QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURT
Court No 7 TECHNOLOGY AND CONSTRUCTION COURTS St Dunstan's House 133-137 Fetter Lane London EC4A 1HD |
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B e f o r e :
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CARILLION CONSTRUCTION LIMITED | Part 7 Claimant/Part 8 Defendant |
-v- | |
DEVONPORT ROYAL DOCKYARD | Part 7 Defendant/ Part 8 Claimant |
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited
190 Fleet Street London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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Crown Copyright ©
Part 1. | Introduction. |
Part 2. | The facts. |
Part 3. | The adjudication. |
Part 4. | The present proceedings. |
Part 5. | The law. |
Part 6. | The first challenge to the adjudicator's decision (target cost and jurisdiction). |
Part 7. | The second challenge to the adjudicator's decision (target cost and natural justice). |
Part 8. | The third challenge to the adjudicator's decision (defects). |
Part 9. | The fourth challenge to the adjudicator's decision (interest). |
Part 10. | Conclusion. |
"(1) A party to a construction contract has the right to refer a dispute arising under the contract for adjudication under a procedure complying with this section.
"For this purpose 'dispute' includes any difference.
"(2) The contract shall --
"(a) Enable a party to give notice at any time of his intention to refer a dispute to adjudication;
"(b) Provide a timetable with the object of securing the appointment of the adjudicator and referral of the dispute to him within seven days of such notice;
"(c) Require the adjudicator to reach a decision within 28 days of referral or such longer period as is agreed by the parties after the dispute has been referred;
"(d) allow the adjudicator to extend the period of 28 days by up to 14 days, with the consent of the party by whom the dispute was referred;
"(e) impose a duty on the adjudicator to act impartially; and
"(f) enable the adjudicator to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law.
"(3) The contract shall provide that the decision of the adjudicator is binding until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to arbitration) or by agreement.
"The parties may agree to accept the decision of the adjudicator as finally determining the dispute.
"(4) The contract shall also provide that the adjudicator is not liable for anything done or omitted in the discharge or purported discharge of his functions as adjudicator unless the act or omission is in bad faith, and that any employee or agent of the adjudicator is similarly protected from liability.
"(5) If the contract does not comply with the requirements of subsections (1) to (4), the adjudication provisions of the Scheme for Construction Contracts apply."
"(1) The minister shall by regulations make a scheme (the Scheme for Construction Contracts) containing provision about the matters referred to in the preceding provisions of this Part ...
"(4) Where any provisions of the Scheme for Construction Contracts apply by virtue of this Part in default of contractual provision agreed by the parties, they have effect as implied terms of the contract concerned."
"1. (1) Any party to a construction contract (the 'referring party') may give written notice (the 'notice of adjudication') of his intention to refer any dispute arising under the contract, to adjudication.
"(2) The notice of adjudication shall be given to every other party to the contract.
"(3) The notice of adjudication shall set out briefly --
"(a) the nature and a brief description of the dispute and the parties involved,
"(b) details of where and when the dispute has arisen,
"(c) the nature of the redress which is sought, and
"(d) the names and addresses of the parties to the contract (including, where appropriate, the addresses which the parties have specified for the giving of notices) ...
"12. The adjudicator shall --
"(a) act impartially in carrying out his duties and shall do so in accordance with any relevant terms of the contract and shall reach his decision in accordance with the applicable law in relation to the contract; and
"(b) avoid incurring unnecessary expense.
"13. The adjudicator may take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law necessary to determining the dispute, and shall decide on the procedure to be followed in the adjudication. In particular he may --
"(a) request any party to the contract to supply him with such documents as he may reasonably require including, if he so directs, any written statement from any party to the contract supporting or supplementing the referral notice and any other documents given under paragraph 7(2),
"(b) decide the language or languages to be used in the adjudication and whether a translation of any document is to be provided and if so by whom,
"(c) meet and question any of the parties to the contract and their representatives,
"(d) subject to obtaining any necessary consent from a party or third parties make such site inspections as he considers appropriate, whether accompanied by the parties or not,
"(e) subject to obtaining any necessary consent from a third party or parties carry out any tests or experiments,
"(f) obtain and consider such representations and submissions as he requires, and, provided he has notified the parties of his intention, appoint experts, assessors or legal advisers,
"(g) give directions as to the timetable for the adjudication, any deadlines, or limits as to the length of written documents or oral representations to be complied with, and,
"(h) issue other directions relating to the conduct of the adjudication.
"14. The parties shall comply with any request or direction of the adjudicator in relation to the adjudication ...
"17. The adjudicator shall consider any relevant information submitted to him by any of the parties to the dispute and shall make available to them any information to be taken into account in reaching his decision ...
"19(1). The adjudicator shall reach his decision not later than --
"(a) 28 days after the date of the referral notice mentioned in paragraph 7(1), or,
"(b) 42 days after the date of the referral notice if the referring party so consents, or,
"(c) such period exceeding 28 days after the referral notice as the parties to the dispute may, after the giving of that notice, agree ...
"20. The adjudicator shall decide the matters in dispute. He may take into account any other matters which the parties to the dispute agree should be within the scope of the adjudication or which are matters under the contract which he considers are necessarily connected with the dispute. In particular, he may --
"(a) open up, revise and review any decision taken or any certificate given by any person referred to in the contract unless the contract states that the decision or certificate is final and conclusive,
"(b) decide that any of the parties to the dispute is liable to make payment under the contract (whether in sterling or some other currency) and, subject to section 111(4) of the Act, when that payment is due and the final date for payment,
"(c) having regard to any term of the contract relating to the payment of interest, decide the circumstances in which, and the rates at which, and the periods for which simple or compound rates of interest shall be paid ...
"22. If requested by one of the parties to the dispute, the adjudicator shall provide reasons for his decision.
"23(1) In his decision, the adjudicator may, if he thinks fit, order any of the parties to comply peremptorily with his decision or any part of it.
"(2) The decision of the adjudicator shall be binding on the parties and they shall comply with it until the dispute is finally determined by legal proceedings, by arbitration (if the contract provides for arbitration or the parties otherwise agree to arbitration) or by agreement between the parties."
"The subcontractor shall forthwith at the request of DML make good at his own cost to the reasonable satisfaction of DML any defects in the subcontract works which appear during the maintenance period."
"If the subcontractor fails to comply with his obligations under this condition DML may do anything reasonably necessary to make good any defects notified to the subcontractor under clause 17(1). Save to the extent that any defects were not caused by the subcontractor's neglect, default or breach or the neglect, default, or breach of a subcontractor of his, all reasonable costs incurred by DML in making good any such defects shall be recoverable from the subcontractor or may be deducted from any monies due or to become due to the subcontractor."
"The status of the parties shall be that of independent companies, and the relationship of the parties shall in no event be construed to be that of principal and agent or master and servant, partnership, association or trust. Each party shall exercise control, management and direction of its activities so that they are carried out for the common good of the Alliance parties and the subcontract works."
"10.1. Target cost.
"For the purposes of this agreement the target cost shall, subject to further adjustment in accordance with clause 13, comprise:
"TCL's cost estimate: £41,065,067.
"Provisional sums: £6,969,500.
"The base cost: £48,034,567.
"TCL's risk contribution: £4,000,000.
"DML's risk contribution: £4,000,000.
"Total contingency: £8,000,000.
"The target cost: £56,034,567.
"TCL's firm fee: £3,165,433.
"Total Alliance cost provision: £59,200,000.
"10.2. Gainshare.
"(a) Underspend of target cost.
"Following satisfactory completion of the subcontract and in the event that the target cost exceeds the final actual cost properly incurred, the parties shall share the unspent difference between the target cost and the final actual cost in the following proportions:
"DML: 30 per cent. TCL: 70 per cent.
"(b) Overspend of target cost.
"In the event that the final actual cost exceeds the target cost, the parties shall share the cost and liability for the overspend above the target cost in the following proportions:
"DML: 60 per cent. TCL: 40 per cent.
"10.3 For the avoidance of doubt, the amount due in final settlement under this agreement shall be:
"(a) For underspend of the target cost
"Final actual cost, plus
"70 per cent of the difference between the actual cost and the target cost plus
"100 per cent of the fee.
"(b) For overspend of the target cost
"Final actual cost, less
"40 per cent of the difference between the actual cost and the target cost, plus
"100 per cent of the fee.
"(a) and (b) above can be expressed as:
"Amount due = A + g(T - A) + F
"Where,
"A = final actual cost
"T = target cost
"F = fee
"g = gainshare, being 70 per cent in underspend and 40 per cent in overspend."
"All works not in accordance with the subcontract."
"1. This amendment to the target cost and the total Alliance cost provision is made 'on account' for the purposes of providing an interim uplift. It is provided on a 'without prejudice basis' and is subject to review arising out of the final agreement reached with the authority and DML and in accordance with this Alliance Agreement."
"Further to your letter reference D154-431-12-104106, dated 12th October, we confirm receipt of your calculation sheet for the 'Carillion Alliance final option'.
"The target cost of £97,717,515 is not agreed for the following reasons:
"1. The Carillion reprice value of £107,255,000 (excluding risk) that you have used is based on a target cost to completion at the end of March 2001.
"2. The amount included for 'Carillion's statistical risk' is £1,931,579 whereas we advised DML on 15th March 2001 of £5,069,940 as per the risk register. The statistical risk using a 70 percentile gives £5,464,000.
"3. We do not accept the pro rata formula as we are not responsible for the cost growth and delays to the project. Since March 2001 we have been tasked to carry out works not anticipated nor included in the March 2001 cost forecast. The combined challenge register of threats, opportunities and variations entered on the challenge register since 2nd April 2001 shows an estimated £9.266 million of extra cost.
"4. On a regular basis since March 2001 we have been notifying you of the likely cost increases to enable you to take full account of them in your discussion with the MoD. (See appendix A attached).
"These cost increases have been caused by instructions from your project manager, variations, scope swaps, continuing design changes and further accelerative measures. The £9.255 million includes for some £3,830,000 of additional work and scope swaps instructed by your project manager alone since March 2001.
"Using the March reprice valuation and adding these costs we arrive at the following target cost.
"Reprice value March 2001: £107.255.
"Less bonus: (1.500).
"Total: £105.755.
"Add Capex: £1.964.
"Add statistical risk: £5.464.
"Total value March 2001 including fee: £113.183.
"Add for changes since March 2001.
"Estimated costs as challenge register.
"April to October 2001: £9.266.
"Less risk register March 2001: (£5.464) £3.802."
Total: £116.983:
"Less fee at 6.2 per cent: (£6.830).
"Target cost: £110.153 (excluding fee and bonus)."
"This amendment to the target cost and the total Alliance cost provision is made 'on account' for the purposes of providing an interim uplift. It is provided on a 'without prejudice' basis and is subject to review arising out of the final agreement reached with the authority and DML, and DML and Carillion in accordance with this Alliance Agreement."
"4. Pursuant to clause 10 of the Alliance Agreement Carillion is entitled following completion to be paid actual cost (as defined) subject to a 70 per cent 'gainshare' or 40 per cent 'painshare' for under or overspend against a target cost. Carillion is further entitled to payment of a fee. Clause 13 of the Alliance Agreement sets out the basis on which adjustments might be made to the target cost and fee. Carillion contends that the parties amended the target cost machinery of the Alliance Agreement and in particular clause 10, such that there was to be a 'review' of the target cost arising out of an expected renegotiation of the terms of the main contract between DML and the MoD.
"Alternatively, Carillion contends that the target cost machinery (as amended) broke down and/or become inoperable such that Carillion is now entitled to be reimbursed actual costs together with a fee. Finally, Carillion contends that the parties agreed Carillion would be paid a bonus of £1,500,000 for completion of Carillion's work sufficient to enable a first submarine to enter 9 Dock by a given date. Carillion contends that it has earned this bonus.
"5. DML has, to date, paid to Carillion the sum of £110 million excluding VAT in respect of the subcontract works carried out by Carillion ...
"7. A dispute has arisen between Carillion and DML as to whether any further sum is due to Carillion in respect of the subcontract works either pursuant to and/or as damages for breach of the Alliance Agreement (as amended by amendments 1 to 6) and/or the subcontract. The dispute and the constituent parts of it have been referred to the Alliance Board on, inter alia, 6th October 2003 and 9th November 2004 and to the Star Chamber on, inter alia, 28th October 2003 and 1st December 2004. The Alliance Board and Star Chamber have failed to resolve the dispute which Carillion now intends to refer to adjudication.
"8. The redress sought by Carillion is a decision that:
"8.1 DML shall pay to Carillion the sum of £10,451,237.61 in respect of further amounts due (excluding bonus) pursuant to the Alliance Agreement (as amended by amendments 1 to 6) and/or the subcontract or such other sum as the adjudicator may determine together with VAT thereon as applicable within seven days of the adjudicator's decision (or within such other period as the adjudicator may decide); alternatively
"8.2. DML shall pay to Carillion the sum of £10,451,237.61 (excluding bonus) as damages for breach of the Alliance Agreement (as amended by amendments 1 to 6) and all the sub-contract or such other sum as the adjudicator may determine together with VAT thereon as applicable within seven days of the adjudicator's decision (or within such other period as the adjudicator may decide); and
"8.3. DML shall pay to Carillion in respect of bonus the sum of £1,500,000 or such other sum as the adjudicator may determine together with VAT thereon as applicable within seven days of the adjudicator's decision (or within such other period as the adjudicator may decide); and
"8.4. DML shall pay to Carillion interest on the above at such rates and for such periods as the adjudicator shall determine or alternatively on the basis that Carillion is entitled to recover interest as part of actual cost ...
"9. Carillion requests reasons for the adjudicator's decision."
"Issue 1: is CCL entitled to be paid an amount in excess of £110 million representing any sums due under the Alliance Agreement as amended, or alternatively by way of damages?
"Issue 2: if so, what is the correct evaluation of any amount due to CCL?
"Issue 3: is CCL entitled to the payment of an amount of £1.5 million representing a bonus?
"Issue 4: is CCL entitled to the payment of a fee and if so what is the evaluation of that fee?"
"Issue 1: CCL is entitled to be paid an amount in excess of £110 million representing sums due under the Alliance Agreement as amended.
"Issue 2: the correct evaluation of the amount due to CCL in excess of £110 million due to the undertaking of the works is £1,167,436 plus any applicable VAT, exclusive of the fee.
"Issue 3: CCL is entitled to the payment of an amount of £1,500,000 representing a bonus.
"Issue 4: CCL is entitled to the payment of a fee in the sum of £6,778,986 plus any applicable VAT."
"Target cost, paragraph 3.4, £113,953,000.
"Actual costs, paragraph 3.10, £112,514,757.
"Gainshare difference (70 per cent of target cost minus actual cost), paragraph 3.1, £1,006,770.
"Less provision for defects, paragraph 3.19, minus £2,354,091.
"Sub-total: £111,167,436.
"Less already paid: £110,000,000.
"Sub-total: £1,167,436.
"Fee, paragraph 5.3, £6,778,986.
"Total sum now due, £7,946,422."
Part 4. The present proceedings
"(1) The decision was made without and/or in excess of jurisdiction; and/or,
"(2) The decision was made on an intrinsically unfair basis and/or in breach of the rules of natural justice; and/or,
"(3) The decision is not compliant with the requirements of the Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 and the Scheme for Construction Contracts Regulations 1998."
1. The adjudicator's decision on target cost (as explained by Mr Dennys in oral argument) was a decision which was outside his jurisdiction and therefore should not be enforced.
2. The adjudicator's decision on target cost was reached in breach of the rules of natural justice and therefore should not be enforced.
3. The adjudicator's decision on allowance for defects was reached in breach of the rules of natural justice and not supported by any or any adequate reasons; therefore it should not be enforced.
4. The adjudicator had no jurisdiction to award interest.
"The intention of Parliament in enacting the Act was plain. It was to introduce a speedy mechanism for settling disputes in construction contracts on a provisional interim basis, and requiring the decisions of adjudicators to be enforced pending final determination of disputes by arbitration, litigation or agreement: see section 108(3) of the Act and paragraph 23.2 of Part 1 of the Scheme. The timetable for adjudications is very tight (see section 108 of the Act). Many would say unreasonably tight, and likely to result in injustice. Parliament must be taken to have been aware of this. So far as procedure is concerned, the adjudicator is given a fairly free hand. It is true (but hardly surprising) that he is required to act impartially (section 108(2)(e) of the Act and paragraph 12(a) of Part 1 of the Scheme). He is, however, permitted to take the initiative in ascertaining the facts and the law (section 108(2(f) of the Act and paragraph 13 of Part 1 of the Scheme). He may, therefore, conduct an entirely inquisitorial process, or he may, as in the present case, invite representations from the parties. It is clear that Parliament intended that the adjudication should be conducted in a manner which those familiar with the grinding detail of the traditional approach to the resolution of construction disputes apparently find difficult to accept. But Parliament has not abolished arbitration and litigation of construction disputes. It has merely introduced an intervening provisional stage in the dispute resolution process. Crucially, it has made it clear that decisions of adjudicators are binding and are to be complied with until the dispute is finally resolved."
"The present case shows how easy it is to mount a challenge on an alleged breach of natural justice. I formed the strong provisional view that the challenge is hopeless. But the fact is that the challenge has been made and a dispute therefore exists between the parties in relation to it. Thus on Mr Furst's argument, the party who is unsuccessful before the adjudicator has to do more than assert a breach of the rules of natural justice, or allege that the adjudicator acted partially, and he will be able to say that there has been no 'decision'.
"At first sight, it is difficult to see why a decision purportedly made by an adjudicator on the dispute that has been referred to him should not be a binding decision within the meaning of section 108(3) of the Act, paragraph 23(1) of the Scheme and clause 27 of the contract. If it had been intended to qualify the word 'decision' in some way, then this could have been done. Why not give the word its plain and ordinary meaning? I confess that I can think of no good reason for not so doing, and none was suggested to me in argument. If his decision on the issue referred to him is wrong, whether because he erred on the facts or the law, or because in reaching his decision he made a procedural error which invalidates the decision, it is still a decision on the issue. Different considerations may well apply if he purports to decide a dispute which was not referred to him at all."
"Here, Mr Gard answered exactly the questions put to him. What went wrong was that in making the calculations to answer the question of whether the payments so far made under the subcontract represented an overpayment or an underpayment, he overlooked the fact that that assessment should be based on the contract sum presently due for payment, that is the contract sum less the retention, rather than on the gross contract sum. That was an error, but an error made when he was acting within his jurisdiction. Provided that the adjudicator acts within that jurisdiction his award stands and is enforceable.
"15. Bouygues contended that such an outcome was plainly unjust in a case where it was agreed that a mistake had been made, and particularly in a case, such as the present, where Dahl-Jensen was in insolvent liquidation, and therefore the eventual adjustment of the balance by way of arbitration will in practical terms be unenforceable on Bouygues's part. I respectfully consider that the judge was quite right when he pointed out that the possibility of such an outcome was inherent in the exceptional and summary procedure provided by the 1996 Act and the CIC adjudication procedure."
"27. The first question raised by this appeal is whether the adjudicator's determination in the present case is binding on the parties -- subject always to the limitation contained in section 108(3) and in paragraphs 4 and 31 of the Model Adjudication Procedure to which I have referred. The answer to that question turns on whether the adjudicator confined himself to a determination of the issues that were put before him by the parties. If he did so, then the parties are bound by his determination, notwithstanding that he may have fallen into error. As Mr Justice Knox put it in Nikko Hotels (UK) Limited v MEPC plc [1991] 2EGLR 103 at 108, in the passage cited by Lord Justice Buxton, if the adjudicator has answered the right question in the wrong way, his decision will be binding. If he has answered the wrong question, his decision will be a nullity.
"28. I am satisfied, for the reasons given by Lord Justice Buxton, that in the present case the adjudicator did confine himself to the determination of the issues put to him. This is not a case in which he can be said to have answered the wrong question. He answered the right question. But, as is accepted by both parties, he answered that question in the wrong way. That being so, notwithstanding that he appears to have made an error that is manifest on the face of his calculations, it is accepted that, subject to the limitation to which I have already referred, his determination is binding upon the parties."
"'It is accepted that the adjudicator has to conduct the proceedings in accordance with the rules of natural justice or as fairly as the limitations imposed by Parliament permit ...'"
"So the parties have entered into a compulsory agreement that the decision of the adjudicator is binding until the dispute is 'finally determined' by legal proceedings et cetera. Although I have heard a trial of an action, I have not 'finally determined' the dispute that was before the adjudicator. This action is brought only to enforce the decision of the adjudicator and there has been no examination of the merits of what lay behind that decision. On the face of the 1996 Act and the Scheme, therefore the decision is still binding on the parties. However, just as the court will decline to enforce contracts tainted by illegality, so I do not think it right that the court should enforce a decision reached after substantial breach of the rules of natural justice. I stress that an unsuccessful party in a case of this sort must do more than merely assert a breach of the rules of natural justice to defeat the claim. Any breach proved must be substantial and relevant."
"24. In Northern Developments (Cumbria) Limited v J&J Nichols, His Honour Judge Bowsher QC cited with approval the following formulation of principles stated by His Honour Judge Thornton QC Sherwood v Casson:
"(i) A decision of an adjudicator whose validity is challenged as to its factual or legal conclusions or as to procedural error remains a decision that is both enforceable and should be enforced;
"(ii) A decision that is erroneous, even if the error is disclosed by the reasons, will still not ordinarily be capable of being challenged and should, ordinarily, still be enforced;
"(iii) A decision may be challenged on the ground that the adjudicator was not empowered by the Act to make the decision, because there was no underlying construction contract between the parties or because he had gone outside his terms of reference.
"(iv) The adjudication is intended to be a speedy process in which mistakes will inevitably occur. Thus, the Court should guide against characterising a mistaken answer to an issue, which is within an adjudicator's jurisdiction, as being an excess of jurisdiction.
"(v) An issue as to whether a construction contract ever came into existence, which is one challenging the jurisdiction of the adjudicator, so long as it is reasonably and clearly raised, must be determined by the Court on the balance of probabilities with, if necessary, oral and documentary evidence.
"25. I respectfully agree with this formulation. I would also add, as I have already pointed out, the provisional nature of the adjudication, which, though enforceable at the time can be reopened on the final determination.
"26. Errors of procedure, fact or law are not sufficient to prevent enforcement of an adjudicator's decision by summary judgment. The case of Bouygues (UK) Limited v Dahl-Jensen (UK) Limited [2000] BLR 522 is a striking example of this. The adjudicator had made an obvious and fundamental error, accepted by both sides to be such, which resulted in a balance being owed to the contractor, whereas in truth it had been overpaid. The Court of Appeal held that the adjudicator had not exceeded his jurisdiction, he had merely given a wrong answer to the question which was referred to him. And, were it not for the special circumstances that the claimant in that case was in liquidation, so that there could be no fair assessment on the final determination between the parties, summary judgment without a stay of execution would have been ordered ...
"29. But the adjudicator's jurisdiction is determined by and derives from the dispute that is referred to him. If he determines matters over and beyond the dispute he has no jurisdiction. But the scope of the dispute was agreed, namely as to the Employer's obligation to make payment and the Contractor's entitlement to receive payment following receipt by the Employer of the Contractor's applications for interim payment, numbers 4, 5 and 6 (see paragraph 12 above). In order to determine this dispute the adjudicator had to resolve as a matter of law whether clauses 30.3.3-6 applied or not, and if they did, what was the effect of failure to serve a timeous notice by the Employer. Even if he was wrong on both these points, that did not affect his jurisdiction.
"30. It is important that the enforcement of an adjudicator's decision by summary judgment should not be prevented by arguments that the adjudicator has made errors of law in reaching his decision, unless the adjudicator has purported to decide matters that are not referred to him. He must decide as a matter of construction of the referral, and therefore as a matter of law, what the dispute is that he has to decide. If he erroneously decides that the dispute referred to him is wider than it is, then, insofar as he has exceeded his jurisdiction, his decision cannot be enforced. But in the present case there was entire agreement as to the scope of the dispute, and the adjudicator's decision, albeit he may have made errors of law as to the relevant contractual provisions, it is still binding and enforceable until the matter is corrected in the final determination."
"The case of Bouygues is a good illustration of the scheme put into practice. The adjudicator had made what was acknowledged to be an obvious and fundamental error which resulted in the contractor recovering monies from the building owner whereas in truth the contractor had been overpaid. The Court of Appeal held that since the adjudicator had not exceeded his jurisdiction but had simply arrived at an erroneous conclusion, the provisional award should stand."
"A number of first instance decisions in the Technology and Construction Court have striven to implement the policy of Parliament. Enforcement proceedings, as they are called, are brought using the CPR part 8 procedure and habitually there is a claim to summary judgment. Judges of the Technology and Construction Court have rightly been astute to examine technical defences to such applications with a degree of scepticism consonant with the policy of the 1996 Act, aptly described by Lord Justice Ward in RJT Consulting Engineers Limited v DM Engineering (Northern Ireland) Limited [2002] EWCA Civ 270, (2002) 83 Con LR 99, [2002] 1 WLR 2344 as 'pay now, argue later'. There has been a number of appeals to this court. I understand anecdotally that this Court may be regarded as less than entirely supportive of the policy of the 1996 Act. There certainly are cases in which this Court has upheld challenges to the enforceability of decisions of adjudicators, but examination of the cases shows that this has occurred when legal principle has to prevail over broad-brush policy, as was the case in the Gilbert-Ash case."
"31. In my opinion, a challenge to the intelligibility of stated reasons can succeed only if the reasons are so incoherent that it is impossible for the reasonable reader to make sense of them. In such a case, the decision is not supported by any reasons at all and on that account is invalid (Save Britain's Heritage v No 1 Poultry Limited, supra). In my view, that cannot be said in this case. The adjudicator has understood what questions he had to answer. He has reached certain conclusions in law on those questions which, however erroneous, are at least comprehensible. Even if the question is one of the adequacy of the reasons, I am of the opinion that the reasons are sufficient to show that the adjudicator has dealt with the issues remitted to him and to show what his conclusions are on each (Save Britain's Heritage v No 1 Poultry Limited, supra, at page 167)."
"14. The common law rules of natural justice or procedural fairness are two-fold. First, the person affected has the right to prior notice and an effective opportunity to make representations before a decision is made. Secondly, the person affected has the right to an unbiased tribunal. These two requirements are conceptually distinct. It is quite possible to have a decision from an unbiased tribunal which is unfair because the losing party was denied an effective opportunity of making representations. Conversely, it is possible for a tribunal to allow the leading party an effective opportunity to make representations, but be biased. In either event, the decision will be in breach of natural justice, and be liable to be quashed if susceptible to judicial review, or (in the world of private law) to be held to be invalid and unenforceable ...
"22. It is easy enough to make challenges of breach of natural justice against an adjudicator. The purpose of the scheme of the 1996 Act is now well known. It is to provide a speedy mechanism for settling disputes in construction contracts on a provisional interim basis, and requiring the decisions of adjudicators to be enforced pending final determination of disputes by arbitration, litigation, or agreement. The intention of Parliament to achieve this purpose will be undermined if allegations of breach of natural justice are not examined critically when they are raised by parties who are seeking to avoid complying with adjudicators' decisions. It is only where the defendant has advanced a properly arguable objection based on apparent bias that he should be permitted to resist summary enforcement of the adjudicator's award on that ground ...
"41. A more fundamental question was raised as to whether adjudicators are in any event obliged to give parties the opportunity to make representations in relation to questions of jurisdiction. I respectfully disagree with the judge's view that the requirements of natural justice apply without distinction, whether the issue being considered by the adjudicator is his own jurisdiction or the merits of the dispute that has been referred to him for decision. The reason for the common law right to prior notice and an effective opportunity to make representations is to protect parties from the risk of decisions being reached unfairly. But it is only directed at decisions which can affect parties' rights. Procedural fairness does not require that parties should have the right to make representations in relation to decisions which do not affect their rights, still less in relation to 'decisions' which are nullities and which cannot affect their rights. Since the 'decision' of an adjudicator as to his jurisdiction is of no legal effect and cannot affect the rights of the parties, it is difficult to see the logical justification for a rule of law that an adjudicator can only make such a 'decision' after giving the parties an opportunity to make representations."
1. The adjudication procedure does not involve the final determination of anybody's rights (unless all the parties so wish).
2. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly emphasised that adjudicators' decisions must be enforced, even if they result from errors of procedure, fact or law: see Bouygues, C&B Scene and Levolux;
3. Where an adjudicator has acted in excess of his jurisdiction or in serious breach of the rules of natural justice, the court will not enforce his decision: see Discain, Balfour Beatty and Pegram Shopfitters.
4. Judges must be astute to examine technical defences with a degree of scepticism consonant with the policy of the 1996 Act. Errors of law, fact or procedure by an adjudicator must be examined critically before the Court accepts that such errors constitute excess of jurisdiction or serious breaches of the rules of natural justice: see Pegram Shopfitters and Amec.
1. If an adjudicator declines to consider evidence which, on his analysis of the facts or the law, is irrelevant, that is neither (a) a breach of the rules of natural justice nor (b) a failure to consider relevant material which undermines his decision on Wednesbury grounds or for breach of paragraph 17 of the Scheme. If the adjudicator's analysis of the facts or the law was erroneous, it may follow that he ought to have considered the evidence in question. The possibility of such error is inherent in the adjudication system. It is not a ground for refusing to enforce the adjudicator's decision. I reach this conclusion on the basis of the Court of Appeal decisions mentioned earlier. This conclusion is also supported by the reasoning of Mr Justice Steyn in the context of arbitration in Bill Biakh v Hyundai Corporation [1988] 1 Lloyds Reports 187.
2. On a careful reading of His Honour Judge Thornton's judgment in Buxton Building Contractors Limited v Governors of Durand Primary School [2004] 1 BLR 474, I do not think that this judgment is inconsistent with proposition 1. If, however, Mr Furst is right and if Buxton is inconsistent with proposition 1, then I consider that Buxton was wrongly decided and I decline to follow it.
3. It is often not practicable for an adjudicator to put to the parties his provisional conclusions for comment. Very often those provisional conclusions will represent some intermediate position, for which neither party was contending. It will only be in an exceptional case such as Balfour Beatty v the London Borough of Lambeth that an adjudicator's failure to put his provisional conclusions to the parties will constitute such a serious breach of the rules of natural justice that the Court will decline to enforce his decision.
4. During argument, my attention has been drawn to certain decisions on the duty to give reasons in a planning context. See in particular Save Britain's Heritage v No 1 Poultry Limited, [1991] 1 WLR 153 and South Bucks DC and another v Porter (No 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953. In my view, the principles stated in these cases are only of limited relevance to adjudicators' decisions. I reach this conclusion for three reasons:
(a) Adjudicators' decisions do not finally determine the rights of the parties (unless all parties so wish).
(b) If reasons are given and they prove to be erroneous, that does not generally enable the adjudicator's decision to be challenged.
(c) Adjudicators often are not required to give reasons at all.
5. If an adjudicator is requested to give reasons pursuant to paragraph 22 of the Scheme, in my view a brief statement of those reasons will suffice. The reasons should be sufficient to show that the adjudicator has dealt with the issues remitted to him and what his conclusions are on those issues. It will only be in extreme circumstances, such as those described by Lord Justice Clerk in Gillies Ramsay, that the court will decline to enforce an otherwise valid adjudicator's decision because of the inadequacy of the reasons given. The complainant would need to show that the reasons were absent or unintelligible and that, as a result, he had suffered substantial prejudice.
Part 6. The first challenge to the adjudicator's decision (target cost and jurisdiction)
"3.3. My consideration of the target cost concerns the dispute raised by CCL in relation to its revised valuation of the target cost as noted in its letter to DML dated 30th October 2001. I have been provided with an alternative calculation of target cost by DML after allowances for provisional sums and scope swaps. However as the dispute in this case concerns CCL's estimation of the cost I shall not consider the alternative calculation. I have read and taken into consideration the various witness statements and the detailed quantum observations of Mr Ennis with respect to the target costs and conclude that I prefer the position of CCL. It appears to me that the considerations of the parties relating to the target cost were discussed at great length during 2001 and the calculations of CCL were ultimately submitted in October 2001 as a result of those discussions. The valuation takes into account revisions and changes to the risk register and challenge register and make revised calculations due to cost.
"3.4. I therefore decide that the revised target cost is £113,953,000."
1. The adjudicator was required to determine the primary sum due to Carillion under the Alliance Agreement. This determination inevitably involved along the way making an assessment of the target cost. All this was spelt out in the notice of adjudication dated 4th January 2005.
2. In its notice of referral dated 6th January 2005, Carillion specifically asked the adjudicator to assess target costs in the sum of £113,953,000, as set out in Carillion's letter dated 30th October 2001. DML responded to this claim in its various written submissions to the adjudicator.
3. It is quite true that Carillion subsequently put forward an argument (based on recently disclosed documents concerning the settlement with MoD) that target costs should be £110 million. See paragraph 1.11 of Carillion's reply dated 28th January and section 11 of Carillion's summary dated 2nd March. Nevertheless, Carillion made it clear that it was not abandoning its original case on target cost. See Pinsent Masons' letter to the adjudicator dated 17th February 2005, which was copied to Herbert Smith. DML understood that this was the position, as can be seen from its rejoinder.
4. The method by which the adjudicator should determine target cost was a matter of controversy between the parties and ultimately for decision by the adjudicator. Both parties provided to the adjudicator voluminous factual and expert evidence to assist him in determining target cost by whichever route he chose to adopt. See, for example, the evidence of Mr Duckworth and Mr Ennis's comments on that evidence.
5. The adjudicator rejected Carillion's argument that a target cost of £110 million could somehow be derived from the documents disclosed concerning the settlement with MoD. In those circumstances, as Mr Dennys has argued, the adjudicator was quite entitled, if he saw fit, to assess target costs at £113.953 million in accordance with Carillion's letter dated 30th October 2001.
6. The adjudicator's assessment of target cost is highly likely to be revised either upwards or downwards, if and when an arbitrator or this court comes to determine the matters in issue between the parties. The adjudicator's approach to or assessment of target cost may well embody errors of both fact and law. This would be unsurprising in view of the statutory constraints under which he was operating and the sheer volume of evidence and intricate submissions which were thrust upon him. Nevertheless, any such errors of law and fact cannot be characterised as excess of jurisdiction.
Part 7. The second challenge to the adjudicator's decision (target cost and natural justice)
"Although the parties have made submissions to me relating to the detail of the discussions between the authority and DML which were concluded during late 2001, as they do not appear to me to have been undertaken under this agreement, I cannot and therefore do not intend here to enter into the merits or otherwise of their outcome if any, which may affect the issues referred."
"(a) CCL's failure to identify the factual and legal basis of its claim meant that its claim should fail ...
"(b) DML was not obliged to put forward the letter of 30th October 2001 to MoD, nor was it in a position to do so ...
"(c) DML did not secure payment in the sum set out in the letter from MoD ...
"(d) Even if DML were obliged to put forward the letter of 30th October, CCL's remedy would be the loss of the chance to fix a target cost based on those figures ...
"(e) There was no obligation on DML to make disclosure of the DML -- MoD negotiation documents."
Part 8. The third challenge to the adjudicator's decision (defects)
1. The Adjudicator focussed on DML's original defects claim of November 2004. He did not address the expanded defects claims of January and February 2005, despite the fact that these had been prepared after further and fuller investigation.
2. The adjudicator applied a reduction factor of 20 per cent to DML's original defects claim: "... in an attempt to more accurately reflect the regular and routine nature of the intended works and their actual cost." See paragraph 3.19 of the adjudicator's reasons. The adjudicator took this course without giving either party the opportunity to comment on his proposed reduction.
3. The adjudicator gave no, or no adequate, reasons for his decision in respect of defects.
Part 9. The fourth challenge to the adjudicator's decision (interest)
"No sum is due and owing to CCL. Therefore the question of interest does not arise."
1. As a matter of impression, this seems to me to be the more natural meaning of subparagraph (c), when read in the context of the whole of paragraph 20 of the Scheme.
2. In my view it is reading too much into the second and third sentences of paragraph 20 to hold that everything in subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c) must arise from some other express term of the contract.
3. It makes obvious commercial sense for an adjudicator to have the power to award interest. The Scheme takes effect as a set of implied terms in many construction contracts pursuant to section 114(4) of the 1996 Act. I would certainly expect the Scheme to include a power to award interest.
4. In my view, the phrase in paragraph 20(c) "having regard to any term of the contract relating to the payment of interest ..." means that if there is any such term, the adjudicator must have regard to it. In other words, the freestanding right conferred by paragraph 20(c) does not override any express term of the contract dealing with interest.
5. If paragraph 20(c) had the meaning for which Mr Furst contends, it would be unnecessary. The clause would be saying that which was self-evident.