25 January
was to supply and install the items specified, and not merely to install items
supplied by the pursuers. The
instruction was based on information obtained from the interior designers,
Thompson MacLeod; all but one of the suppliers named by Thompson MacLeod
envisaged a lead-in time of 21 days from the date of the order. The consequences of this instruction for the
pursuers are set out at some length in a letter to Keppie
dated 8 March (No 7/55, or 7/147, of process).
That letter began by giving notice that, in accordance with clause 25,
notice was given that the progress of the Works was likely to be delayed owing
to the circumstances set out in the letter.
In relation to the en suite fittings the letter provided as follows:
"On 13th
January 1999
Keppie Architects wrote to SCL instructing us to
order the following:
i.
Toilet
roll holder - Anticipated delivery 10
days = due 23rd January 1999.
ii.
Towel
rack - Anticipated delivery
21 days = due 3rd February 1999.
iii.
Grab
bar - Anticipated
delivery 21 days = due 3rd February 1999.
iv.
Robe
hook - Anticipated delivery
10 days = due 23rd January 1999.
v.
Glass
shelf - Anticipated delivery
10 days = due 23rd January 1999.
vi.
Shaving
mirror - No delivery period quoted.
On 22nd
January 1998 Architects issued further instructions, these included updated
quotations stating that all items except the shaving mirror are subject to a 21
day lead-in period.
On 3rd
February 1999
we received further verbal instructions from Keppie Architects
to fit 2 soap dispensers to each en-suite.
These were delivered in due time.
The shaving
mirrors were delivered in good time.
However, all other items were not delivered until 9th
February 1999
The further
delaying factor was that delivery of items i, iv and v was received 17 days later than quoted by Keppie in their letter of 13th
January 1999
and delivery of items ii and iii was 6 days later than quoted by Keppie in their letter of 13th
January 1999.
Further to
the delayed deliveries, revised instructions were issued regarding fixing of
the items. Thompson MacLeod confirmed
fixing positions of items ii, iii, iv and v and soap
dispensers on 9th February 99.
The other items started on 10th
February 1999.
Thompson
MacLeod subsequently gave verbal instructions changing heights for the toilet
roll holder on 12th February 1999.
This was confirmed by facsimile on 16th
February 1999.
The security
screws supplied for the shaving mirrors were unsuitable for the locations in
the en-suites. SCL had to order new
security screws for all the shaving mirrors.
These were delivered on 16th February 1999.
On the
16th February 1999 we were able to start revisiting all areas to fix items i and vi.
As previously
mentioned, fixing of item v (glass shelf) started on 10th
February 1999. It became immediately apparent that the shelf
specified by Thompson McLeod and Keppie was too large
to fit in the en-suite bathroom. SCL
immediately sent a facsimile to their shelf manufacturer to try and resolve the
problem, we also investigate[d] sourcing shelves from
an alternative supplier. Following
discussions Thompson MacLeod issued their revised requirements on 15th
February 1999. At the time of writing the new shelves have
not been delivered.
The
installation of all the available en-suite fittings was completed on 26th
February 1999. Fitting of the outstanding glass shelves will
be carried out within one week of delivery.
We anticipate
the shelves will be delivered before 8th
March 1999, therefore installation should be
complete by 15th March 1999".
Mr Cornish, who was the author
of that letter, spoke to its contents (day 3, 3.18). On the basis of his evidence, I am satisfied
that the statements of fact in the letter are substantially accurate.
[90] Mr Cornish
(day 3, 2.46 onwards) explained that the defenders had envisaged finishing
rooms and snagging them on a floor by floor basis; thereafter the rooms would
be locked so that one could gain entry and damage the work that had been
done. Because of the difficulties
mentioned in the letter that was not possible; it was necessary to keep going
back into bedrooms and bathrooms in order to install each successive item as it
arrived. The problems were summarized in
Mr Cornish's project manager's report to the
site meeting held on 3 February 1999 (found at No 6/17 of process). Repeated snagging became necessary, which had
a serious effect on the defenders' ability to progress the Works (day 3, 3.02). Mr Cornish's
opinion was that the instruction relating to en suites had critically affected
the defenders' ability to deliver the en suites and the bedrooms. Mr Lowe (day 26, 11.05) would not accept
that the activities were such that damage would inevitably occur in the
situation described by Mr Cornish.
He thought that tradesmen should be able to work with sufficient care to
avoid any significant problems. On this
matter I prefer the evidence of Mr Cornish. It seems to me that a degree of damage would
be almost inevitable if items such as those described in the relevant Architect's
Instructions were installed in bathrooms.
That would require checking the state of the rooms and consequential
snagging work. In this connection, I
think that it is significant that Mr Cornish was an experienced site agent
and manager, and clearly spoke from his own experience on the project. Mr Lowe, by contrast, appeared to be
speaking from a more theoretical point of view, and in my view he assumed that
tradesmen would take a greater degree of care than can realistically be
expected.
[91] Mr Cornish
gave evidence that a reasonable time for instruction of the en suite fittings
would have been ten weeks prior to the Completion Date (day 3, 3.00) that would
have been in late November 1998. He
explained that that would have enabled the defenders to start the process of
ordering the fittings earlier; they would thus have secured delivery at an
earlier stage. This would have helped
the defenders to complete the rooms systematically, floor by floor, and to lock
rooms once they had been completed. Mr Whitaker's
evidence (report, No 7/8 of process, paragraph 2.70 and accompanying table; day
15, 3.45) was that a reasonable date for issuing the instruction would have
been 16 November 1998.
Mr Lowe (day 26, 11.36) stated that he did not accept that the
instruction on this matter was late. He
qualified that by stating that it was late "as defined", but it did
not delay completion. He clarified the
expression "as defined": it meant an instruction which was late in
terms of clause 25 because the contractor had requested it in writing. The schedule produced at the site meeting of 7
October 1998,
which was made available to RMJM, listed the items on which an instruction was
required. Before that date, the
defenders had produced an Information Required Schedule (No 7/114 of process)
which included a request that information relating to sanitary ware should be
provided by 10 August 1998.
Mr Cornish stated in evidence that that request covered final fix
items to the en suites (day 3, 2.15). In
these circumstances I am of opinion that the defenders made a written request
for the relevant instruction, as required by clause 25.4.6.
[92] I
accept the evidence of Mr Whitaker, which was supported by the evidence of
Mr Cornish, that the instruction should have been issued on or about 16
November 1998. On that basis I consider that the written
request for an instruction was made within a reasonable time of that date, as
required by clause 25.4.6. I accordingly
conclude that there was a Relevant Event in terms of that clause, namely a late
instruction in relation to the final fix items to the en suites. I am further of opinion that that Relevant
Event caused completion of the Works to be delayed beyond the Completion
Date. The tasks required following the
instruction were described by Mr Cornish, in the evidence summarized
above. These began with ordering the
relevant items, with a consequential lead-in time. Mr Cornish's
view was that the bathroom fittings were critically important to all 167
bathrooms (day 2, 3.17). Mr Whitaker
was of opinion that the completion of the bedrooms, including the linked
bathrooms, was a critical activity (No 7/156 of process, paragraph 2.12), and
it is easy to see why that was so; in a hotel the proper fitting out of the
bedrooms is clearly critical to completion.
The final fix work in the bathrooms, excluding snagging, was completed
on 10 March 1999 (Clerk of Works' diary, No 6/19 of process). Mr Whitaker considered that a further
two weeks was required to complete the snagging (No 7/8 of process, page
27). I accept Mr Whitaker's
evidence on this matter, and on that basis I consider that the defenders were
delayed until approximately 25 March 1999.
I consider that that delay was caused by the late instruction. In this case, I consider that the delay in
completion was caused by the lateness of the instruction rather than its
content. That was in accordance with the
evidence of Mr Cornish (day 3, 3.05) and Mr Whitaker (No 7/8 of
process, paragraph 2.70; day 12, 10.18).
Pursuers' criticism of defenders' case on instructions following Keppie's appointment
[93] At
this point it is convenient to deal with certain general criticisms made by the
pursuers of the defenders' arguments relating to instructions given following
the replacement of RMJM by Keppie. These related in particular to the delay
analyses set out by Mr Whitaker in his second report (No 7/8 of
process). First, Mr Lowe criticized
the type of delay analysis carried out by Mr Whitaker as a
"theoretical exercise" (in his report No 6/351 of process, and in
evidence: day 22, 2.35). Mr Whitaker
had stated in evidence that he had carried out a small version of a critical
path analysis in respect of each activity; these were contained in the tables
in his second report. The pursuers
submitted, however, that no practical analysis had been carried out by Mr Whitaker. The en suites were taken as an example: Mr Whitaker's
analysis started from the premise that the reasonable time for issue of the
instruction had to be measured against a Completion Date of 25
January 1999. He proceeded to calculate the delay period by
reference to that date, and on the assumption that certain necessary elements
of the work happened after that date.
Thereafter he worked on the basis that the whole of the delay in issuing
the instruction would necessarily produce an equivalent delay in
completion. Thus, in the case of the en
suite fittings, the delay in issuing the instruction is shown as 59 days and it
is assumed that that automatically delayed completion after 25
January 1999
by the same number of days, giving a date of 25 March. No analysis was carried out to establish
whether that was in fact correct. In
this respect, it was assumed that there was no other work to be done; it was
only on that basis that it could be assumed that the delay to completion
corresponded to the delay in issuing the instruction. That was not warranted by the facts, however,
in that various causes of delay were operating together.
[94] I
do not think that this criticism is well founded. The method used by Mr Whitaker was as
follows (day 11, 3.36 onwards). He first
established a chronology, based on what actually happened on site in respect of
each of the enumerated items. He then
calculated the time that was reasonably required for delivery, installation and
snagging. In part this calculation was
based on what actually happened, and in part was based on Mr Whitaker's
judgment as to what was reasonable for any particular aspect of the work. I was satisfied that he had great experience
of programming in the construction industry and that his estimates of the
periods required for particular items of work were reasonable. Once Mr Whitaker had calculated the
period required for delivery, installation and snagging he worked backwards
from the contractual completion date (25 January 1999) to determine the latest reasonable
date for issue of the relevant instruction.
On that basis he was able to calculate the delay in issuing the
instruction. He then assumed that the
delay to completion caused by the lateness of the instruction would be the same
as the delay in issuing the instruction.
That seems to me to be reasonable in relation to the particular item of
work that is involved. This of course
assumes that no other causes of delay were operative. There were in fact a substantial number of
other causes of delay, and to that extent the pursuers' criticism has some
foundation. Nevertheless, this simply
means that delay was caused by a number of concurrent causes. These must in my opinion be dealt with in the
manner discussed above, in particular at paragraphs [17]-[19]. The result is that any extension will be
granted not on the basis of the delay in any individual case but on the basis
of the whole of the causes of delay that are operative in the period following
the contractual completion date.
[95] The
pursuers' second criticism of Mr Whitaker's approach was that, in his
delay tables, he used "guesstimates" for the duration of, for
example, order, delivery and installation.
In fact it is clear from Mr Whitaker's tables that he did take
account of what actually happened in determining the duration of any particular
activity. Thus, in relation to the fix
items in the en suites, he based his analysis on the issue of the relevant
instruction on 22 January, the start of installation on 11 February and the end
of the installation period on 10 March.
All of these were actual dates, a point that was accepted by Mr Lowe
in cross-examination (day 26, 10.50).
This point applies generally to all of the final fix items. In some cases Mr Whitaker had to
estimate the duration of one part of an activity, for example (in the case of
the en suite fittings) snagging and the necessary period for ordering the
fittings. As indicated in the last
paragraph, however, I am satisfied that Mr Whitaker's estimates were
reasonable; they were based on his experience in the construction industry, and
none of them appeared to me to be exaggerated.
The pursuers' third criticism of Mr Whitaker was that he had made
excessive allowances for snagging. In
relation to the en suite fittings, the pursuers submitted, on the basis of Mr Lowe's
evidence (day 22, 2.57) that the contractor should tidy up when he finished
working in an area. That was not
snagging; snagging involved in dealing with items of work that had been done
incorrectly. This difference is, I
suspect, more semantic than real. As
work proceeds on a task such as installing bathroom fittings, it is obvious
that some untidiness will result; it also seems to me to be very likely that
some items may not be properly installed, or that tiles or woodwork may be
damaged. All of these matters would
require to be dealt with, on a room-by-room basis. That is what I understand snagging to amount
to. Given the number of rooms involved,
I did not find Mr Whitaker's estimates (14 days for fittings in 167
bathrooms) excessive. The pursuers'
fourth criticism of Mr Whitaker's approach was that he had not endeavoured
to demonstrate that any of the listed items were on the critical path. On the basis of Mr Lowe's evidence, the
pursuers submitted that they were not. I
have already indicated that I am unable to rely on Mr Lowe's exercise in
determining the critical path, at least in the later stages of the
contract. In a sense, as a contract
nears completion, more items will fall on the critical path because practical
completion is impossible until they have been completed. This culminates in the last item to be
completed which is, of necessity, on the critical path. In relation to the various items of work that
Mr Whitaker thought caused delay to completion as a result of late
instructions following the appointment of Keppie, I
am satisfied that each of them was on the critical path, in the sense that the
work was necessary before a hotel could be said to have achieved practical
completion.
[96] Fifthly,
the pursuers criticized Mr Whitaker's analysis because he had made use of
the original completion date of 25 January 1999.
In the first place, by the time when the relevant instructions were
given, the defenders were already working on a 57-week programme; consequently
actual progress on site could not be reflected in the original completion
date. In the second place, by using the
original completion date, Mr Whitaker had prevented himself from analyzing
the progress that the contractor was making in relation to the 57-week
programme. In the third place, there was
no logic in measuring delay against the original completion date when the contractor
was already in delay at a date when the instruction was issued. On this basis it was said that the lateness or
otherwise of an instruction can only be assessed against the actual progress of
the works at the relevant time, not against the current contractual completion
date. I do not think that this criticism
is well founded. It is true that Mr Whitaker's
analysis was based on a completion date of 25 January, but that was the current
contractual completion date.
Consequently, in calculating the delay that was caused by any particular
late instruction, the starting point had to be the original completion
date. The reason, discussed more fully
at paragraph [23] above, is that that was the date by which the defenders were
contractually obliged to complete the works; in terms of clause 5.4 of the
Conditions of Contract it is envisaged that information will be provided by the
architect in such a way as to enable completion in accordance with the
contractual Conditions. Those Conditions
include the obligation, in clause 23, to complete by the completion date. The 57-week programme was, for this purpose,
an internal document of the defenders.
It obviously reflected delays that have already occurred in the
project. The architect, however, had
retained the original completion date, despite applications for an extension of
time under clause 25. In my opinion the
pursuers must accept the consequences of that decision. It is true that various other causes of delay
were operating at the same time as the delay caused by the late instruction
relating to the bathroom fittings, and the analysis carried out by Mr Whitaker
in relation to the bathroom fittings does not take account of these. In my opinion that is the correct
procedure. The delays caused by the
individual late instructions must first be analyzed, and an estimate formed of
the length of the delay caused by each such instruction. It is only then that the Architect, or the
court, can proceed to the second stage of estimating the relative significance
of the various causes of delay. Those
must of course be taken into account as concurrent causes of delay.
[97] Finally,
the pursuers submitted that the defenders had sought to categorize the various
events following the appointment of Keppie as late
instructions. The evidence was not to
that effect, however; each of these heads of claim amounted to additional work
and thus a variation. In my opinion
there is no incompatibility between a late instruction and a variation. A particular instruction may amount to a
variation, but it may still be late; that seems elementary. Thus I do not think that the defenders' approach
to the items instructed following Keppie's
appointment is erroneous on this ground.
Indeed, once it became clear that further instructions were likely to be
given regarding final fix items in the bedrooms and en suites, Mr Cornish
produced the schedule referred to in paragraph [88] above; this was discussed
at the site meeting of 7 October 1998, and was designed to ensure that timeous instructions were given in respect of all of those
items. Following the issuing of that
document, I am of opinion that the provisions of clause 25 relating to late
instructions were applicable.
[98] Mr Lowe
also gave evidence on the effect of the instruction relating to the en suite
fittings. He criticized Mr Whitaker's
allowance of 14 days for snagging, on the basis that most of what Mr Whitaker
described as snagging was merely tidying up.
I reject this criticism, for the reasons stated above; it seems to me
that the difference is largely semantic, and that some time would be required
to ensure that the rooms were in good order following the completion of the
installation of the final fix items. Mr Lowe
further concluded that this item of work did not fall on the critical path and
thus did not delay completion. In my
opinion the lateness of the instruction inevitably meant that the completion of
this item would fall after the contractual completion date. I am further opinion that this item was
critical, in the sense that properly fitted out bathrooms were essential for
practical completion of the hotel.
2. Bedhead
lighting
[99] Originally
bedhead lighting was not part of the Works. At the site meeting held on 7
October 1998,
Mr Cornish raised the issue of various bedroom fittings; these were
mentioned in the schedule produced at the meeting (No 7/46 of process, page
13). One of the items mentioned was
"Wall lights". Against this
entry appeared the words "Free issue to Browns?" Mr Cornish stated in evidence (day 3,
3.40 that this was a reference to bedhead
lighting. As with the bathroom fittings,
Mr Cornish explained that he was anxious to clarify responsibility for
supply and installation in order to plan the installation programme (day 3,
3.40). Mr Cornish mentioned the bedhead lights in his letter to RMJM of 30 November (No
7/47 of process). On 3 December 1998 (No 7/48 of process) he wrote to the
pursuers enclosing correspondence relating to client supply items, and asked
about the delivery situation in order that the defenders might be
informed. At this point it was assumed
that the pursuers would supply the lighting for installation by the defenders. On 16 December 1998 Mr Cornish sent a fax to Keppie in which he referred to previous correspondence with
RMJM and, in relation to inter alia the bedhead lights, stated
"These
are items that cannot be deferred any longer.
Electrically, we cannot of course complete bedrooms without bedhead lights.
(Work commences 11/1/99).
Please instruct accordingly".
The defenders received an Architect's
Instruction in relation to the bedhead lighting on 24
December 1999
(noted in No 7/55 of process; dealt with by Mr Cornish, day 3, 3.42). The instruction was to supply and install the
lighting. Events thereafter are set out
in the defenders' letter to Keppie dated 8
March 1999
(No 7/55 or 7/157 of process); as indicated above in relation to the bathroom
fittings, I am satisfied that this letter contains a substantially accurate
account of events (on the basis of the evidence of Mr Cornish; day 3,
3.46):
"The bedhead lights were not part of our contract. However, since the bedhead
lights are hard wired it is not possible to bring power into the rooms until
the bedhead lights are fitted, nor is it possible to
test and commission the electrical services.
On 24th
November 1998
we wrote to RMJM asking for the bedhead lights to be
issued to us. On November 1998 we wrote
to RMJM once again on this subject.
Finally we wrote to yourselves on 16th
December 1998
requesting that the bedhead lights were issued to us
in order to commence work on 11th January 1999.
We then
received your instruction to supply and fix the bedhead
lights on 24th December 1998.
Our purchasing department had already closed for the Christmas shutdown
and consequently an order for the lights could not be placed until 4th
January 1999
at the very earliest.
In site
meeting No. 12 (6th January 1999), minute 3.5, Keppie
state that the bedhead lights supplier could deliver
approx. 50% of the fittings by 20th January 1999 with the balance by
5th February 1999 on early receipt of an order.
SCL placed an
order for the items on 6th January 1999.
Deliveries
were not made in accordance with the date quoted by Keppie. Actual deliveries were received as follows:
36 No. 26th
January 1999
304 No. 2nd
February 1999
The further
delaying factor was that:-
a. 36No. were
delivered 6 days later than the dates quoted.
b. 134No. were
delivered 13 days later than the dates quoted.
c. 170No. were
delivered in accordance with the quoted dates".
The Clerk of Works' report for the
week ending 14 February 1999 refers to electrical connection work
to the bedroom furniture at fifth floor level; this included the bedhead lighting. The Clerk of Works' diary records electrical connections' being
made to the bedroom furniture on 19
February 1999. The Information Required Schedule
(No 7/114 of process) dated 26 January 1998, in the section headed
"Electrical", stated that the date when
information was required was May 1998.
In the same document, in the section headed "Finishes", which
might be construed as referring to the bedhead
lighting, it was indicated that information was required by 10 August 1998.
[100] Mr Whitaker
dealt with the bedhead lights in his report (No 7/8
of process) at paragraphs 2.71-2.73, with a table summarizing his position on
page 7/8/29. His conclusion was
that Keppie issued their instruction to the defenders
to supply the bedhead lights 23 calendar days later
than was required for them to be able to complete the work by the then
completion date of 25 January 1998.
On that basis the completion of the Works was delayed until 17
February 1999;
this was caused by the lateness of instruction alone. Mr Whitaker considered that a reasonable
date for the contractor to have received the instruction was 2
December 1998;
that would allow a reasonable period to order the lighting, install it and
complete snagging (day 12, 10.47). In
reaching this conclusion he took into account the Christmas break. On this occasion he described what followed
in some detail. That seems to me to
indicate that the exercise that Mr Whitaker performed was not
theoretical. Mr Whitaker stated
that he had followed in the same principles in all of the exercises relating to
items instructed by Keppie. He had discovered the actual delivery and
installation periods, when that was possible. He had made allowance for a reasonable period
for snagging and cleaning. He had taken
care to ensure that the exercise was conservative in nature; it was based on
his experience in the construction industry.
He disagreed with the description "guesstimate" applied to his
exercises; he considered them to be carefully assessed estimates. I found Mr Whitaker's evidence
convincing on this matter, and I consider that his method was one that was
entirely reasonable and was carried out on a responsible basis. For the avoidance of doubt, I should indicate
that the same conclusion relates to the other estimates of delay carried out by
Mr Whitaker in relation to instructions issued by Keppie. The evidence of Mr Cornish on delays
relating to bedhead lights was to similar effect as Mr Whitaker's
evidence; he thought that a reasonable date for the receipt of an instruction
would have been about the beginning of December 1998 (day 3, 3.53).
[101] Mr Lowe
accepted in cross-examination that the instruction relating to bedhead lighting was issued late (day 26, 12.09). He was
not re-examined on that matter. He did,
however, state that the late instruction did not cause any delay to completion,
on the basis that this lighting did not fall on the critical path. In my opinion this item was critical, in the
sense that the proper fitting out of the bedrooms was necessary before
practical completion could be said to have taken place.
[102] In my opinion a written request for an Architect's
Instruction was made in the schedule produced at the site meeting held on 7
October 1998. It was not suggested that that application
was made on a date unreasonably distant from our unreasonably close to the date
when it was necessary to receive the relevant instruction. In those circumstances I am of opinion that
the defenders made a written request for the relevant instruction, as required
by clause 25.4.6. I accept the evidence
of Mr Whitaker that the instruction should have been issued on or about 2
December 1998. On that basis I consider that the relevant instruction was not
issued "in due time" for the purposes of clause 25.4.6; there was
accordingly a Relevant Event within the meaning of that clause. Mr Whitaker stated in his initial report
(No 7/156 of process, paragraph 2.12) that the fitting out of the bedrooms was
a critical activity; that included the bedhead
lighting work (day 10, 12.20). Mr Cornish
supported that view (day 2, 11.57, day 3, 3.35). It seems to me to be clear that the
commissioning of the electrical work would not be possible without the
installation of the full lighting systems in the bedrooms; I accordingly have
no difficulty in accepting that this item of work was critical. I therefore conclude that the delay in
completing the installation of the bedhead lights
caused completion of the Works to be delayed beyond the Completion Date. Mr Whitaker suggested that work was
delayed until 17 February 1999.
The Clerk of Works' diary records that work continued on the bedhead lights until 19 February 1999.
That entry indicates that the delay in completion was two days longer
than indicated by Mr Whitaker. In
my opinion I must conclude that the work was delayed until the latter date, 19
February. I further conclude that the
delay was caused by the lateness of the instruction rather than its
content. Mr Cornish stated that the
work content of the instruction was not large in itself, but that the lateness
of the instruction caused difficulty (day 3, 3.56). Mr Whitaker agreed (day 12, 10.56).
3. Trouser presses
[103] The supply and installation of trouser presses was not part
of the original contract. At the time of
site meeting No 9, which was held on 7 October 1998, Mr Cornish asked about client
supply items. In the schedule produced
for the purposes of the meeting trouser presses were one of the items
specifically raised (No 7/46 of process, page 13). The comment adjacent to this is "Install
w/c 07/12/98?". At site meeting No 10, held on 4
November 1998
RMJM stated that the pursuers would provide free issue trouser presses to have
them installed within the contract (No 7/42 of process, paragraph
06-3.1.1). On 30
November 1998
the defenders wrote to RMJM (No 7/47 of process) to state that verification was
required from the pursuers on client supply items to be brought to site before Practical
Completion. Mr Cornish indicated
that it was important for the defenders to know exactly what was happening
because of their intention to paint and snag the building on a floor by the
floor basis; consequently they wanted the trouser presses to be delivered in
instalments (day 4, 10.54). Following
their appointment, Keppie wrote to the pursuers on 3
December 1998
to seek clarification on client supply items (No 7/48 of process). On 6 January 1999 the defenders received a verbal
instruction to fit the trouser presses; this is recorded in the defenders'
letter to Keppie dated 8 March
1999 (No
7/55 of process). On the basis of the
evidence of Mr Cornish, I accept that that letter is an accurate summary
of what happened thereafter. The letter
is as follows:
"The
trouser presses were not part of our contract.
However, they are wired in and then covered with a duct from the
furniture case goods manufacturer.
Consequently, the trouser presses are required in order to finish the
furniture installation, power up the rooms and test and commission the
electrical works.
On 23rd
November 1998
it became apparent that our domestic furniture manufacturer (A. Thomson) had
received direct instructions from the interior designer (Thompson MacLeod) to
manufacture cable tidy boxes.
Consequently SCL were unaware of the size or fixing arrangements of this
cable tidy until it was delivered to site.
Our letter
dated 30th November to RMJM confirms that trouser presses need to be
delivered floor by floor to our programme.
The programme
was confirmed to the client via our fax dated 3rd
December 1998. The first delivery was due during week
commencing 11th January 1999 with further deliveries at weekly
intervals.
On 6th
January 1999
the Architect issued a verbal instruction to fit trouser presses.
On 22nd
January 1999
we received 100No. Trouser presses i.e. 7 days later than required.
A sample
trouser press was fitted in the mock-up room and the following problems were
identified:
a. Cable tidy boxes incorrectly sized.
b. Setting out of trouser press position seemed
incorrect and required clarification.
c. Trouser presses were plug in type not hard
wired as the client required (the specification was correctly installed with
single gang sockets).
These
problems were witnessed by Janet Matthews [an operations manager for the
pursuers] and communicated to Keppie Architects by
fax dated 24th January 1999 [No 7/58 of process].
On 3rd
February 1999
verbal instructions [confirmed at No 7/59 of process] were issued by Keppie Architects as follows:
a. Fit cable tidy box and decorate.
b. Setting out position clarified.
c. Remove of all single gang plugs and replace
with fused spurs.
The further
delaying factor was that trouser press installation started on 4th
February 1999,
i.e. 20 days later than Shepherd's requirements.
Further to
fitting the trouser presses we wrote to yourselves on 16th
February 1999. The trouser presses can not be wired up in
accordance with the revised requirements since the skirting trunking
is already full of cables. Our letter
asks for further directions, however, at the time of writing these have not
been received and this work is 'on-stop'.
Until instructions are issued fixing of the trouser presses cannot be
completed".
The evidence did not disclose
precisely when fitting of the trouser presses was completed, but it is clear
from the letter that this had not occurred by 8 March 1999.
Moreover, in a letter to Keppie dated 11 March
1999 (No 7/150 of process) the defenders stated that no instruction had been
received from the architect to resolve the question of the wiring of trouser
presses; this related in particular to the question of whether they should be
hard wired or fitted in such a way that they plugged into a socket. In that letter the defenders indicated that
the work would be completed by 29 March 1999 if the information were made
available by 15 March. Despite that, the
minutes of the handover meeting held on 29 March 1999 (No 7/61 of process, page 5) record
that hardwiring details were still awaited from Blyth
& Blyth.
[104] Mr Whitaker
dealt with trouser presses in his second report (No 7/8 of process) at
paragraphs 2.78-2.87, and in a table found on page 32. His opinion was that a reasonable date for an
instruction relating to trouser presses would have been 5
December 1998. This was 33 days before the actual
instruction relating to the trouser presses; a verbal instruction was issued on
6 January 1999. On that basis Mr Whitaker
concluded that the delay to completion of the Works was 33 days as a result of
the late issue of instructions; in his report he stated that this excluded any
effect of the work content involved. Mr Cornish
thought that the instruction should have been issued by the end of November
1998 (day 4, 11.20). In
the Information Required Schedule of 26
January 1998 (No 7/14 of process), information relating to
furniture, which formed part of "finishes", is required by 10 August 1998.
[105] In
my opinion a written request for information relating to trouser presses was
made in the schedule produced by Mr Cornish at site meeting No 9, held on
7 October 1998, and indeed in the Information Required Schedule of 26 January
1998. It was not suggested that this
application was made on a date unreasonably close to or unreasonably distant
from the date when the information was required. I am accordingly of opinion that the
defenders made a written request for the appropriate instruction in accordance
with clause 25.4.6. I accept the
evidence of Mr Whitaker that an Architect's Instruction should have been
issued in early December 1998. I
therefore consider that the relevant instruction was not issued "in due
time" for the purposes of clause 25.4.6, and that there was accordingly a
Relevant Event within the meaning of that clause. In relation to the criticality of this item, Mr Cornish
stated that the installation of the trouser presses affected the defenders'
ability to complete the fitting out of the bedrooms; electricians, carpenters
and decorators all had to carry out work in relation to the fitting of the
trouser presses. In addition a separate
commissioning exercise was required (day 4, 11.09 onwards). Mr Whitaker stated (in his report No
7/156 of process, and paragraph 2.12) that the bedroom fit out activity was
critical. In my opinion that is
clear. Mr Whitaker further
expressed the opinion (in his second report) that as a result of the late
instruction regarding trouser presses the completion of the Works was delayed
until 27 February 1999.
In evidence he explained that in reaching this conclusion he had not
taken account of the difficulties with hard wiring the trouser presses;
consequently it might be appropriate to regard the delay as extending until the
middle of March 1999 (day 12, 12.07); the delay would then be 47 days, not 33,
and the last date in his table at page 32 of his report should be 13 March
1999. On the foregoing basis I am of
opinion that the delay caused by the late instruction of the trouser presses
should be regarded as continuing until 13 March 1999.
Counsel for the defenders submitted that, because work relative to the
trouser presses continued until at least 29 March, it would be appropriate to
use that a date as marking the end of the delay. That is, however, contrary to the evidence of
Mr Whitaker, and I think that I must confine myself to that evidence. I accordingly consider that 13 March is the
appropriate date. I am further satisfied
that this delay was caused by the lateness of the instruction rather than its
content. That accords with the evidence
of Mr Cornish, which was that the work content was not significant (day 3,
11.22; see also his project manager's summary for the site meeting of 3
February 1999
at item 4). Mr Whitaker was of the
same view (day 12, 12.14).
[106] Mr Lowe
gave evidence that the problems with the trouser presses related to the system
of wiring. He thought that Keppie had dealt with that problem as quickly as possible
(day 26, 12.36 onwards). In addition, Mr Lowe
expressed the view that the instruction in relation to the trouser presses was
issued in good time having regard to the contractor's actual progress on site
(in his report, No 6/351 of process, page 16). In cross-examination (day 26,
12.39) Mr Lowe reiterated that the instruction was not late; although the
issue had been raised by the defenders at the site meeting of 7 October, he
thought that that was only in the context of a "delivery
situation". In my opinion that is
not the correct analysis of the matter raised at that site meeting; while the
trouser presses were raised as a client supply item, Mr Cornish made it
clear that he wanted the precise responsibilities in respect of such items to
be determined as a matter of urgency.
The schedule produced by the defenders at that meeting includes the
comment "Install w/c 07/12/98?";
this tends to indicate that installation was discussed. In any event, paragraph 3.1.5 of the minute
(No 7/46 of process) indicates that the defenders wanted "to ensure the
responsibility for supply and installation is clear and to plan the
installation programme". It is also
stated that installation for each item needed to be confirmed by the pursuers,
the defenders' aim being to avoid damage to completed finishes. RMJM were to co-ordinate matters arising in
respect of fixtures and fittings. In the
light of that paragraph I consider that Mr Lowe's reasons for treating the
issue at the meeting as being only "delivery" are ill-founded. I conclude that the issue of responsibility
for fitting was raised at the meeting, and in the light of that matter, which
was clearly important, I agree with Mr Whitaker
that the instruction was late. I also prefer
the evidence of Mr Cornish and Mr Whitaker to the effect that the
problems were more extensive than the system of wiring, and arose out of the
late instruction relating to the supply and fixing of the trouser presses.
4. Central atrium beam encasement
[107] At
site meeting No 10, held on 4 November 1998, the defenders tendered a monthly
report which contained a list of outstanding information as at that date (No
7/42 of process, page 13). The seventh
item included in that list was "Details of gantry to Central Atrium (if
required)". That item related to a gantry across the atrium of the hotel to
which window cleaning harnesses could be fixed, and the encasement of beams in
the central atrium area with MDF boarding.
The list of outstanding information indicated that all of the items
mentioned were required as a matter of urgency, and not later than Friday
6 November 1998, to enable the defenders to assess the implications and effects on
completion. RMJM did not provide any information, and the matter was discussed
again at the meeting held on 2 December 1998; at paragraph 6.2 of the minutes (No
7/43 of process) it is noted that safe access for the purposes of atrium window
cleaning was to be reviewed. The architect
and the pursuers were identified as the parties responsible for progressing
matters. On 15 December 1998 Mr Cornish sent a fax to Keppie relating to the central atrium gantries. With it he enclosed a sketch to indicate what
he thought RMJM had had in mind. This indicated that the gantries were to be
enclosed in 12 mm MDF boarding. On 29
December 1998
the defenders received a verbal instruction to proceed with the arrangement set
out by Mr Cornish in that drawing (referred to at No 7/44 of process, page
14). That verbal instruction was
subsequently confirmed by a written instruction dated 4 February
1999 (found
at No 7/69 of process as item 7.3). A
verbal instruction received on 20 January had indicated that the MDF boarding
should be 22 mm thick (see No 7/45 of process, page 10). The system for supporting harnesses was
procured and installed by the defenders, with the work being completed on 15
January 1991
(Clerk of Works' diary). The beam
encasement work started on 27 January and was completed on 9 February (Clerk of
Works' diary).
[108] Mr Whitaker
expressed the opinion that a reasonable time for the issue of the instruction
relating to the gantries would have been 25 November 1998 (report, No 7/8 of process,
paragraphs 2.88-2.91, and table on page 34).
This was based on his estimate of a reasonable period for placing an
order and organizing the work and a reasonable period for delivery, installation
and snagging. He concluded that the
delay in issuing the necessary instruction was 35 days, and that that caused a
delay of 35 days in completion, as a result of the lateness of the instruction. In my opinion a written request for
information on the atrium gantries and beam encasement was made in the
information required schedule produced at the site meeting on 4 November 1998.
No suggestion was made that this was unreasonably early or unreasonably
late. On that basis, the defenders made
a written request for the appropriate instruction in accordance with clause
25.4.6. I accept Mr Whitaker's
evidence that an architect's instruction should have been issued by 25
November 1998. Mr Cornish thought that the instruction
should have been issued at the end of October or start of November. On this matter, however, I think that Mr Whitaker's
evidence is preferable. On that basis, I
conclude that the relevant instruction was not issued "in due time"
for the purposes of clause 25.4.6; there was therefore a Relevant Event within
the meaning of that clause.
[109] I
am further of opinion that the issue of this instruction was critical for the
completion of the project. Mr Cornish
(day 4, 11.45) explained by the information was important. The atrium was six storeys high and a
scaffold was required to reach every floor.
Until all trades had completed work on the curtain wall, the scaffolding
could not be removed. Until the
scaffolding was removed, however, the defenders were unable to do the second
and final fix work at low level in the entrance area; that would apply to
joinery and decoration at that area. In
addition, a quarry stone doorframe and revolving door had to be installed after
the scaffolding had been removed.
Consequently the atrium gantries and encasement had a critical effect on
the ability to complete the entrance area of the hotel. Support for Mr Cornish's
evidence on this matter is found in his project manager's report to the site
meeting held on 3 February 1999 (No 6/17 of process). Mr Cornish further indicated that,
following receipt of the instruction, there was a two-week lead-in period (day
3, 11.50). The fixing system for the
harnesses was completed by 15 January, but the beam encasement work was not
started until 27 January and was only completed on 9 February. That by itself indicates that delay was
caused by the late instruction. I am
satisfied that completion was delayed by the late instruction. Mr Whitaker's evidence was that that
delay amounted to approximately five weeks from the completion date of 25
January 1999
(second report, paragraph 2.91 and table).
I consider that to be a reasonable estimate, and on that basis I am of
opinion that, when account is taken of the late instruction relating to the
atrium gantries and beam encasement, the completion date should be extended
until 1 March 1999. I consider
that this was the result of the lateness of the instruction rather than its
content. Mr Cornish gave evidence
that it would have been relatively straightforward to perform the necessary
work at an earlier stage (day 4, 11.53).
Mr Whitaker thought that it should have been possible to cater for
the work on the gantries without delaying overall progress (day 12, 2.40). I accept that evidence.
[110] The
pursuers submitted that the work on the central atrium beam encasement was not
critical; in particular, the Clerk of Works' diary disclosed that work was
carried out at ground level on items such as the slab for the revolving doors,
where work had largely been carried out before the scaffolding for the
higher-level work was erected. In
addition, the Clerk of Works' diary disclosed that a floor screed was laid in
the atrium on 2 January, although it was removed on 6 and 7 January because it
was not thought sufficiently durable. On
14 January work began on a slate floor, with protection being supplied as
necessary. Consequently any delay in the
floor related to deficiencies in the concrete screed rather than the
scaffolding. Furthermore, the beam
encasement was programmed on the defenders' 57-week programme (number 7/45 of
process) to finish on 1 February. On
that basis, evidence of Mr Cornish that proceeded on the basis of the
original completion date of 25 January was, it was submitted, irrelevant. Mr Lowe expressed the opinion that the
instruction relating to the atrium gantries was issued in good time having
regard to the contractor's actual progress on site (report, No 6/351, page
16). In my opinion the criticism of the
defenders' case on this matter is not conclusive. The fact that work on the floor was able to
proceed while the scaffolding was up is hardly surprising, since the
scaffolding would have been close to the wall.
It was the ability to finish the floor and to finish work on the doors
that was critical. Moreover, I consider
that it was necessary to use the original completion date as a reference point
in determining whether there was delay; the fact that other delays existed
(delays which were reflected in the 57-week programme) is taken into account to
the treatment of concurrent causes.
5. Fibre optic lighting in bar and
breakfast bar areas
[111] In the bar and breakfast bar areas of the hotel fibre optic
lighting was to be provided. Mr Whitaker
dealt with this matter in his second report (No 7/8 of process) at paragraphs
2.95-2.99, and in the accompanying table on page 36. He indicated that on Thursday 21 January
1999, two working days before the then Completion Date, Keppie
sent the defenders a quotation from Carmichael Lighting Associates for the
supply of the fibre optic lighting (produced with No 7/160 of process). In their covering letter Keppie
informed the defenders that that quotation had been sent directly to the
relevant subcontractor, Browns Electrical, on 1 December
1998. Mr Whitaker notes that that would seem
to show that the architect had been in a position to instruct acceptance of the
quotation seven weeks earlier. The
letter of 21 January instructed the defenders to act on the quotation and to
take delivery of the arrangement to suit both the bar and breakfast bar. Two quotations from Carmichael were attached to the letter, both
dated 1 December 1998; one had been sent to Browns and the
other to Thompson MacLeod, the pursuers' interior designers. These related only to fibre optic lighting in
the bar area. Following the architect's
letter of 21 January 1999, Mr Cornish sent a fax dated 24
January 1999
(No 7/58 of process); this asked for urgent action in relation to the fibre
optic lighting. In the fax Mr Cornish
mentioned that the defenders had acted on the instruction immediately and had
instructed their shopfitter, Nash Fisher; Nash Fisher
had yet to respond whether items could be retro-fitted in such a way as to
maintain delivery dates. The delivery
date for the breakfast bar was the week commencing 25 January; that for the
main bar was the week commencing 1 February.
Mr Cornish further pointed out that the instruction to Carmichael
Lighting made no reference to any installation in the breakfast bar. The fax concluded "If you require fibre
optic lighting to this bar please specify". In evidence Mr Cornish explained the
reference to retro-fitting: Nash Fisher were making up the breakfast bar and
the bar at their factory in Bristol, and the question was whether they could
incorporate the wiring for the fibre optic lighting into the joinery before it
was completed (day 4, 12.10). Keppie responded by letter dated 28 January 1999, with which they enclosed a revised
quotation for the supply of fibre optic lighting from Carmichael Lighting associates;
this included the breakfast bar. By that
letter Keppie instructed the defenders to accept the
quotation and install fibre optic lighting in both bar and breakfast bar. At the subsequent site meeting, on 3
February 1999,
Mr Cornish reported that the bar and breakfast bar would not be fitted
until 1 March, as procurement of the necessary items would take 3-4 weeks (No
7/45 of process, page 10).
[112] The
evidence of Mr Cornish was that the defenders would have required to
supply Nash Fisher with details of the fibre optic lighting two weeks before
the bar and breakfast bar carcasses were due to be delivered to site; in
addition, allowance would have to be made for the period necessary for
procurement, but Mr Cornish did not know what that was (day 4, 12.15). In
the minute of site meeting No 13 (No 7/45 of process, at page 10) it was
indicated that the procurement period was 3-4 weeks. Mr Whitaker thought that the two-week
period for the work and snagging was reasonable and that the procurement period
had to be taken into account (day 12, 1.56).
On that basis, a period of five to six weeks was required. Taken back from the Completion Date, that
indicates an Architect's Instruction at the beginning of December 1998. In my opinion that would have been a
reasonable time for the relevant Instruction.
That was, of course, very close to the point where Keppie
were instructed in place of RMJM, and that may explain why no Instruction was
issued at that time. An application in
writing had in my opinion been made, in the form of the Information Required
Schedule dated 26 January 1998 (No 7/114 of process); in this all
information relating to electrical work was to be produced by 4
May 1998. That was in my opinion sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of clause 25.4.6. There
was no suggestion that this application was made unreasonably early or
unreasonably late.
[113] On
the foregoing basis, I consider that the failure to issue the relevant Architect's
Instruction in time to allow the installation of the fibre optic lighting prior
to the completion date would constitute a Relevant Event for the purposes of
clause 25.4.6. The revised Instruction
was in fact issued on 28 January 1999, after the completion date. I am further of opinion that the failure to
give the instruction in time was critical to completion; the evidence of Mr Cornish
was that the lighting had to be incorporated by Nash Fisher into their joinery
carcasses, which were then delivered to site and installed there. Mr Cornish stated that a lot of services
had to be fitted in the bar area is once the joinery carcasses had been
installed; consequently the delay affected the defenders' ability to finish the
work. In addition, the installation of
the bars was essential to complete elements of the floor finishes, and security
shutters had to be placed on the bar once it was installed (day 4, 12.10
onwards). I accept Mr Cornish's evidence on these matters; it accords with
obvious common sense. The result is that
I consider that the Relevant Event delayed completion of the Works beyond the completion
date.
[114] The
bar and breakfast bar had not been fitted at the time of the site meeting held
on 3 February 1999; at that time Mr Cornish reported that fitting would
not take place until 1 March (No 7/45 of process, page 10). Neither expert witness was clear as to when
the bar and breakfast bar were in fact fitted.
The last item of work relating to the fibre optic lighting was
instructed on 18 March 1999 (AI 137). This was a minor adjustment to the lighting,
which indicates that the lighting had been installed by that time. Mr Whitaker (day 12, 1.54 onwards)
estimated that the result of the delay in instruction was that the period for
completion should be extended to 15 March 1999.
The basis for this conclusion was that Mr Cornish had indicated at
the site meeting on 3 February that the bar and breakfast bar would not be
fitted until 1 March; in addition, Mr Whitaker thought that an allowance
had to be made for associated work and snagging, and he allowed two weeks for
that. I accept Mr Whitaker's
evidence on this matter. I accordingly
conclude that the time for completion should be extended as a result of the
late instruction relating to the fibre optic lighting until 15
March 1999. I am further of opinion that the delay was
caused by the lateness of the instruction rather than its contents. Mr Cornish indicated (day 4, 12.22) that
it would not take long to incorporate the lights into the joinery, and Mr Whitaker
reached a similar conclusion (No 7/8 of process, paragraph 2.99).
[115] In
this case the pursuers repeated the general criticisms that applied to all of the final fix items.
Mr Lowe expressed the opinion that the instruction was issued in
good time having regard to actual progress. In my opinion the general criticisms are not
well founded in this case, and I prefer the evidence of Mr Whitaker to
that of Mr Lowe regarding the timing of the instruction.
6. External mounted floodlights
[116] Floodlights
were to be mounted on the outside of the building at plant (sixth floor)
level. The work involved is dealt with
by Mr Whitaker in his second report (No 7/8 of process, paragraphs
2.104-2.111, and table on page 39). At
site meeting No 12, held on 6 January 1999, the Clark of Works suggested that
the lights to be installed were too weighty, and it was requested that it
should be confirmed that the specification was correct for the location (No
7/44 of process, M & E Services Information Required Schedule, at page 21). Mr Cornish indicated that the external
floodlights were fairly heavy pieces of electrical equipment, which were due to
be fixed to the cladding at sixth floor level; this was lightweight metal
panelling, and the concern was that it would not support the floodlights adequately
(day 4, 12.48). On 11
January 1999
the defenders sent Keppie a fax enclosing a proposed
detail for the fixing of the floodlights (No 7/78 of process). In their letter to Keppie
dated 25 January 1999 (No 7/52 of process) the defenders
stated that an instruction requiring the floodlights was required
urgently. The minutes of the next site
meeting, held on 3 February 1991 (No 7/45 of process) indicate at
paragraph 4.1.2 that the locations of floodlights had been considered and that
these should now be fixed through the frieze level panels and louvres. In his
report to the meeting (page 11) Mr Cornish indicated that no Architect's
Instruction had yet been received, and that on the defenders' current knowledge
installation would take 4-6 weeks from the time of the instruction; therefore
cherry pickers would be on site well into March 1999. The Information Required Schedule produced at
that meeting further indicated (item 2) that instructions were required from Blyth & Blyth. An instruction seems then to have been given;
on 22 February 1999 the defenders sent a fax to Zonner
ordering 22 lighting brackets (No 7/79 of process). These required to be
powder coated by a specialist, in order that they would match the colour of the
cladding. The Clerk of Works' report
dated 15 March 1999 records that fixing of the
floodlights had begun during the previous week.
When the handover meeting took place on 29 March
1999 the
floodlights were excluded from the handover (No 7/61 of process). The Clerk of Works' diary indicates that the
connection of the floodlights was completed on 31 March. On the foregoing basis, Mr Whitaker
concluded that the defenders were delayed until 22 March
1999 in
completing the Works on account of the lateness of the instruction to modify the
fixing of the floodlights at high level.
[117] Mr Whitaker's
evidence was that a reasonable time for issuing an instruction relating to the
high-level lighting was 9 December 1998; he thought that the problem should
have been identified by the design team before it was noticed by the Clerk of
Works (second report, page 39; day 12, 2.18).
Mr Cornish thought that the instruction should have been issued
even earlier (day 5, 10.45). The
relevant Instruction was in fact issued on 3 February 1999.
In my opinion it is clear that the instruction was not issued timeously;
it was in fact produced after the completion date. It seems to me to be clear that the design
team should have considered the light fixings in good time to allow their
installation prior to the completion date.
In addition, it is clear that there was a lead-in time for the form of
fixing ultimately used; that is hardly surprising. An application in writing was made for
information in respect of floodlights in the Information Required Schedule
produced at the site meeting held on 6 January 1999.
It was not suggested that this was unreasonably early or unreasonably
late. In my opinion the necessary architect's
instruction should have been issued shortly thereafter to allow the
installation of the floodlights to proceed as rapidly as possible. I consider that the instruction should have
been issued by the Monday following the site inspection of 6 January, that is to say by 11 January. I accordingly conclude that the late issue of
the relevant information was a Relevant Event, and that it caused the
completion of the Works to be delayed beyond the completion date. The effect on
the Works was spoken to by Mr Cornish (day 5, 10.48); he stated that the
result of the delay was that the floodlights themselves could not be completed
and commissioned; in addition, the use of cherry pickers late in the
construction programme affected work at ground level, including landscaping and
the surfacing of parking and access areas.
Mr Whitaker's opinion (No 7/8 of process, page 39) was that the
defenders were delayed by the late instruction until 22 March 1999.
Work in fact continued on the floodlights until 31 March, and they
were excluded from the handover on 29 March. There was no suggestion that work on the
floodlights had proceeded unduly slowly.
In these circumstances I think that the inevitable conclusion is that
the late instruction delayed completion until 31 March. Both Mr Cornish and Mr Whitaker
thought that the work content of the instruction regarding the fixings for the
floodlights was not major, and that it was the lateness of the instruction that
caused delay (Mr Cornish on day 5, 10.49; Mr Whitaker on day 12 at
2.21). On the basis of their evidence I
agree with that conclusion.
[118] The
pursuers criticized the evidence of Mr Cornish and Mr Whitaker in
that they both suggested that instructions should have been issued by the architect
before the problem was noticed by the Clerk of Works. Mr Whitaker's evidence, at least, was
that the problem should have been identified by the design team before it was
noticed by the Clerk of Works. Nevertheless,
a Relevant Event under clause 25.4.6 cannot occur until a written application
for an instruction is made and that did not occur until 6 January. For this reason I reject the view of
Mr Whitaker and Mr Cornish that the instruction should have been
issued on 9 December or earlier; instead I consider 11 January to be
the appropriate date. Mr Lowe gave
evidence that the instruction in relation the external floodlights was issued
in good time having regard to the contractor's actual progress on site. For the reasons discussed in the last
paragraph I do not agree with that view.
Counsel for the defenders drew attention to one further aspect of Mr Lowe's
evidence in relation to the floodlights, and also the cooling system for the
refuse room. In cross-examination (day
26, 2.42) Mr Lowe stated that the fixing of the floodlights did not affect
practical completion because the floodlights were excluded from the
handover. The same would apply to the
stair balustrading (a matter discussed below where
the defenders were in default). In
re-examination (day 27, 2.19) Mr Lowe was asked whether practical
completion could be achieved before the stair finishes and balustrades were
completed on 12 April. He replied that
these were in his opinion necessary for completion. On that basis 12 April would be the correct
date for practical completion. Shortly
afterwards (day 27, 2.26), Mr Lowe was asked about the position on 28
March, and in particular whether as at that date the completion of the Works
had been delayed by the stair finishes and balustrades. Mr Lowe replied "Simplistically,
yes". He was then asked whether the
same was true of the louvres to the refuse room, and
he replied "Yes. My answer applies
to the other items". That indicates
that Mr Lowe accepted that the major items of work that had not been
completed by 29 March were causing delay as at that date. He accepted that this would apply to both the
cooling system to the refuse room and the stair balustrades and finishes, but
it would seem that the same point must apply to the floodlights.
7. Cooling system for the refuse room
[119] It was decided by the pursuers prior to site meeting No 10,
held on 4 November 1998, that a cold room condenser should
be installed in the hotel's refuse room.
At paragraph 3.4.7 of the minutes of that meeting (No 7/42 of process)
it was noted that RMJM had advised that chillers were to be provided in the
refuse stores; an Instruction was to follow from RMJM. The significance of this matter is that it
was necessary to provide cooling in the cold store room where food and other
items were stored for use in the kitchen and restaurant. The condenser required for that cooling
system was located within the refuse room.
That could, however, cause heat to build up in the refuse room, which
gave rise to a health and safety issue; consequently measures were required to
deal with the heat. This matter was not
controversial, and was spoken to by Mr Cornish (day 4, 2.14), Mr Whitaker
(day 12, 2.37) and Mr Lowe (day 26, 3.07).
Prior to the site meeting held on 6 January 1999, the defenders issued an Information
Required Schedule in respect of M & E services. This recorded that the defenders required
confirmation of the position of the cold room condenser, the routes of the
necessary pipework and any builders work enclosure
that was required (No 7/44 of process, page 20). The issue was discussed at the meeting, and
at paragraph 7.5 of the minutes (No 7.44 of process) it is narrated that Blyth & Blyth and Keppie were to review the condenser requirements to the
cold room and refuse store; a planning issue had arisen. The item was marked for action by those two
firms. The planning issue arose because,
as a result of the installation of the condenser, louvres
would be required on the outside of the building (Mr Cornish, day four,
2.21). At this meeting (No 7/44 of
process, paragraph 8.3) Mr Paul Toffolo of Keppie requested that the defenders act on directions from
consultants; this would short-circuit the flow of information at the initial
stage. All such directions would be
followed up by the issue of an architect's instruction. The purpose of this was to get information
produced by Blyth & Blyth quickly to the electrical and mechanical subcontractors,
who had to act on that information. Mr Cornish
indicated that that instruction was given because Mr Toffolo
knew that instructions were already very late (day 3, 2.21). The defenders then sent Keppie
a notice of delay under clause 25; this was in the form of a letter dated 25
January 1999
(No 7/52 of process) which referred to the cold water condensers as a source of
delay, and it was noted that information was required from Keppie
and Blyth & Blyth.
[120] At
the next site meeting, held on 3 February 1999, Mr Cornish recorded in his
project manager's summary (No 7/45, page 11, item 10) that the defenders had
been instructed on 29 January to procure fans, louvres
and an air conditioning unit, and to build an enclosure in the refuse room and
carry out extensive builders work. Mr Cornish
indicated in his report that there was little prospect that that work would be
completed until mid or late March. The terms
of the instruction of 29 January are found in No 6/129 of process as AI
131. At the site meeting of 3 February
(minutes, paragraph 4.1.14) receipt of information for the condensers and
ventilation to the refuse room was confirmed.
It was noted that the subcontractor required electrical specification
for the controls. It was further
specified that the vent grille was to be full height to accommodate three
openings, and was to be coloured to match the render. It was further noted (minutes, paragraph
5.2.5) that, according to the mechanical engineer, the fan coil arrangement to
the refuse room was causing delay. The
problem of heat in the refuse room required the enclosure of the condenser unit
within partitioning inside the refuse room.
It also required that extract and ventilation fans and grilles should be
installed, along with a fan coil unit designed to contain chilled water within
the refuse room itself, in order to keep the refuse room cool. The relevant instruction for this solution is
found at AI 135, issued on 5 March 1999; this referred to an engineer's
instruction of 2 March 1999. It was this Architect's Instruction
that contained the information necessary for the construction of the chilling
system by the electrical subcontractor (Mr Cornish, day 4, 2.36). Work on the chilling system was completed on 12
April 1999 (Mr Lowe's
report, No 6/16 of process, appendix 3, item 81, paragraph 13).
[121] Mr Cornish
gave evidence that the instruction relating to the chilling system in the
refuse room should have been issued as part of the first fix mechanical works,
by October 1998 (day 4, 2.42). Mr Whitaker
considered that instruction should have been issued no later than the middle of
November 1998; the matter had first been raised at the site meeting held on 4
November, and RMJM had stated that an instruction would follow (No 7/42 of
process, page 4). In their original
Information Required Schedule dated 26 January 1998 (No 7/114 of process) the
defenders had asked that information relating to electrical works should be issued
by 4 May 1998 and information relating to mechanical works by 29
June 1998. A further written request for the information
was found in the schedule produced at site meeting No 12 on 6
January 1999.
[122] Against the foregoing background, I am of opinion that the Architect's
Instruction issued on 29 January 1999 was not issued "in due
time" for the purposes of clause 25.4.6.
I consider that a written application for an Instruction was made by
means of the Information Required Schedule of 26 January
1998. The matter had been discussed at site meeting
No 10, on 4 November 1998, when it was stated that an
Instruction would follow; the request must be construed in the light of that
meeting. In my opinion the application
was neither unreasonably late nor unreasonably early; no suggestion to the
contrary was made. The Instruction was
not in fact issued until 29 January 1999, after the contractual completion date. Mr Whitaker gave evidence that the
instruction was "obviously late" (day 12, 2.56). I think that that
must be correct, in view of the timing of the earlier discussions, and also in
view of the time that was in fact taken to install the cooling system. In these circumstances I consider that the
late Instruction relating to the refuse store cooling system was a Relevant
Event for the purposes of clause 25.4.6.
I am further of opinion that the Relevant Event caused completion of the
Works to be delayed beyond the Completion Date.
In view of the fact that the Instruction was only issued on 29
January 1999,
it is inevitable that delay would be caused to the Completion Date. In any event, the work involved was clearly
relatively complicated; it involved the procurement of the necessary equipment
and pipework.
It was only completed on 12 April 1999, which tends to indicate the
complexity of what was involved. Mr Cornish
further explained (day 4, 2.52 onwards) that the instruction affected the
ability to commission the mechanical systems at ground floor level. It further affected commissioning of the cold
store room and made it necessary to recommission the
electrical control systems. In these
circumstances it seems clear that the lateness of the Instruction caused delay
beyond the Completion Date. It also
appears that the work was critical for the purposes of completion. It was essential that the cold store should
be usable if the kitchen were to be brought into use,
and that was clearly critical to the hotel restaurant (day 4, 2.43). Mr Lowe agreed that kitchen and storage
areas were necessary for completion of the hotel (day 23, 3.07). Moreover the refuse room cooling was, along
with the stair balustrading, one of the last two
items to be completed; both were completed on 12 April
1999. Mr Lowe accepted that the last item to
be completed is necessarily on the critical path (day 22, 3.14). Consequently the refuse room cooling must
have been critical.
[123] As
to the length of time that should be allowed by way of extension, Mr Whitaker's
opinion (second report, paragraph 2.117) was that the defenders were delayed in
completing the Works until 9 April 1999 as a result of the lateness of the
instruction to provide cooling to the refuse store. Counsel for the defenders submitted that,
since the refuse store cooling was only completed on 12 April 1999, that should be treated as the end of the
delay caused by that part of the Works.
There was no suggestion that the defenders or their subcontractors were
particularly dilatory in this part of the works. Consequently I think that counsel was correct
in his submission, and I find that the extension in respect of the refuse store
cooling should be until 12 April 1999.
Mr Whitaker's evidence was that it was the lateness of the
instruction that caused delay, rather than its
content. He stated that the effect of
the instructed works was localised; thus it would have been possible to bring
in further resources to work in that area without disruption to other trades
and other work (day 12, 2.56). Mr Cornish
was also of opinion that the defenders' delay was caused by the lateness rather
than the content of the instruction. The
instruction represented a fairly minor part of the works (day 4, 2.46). Thus 3 fan coils had to be installed in this
area, but 170 fan coils were installed elsewhere. Larger chiller
equipment had to be installed elsewhere in the building. On the basis of this evidence I am of opinion
that it was the lateness rather than the content of the instruction that caused
the delay.
[124] The
pursuers submitted that Mr Cornish had not been able to indicate the
effect that the works on the cooling system for the refuse room would have on
overall progress of the works; moreover, he had given evidence that the content
of these works was a fairly minor part of the works as a whole and did not affect
work in the bedrooms. In my opinion the
answer to this point is that these works occurred at the very end of the
contract, and work was in fact continuing on 29 March when the handover meeting
occurred. At that stage any work that is
still outstanding, if it is essential for the usable occupation of the
building, must necessarily be critical.
That point was in effect accepted by Mr Lowe in the passages in his
evidence discussed at paragraph [122] above; these apply equally to the cooling
system for the refuse room. Moreover, in
questioning by the court during evidence in chief, Mr Lowe accepted that
the last item to be completed is, by definition, on the critical path (day 22,
3.14). That point can in my opinion be
generalized; any work of significance that is still outstanding at handover
must be on the critical path.
8. Trees
[125] On
13 November 1998 English Landscapes, the defenders' landscape subcontractors
sent a fax to RMJM (No 7/159 of process) to state that trees of the variety
that had been specified (Liriodendron tulipifera 'Aureomarginatum') were
not available; English Landscapes suggested an alternative, namely the standard
variety of that species, and requested further instructions. RMJM's appointment
was terminated shortly thereafter. At site meeting No 12, held on 6
January 1999,
it is recorded in the minutes that Keppie were to
agree the landscaping consultancy requirements with the pursuers (No 7/44 of
process, page 3, item 29). The matter
was mentioned again at site meeting No 13, held on 3 February (No 7/45 of
process, page 11, item 11). On 5
February 1999
the defenders became aware that a firm of landscape consultants, Derek Lovejoy
and Partners, had been appointed (No 7/84 of process). A meeting took place that day attended by
Lovejoy, English Landscapes, the defenders and Bristol City Council to discuss
the matter. The local authority
were involved because of the existence of a planning condition that the
variety and size of trees had to be approved by the council. On 10 February Lovejoy wrote to the local
authority to request approval of alternative trees. On 18 February the Architect instructed
alternative trees. In the Clerk of
Works' diary it is recorded that the trees were on site ready to start planting
on 1 March 1999 (No 7/85 of process).
On 2 March the defenders wrote to Keppie (No
7/84 of process) to inform them, in accordance with clause 25, that the
progress of the works was likely to be delayed in respect of landscaping. The cause of delay is set out in detail; in
essence the complaint was that no information as to the variety of trees to be
planted was provided until 18 February.
It is agreed in the parties' joint minute that the landscaping element
of the works was completed on 19 March 1999; that is in accordance with entries
in the Clerk of Works' report for the week ending 21 March.
[126] Mr Whitaker
(second report, paragraphs 2.118-2.121 and accompanying table) expressed the
opinion that the defenders were delayed in completing the Works until 31 March
1999 as a consequence of the lateness of the instruction with regard to the
alternative variety of tree to be planted.
His view was that the instruction should have been issued no later than 16
December 1998
(table, and day 12, 3.02). Mr Cornish
gave evidence that the instruction should have been issued on 1
December 1998,
on the basis that the information had been requested in mid-November (day 4,
3.09). In my opinion it is clear that an
application in writing for the necessary information was made by English
Landscapes on 13 November 1998, and that that application satisfied
the requirements of clause 25.4.6. There
was no suggestion that the application was made unreasonably early or
unreasonably late. In view of that
application, I am of opinion that Mr Whitaker was fully justified in
expressing the opinion that an Instruction should have been issued by the
middle of December. On that basis I
conclude that the instruction of 18 February 1999 was not issued "in due
time" within the meaning of clause 25.4.6.
It is likewise clear in my opinion that the lateness of the instruction
caused the completion of the Works to the delayed beyond the Completion
Date. The instruction itself was in fact
issued more than three weeks after the then current Completion Date. The planting of the trees was clearly
necessary to complete the landscaping work (Mr Cornish, day 4, 3.11). The landscaping works were part of the Works
to be performed under the contract, and consequently the delay in landscaping
caused delay in completion beyond the Completion Date. I am of opinion that completion of the Works
was delayed until 19 March by the failure to provide a timeous
instruction relating to the trees; that was the date when planting concluded. I
am further of opinion that the delay was caused by the lateness of the
instruction rather than its content.
Indeed, the content of the work did not change in any way; all that
happened was that one variety (Aureomarginatum) of
the species was replaced by the standard form of the species.
[127] The pursuers submitted that much of the delay in planting
the trees was the result of either weather conditions or default by the contractor
or subcontractor. The Clerk of Works'
diary (No 6/19 of process) indicated that on 8 March that it was too wet for planting
and also, on 15 March, that the topsoil had not been cultivated to
specification and was of poor quality. In fact the entry on 8 March notes that
the soil was still too wet for planting but that the landscaping contractor was
fixing trees that had already been planted.
That suggests that work was progressing.
I have been unable to find any entry relating to the landscaping work on
15 March. On 18 March it is narrated
that the Clerk of Works went right through the landscaping scheme with the
landscape architect. He agreed to write
to the contractor regarding planting and the replacement of plants. The Clerk of Works then went through the
scheme with the landscape subcontractor and agreed snags to be corrected. These entries do not suggest that bad weather
was a serious problem; indeed, it appears from the Clerk of Works' diary that
on the whole the weather during the first three weeks of March was fine, good
or very good. The fact that snagging
work had to be carried out is hardly surprising. In my opinion the pursuers' submission on
this matter is without substance.
9. External render
[128] The exterior walls of the hotel at ground floor level were
to be covered with render. In the defenders' Information Required Schedule produced
for site meeting No 12 (No 7/44 of process, page 14) it is indicated that on 18
November 1998 the defenders had made an application for information in respect
of the Andura coatings that had been specified by the
architect, that information being required by 30 November. At the site meeting, which was held on 6
January 1999,
Keppie agreed (paragraph 4.1, item 15) that, by 1
February, they would discuss and agree the texture of the render with the
client and with the Planning Department of the local authority, and would
review the base coat thickness and interface with the windows. Keppie and the
pursuers were noted as being responsible for dealing with this issue. The reference to the interface with the
windows was explained by Mr Whitaker (day 12, 3.16): the windows were
manufactured to precise tolerances, but the tolerances used in the blockwork were less precise; consequently the difference
between the two created a problem in achieving the required thickness of
render. Doubts about this had been
expressed by the defenders. On 27
January 1999
Keppie issued a verbal instruction that the defenders
should use Andura Orchid Fine Textured TMC render;
"Orchid" was the colour. That
instruction was confirmed by the defenders in a fax to Keppie
dated 30 January; Keppie responded to this by a
letter dated 1 February. At site meeting
No 13, held on 3 February, Mr Cornish reported in the Project Manager's
Summary that, if a lot of cold or wet weather was experienced in February, that
work would not be finished (No 7/45, page 11, item 12). He also indicated that graffiti paint had
still not been instructed. Matters were
taken further in a letter from the defenders to Keppie
dated 10 February (No 7/89 of process) . In this letter the defenders pointed out a
number of further issues that were preventing a start on the render. These were: first, the specification in the
relevant Bill of Quantities did not correspond to the recommendations of the
manufacturer of the render; secondly, the extent to which the specification required
graffiti coating had not been confirmed; thirdly, the defenders had had
difficulty in obtaining metal beading for placing round the windows to suit the
specified thickness of the render; fourthly, confirmation was requested as to
whether the main rendering works should be delayed until a sample panel,
ordered on 4 February, had been approved; and fifthly, the interface between
the rendering and the windows was to be reviewed by 1 February in accordance
with the decision made at site meeting No 12.
In evidence Mr Cornish stated that the defenders could not have
started the external rendering until the issues in that letter had been
resolved (day 4, 2.27). Keppie replied to the letter in two stages. First, on 12 February (found in No 6/351 of
process, at appendix 3/4) they advised the defenders of a supplier of
appropriate beading. Secondly, on 15
February Keppie dealt with the other issues; they
advised that the sample panel was only likely to be relevant to the colour, and
that it would be acceptable to have a projection of the render of between 6 and
10 millimetres beyond the window face.
The Clerk of Works recorded in his diary that the preparation for the
start of rendering began on 8 March, and that the work was completed in the
following week.
[129] Mr Whitaker
was of opinion that the Architect's Instruction for the render should have been
issued by 20 December 1998 (second report, paragraphs 2.1 to
2-2.128 and accompanying table). The
evidence of Mr Cornish was that issues regarding the render should have
been resolved by the end of November (day 4, 3.29). The defenders had requested the relevant
information by 30 November, as is indicated in the Information Required
Schedule presented at site meeting No 12.
On that basis, I am of opinion that Mr Whitaker's date of 20
December is clearly justified. In these
circumstances, I consider that the Architect's Instructions issued on 27
January and 15 February dealing with rendering were not issued "in due
time" in terms of clause 25.4.6.
The information in connection with the rendering had been requested by
30 November; moreover, in the original Information Required Schedule dated 26
January 1998
(No 7/114 of process) the defenders had requested full package information in
relation to external rendering by 31 July 1998.
It was not in dispute that the requests for an Instruction were made
neither unreasonably early nor unreasonably late. I accordingly conclude that there was a
Relevant Event within the meaning of clause 25.4.6, namely a late instruction
relating to the external rendering.
[130] In my opinion that Relevant Event caused completion of the
Works to be delayed beyond the Completion Date.
Mr Cornish gave evidence that work on the rendering could not begin
until the issues set out in the defenders' letter of 10 February were dealt
with (day 4, 3.27). Moreover, the
specification provided that the defenders should not start rendering work until
the colour and texture of the render had been approved. Definitive instructions were not given until
15 February, which was three weeks after the Completion Date. It is obvious that the rendering had to be
completed before the hotel could be said to be completed; indeed, the necessary
scaffolding and other equipment would make it difficult to run the hotel while
rendering work was proceeding. In his
second report Mr Whitaker expressed the opinion (paragraph 2.128) that the
defenders were delayed until 8 March 1999 (wrongly stated as 1998) as a result
of the late issue of instructions regarding the rendering. I am content to accept that view, which I
think was reasonable in all the circumstances.
I am further of opinion that the delay was caused by the lateness of the
instruction rather than its content. The
work involved was basically the same as that originally specified; it involved
the application of render to the walls at ground floor level. Moreover, it is clear from the Clerk of Works
diary that the work did not take long; preparations began on 8 March and were
concluded the following week.
[131] The pursuers submitted that the completion of the external
render resulted from a series of contractor defaults relating to the eaves
cladding and the interface between the windows and the blockwork. In this respect they relied on the evidence
of Mr Lowe, who stated that the scaffolding on the outside of the building
was not taken down in line with the programme because of difficulties
encountered in the detailing of the eaves at roof level (report, No 6/351 of
process, paragraph 2.128). Mr Lowe
further stated that the scaffolding remained in place as a result of contractor
default because the installation of the cladding to the underside of the roof
overhang was not as detailed on the architect's sketch. Mr Cornish, however, gave evidence (day
7, 2.19) that the problem with the eaves arose because Kelsey, the subcontractor,
had suggested that a colour strip should be used to cover the fixings on the
eaves panelling; this was not accepted by the architect on visual grounds. It was then pointed out that the fixings
could not be seen from the ground, and the architect then accepted the
suggestion. This was the only evidence
as to what actually occurred on site, and I cannot hold that it involved contractor
default. The relevant architect's sketch
was not produced, and there was no evidence of any material departure from the
sketch. In addition, the dismantling of
the scaffolding was completed on 4 February 1999, but the rendering work could not
begin until the issues mentioned in Mr Cornish's
letter of 10 February 1999 had been dealt with. In particular, a sample panel had to the
approved, and that appears only to have occurred after 15 February. Mr Lowe further gave evidence that there
had been contractor default in relation to the interface between the windows
and the blockwork.
He stated (day 22, 3.19) that the defenders should have started from the
external face and worked back in to ensure a straight external face; in this
way any discrepancies between the manufacturer tolerances for the windows and
the tolerances for the blockwork could be eliminated
by making adjustments to the position of the blockwork. Nevertheless, in cross-examination Mr Lowe
accepted that the architect was obliged to provide accurately dimensioned drawings
to enable the contractor to set out the works at ground level (day 27, 10.39),
and that the contractor's obligation was to set out the works accurately in
accordance with those drawings.. On that
basis, I have difficulty in understanding how the contractor could make the
sort of adjustments that Mr Lowe envisaged. Indeed, if a significant discrepancy arises
between the tolerances for the blockwork and those
for the windows, it is for the architect to determine how the two elements are
to be integrated with each other; this appears from clause 2.4.4 of the
Conditions. The defenders further relied
on the evidence of Mr Lowe that the instruction in respect of the render
was issued in good time having regard to actual progress on site, and was not
on the critical path. In my opinion the
instruction was late, as indicated in Mr Whitaker's evidence, and at the
stage of the contract where the problems of the external render arose it is
clear in my view that it was critical to completion.
Delay by defenders: lifts
[132] The pursuers contended that, even if the defenders were
correct in asserting that Completion had been delayed by the various matters
discussed above, it was also delayed by two further matters, the lifts and the
stair balustrades. Both of these were
the responsibility of the defenders or the defenders' subcontractors. They accordingly operated as concurrent
causes of the delay. The delay caused by
these two items was such that completion could not have occurred any earlier
than it did. This contention raises the
issue of concurrent causes, discussed at paragraphs [18]-[19] above. Before considering that issue, however, I
must deal with the evidence relating to the lifts and the stair balustrades.
[133] In
relation to the lifts, in the defenders' programme work was originally planned
to start on 16 September 1998.
Completion was scheduled for 8 December 1998.
The defenders' original subcontractor was Nationwide Lifts. Discussions between the defenders and
Nationwide had taken place prior to the site meeting held on 25
March 1998
(No 7/13 of process, paragraphs 3.1.4 and 3.4.6). At that time RMJM wanted to see the subcontractor's
proposals. At the next site meeting,
held on 27 April 1998, it was noted that drawings were
awaited from Nationwide (No 7/14 of process, paragraph 01-3.1.3). The defenders stated that the procurement
period for the manufacture of the lifts would be 15 weeks after drawing
approval. At site meeting No 7, held on
12 August, information was still outstanding from Nationwide (No 7/36 of
process, paragraph 05-3.4.3). It is
recorded that the defenders had met the managing director of Nationwide
"to emphasize serious concerns on lack of performance from Nationwide and
to re-state specific information required". The defenders were also exploring
alternative suppliers at this time. At
site meeting No 8, held on 9 September 1998 the defenders advised the pursuers
that they were the seeking an alternative lift supplier (No 6/17 of process,
paragraph 05-3.4.3). By the time of site
meeting No 9, held on 7 October, the defenders had selected an alternative lift
supplier, and drawings had been supplied to RMJM, with some data outstanding
(No 6/17 of process, paragraph 05-3.4.3).
At the next site meeting, No 10, held on 4 November 1998, it was noted that the defenders had
presented a lift sample to the pursuers, who had indicated that the lift was acceptable. The defenders were to meet the lift supplier
on 5 November to receive further details.
RMJM stressed the need for technical information to be provided. In the programme annexed to the minutes of
that meeting (No 7/42 of process) the lift installation was omitted. At about that time, however, the defenders
had produced a 57-week programme (No 7/45 of process), which indicated an
intention to complete the lift installation and commissioning by 8
February 1999. In fact work on the lifts began on 1
December 1998
and was completed on 24 March 1999 (recorded in the joint minute). Even with the second subcontractor, progress
appears to have been fairly slow (Clerk of Works' diary, 21 and 22 December
1998, 22, 25, 27 and 29 January 1999 and elsewhere). No extension of time was sought by the
defenders for delay arising from the lift installation.
[134] Mr Whitaker
ultimately conceded (day 15, 11.18) that the lifts had been installed late, and
that this was a problem for which the defenders had been responsible. He further accepted that it involved a delay
that was concurrent with other delays until 23 March 1999.
Mr Lowe was of opinion that Practical Completion could not have
taken place until the work to the lifts had been completed.
[135] In my opinion the pursuers were correct in asserting that
Completion was delayed by work on the lifts.
That delay was the responsibility of the defenders and their subcontractors;
indeed, the defenders do not argue the contrary. I accordingly conclude that the delay in
completing the lift installation was a concurrent source of the delay in
Completion. That delay lasted until 24
March, when it is agreed that the lift installation was completed.
Delay by defenders: stair balustrades
[136] In
the Bills of Quantities stair balustrading and
finishes are listed as provisional sums.
It is noted that the works are to be executed by a domestic subcontractor. In the defenders' original construction
programme (No 7/156 of process) stair balustrading
appears in the "finishes" section.
The dates for starting and finishing this activity were 14
October 1998
and 24 November 1998 (Mr Whitaker's logic-linked
version of the programme, No 7/156 of process, Appendix D). In the revised 57-week programme put forward
at site meeting No 13 on 3 February 1999 the completion date was altered to 8
February 1999. Because certain of the concrete work was of poor quality, the defenders required to carry out
skim finishing to the stairs. The
quality of the concrete is noted in the minutes of site meeting No 6, held on 15
July 1998,
where it is recorded that there was discussion on "current inappropriate
quality of concrete related to required finish to walls". The matter was raised again at site meeting
No 7 on 12 August (No 7/36 of process, paragraph 06-3.2.1 and 3.4.3) and site
meeting No 8 on 9 September (No 6/17 of process), where it was noted (paragraphs
6-3.2.1 and 3.4.3) that the defenders were to provide proposals for the stair,
atrium and lift lobby walls to remedy "inaccuracies/poor quality arrises/edges in concrete". At site meeting No 9, held on 7 October
1998, it was
recorded (at paragraph 6-3.4.3):
"[Mr Cornish]
advised all concrete in atrium and lift lobby will be skim plastered to remedy
inaccuracies in concrete. [Mr Cornish]
confirmed angle edge beads will be used to ensure straight, clean edges of
concrete".
That work was necessary in order to
carry out the work on the stair balustrades and finishes. The relevant architect's
instructions (Nos 78 and 105) were issued on 4
September and 14 October 1998. The actual start of work on the
stair balustrades occurred on 18 December 1998, and the actual completion date was 12
April 1999
(joint minute).
[137] Problems
occurred as the stair balustrading work
continued. The Clerk of Works noted
concerns about quality on 2 March 1999 and recorded that the need to carry out
drilling for base plates created dust, which had an impact on the snagging of
the atrium area (9, 11 and 12 March 1999; Mr Cornish, day 7, 12.37).
Although it is agreed that completion occurred on 29 April, some snagging work
occurred as late as 20 April (Clerk of Works' diary). It was not possible to achieve Practical
Completion without the main stair and the fire escape stairs; for these to the
available for use the balustrading had to be
complete, as the handrail was obviously necessary (Mr Cornish, day 7,
12.47). The defenders did not seek any
extension of time in respect of the stair balustrades.
[138] In my opinion completion was delayed by the work on the
stair balustrades. That delay was the
responsibility of the defenders as contractor; that was not in dispute. I accordingly conclude that the work on the
stair balustrades and the stair finishes was a concurrent source of the delay
in completion. That delay lasted until 12
April 1999,
which is agreed in the joint minute to be the date when work on the balustrades
ended.
[139] I
should mention one further matter. In
their written submissions the pursuers referred to certain other items of work
that were said to have delayed Practical Completion and which were the
responsibility of the defenders or their subcontractors. These included the
installation of utilities and lagging in the plant room. Both of these, however, were considered by Mr Lowe
not to be on the critical path. It follows that the only delay that they can
have caused to Practical Completion is the delay in their own completion. It is not entirely clear when work on
utilities came to an end; the gas supply to the hotel was turned on on 15 February, and the gas main itself appears to have
been installed either on or shortly after 5 February (Mr Cornish, day 7, 3.08). In all the circumstances I do not regard this
activity as of great significance. It
was not explored at great length in evidence, and it is not clear on the
evidence what the causes of the delay were; it is impossible to exclude the
possibility that progress was slow simply because it was known that completion
was going to be delayed for other reasons.
Lagging in the plant room appears to have continued, according to the
Clerk of Works' diary, for most of February and until 10 March. On 15 March it is recorded that the defenders
were cleaning up in the plant room. The
issue of the plant room lagging was first raised by the pursuers in
cross-examination of Mr Whitaker.
Counsel for the defenders objected to the line of evidence, on the basis
that it had not been put to Mr Cornish during his cross-examination. That objection was maintained in
submissions. In my opinion the objection
was well founded, and I sustain it. Mr Cornish
was the obvious witness of fact on this matter, and elementary fairness
dictates that it should have been put to him.
He might have been able to provide some reason for the apparent
delay. For this reason I will disregard
the issue of the plant room lagging.
Clause 13.8
[140] The next issue that must be considered is the application of
clause 13.8 of the Conditions of Contract.
Clause 13.8 sets out certain procedures that are to be followed if the contractor
considers that any architect's instruction or the equivalent will require
either an adjustment to the contract sum or delay the completion date. So far as material it is in the following
terms:
"13.8.1
Where, in the opinion of the Contractor, any instruction, or other item which,
in the opinion of the Contractor, constitutes an instruction issued by the Architect,
will require an adjustment to the Contract Sum and/or delay the Completion
Date, the Contractor shall not execute such instruction (subject to Clause
13.8.4) unless he shall have first submitted to the Architect, in writing,
within 10 working days (or within such other period as may be agreed between
the Contractor and the Architect[)] of receipt of the instruction, details of:
1. Initial estimate of the adjustment (together
with all necessary supporting calculations by reference to the Contract
Documents);
2. Initial estimate of the additional resources
(if any) required and his method statement for compliance;
3. Initial estimate of the length of any
extension of time to which he considers he is entitled under Clause 25 and the
new Completion Date (together with all necessary supporting documentation by
reference to the Master Programme);
4. Initial estimate of the amount of any direct
loss and/or expense to which he may be entitled under Clause 26; and
5. Any such other information as the Architect
may reasonably require.
13.8.2 The Contractor
and the Architect shall then, within 5 working days of receipt by the Architect
of the Contractor's estimates, agree the Contractor's assessments. Following such agreement, the Contractor
shall immediately thereafter comply with the instruction and the Architect
shall grant an extension of time under Clause 25.3 of the agreed length (if
any) and the agreed adjustments (if any) and the agreed adjustments (if any) in
relation to clauses 13.8.1.1 and 13.8.1.4 shall be made to the Contract Sum.
13.8.3 If
agreement cannot be reached within 5 working days of receipt by the Architect
of the Contractor's estimate on all or any of the matters set out therein;
then;
1. the Architect may nevertheless
instruct the Contractor to comply with the instruction; in which case the
provisions of Clauses 13.5, 25 and 26 shall apply; or
2. the Architect may instruct the Contractor
not to comply with the instruction, in which case the contractor shall be
reimbursed all reasonable costs associated with the abortive [instruction].
13.8.4 The Architect
may, by notice to the Contractor before or after the issue of any instruction,
dispense with the Contractor's obligation under Clause 13.8.1, in which case
the Contractor shall immediately comply with the instruction and the provisions
of Clauses 13.5, 25 and 26 shall apply.
13.8.5 If the
Contractor fails to comply with any one or more of the provisions of Clause
13.8.1, where the Architect has not dispensed with such compliance under Clause
13.8.4, the Contractor shall not be entitled to any extension of time under
Clause 25.3".
[141] The terms of clause 13.8 were considered by Lord Macfadyen when the action was at debate; his decision is
reported at 2002 SLT 781. Lord Macfadyen made the following comments (at 793):
"[30] In
my opinion, the language of clause 13.8 is
prima facie applicable to all architect's instructions, including those in
respect of the expenditure of provisional sums.
There is no qualification of the reference in clause 13.8.1 to architect's
instructions to suggest that any subcategory of such instructions is to be
excluded from the scope of the clause.
The repetition of the substance of clause 13.3.1 in clause 13.8.6,
although apparently redundant, lends support to the contention that clause 13.8
applies, without distinction, to all architect's instructions.
...
[32] In my
view a distinction falls to be drawn between, on the one hand, a late
instruction which, simply because of its lateness, gives rise to a need to
adjust the contract sum and/or grant an extension of time and, on the other
hand, an instruction which, although late, is of such a nature that it would,
whenever issued, have given rise to a need to make such an adjustment or grant
such an extension. The latter category
of instruction falls, in my view, within the scope of clause 13.8, whereas the
former does not. It is in my view
difficult to formulate the distinction more precisely in the abstract. It would, in my view, be wrong to say simply
that clause 13.8 has no application to late instructions. On the other hand, a failure to comply with
clause 13.8 will not, in my view, exclude a claim for extension of time in so
far as the extension is made necessary by the lateness of the instruction as
distinct from its content.
...
[35] In my
opinion the architect's power under clause 25.3.3 [to grant extensions of time]
must be read subject to the special provision of clause 13.8.5. Clause 13.8.5 defines the effect of failure
to comply with the provisions of clause 13.8.1 as being that 'the Contractor
shall not be entitled to any extension of time under clause 25.3'.... The contractor's
right to [an extension] is, therefore, in my opinion, removed, in terms of
clause 13.8.5, if the contractor fails to comply with the provisions of clause
13.8.1".
When the defenders reclaimed against
Lord Macfadyen's decision his opinion on the
foregoing matters was not challenged.
[142] Nevertheless, in his submissions senior counsel for the
pursuers contended that Lord Macfadyen's construction
of clause 13.8 was mistaken. He
emphasized the wording of clause 13.8.1, which refers to "any"
instruction which in the opinion of the contractor would require an adjustment
to the Contract Sum or delay the Completion Date. No distinction is made between
content and timing; instead all that is relevant is the impact of an Architect's
Instruction on cost or completion. The
wording of the remainder of the clause was likewise mandatory; clause 13.8.5
denied the contractor a right to "any extension of time under clause
25.3".
[143] In my opinion Lord Macfadyen's
construction of clause 13.8 is clearly correct.
That construction is based on a distinction between delay caused by the
lateness of an instruction and delay caused by its content; the clause applies
to the latter type of delay but not to the former. That makes practical sense. This can be seen by considering a
hypothetical example where the delay is clearly caused by lateness alone. Suppose that external walls are to be covered
in render of a particular specification, the colour to be advised by the architect. According to the contractor's programme work
on the render is to start on 15 October and, because of a 14-day lead-in time,
information on the colour is required by 1 October. The architect instructs the colour on 10
October. Because of the lead-in time,
work cannot begin until 25 October. In those circumstances, what would be the
point of using the clause 13.8 procedure when the architect's instruction was
received on 10 October? There is no
additional cost. So far as lateness is
concerned, delay is inevitable because the instruction was 10 days late. Using the clause 13.8 procedure does not give
the architect the option of cancelling it, or instructing something else; that would
merely add to the delay. The sensible
course is clearly that the contractor should proceed with the work
immediately. In my opinion the clause
cannot have been intended to operate in such circumstances. The same must be true in all cases where
delay is caused by the mere lateness of an instruction or variation, rather
than its content.
In conclusion, I would merely add that clause 13.8 does not appear to
have been well thought through. It is,
so far as I am aware, an unusual clause, innovating upon the standard JCT
scheme. In these circumstances I do not
see any need to give it a liberal construction; it should be construed so that
it does not operate where it makes no contractual sense. Moreover, support for Lord Macfadyen's construction can be found in the wording of
clause 13.8.1 itself. Where the content
of an instruction is the problem, it can be said that it is the
"instruction" (the word used in clause 13.8.1) that has caused the
delay. Where delay in the lateness of
the instruction is the source of the problem, however, it is the lateness
rather than the instruction that causes the delay. Exactly the same analysis applies to
variations. A variation may or may not cause
delay because of its content. If the
work instructed is fundamentally different, it is quite possible that the
content will give rise to delay. Where
the variation is relatively minor, however, it is unlikely that content will
cause delay; nevertheless, if the variation is issued late that may cause
delay, and the example given above is still in point. In every case it is necessary to examine the
particular instruction or variation to discover whether any resulting delay is
caused by lateness or content.
[144] On this basis, I am of opinion that with one exception all
of the Architect's Instructions founded on by the defenders for the purposes of
the counterclaim are outwith the scope of clause
13.8. In every case except the gas
venting, for the reasons discussed above in relation to the individual Architect's
Instructions, I consider that it was the lateness rather than the content of
the Instruction that caused the delay to completion. The result is that in none
of these cases does clause 13.8 preclude the defenders from claiming an
extension of time under clause 25. In relation
to the gas venting scheme, the defenders admitted that it was content rather
than lateness that caused the delay. In
this case the defenders did not make use of the clause 13.8 procedure. In these circumstances it is necessary to
consider the issues of waiver and personal bar.
Waiver and personal bar
[145] Waiver
involves the abandonment of a right: Armia Ltd v Daejan Developments Ltd, 1979 SC(HL) 56, at 69 per Lord
Fraser of Tullybelton; and at 72 per Lord Keith of Kinkel. The word
"right" must in my opinion be relatively widely construed. It should include not only a right in the
narrowest sense, consisting of a claim against another person, but should also
extend to other forms of legal entitlement.
These include entitlements that may more properly be described as a
privilege or an immunity; a privilege is an
entitlement to prevent another person from exercising a claim-right, and an
immunity is an entitlement to prevent another person from exercising a
power. (The
terminology used here is derived from W.N. Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as applied in Judicial Reasoning, (New Haven,
1923)). I am of opinion that the
pursuers' right to invoke clause 13.8 is properly characterized as an immunity; the defenders have a power to use that clause
to claim an extension of time, and the pursuers have an immunity against that
power if the defenders do not fulfil the requirements of the clause. In my opinion an immunity
can be the subject of waiver. That view
is I think supported by the decision of Lord Eassie
in E & J Glasgow Ltd v UGC Estates
Ltd, [2005] CSOH 63, where (at paragraph [33]) he states:
"In a
contractual context, waiver of a contractual term may necessarily imply that
something which does not satisfy all the contractual conditions is yet to be
treated as being within those provisions because the party having an interest
to insist on full satisfaction has either expressly, or by implication arising
from the factual circumstances, waived his right to insist on one or more of
the contractual conditions being duly fulfilled. In ordinary usage, waiving a contractual term
is indeed to say that one is not insisting on one's right to require due
observance of the term....[T]he authorities illustrate
that a contractual term which is definitive of a contractual entitlement may be
waived".
[146] The defenders issued a series of notices in terms of clause
25 of the Contract Conditions (Nos 7/130-7/152 of
process). For the purposes of the
following analysis I will concentrate on the first of these (No 7/130), which
related to the gas venting scheme; nevertheless I think that exactly the same
analysis applies to the later notices.
The first delay notice was issued on 31 March 1998 (see paragraph [44] above). It narrated that delay was likely to occur in
the progress of the works as a result of the instruction relating to the new
gas venting system, using the Proofex membrane. It narrated the alleged causes of the delay
in some detail. That notice was issued
eight days after the instruction to use the Proofex
membrane, that instruction having been issued on 23 March. The issue was discussed at a project review
meeting held on 8 April 1998 (discussed at paragraph [45] above;
the minutes are No 6/31 of process). The
meeting was attended by Mr Dibben on behalf of
the defenders and Mr Sandy Orr on behalf of the pursuers. Mr Dibben
alone gave evidence about the meeting (day 9, 10.57 onwards). He reported the delay; Mr Orr's response
was that he was not prepared to accept that the third stage of the contract the
defenders could be incurring a potential delay.
According to Mr Dibben, Mr Orr had
stated that the defenders were not getting an extension of time. When he was asked subsequently whether any
representative of the pursuers at that meeting said that there would be no
extension of time because the defenders had not operated clause 13.8, Mr Dibben stated that he did not think that the clause was
ever mentioned (day 9, 12.43).
[147] Later,
on 9 October and 17 November 1998 letters were written by the architect, RMJM,
in relation to the claim for an extension of time as a result of the gas
venting instructions (Nos 6/36 and 6/37 of
process). Nothing was said in these
letters about clause 13.8. Instead, the
defenders' claim was rejected because, it was said, the defenders had agreed to
absorb the delay; I discuss this matter at paragraph [45]. Moreover, the letter of 9 October dealt with
claims under express reference to clause 25.
RMJM indicated that in their view the gas venting instruction
constituted, a Relevant Event under clause 25.4.5.1, and that event caused the
defenders delay. A similar point can be
made in relation to other letters from the architect; these include RMJM's letter of 26 August 1998 (No 7/133 of process) and their letter
of 19 October 1998 (No 7/157 of process). In the second of these letters RMJM granted
an extension of time, despite the defenders' failure to operate clause 13.8.
[148] The pursuers argued that there was no evidence to suggest
that they were directly involved in any decisions relating to extension of time
taken by the architect. Consequently the
defenders required to rely on the actings of the architect
as agent of the pursuers. Nevertheless,
the architect had no implied authority to vary or waive the terms of a building
contract. Reference was made to Hudson on Building and Engineering
Contracts, 11th ed, paragraphs 2.058-2.060; to Toepfer v Warinco AG,
[1978] Ll Rep 569, at 577; and to Keating on Building
Contracts, 7th ed, at paragraph 11.10.
The architect had no ability to affect the legal relationship between
the employer and the contractor: Charles Rickards Ltd v Oppenhaim,
[1950] 1 KB 616, at 626 per Denning LJ.
These authorities and textbooks do, I think, establish that an architect
has no power to vary or waive the terms of a building contract in relation to
matters of substance. Thus the passage
cited from Hudson provides a number of examples to illustrate the
general inability of the architect to commit the owner to any change of the building
contract. All of these go to the
substance of the contract, or the substance of claims under the contract; they
do not relate to matters of mere procedure.
It is obvious that the architect should not have authority to vary the
substance of the obligations of the contractor except to the extent that he has
given power to do so by provisions such as clause 13 of the present form of
contract. The contractor's basic function is to provide the works required by
the employer, and the architect's responsibility is to ensure that he does
that. In the administration of a complex
contract, however, it is not uncommon to find that the procedural requirements
of the contract are not followed to the letter.
This is hardly surprising; if matters seem straightforward or if the
practical result that is desired is clear, the niceties of procedure may not
seem important, and there is an obvious temptation to ignore them. In a construction contract most of the
procedural requirements will be matters with which the architect is directly
involved on the employer's behalf.
Consequently the decision to dispense with procedural requirements is
likely to be that of the architect. In
my opinion the architect must have power to dispense with such
requirements. If that were not so, the contractor
could never acquiesce in any procedural shortcuts, however clear the substance
might be, for fear that at some future date the employer would reject what the architect
had done. The result would be that every
detail of procedure would require to the followed to the letter unless the
employer agreed to dispense with it.
That seems to me to fly in the face of common sense; it would, I
suspect, add greatly to the administrative burden of most building
contracts. For this reason I am of
opinion that the architect has power, at least under the JCT Standard Forms, to
waive or otherwise dispense with the procedural requirements of the contract.
[149] Clause
13.8 must in my opinion be construed as imposing procedural requirements,
rather than dealing with matters of substance.
In respect of any extension of time, the substative
provision is clause 25; in respect of prolongation costs and other form of
direct loss and expense, it is clause 26.
Clause 13.8 is clearly conceived against the background of these two
clauses. It applies where in the contractor's
opinion any instruction will either require an adjustment to the Contract Sum
or delay the Completion Date (clause 13.8.1).
In that event, the contractor is directed not to execute the instruction
without first submitting to the architect initial estimates of various matters,
including the likely adjustment to the Contract Sum, the likely extension of
time that will be required and the estimated amount of direct loss and expense
under clause 26. Thereafter the contractor
and the architect may, within five working days, agree the contractor's
estimates; if they fail to do so the architect is given the choice of ordering
compliance with the instruction, in which case the provisions of clauses 25 and
26 apply, or instruct the contractor not to comply with the instruction. Essentially, the however, the clause is
designed to provide a pre-estimate of the cost in time and money of complying
with a proposed instruction. In that way
the cost can be agreed conclusively in advance; failing that the architect may
decide to withdraw the instruction, usually, it may be supposed, because the
cost is too great; or alternatively the architect can proceed with the
instruction regardless, in which case clauses 25 and 26 apply. It follows in my opinion that the function of
the clause is essentially procedural in nature.
There is a facility to agree certain matters, but failing that the
substantive provisions of the contract apply.
[150] One
further aspect of clause 13.8 must be considered; this is the effect of clause
13.8.4 and clause 13.8.5. Clause 13.8.4
authorizes the architect, by notice the contractor, to dispense with "the contractor's
obligation" under clause 13.8.1, in which case clauses 25 and 26
apply. Clause 13.8.5 provides that, if
the contractor fails to comply with clause 13.8.1, he will not be entitled to
any extension of time under clause 25.
There is thus an express power to dispense with the requirements of
clause 13.8.1, and the question arises as to whether this impliedly excludes
waiver of the clause. In some cases an
express power to dispense with a provision might well exclude a right of
waiver. Nevertheless, I think that such
cases are exceptional, and that the norm is that waiver should be available
even when there is an express right of dispensation. My reason for this conclusion is
twofold. First, waiver, like other forms
of personal bar, is based on elementary considerations of justice; these are
well expressed by Dixon J. in a passage cited in paragraph [154] below in
relation to the right of estoppel in the law of Australia.
If one party speaks or acts in such a way as clearly to suggest waiver,
it may be obviously unfair to ignore what he has said or done. Secondly, in practice those involved in
commercial relationships frequently act in an informal manner in their dealings
with each other, no doubt because this enables their business to proceed
quickly and efficiently. If effect is to
be given to the parties' true intentions, objectively construed, these informal
dealings must be recognized, and waiver and other forms of personal bar achieve
this. I accordingly conclude that the architect
had power to waive the requirements of clause 13.8 and to bind the pursuers by
so doing.
[151] In
relation to the gas venting scheme, I am of opinion that the pursuers waived
the requirements of clause 13.8, both through their own actings
at the meeting held on 8 April and through the actings
of RMJM in their approach to the claim intimated on 31 March. The function of clause 13.8 is to ensure
that, if an instruction or variation is issued, the question of delay and any
financial consequences are dealt with immediately. In that way the architect is able to assess
the consequences of the relevant instruction and to decide whether to maintain
the instruction or to revert to the previous position. If an application is made for an extension of
time, however, that flatly contradicts the scheme of the clause. That is in my opinion sufficient to put the architect
on notice that clause 13.8 is not being used.
The same applies to the employer if he becomes aware of the claim for an
extension of time. Failure to invoke
clause 13.8 is of significance, given its contractual importance, especially in
working through the legal and financial consequences of the step that the architect
proposes to take. If the claim is made
for an extension of time, there is in my view a very obvious need to invoke
clause 13.8, if the immunity conferred by that clause is truly to be
invoked. In the present case no attempt
was made to invoke clause 13.8, or indeed to refer to it in any way. In these circumstances, in particular having
regard to the facts set out at paragraphs [146] and [147] above, I am of opinion
that the immunity contained in that clause was waived. In drawing this inference I rely principally
upon the immediate reaction to the defenders' claim, as disclosed at the
meeting held on 8 April. It is clear
from the minutes of that meeting that the claim for an extension of time was
discussed at length. In view of the
apparent importance of clause 13.8, it would be very surprising if no mention
were made of the clause unless either the pursuers or the architect, acting on
their behalf, had decided not to invoke the clause. It is adding significance of both
representatives of the pursuers and representatives of RMJM were present at the
meeting, yet neither mentioned the clause.
[152] One
further requirement of waiver is that the person asserting it must have
conducted his affairs in reliance on the waiver, although there is no need for
him to have acted on it to his prejudice:
Armia Ltd v Daejan
Developments Ltd, supra, per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton
at 69 and per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 72. In the present case I am of opinion that the
defenders did clearly act on the basis of the waiver at the meeting held on 8
April, in that they pursued a claim under clause 25 without any reference to
clause 13.8. No doubt, if clause 13.8
had been applied strictly, the defenders would have been out of time prior to 8
April, but that did not happen. The
defenders continued to pursue claims under clause 25 in relation to both the
gas venting scheme and the various other sources of delay discussed previously,
and that is in my opinion sufficient to satisfy the requirement of conducting
affairs in reliance on the waiver.
[153] For
the pursuers it was submitted that the defenders had led no evidence to suggest
that the architect was even aware of the terms of clause 13.8 when he issued
decisions in relation to applications for extension of time. Waiver of a right cannot be inferred from
circumstances that may be consistent with its retention; moreover, because
waiver involves the abandonment of a right for all time it cannot be based on a
mere oversight. Reference was made to Evans v Argus Healthcare (Glenesk) Ltd, 2001
SCLR 117, at paragraph [11]; to Armia Ltd v Daejan Developments Ltd, supra, at 69 and 71-72; and to
Oak Mall Greenock Ltd v McDonald's
Restaurants Ltd, 9 May 2003.
I agree with the general propositions advanced on this matter. Nevertheless, I do not think that it can be
supposed that the architect was unaware of the terms of clause 13.8. It must generally be presumed that an architect
is aware of the whole of the terms of the building contract under which he is
acting; that seems fundamental to the architect's responsibilities. Moreover, at the meeting held on 8 April
representatives of the pursuers were present.
In these circumstances I consider that an inference of waiver can be
drawn. The result is that the pursuers cannot invoke clause 13.8 as an immunity against a claim for an extension of time under
clause 25.
[154] The defenders also rely on the principle of personal
bar. The classic statement of personal
parties of clause that of LC Birkenhead in Gatty v Maclaine, 1921 SC (HL) 1, at 7:
"Where A
has by his words or conduct justified B in believing that a certain state of
affairs exists, and B has acted upon such belief to his prejudice, A is not
permitted to affirm against B that a different state of fact existed at the
same time".
The rationale of the doctrine of
personal bar is set out by LP Rodger in William
Grant & Sons Ltd v Glen Catrine Ltd, 2001 SC 901; citing Dixon J. in Grundt v Great Boulder Pty Gold Mines Ltd, (39) 59 CLR
641, at 674-675, Lord Rodger said (at 921):
"[T]he
basal purpose of the doctrine of estoppel 'is to
avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel
by compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon which the
former acted or abstained from acting.
This means that the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to
give protection is that which would flow from the change of position if the
assumption were deserted that led to it.
So long as the assumption is adhered to, the party who altered his
situation upon the face of it cannot complain.
His complaint is that when afterwards the other party makes a different
state of affairs the basis of an assertion of right against him then, if it is
allowed, his own original change of position will operate as a detriment. His action or inaction must be such that, if
the assumption upon which he proceeded were shown to be wrong and an inconsistent
state of affairs were accepted as the foundation of the rights and duties of
himself and the opposite party, the consequence would be to make his original
act or failure to act a source of prejudice'".
[155] It
is accordingly necessary for the defenders to establish both a representation,
express or implied, that a certain state of affairs exists and actings on the faith of that representation, to the
prejudice of the person who so acts. In relation to the gas venting
instruction, I think that an implied representation can be inferred from the actings of both the pursuers and RMJM at the meeting held
on 8 April. In this case, however, I am
of opinion that it cannot be said that the defenders acted on such a
representation to their prejudice. What
they did was to pursue a claim under clause 25, without regard to the
implications of clause 13.8. If clause
13.8 had been invoked, however, the defenders would have had no claim under
clause 25 because any such claim was barred by clause 13.8.5. Thus they were not actually prejudiced. No doubt they incurred expense in pursuing
the clause 25 claim, but I do not think that that is sufficient to amount to
prejudice for the purposes of the law of personal bar.
[156] Because
of the view that I have taken on the construction of clause 13.8, it is not
necessary to consider how waiver or personal bar would apply to elements of the
defenders' claim other than the gas venting instruction. In these cases, however, a broadly similar
analysis would apply, subject to one exception.
In relation to personal bar, as against waiver, I think that it could be
said that there was prejudice, in that the defenders repeatedly failed to make
use of the clause 13.8 procedures on the assumption that their claims were
being dealt with under clause 25 alone.
Concurrent delays
[157] I
accordingly conclude that the delay in completion was the result of concurrent
causes. The majority of those were the
result of the late instructions or variations issued by the architect, and are
Relevant Events for the purposes of clause 25; two of those causes, however,
the work on the lifts and the work on the stair balustrading,
were the fault of the defenders or their subcontractors. In my opinion none of the causes of delay can
be regarded as a "dominant" cause; each of them had a significant
effect on the failure to complete timeously.
The pursuers advanced an argument based on the proposition that the
items involving contractor default, the lifts and the stair balustrades, were
the "dominant" cause of the delay, but I am of opinion that this
contention must be rejected. Indeed, the
lateness of the instructions relating to the gas venting scheme and the roof
steelwork had a major effect on the progress of the works, to a substantially
greater degree than the items involving contractor default. Consequently the
case is one of true concurrent causes.
In those circumstances the correct approach is in my opinion that set
out at paragraph [18] above. Clause 25
requires that the architect should exercise his judgment to determine the
extent to which completion has been delayed beyond the Completion Date by
Relevant Events, or non-contractor's risk events. Put another way, that
involves a determination of the aggregate period within which the Works as
ultimately defined should have been completed having regard to the incidence of
Relevant Events. That determination must
be made on a fair and reasonable basis, as required by clause 25. In a case such as the present where there is
true concurrency between Relevant Events and events that involve contractor
default, apportionment will frequently be appropriate. In my opinion this is such a case. Apportionment enables the architect to reach
a fair assessment of the extent to which completion has been delayed by
Relevant Events while at the same time taking into account the effect of other
events which involve contractor default.
Where the decision of the architect is challenged, the court must of
course perform the same exercise.
[158] That leads on to the question of how the exercise of
apportionment is carried out. That
exercise is broadly similar to the apportionment of liability on account of
contributory negligence or contribution among joint wrongdoers. In my opinion two main elements are
important: the degree of culpability involved in each of the causes of the
delay and the significance of each of the factors in causing the delay. In practice culpability is likely to be the
less important of these two factors.
Nevertheless, I think that in appropriate cases it is important to
recognize that the seriousness of the architect's failure to issue instructions
or of the contractor's default may be a relevant consideration. The causative significance of each of the
factors is likely to be more important.
In this respect, two matters appear to me to be potentially
important. The first of these is the
length of the delay caused by each of the causative events; that will usually
be a relatively straightforward factor.
The second is the significance of each of the causative events for the
Works as a whole. Thus an event that
only affects a small part of the building may be of lesser importance than an
event whose effects run throughout the building or which has a significant
effect on other operations. Ultimately,
however, the question is one of judgment.
[159] In the present case the defenders have established eleven
matters that constitute Relevant Events.
These matters, and the extent to which they delayed completion, are as
follows:
1. Gas venting: 18 February (but
concurrent with roof steelwork).
2. Roof steelwork: 1 March.
3. En suite fittings: 25 March.
4. Bedhead lighting: 19 February (or 17
February according to Mr Whitaker).
5. Trouser presses: 13 March.
6. Central atrium beam encasement: 1
March.
7. Fibre optic lighting: 15 March.
8. External mounted floodlights: 31
March.
9. Cooling to refuse room: 12 April.
10. Trees: 19 March.
11. External render: 8 March.
The pursuers have established two
concurrent causes: the installation of the lifts, which delayed completion
until 24 March, and the construction of the stair balustrades, which delayed
completion until 12 April.
[160] The original Completion Date was 25 January
1999. On 4 June 1999 this was extended by Keppie Architects by four weeks, to 22 February. Practical Completion was certified by Keppie as having taken place on 29 March; that occurred
retrospectively on 27 April. What
actually happened on 29 March was that the pursuers took partial possession of
certain parts of the Works, with possession of other parts being taken
subsequently, on 13 and 30 April. Thus construction continued well into April,
and certainly until 12 or 13 April; work on the cooling to the refuse room and
the stair balustrades continued until 12 April.
The defenders claim that they are entitled to an extension of time until
14 April, or 11 weeks in total. The
pursuers claim that the defenders should have no extension, because none of the
items relied on by them was on the critical path and none caused any delay to
completion. I have already rejected the
latter argument. Nevertheless, I consider
that I must make some allowance for the lift installation and the construction
of the stair balustrades, both of which delayed completion. That means that the period of 11 weeks
claimed by the defenders must be reduced.
[161] In considering the extent to which that period should be
reduced, the matters referred to at paragraph [157] must be considered. I do not consider culpability to the a major
factor; nevertheless, the sheer quantity of late instructions following Keppie's appointment is I think significant; so is the fact
that the failure to issue instructions occurred following requests for
information which started (during the course of the Works) on 7 October
1998. So far as the causative significance
of each of the events is concerned, all caused some delay, although the delay
resulting from the gas venting instruction was concurrent with 3 1/2 weeks of
the delay resulting from the late instruction relative to the roof
steelwork. The two items that had the
longest lasting effect were the cooling to the refuse room and the stair
balustrades, both of which concluded on about 12 April. In relation to the causative significance of
each of the events for the Works as a whole, I must I think take account of the
fact that items such as the en suite fittings, the bedhead
lights and the trouser presses affected all of the bedrooms in the hotel. Finally, I must take account of the fact that
the number of Relevant Events is substantially greater than the number of items
for which the defenders are responsible; moreover some of them, notably the gas
venting and roof steelwork instructions, related to important matters that had
significant effects on the overall progress of the Works. Taking all these circumstances into account,
I am of opinion that the part of the total delay apportioned to Relevant Events
should be substantially greater than that apportioned to the two items for
which the defenders are responsible. I
consider that a fair and reasonable result would be that the defenders are
entitled to an extension of time of nine weeks from the original Completion
Date. On that basis I conclude that
completion has been delayed beyond the completion Date by Relevant Events for a
period of nine weeks, or until 29 March 1999.
Prolongation costs
[162] In the counterclaim the defenders' fourth conclusion (as
amended) is for payment of the sum of г27,069.10, inclusive of value added
tax. This is said to represent the costs
incurred by the defenders as a result of the prolongation of the contract works. In the joint minute it is agreed that, to the
extent that the Works were prolonged beyond the original Completion Date, the
defenders incurred loss and/or expense arising from the prolongation of the
works from 25 January 1999 to 14 April
1999 (11
weeks and 2 days) in the sum of г11,518.80 plus value added tax per week. The sum concluded for in fact represents two
weeks' prolongation costs. It is
restricted in that way because the adjudicator awarded prolongation costs for
nine weeks; consequently the counterclaim relates only to the two additional
weeks claimed by the defenders.
[163] The defenders seek to recover their prolongation costs under
clause 26 of the JCT Standard Form.
Clause 26 has two formal requirements.
First, the contractor must have must have made written application to
the architect stating that he has incurred or is likely to incur direct loss
and/or expense in the execution of the Contract because the regular progress of
the Works had been was likely to be materially affected by failure to receive timeous instructions.
Secondly the application must be made as soon as it had become, or
should reasonably have become, apparent that the regular progress of the Works
had been or was likely to be affected.
In my opinion both of these requirements were satisfied in the present
case. The defenders made a series of
written applications to recover direct loss and expense that they alleged had
been caused by prolongation; these are found in Nos
7/137, 7/141, 7/142, 7/144, 7/146, 7/147, 7/149 and 7/150 of process. It appeared that the applications were made
as soon as it became apparent that the Works might be prolonged.
[164] The defenders' claim is based on clause 26.2.1; it is said
that the defenders did not receive necessary instructions in due time. For the reasons discussed above in relation
to the defenders' claim for an extension of time, I am of opinion that the
defenders did not receive instructions in due time in respect of the roof
steelwork and the nine items narrated above where instructions were given
following the replacement of RMJM by Keppie. The reasoning applicable to an extension of
time seems to me to be equally applicable to a claim for direct loss and
expense based on clause 26.2.1. It was
clear in my opinion that the regular progress of the Works was "materially
affected" (clause 26.1) by the instructions that were not received in due
time; that appeared from the evidence that is summarized above in relation to
an extension of time. Mr Cornish
was asked (day 4, 3.48) how satisfied he was that late instructions were
critical to the defenders' completion of the Works. Mr Cornish replied that the late
instructions were "completely critical". He went on to say that he was satisfied that
they affected the regular progress of the Works "in a very profound
way". I thought that these views
were justified by the evidence as a whole.
I accordingly conclude that the requirements of clause 26 are satisfied.
[165] For the pursuers it was submitted that the defenders' claim
for propagation costs should be refused for the same reasons as were advanced
in opposition to their claim for an extension of time. I have granted an
extension of time, and consequently I reject this part of the argument. It was further submitted that, even if the
defenders were entitled to an extension of time to resist liability for
liquidated and ascertained damages, they were not automatically entitled to
prolongation costs for an identical period.
It was submitted in particular that, if a contractor incurs additional
costs that are caused both by an employer delay and by a concurrent contractor
delay, the contractor should only recover compensation to the extent that it
was able to identify the additional costs caused by the employer delay as
against the contractor delay. If the contractor
would have incurred the additional costs in any event as a result of the contractor
delay, he would not be entitled to recover those additional costs.
[166] It is I think correct that a claim for prolongation costs
need not automatically follow success in a claim for extension of time. The wording of clause 26 differs from that of
clause 25, and different considerations may apply. In the present case, however, I am of opinion
that the claim for prolongation costs should follow the result of the claim for
extension of time. In this respect the
decision in John Doyle Construction Ltd v
Laing Management (Scotland) Ltd, supra,
may be relevant. In that case it is
recognized at paragraphs [16]-[18] that in an appropriate case where loss is
caused both by events for which the employer is responsible and events for
which the contractor is responsible it is possible to apportion the loss
between the two causes. In my opinion
that should be done in the present case.
This is a case where delay has been caused by a number of different
causes, most of which were the responsibility of the employer, through the architect,
but two of which were the responsibility of the contractor. It is accordingly necessary to apportion the
defenders' prolongation costs between these two categories of caused. I consider that the same general
considerations, the causative significance of each of the sources of delay and
the degree of culpability in respect of each of those sources, must be balanced. On this basis, I am of opinion that the
result of the exercise should be the same; I am unable to discover any reason
for treating the two exercises under clause 25 and clause 26 on a different
basis. I accordingly conclude that the
defenders are entitled to their prolongation costs for nine weeks. This amount has in fact been paid to them in
consequence of the determination of the adjudicator. Consequently no further sum is due at this
stage.
[167] It will be apparent that I have rejected the pursuers'
argument that, if prolongation costs are caused both by an employer delay and
by a concurrent contractor delay, the contractor will not be entitled to
recover such costs if he would have incurred them as a result of the contractor
delay. That approach seems to be based
on a rigidly logical application of the principles of causation as they apply
in the general law of contract and delict. Under clause 26, however, as with clause 25,
I am of opinion that such an approach is not appropriate; instead, the direct
loss and expense sustained by the contractor should be apportioned between the
events for which the employer is responsible and the events for which the contractor
is responsible.
Conclusion
[168] For the reasons stated above I conclude that the pursuers
are not entitled to declarator that the Completion
Date is 25 January 1999; nor are they entitled to the other
remedies sought in the principal action.
The defenders moved to amend their defences by adding new fourth and
fifth pleas-in-law, dealing with waiver and personal bar respectively. I will grant that motion and allow the
defences to be amended. Thereafter I
will sustain the defenders' second, third and fourth pleas-in-law in the
principal action, the fourth being restricted to the issue of the gas venting
instruction. On that basis I will assoilzie the defenders from the conclusions of the
principal action. In respect of the
counterclaim, I have decided that the defenders are entitled to an extension of
time of nine weeks. In these
circumstances I will sustain the defenders' first plea-in-law and grant a
modified decree in terms of the first conclusion of the counterclaim; decree
will be for declarator that the defenders are
entitled to an extension of time of nine weeks for the completion of the Works
under the contract between the parties, with the Completion Date thereunder accordingly being 29 March 1999. I will sustain the defenders' second and
third pleas-in-law and pronounce decree of reduction of the Certificate of
Notification of Revision to the Completion Date and Certificate of
Non-Completion issued by Keppie Architects on 9 June 1999; that will involve granting decree
in terms of the second and third conclusions of the counterclaim. In view of my decision on prolongation costs,
no further sum is due by the pursuers to the defenders. I will accordingly sustain the pursuers'
second and sixth pleas-in-law in the counterclaim and assoilzie them from the
fourth conclusion of the counterclaim.