England and Wales High Court (Queen's Bench Division) Decisions

The Defendant’s applications

(i)                  set aside the Claim Form on the ground that this court has no jurisdiction to hear the claim; alternatively,

(ii)                stay these proceedings on the ground that the courts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, more specifically, the Banking Disputes Committee (also known as the Committee for the Settlement of Banking Disputes or SAMA Committee) is clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum to determine the claim; and,

(iii)              discharge and set aside the WWFO.

The Claimant’s application

Factual Evidence

Foreign Law Evidence

Factual Background

DMT

The 2012 Commodity Agreement

“The other Clauses of the Agreement, not subject to this Amendment shall remain unchanged”

The 2012 Letters of Credit Agreement

The Personal Guarantee

The Cross Guarantee

The Promissory Note

No charge on Mr Aldwood’s property

Expiry of the 2012 Facilities in 2015

Events in 2016

First Letter of Demand

“In the case of failure to settle the current outstanding, the Bank will have no choice but to take all legal measures available to it including, but not limited to listing of the name of the Borrower as well as the guarantors to the list of defaulters (blacklist) in the Saudi Credit Bureau and to file a claim lawsuit before Committee for Settlement of Banking Disputes and/or any other judicial body”

19 May 2016 meeting

Second Letter of Demand

The first enforcement action in KSA

Application for extension of repayment obligation

“With reference to the sums due, we inform you that in view of the economic circumstances and the conditions with regard to collection generally, we will not be able to pay the sums due in full. We hope you will be able to agree to the scheduling of the entirety of the facilities over a period of 60 months…”

Internal Memo of 17 August 2016

“There is no-one with power to answer customer queries and/or allay bank concerns. Client representative Ahmad Allafouza is still attending our calls. However, he is not a decision maker.

According to information available, the owner, Badr [i.e. Mr Aldwood] was in London  since the past few days and was neither returning calls nor responding to messages…

The personnel mentioned that Badr [i.e. Mr Aldwood] has two palaces in Riyadh amounting to SAR250-300 along with other villas and apartment he supposedly owns. Although he has assets overseas , the extent of his wealth outside the country is not known. A total of two banks have already filed the case against the customer in the enforcement court. ANB has filed its case with SAMA. …

Attendants of the meeting mentioned that the total exposure of the three banks namely ANB, GIB, SABB, SHB amounted to a total of SAR450 million+ ,with SHB at the highest level (SAR 180MM+).

The second enforcement action in the KSA

Instruction of Enyo

2018

2019

I. The challenge to the court’s jurisdiction

First : the Court should declare that it has no jurisdiction because the Personal Guarantee contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the courts of KSA;

Secondly: this Court should not exercise jurisdiction to hear the claim under the Personal Guarantee because the KSA courts are clearly and distinctly the more appropriate forum.

“(1) Where plaintiffs sue in England in breach of an agreement to refer disputes to a foreign court, and the defendants apply for a stay, the English court, assuming the claim to be otherwise within its jurisdiction, is not bound to grant a stay but has a discretion whether to do so or not.

(2) The discretion should be exercised by granting a stay unless strong cause for not doing so is shown.

(3) The burden of proving such strong cause is on the plaintiffs. (4) In exercising its discretion the court should take into account all the circumstances of the particular case.

 The following matters, where they arise, may properly be regarded: (a) in what country the evidence on the issues of fact is situated, or more readily available, and the effect of that on the relative convenience and expense of trial as between the English and foreign courts. (b) Whether the law of the foreign court applies, and if so, whether it differs from English law in any material respects. (c) With what country either party is connected, and how closely. (d) Whether the defendants genuinely desire trial in the foreign country, or are only seeking procedural advantages. (e) Whether the plaintiffs would be prejudiced by having to sue in the foreign court because they would (i) be deprived of security for their claim; (ii) be unable to enforce any judgment obtained; (iii) be faced with a timebar not applicable in England; or (iv) for political, racial, religious or other reasons unlikely to get a fair trial.”

“Reflexive application is a term of art in the field of conflicts of law, allowing the court to apply by analogy provisions of European law by treating non-member states as they were member states...The court’s vehicle for analogous application is via a purposive use of its discretion to stay proceedings under the CPR” [65]

The Bank’s submissions in response

a.        The Regulation is based on the fundamental principle set out in Article 4(1) that jurisdiction is to be based on the defendant’s domicile. This general rule is for the benefit of both claimants and defendants. It promotes certainty and predictability.

b.       On its true construction the only permitted exceptions to jurisdiction based on Article 4(1) are those to be found in the Recast Regulation itself. This promotes certainty, predictability and uniformity of outcome across the courts of Member States.

a.        If an application for a stay on El Amria grounds may be made in respect of a claim for which the court has jurisdiction under Article 4(1) of the Brussels Recast Regulation, no stay should be granted in this case because clause 16 in the Personal Guarantee is not an exclusive jurisdiction clause but an asymmetrical jurisdiction clause which permits these proceeding to be brought here.

b.       Therefore Mr Aldwood is not entitled to a stay in any event.

The Bank’s first submission

“The Regulation is the latest incarnation of a legislative text designed and drafted by civil lawyers trained in the continental legal tradition, and subject to authoritative interpretation by judges who are almost all civilian lawyers. It was made and has to be understood, to be interpreted according to European canons of construction, at least if it is to be understood in a way which will confirm to the views of the European Court.

“[A]ttention to the general principles underpinning the Regulation, as the European Court has declared them … is the proper first step in the interpretation of any individual provision. Where they point in different directions, an argument which is well founded by reference to the purpose of the Regulation as a whole has the greatest prospect of being found to be correct.”

The applicable principles

“The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile.”

 “There must be a connection between proceedings to which this Regulation applies and the territory of the Member States. Accordingly common rules of jurisdiction should in principle apply when the defendant is domiciled in a Member State”.

 “A defendant not domiciled in a Member State should in general be subject to the national rules of jurisdiction applicable in the territory of the Member State of the court seised. ”

Articles 4 and 6

Article 4

1.    Subject to this Regulation, persons domiciled in a Member State shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that Member State.

2.   Persons who are not nationals of the Member State in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that Member State.

Article 6

1.   If the defendant is not domiciled in a Member State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Member State shall, subject to Article 18(1), Article 21(2) and Articles 24 and 25, be determined by the law of that Member State.

2.   As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a Member State may, whatever his nationality, avail himself in that Member State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular those of which the Member States are to notify the Commission pursuant to point (a) of Article 76(1), in the same way as nationals of that Member State.

Article 25

“The autonomy of the parties to a contract, other than an insurance, consumer or employment contract, where only limited autonomy to determine the courts having jurisdiction is allowed, should be respected subject to the exclusive grounds of jurisdiction laid down in this Regulation”

a.        To be effective any agreement must satisfy certain formal requirements;

b.       Only agreements stipulating that courts located within the EU benefit from protection by mandatory stay;

c.        A jurisdiction agreement may not override certain categories of exclusive jurisdiction; and

d.       Any agreement which is contrary to Articles 15, 19 and 23 (which contain special rules for consumer contracts, insurance and employment contracts) will have no legal force.

Articles 33 and 34

Article 33

1.   Where jurisdiction is based on Article 4 or on Articles 7, 8 or 9 and proceedings are pending before a court of a third State at the time when a court in a Member State is seised of an action involving the same cause of action and between the same parties as the proceedings in the court of the third State, the court of the Member State may stay the proceedings if:

2.   The court of the Member State may continue the proceedings at any time if:

3.   The court of the Member State shall dismiss the proceedings if the proceedings in the court of the third State are concluded and have resulted in a judgment capable of recognition and, where applicable, of enforcement in that Member State.

4.   The court of the Member State shall apply this Article on the application of one of the parties or, where possible under national law, of its own motion.

Article 34

1.   Where jurisdiction is based on Article 4 or on Articles 7, 8 or 9 and an action is pending before a court of a third State at the time when a court in a Member State is seised of an action which is related to the action in the court of the third State, the court of the Member State may stay the proceedings if:

2.   The court of the Member State may continue the proceedings at any time if:

3.   The court of the Member State may dismiss the proceedings if the proceedings in the court of the third State are concluded and have resulted in a judgment capable of recognition and, where applicable, of enforcement in that Member State.

4.   The court of the Member State shall apply this Article on the application of one of the parties or, where possible under national law, of its own motion.

“When taking into account the proper administration of justice, the court of the Member State concerned should assess all the circumstances of the case before it . Such circumstances may include connections between the facts of the case and the parties and the third State concerned, the stage to which the proceedings in the third State have progressed by the time proceedings are initiated in the court of the Member State and whether or not the court of the third State can be expected to give a judgment within a reasonable time.

That assessment may also include consideration of the question whether the court of the third State has exclusive jurisdiction in the particular case in circumstances where a court of a Member State would have exclusive jurisdiction .”  (my emphasis)

a.        In order to be able to rely on a jurisdiction clause in favour of non-Member State to support a stay under Article 33 the party in question must have actually commenced proceedings in that state; and

b.       There is no presumption in favour of a stay.

The case law

“ The present case is concerned with the doctrine of forum conveniens, when applied as between a member state and a non-member state. But it might just as easily have been concerned with the doctrine of lis alibi pendens, or “prorogation of jurisdiction”, or the rule that disputes concerned with rights in rem over immovable property should be heard in the state where the property is situated, or any of the other situations for which the Brussels Convention provides discretionary or mandatory exceptions (in Sections 2 to 6 of Title 2 of the Convention).” [45]

Q1 Is it inconsistent with the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments 1968, where a claimant contends that jurisdiction is founded on Article 2, for a court of a Contracting State to exercise a discretionary power, available under its national law , to decline to hear proceedings brought against a person domiciled in that State in favour of the courts of a non-Contracting State:

(a) if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State under the 1968 Convention is in issue;

(b) if the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State?

Q2 If the answer to question 1(a) or (b) is yes, is it inconsistent in all circumstances or only in some and if so which?

(Emphassis added)

The ECJ’s answer

“Article 2 of the Brussels Convention applies to circumstances such as those in the main proceedings, involving relationships between the courts of a single Contracting State and those of a non-Contracting State rather than relationships between the courts of a number of Contracting States” [35]

“It must be observed, first, that Article 2 of the Brussels Convention is mandatory in nature and that, according to its terms, there can be no derogation from the principle it lays down except in the cases expressly provided for by the Convention ” [37]

Application of the forum non conveniens doctrine, which allows the court seised a wide discretion as regards the question whether a foreign court would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of an action, is liable to undermine the predictability of the rules of jurisdiction laid down by the Brussels Convention, in particular that of Article 2, and consequently to undermine the principle of legal certainty, which is the basis of the Convention [41]

[A]llowing forum non conveniens in the context of the Brussels Convention would be likely to affect the uniform application of the rules of jurisdiction contained therein in so far as that doctrine is recognised only in a limited number of Contracting States, whereas the objective of the Brussels Convention is precisely to lay down common rules to the exclusion of derogating national rules [43]”

“precludes a court of a Contracting State from declining the jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that convention on the ground that a court of a non-Contracting State would be a more appropriate forum for the trial of the action even if the jurisdiction of no other Contracting State is in issue or the proceedings have no connecting factors to any other Contracting State”

[29] The starting point is the need to recognise that, following Owusu v Jackson , what is now article 4.1 lays down the primary rule regulating the jurisdiction of each member state to entertain claims against persons domiciled in that state. The Recast Brussels Regulation itself (like its predecessors) contains a number of express provisions which derogate from that primary rule. As exceptions to it, they are all to be narrowly construed. If, therefore, the Recast Brussels Regulation also contains (as it probably does) an implied exception from the otherwise automatic and mandatory effect of article 4, based upon abuse of EU law, then that is also an exception which is to be narrowly construed.

Coreck Maritime

“[130] However, the defendants rely on article 22 to argue that the court should decline jurisdiction. They refer to the decision of the ECJ in Coreck Maritime GmbH v Handelsveem BV (Case C-387/98) , which concerned article 17 of the Brussels

Convention, an article about jurisdiction agreements (broadly corresponding to article 23 of the Brussels Regulation). Although article 17 referred to an agreement that a court or the courts of a contracting state should have exclusive jurisdiction to settle disputes and therefore did not apply to agreements designating a court of a noncontracting state, the ECJ did not consider that therefore the Brussels Convention prevented the courts of contracting states from giving effect to the parties’ agreement as to jurisdiction. At paragraph 19 of its judgment, the ECJ said that, “A court situated in a Contracting State must, if it is seised notwithstanding such a jurisdiction clause, assess the validity of the clause according to the applicable law, including the conflict of law rules, where it sits …”. It cited the Schlosser Report at para 176.

[131] This in itself shows that paragraph 37 of the judgment in Owusu v Jackson , upon which Mr Smouha relied (see para 119) is not to be understood to prevent the national court declining jurisdiction in all circumstances unless they are expressly recognised by the Brussels Regulation. A basic principle of the Regulation emphasised by the ECJ in Owusu itself is that a well-informed party should be able to predict where he might be sued and where he is entitled to sue, and it would not promote this principle to interpret the Regulation so as to defeat the parties’ express agreement for exclusive jurisdiction, an agreement that is generally designed to achieve just such certainty. I cannot accept that in Owusu v Jackson the ECJ intended to overturn its decision in Coreck Maritime. Further, Briggs and Rees on Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (5 ^th Ed, 2007) observe at para 2-256 fn 5, that so to interpret paragraph 37 of the Owusu judgment would not easily fit with the ECJ’s description of the second question that they were asked as “hypothetical”. The ECJ itself, in the context of explaining the applicability of article 2 although only one contracting state was involved in the relevant legal relationship, said (at para 28), “… the rules of the Brussels Convention on exclusive jurisdiction or express prorogation of jurisdiction are likely to be applicable to legal relationships involving only one contracting State and one or more non-Contracting States”.

‘(1)     Must the first sentence of Article 17 of the Brussels Convention (in particular, the words “have agreed“), read in conjunction with the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which “the purpose of Article 17 is to ensure that the [consent of the] parties ... to such a clause, which derogates from the ordinary jurisdiction rules laid down in Articles 2, 5 and 6 of the Convention, ... is clearly and precisely demonstrated“, be interpreted as meaning:

    (a)    that, in order for a clause vesting jurisdiction in a given court, as provided for in that article, to be valid as between the parties, it is necessary in each case for that clause to be formulated in such a way that its wording alone makes it quite clear or at least easy to ascertain (even) for persons other than the parties - and in particular to the court concerned - which court is to have jurisdiction to settle disputes arising from the legal relationship in the context of which that clause is stipulated; or

a.        In order for a jurisdiction agreement to be valid under Article 17, it is not necessary for the court to be identified by name. It is sufficient that the identity can be ascertained by objective criteria.

b.       For the purposes of Article 17 one of the parties must have a place of business in a Contracting State.

c.        A third-party holder of a bill of lading is bound by a jurisdiction clause in a bill of lading if either (a) the third party has succeeded to the shipper’s rights (which is a matter to be determined under relevant national law) or (b) the third-party consented.

d.       It is for the national court to decide which national law is to be applied in order to determine whether the third-party holder of a bill of lading has succeeded to the shipper's rights and obligations.

“As to the second condition, Article 17 of the Convention does not apply to clauses designating a court in a third country. A court situated in a Contracting State must, if it is seised notwithstanding such a jurisdiction clause, assess the validity of the clause according to the applicable law, including conflict of laws rules, where it sits (Report by Professor Schlosser on the Convention of 9 October 1978 on the Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Convention on Jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in Civil and Commercial matters and to the Protocol on its interpretation by the Court of Justice, OJ 1979 C 59, p. 71, paragraph 176).”

“Agreements conferring jurisdiction on courts outside the Community

176. (a) [1] In cases where parties agree to bring their disputes before the courts of a State which is not a party to the 1968 Convention there is obviously nothing in the 1968 Convention to prevent such courts from declaring themselves competent, if their law recognizes the validity of such an agreement. [2] The only question is whether and, if so, in what form such agreements are capable of depriving Community courts of jurisdiction which is stated by the 1968 Convention to be exclusive or concurrent. [3] There is nothing in the 1968 Convention to support the conclusion that such agreements must be inadmissible in principle (46). [4] However, the 1968 Convention does not contain any rules as to their validity either. [5] If a court within the Community is applied to despite such an agreement, its decision on the validity of the agreement depriving it of jurisdiction must be taken in accordance with its own lex fori.  In so far as the local rules of conflict of laws support the authority of provisions of foreign law, the latter will apply. [6] If, when these tests are applied, the agreement is found to be invalid, then the jurisdictional provisions of the 1968 convention become applicable.”

“DISCRETIONARY POWERS REGARDING JURISDICTION AND TRANSFER OF PROCEEDINGS

76. The idea that a national court has discretion in the exercise of its jurisdiction either territorially or as regards the subject matter of a dispute does not generally exist in Continental legal systems . Even where, in the rules relating to jurisdiction, tests of an exceptionally flexible nature are laid down , no room is left for the exercise of any discretionary latitude . It is true that Continental legal systems recognize the power of a court to transfer proceedings from one court to another. Even then the court has no discretion in determining whether or not this power should be exercised. In contrast, the law in the United Kingdom and in Ireland has evolved judicial discretionary powers in certain fields. In some cases, these correspond in practice to legal provisions regarding jurisdiction which are more detailed in the Continental States, while in others they have no counterpart on the Continent. It is therefore difficult to evaluate such powers within the context of the 1968 Convention. A distinction has to be made between the international and national application of this legal concept.

77. (a) In relationships with the courts of other States and also, within the United Kingdom, as between the courts of different judicial areas (see paragraph 11) the doctrine of forum conveniens — in Scotland, forum non conveniens — is of relevance. The courts are allowed, although only in very rare and exceptional cases, to disregard the fact that proceedings may already be pending before foreign courts, or courts of another judicial area. Exceptionally, the courts may refuse to hear or decide a case, if they believe it would be better for the case to be heard before a court having equivalent jurisdiction in another State (or another judicial area) because this would increase the likelihood of an efficient and impartial hearing of the particular case. There are several special reasons why in practice such discretionary powers are exercised: the strict requirements traditionally imposed by the laws of the United Kingdom and Ireland regarding changes of domicile (see paragraph 72); the rules allowing establishment of jurisdiction by merely serving a writ or originating summons in the territory of the State concerned (see paragraphs 85 and 86); the principles developed particularly strongly in the procedural law of these States requiring directness in the taking of evidence with the consequent restrictions on making use of evidence taken abroad or merely in another judicial area; and finally, the considerable difficulties arising in the application of foreign law by United Kingdom or Irish courts.

78. According to the views of the delegations from the Continental Member States of the Community such possibilities are not open to the courts of those States when, under the 1968 Convention, they have jurisdiction and are asked to adjudicate . Article 21 expressly prohibits a court from disregarding the fact that proceedings are already pending abroad. For the rest the view was expressed that under the 1968 Convention the Contracting States are not only entitled to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions laid down in Title 2 ; they are also obliged to do so. A plaintiff must be sure which court has jurisdiction. He should not have to waste his time and money risking that the court concerned may consider itself less competent than another . In particular, in accordance with the general spirit of the 1968 Convention, the fact that foreign law has to be applied, either generally or in a particular case, should not constitute a sufficient reason for a court to decline jurisdiction. Where the courts of several States have jurisdiction, the plaintiff has deliberately been given a right of choice, which should not be weakened by application of the doctrine of forum conveniens..”. (emphasis added)

The above paragraphs (in particular the passages I have highlighted) are consistent with the decision of the Grand Chamber in Owusu and inconsistent with the existence of a discretionary latitude to stay claims where jurisdiction is based on domicile.

The English case law under the Brussels Convention / Regulation 44/2001

a.        None of them were considering the Recast Regulation.

Exercise of a discretion on El Amria grounds (if this is available under the Regulation)

a.        Any such discretion must be applied reflexively having regard to the terms of the Recast Regulation in particular Article 25 thereof i.e. I am to treat KSA as if it were a Member State of the European Union.

b.       An important factor in the exercise of the discretion was whether Clause 16 is an exclusive jurisdiction clause under which the parties agreed to refer all disputes to the SAMA committee in KSA (and nowhere else) or not.

c.        The interpretation of clause 16 is governed by the law of KSA.

a.        Having regard to the expert evidence of KSA law and its terms Clause 16 was plainly an exclusive jurisdiction clause which required all disputes to be referred to a court in KSA and prohibited proceedings being commenced outside the KSA.

b.       Absent strong grounds to the contrary, this court ought to enforce by imposing a stay on these proceedings brought here in breach of it.

The proper scope of foreign law evidence on the interpretation of clause 16

Discretion

II. The Freezing Order

The legal test

a.        A good arguable case on the merits

b.       A real risk that the defendant will dissipate his assets

c.        It is just and convenient to grant the relief

Good arguable case

a.        The Bank has a judicial decision in its favour against DMT for the sum secured.

b.       There is no dispute that DMT ran into severe financial difficulties in April 2016 and by 29 June 2016 could not pay the sums which it accepted were due to the Bank.

c.        There is no dispute about the validity of the Personal Guarantee itself.

d.       The Bank has the benefit of certificate of debt clause. Even if this were not conclusive evidence of the sum due, there is no real dispute that DMT borrowed a very substantial sum from the Bank and then defaulted.

e.        The only basis on which Mr Aldwood seeks to defend the claim is that the Personal Guarantee lapsed in 2013 under KSA law because it was not specifically referred to in the renewal agreements. In my judgement, the Bank’s response that the Personal Guarantee was clearly understood to be a continuing security and that this captured and expressed by the clause in each amendment which stipulated that all other terms of the agreement remained in full force represents at least a good arguable case that the Personal Guarantee has remained valid and enforceable under KSA law. It is not the role of the court at this interlocutory stage in a claim to balance the finer points of expert foreign law evidence against each other. 

f.        On the basis of language used by the parties in renewing the agreements and the agreements themselves, it seems clear to me that both the Personal Guarantee and the Cross Guarantee were intended to be continuing security is (at the very least) a good arguable case on the merits.

Risk of dissipation

“In our view, the test is whether, on the assumption that the plaintiffs have shown at least a “good arguable case” the court concludes, on the whole of the evidence then before it, that the refusal of a Mareva injunction would involve a real risk that a judgment or award in favour of the plaintiffs would remain unsatisfied.”

“The relevant legal principle in determining whether for the purposes of granting or maintaining a freezing order a claimant has shown a sufficient “risk of dissipation” is that the claimant will satisfy that burden if it can show that:

(i) there is a real risk that a judgment or award will go unsatisfied, in the sense of a real risk that, unless restrained by injunction, the defendant will dissipate or dispose of his assets other than in the ordinary course of business: The Niedersachsen [1983] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 600 per Mustill J as interpreted by Christopher Clarke J in TTMI v ASM Shipping [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 401 at 406 (paragraphs 24-27) or

a.        Mr Aldwood had understated the value of a yacht.

b.       Mr Aldwood failed to disclose in his schedule of assets three bank accounts containing US$481,946, £15,029 and £120.009 respectively.

c.        Mr Aldwood sought permission to release a tax payment of £400,000 said to be required urgently but then revised down to £183,936 when questions were asked.

d.       Payments totalling EUR50,000 were made from a bank account controlled by Mr Aldwood contrary to the WWFO.

e.        I have not seen any evidence of any unjustified dealing by the Defendant with any of his assets in 2016 or subsequently.

f.        The Bank’s case on dissipation of assets and unjustified dealing in assets is very thin indeed and is largely based on the inference that when he left the KSA in 2016 he did so to flee his creditors and if the injunction is discharged he may do the same again. The Bank’s case does not on proper analysis rise above the level of general assertion which is not sufficient to meet the threshold for this type of injunction.

g.       The Bank does not assert that Mr Aldwood has been dishonest.

h.       There is no solid evidence of a current risk of dissipation. Mr Aldwood has lived in England since 2016 and his children are at school here. His major assets are his home here and a house in France, a yacht and an investment portfolio necessary for his Tier 1 (Investor) visa. There is no evidence from which I can infer that there is a real risk of these assets being dissipated illegitimately.

i.         Mr Aldwood’s response to the claim and to the WWFO has not been inappropriately casual or evasive.

Full and frank disclosure

III. Disposal

a.        The Defendant’s application for a stay is dismissed. The court has jurisdiction to hear the claim.

b.       The Defendant’s application to discharge the order made by Mr Justice Murray on 18 January 2019 is granted.

c.        The Claimant’s application to continue or reinstate the order made by Mr Justice Murray as varied by consent is dismissed.