QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
B e f o r e :
BETWEEN
____________________
Caretech Community Services Ltd |
Claimant |
|
And |
||
(1) Mr Russell Stanley Oakden (2) Allcare Community Care Services Limited (3) Mrs Lisa Berry |
Defendants |
____________________
Ms Katie Ayres of counsel instructed by Quality Solicitors for the Third Defendant/Respondent.
Hearing date: 15th May 2017
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Master McCloud:
(i) Caretech Community Services Ltd v Berry and Ors
(ii) Jones v Chichester Harbour Conservancy
(iii) Al-Haddad v British Broadcasting Corporation Claim No. HQ16D00807
This case
22. I prefer the evidence of the Berrys over that of Mr Mellor insofar as it differs. Mr Mellor's chaotic approach to the accuracy of his certificates of service, his apparent woeful lack of knowledge of the role of a statement of truth or as to the propriety of signing documents but leaving the date unaltered when he must know that such is misleading and the shifting answers he gave in relation to why documents were dated as they were or whether a document had been freshly signed all give me no confidence in the accuracy of whatever records he may keep in relation to service of documents or in relation to his entire approach to accuracy of court documents. I need not find as a fact the actual address if any of service of the claim form: I am satisfied that it was not served at number 46. Given the lack of accuracy of Mr Mellor's documents, it is also of no surprise that the documents did not go to number 40 either despite the wording of the first and second certificates. Whatever he did with them (and it was suggested that he may have used an incompetent other person to do the work, but I need not go into that given my decision here) he did not serve them at 46 and may not have served them at all anywhere.
23. As to the second service in my judgment that is a clear fabrication. The Certificate is wrongly dated December 2015 when Mr Mellor accepts he had not yet had the wording of the statement of truth. It is far more likely that he produced that document a year later. The idea that he would take it upon himself to re-serve black and white copy documents in 2015 and then execute a new certificate of service without any instruction from any client to do so, and then omit to mention that fact or provide the certificate until about a year later when he knew there was a dispute as to service, such that the suggestion arose well after the evidence and disclosure deadlines had passed, is fanciful and I reject it. Service of photocopies would in any event not be valid service but my finding is that not even the copies were served.
Brown v Innovatorone plc [2010] 2 All ER (Comm) 80
Anderton v Clwyd CC [2002] EWCA Civ 933
Abela and Ors. v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44
Kaki v National Provate Air Transport Co. and Ors. [2015] EWCA Civ 731
MB Garden Buildings Ltd v Burton [2014] EWHC 431 (IPEC)
United Utilities Group Plc v Jayne Hart (unrep) HHJ Wood QC 24/9/2015, BAILII: [2015] EW Misc B48 (CC)
Godwin v Swindon BC [2001] EWCA Civ 1478
Hills Contractors and Construction Ltd v (1) Smith (2) Struth [2013] EWHC 1693 (TCC)
Training in Compliance Ltd v Dewse [2001] CP Rep 46
Excelsior Commercial & Industrial Holdings Ltd v Salisbury Hammer Aspden & Johnson and Ors. [2002] EWCA Civ 879 (on costs only)
OOO Abbott v Econowall UK Ltd [2016] EWHC 660 (IPEC)
(1) Bethell Construction Ltd (2) Bethell Group Plc v Deloitte and Touche [2011] EWCA Civ 1321
Albon (t/a NA Carriage Co.) v (1) Naza Motor Trading SDN BHD (2) Tan Sri Dato Nasimuddin Amin (No. 2) [2007] EWHC 327 (Ch)
Asia Pacific (HK) Limited and Ors. v (1) Hanjin Shipping Co. Ltd (2) Owners of the MV "Hanjin Pennsylvania" [2005] EWHC 2443 (Comm)
(1) Nutifafa Kuenyehia (2) Doris Enyonam (3) Lartisan Services Inc. v International Hospitals Group Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 21
Gee 7 Group Ltd v Personal Management Solutions Ltd [2016] EWHC 891 (Ch)
Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2016] EWCA Civ 177
Denton v TH White Ltd [2014] EWCA Civ 906
Robert Lawrence Weston v (1) Kenneth William Bates (2) Leeds United Football Club Ltd [2013] 1 WLR 189 [2012] EWHC 590 (QB) (Tugendhat J upholding an appeal against decision of Master McCloud at first instance, HQ10D02911).
Also referred to or mentioned in judgment:
Cranfield v Bridgegrove Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 656
Vinos v Marks and Spencer plc [2001] 3 All ER 784
Wilkey v BBC [2003] 1 WLR 1
Mitchell MP v New Group Newspapers Limited [2013] EWCA Civ 1537
Al-Haddad v British Broadcasting Corporation REF
Jones v Chichester Harbour Conservancy REF
Service of the claim form by an alternative method or at an alternative place
6.15
(1) Where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this Part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place.
(2) On an application under this rule, the court may order that steps already taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service.
(3) An application for an order under this rule
(a) must be supported by evidence; and
(b) may be made without notice.
(4) An order under this rule must specify
(a) the method or place of service;
(b) the date on which the claim form is deemed served; and
(c) the period for
(i) filing an acknowledgment of service;
(ii) filing an admission; or
(iii) filing a defence.
"Scope
This glossary is a guide to the meaning of certain legal expressions as used in these Rules, but it does not give the expressions any meaning in the Rules which they do not otherwise have in the law.
[ ]
Service
Steps required by rules of court to bring documents used in court proceedings to a person's attention."
The relevant facts
Issues
Issue 1: Non-Service versus Mis-Service, scope of court's powers under r.6.15(2)
(i) complete failure to deliver or purport to deliver the claim form for purposes of service ('Non-service'); and
(ii) defective service ('Mis-service') such as where there was an attempt to serve validly but some error meant that the delivery of the document to the Claimant fell short of meeting the requirements for valid service.
Issue 2: Inclusive or exclusive reading of rule 6.15?
"6.15(1) Where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this Part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place."
"6.15 (2) On an application under this rule, the court may order that steps already taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service."
Issue 3: 'good reason' to grant permission under r.6.15 and exercise of the court's discretion if there is.
Parties' arguments in more detail
Issue 1: Mis-service vs Non-service
"There has been no service of the claim form and the particulars of claim in these proceedings largely because of what appear to me to be a series of faulty steps on MBGB's part. I do not think that CPR 6.15 and in particular the retrospective power given to the court under CPR 6.15(3)[1] was designed for the purpose of curing that sort of failure to comply adequately with the civil procedure rules"
"44. Although [Tugendhat J.] refers to what is required under the CPR, I note that at [18] he refers to what the Master said in her original judgment where she correctly, in my judgment, "expressed grave doubts as to whether, if service were effected within the jurisdiction, anything less than a sealed copy of the claim form (what she called a "first generation copy") would suffice, save in cases where the rules specifically so provide (as they do for example, in permitting service by fax or e-mail: CPR r 6.3(i)(d)."
"Whilst there was nothing wrong with the mode of service (solicitor DX), by choosing this route, the original sealed and stamped version of the claim form, it is said, had to be enclosed."
By contrast as the judge acknowledged, such an issue would not arise where the mode was (say) service by fax, since that implicitly allows a copy to be served.
"67. A significant amount of discussion took place in the court below, as well as before me on the need to distinguish between mis-service and non-service. This is plainly necessary in those cases where a party seeks to avail itself of the discretionary indulgences under 6.15 and 6.16, in the context of more complex service situations, and where there has been a genuine attempt to comply with the requirements even if there was a misunderstanding or error of judgment. The more obvious case of a failure to serve in time, (overlooking) or falling foul of the deeming provisions is easily understandable as a case of non-service because the rules are entirely prescriptive in setting time limits.68 it seems to me that the present situation does not sit comfortably with those kinds of cases where the courts have been less than indulgent because time was allowed to expire before service (in other words the first category in the Anderton case [para 57]). Plainly the judge has come to his conclusion on the basis of the judgment of Ramsey J in Hill Contractors, but it seems to me that that case has to be put in context; there the judge was seeking to extract the claimant from a requirement to serve particulars of claim on the basis that a copy claim form only had been provided prior thereto and service had been unintended. It would have been manifestly unjust, and contrary to the overriding objective in the circumstances of that case to visit on the claimant the consequences of a time limit expiry when it was merely bringing an issued claim form to the attention of the defendant without going through a formal process.
69. Whilst those cases involving mis-service tend to relate to complications with the correct identity of the defendant, and the present situation cannot easily be associated with that, it seems to me that a "service form" failure if that is what happened in this case, does not lend itself comfortably to either category."
"19. The first question, therefore, is whether what happened on 21st March amounts to service. That question must as is common ground be judged objectively, that is to say by looking at what was done and said by and as between the parties in order to determine whether it amounts to service. If it does so, an unexpressed intention that it should not do so cannot alter the position. If it does not do so, the fact that the person who did the acts in question intended or thought that what he did constituted service does not make it so. Whether service has been effected cannot depend upon the views, possibly idiosyncratic or even bizarre, of individual litigants or their advisors.20. The Civil Procedure Rules do not define what is meant by service other than by prescribing how it may be done. Personal service involves leaving the document with the relevant person: CPR 6.4 (3), (4), and (5). Service other than personal service may consist of leaving the document at an address for service within the jurisdiction, or serving it through a document exchange, or sending it by post or fax. The common thread is that the party serving the documents delivers it [sic] into the possession or control of the recipient or takes steps to cause it to be so delivered. But, as the authorities recognise, a party delivering the claim form may say that he is not delivering it by way of service, but for information only. If he does so he is to be taken at his word."
"33. In my judgment the dispatch of the fax on 21st March did constitute service of the claim form. The substance of the matter is that Mays Brown delivered to HTD, by a permitted method of service, a claim form, and thereby not only brought to their attention the fact that the claim had been issued but also provided them with a copy of it. Mays Brown did not indicate that the form was provided to them subject to a condition that it was for information only, or that, although delivered, it was not to be regarded as served. When a claim form is delivered to the recipient in a manner provided for by the rules it is, in my view, served unless it is made clear by the person who delivers it that, whilst he is delivering the form by such a method he is not in fact serving it."
Issue 2: Whether power under r.6.15 can be exercised in cases where there is a failure of both method of service and location of service.
"26. the power [to dispense with service] is unlikely to be exercised save where the claimant has either made an ineffective attempt in time to serve by one of the methods of service permitted by r.6.2, or has served in time in a manner which involved a minor departure from one of those permitted methods of service it is not possible to give an exhaustive guide to the circumstances in which it would be right to dispense with service of a claim form."
Issue 3: 'good reason' and exercise of discretion
"Now that the disputed interpretations of the CPR have been resolved by Godwin and by this judgment, there will be few (if any) acceptable excuses for future failures to observe the rules for service of a claim form. The courts will be entitled to adopt a strict approach, even though the consequences may sometimes appear to be harsh in individual cases" and (at 36):
"Procedural rules are necessary to achieve justice. Justice and proportionality require that there are firm procedural rules which should be observed, not that general rules should be construed to create exceptions and excuses whenever those, who could easily have complied with the rules, have slipped up and mistakenly failed to do so."
(1) Retrospective applications under r.6.15 are now possible (para. 36 of judgment).
(2) The applicable test is "whether in all the circumstances of the particular case, there is good reason to make the order sought" (para. 35 of judgment).
(3) The "relevant focus is upon the reason why the claim form cannot or could not be served within the period of its validity" (para. 48).
(4) "The mere fact that the defendant learned of the existence and content of the claim form cannot, without more, constitute a good reason to make an order under rule 6.15(2). On the other hand, the wording of that rule shows that it is a critical factor" (para. 36).
"45 In my judgment under the CPR what is required, as a general rule, is service of a hard copy document as issued and sealed by the court and a photocopy of that document is not sufficient. As stated in Cranfield v Bridgegrove at [87] the only flaw in the process was that "a copy of the issued claim form" rather than "the original document itself" was received."
"28 it was unnecessary for the Claimant to have any kind of discretion exercised under r. 6.9" [now 6.16] .."although Dyson LJ thought it was appropriate to give guidance on the hypothetical situation whereby the claimant had been required to serve on the solicitors only. If that had been the case, the claimant's solicitor had served only a copy claim form and not the original sealed version. Whilst proceeding hypothetically, he went on to say this:
88. In these very unusual circumstances, had it been necessary to do so, we would have decided that it was right to dispense with service under CPR 6.9. It is possible that the difference between service under section 725(1) and service under the CPR was not fully understood, and that the importance of serving on the party to be served the original claim form that has been issued (rather than a copy) was not appreciated. But in future the significance of these points will have to be taken into account. Errors of this kind will generally not be regarded as good reasons for making an order under CPR 6.9. In stipulating a strict approach for the future in such circumstances, we have been guided by what was said in Anderton and Wilkey.
29. Thus Dyson LJ was saying, without identifying the specific rule or practice direction which required the form of the documentation to be the original, in future where reliance was sought to be placed upon CPR 6.9 (6.16 dispensing with service) the court would have to adopt a stricter approach."
Discussion and decision
[ ]"Service
Steps required by rules of court to bring documents used in court proceedings to a person's attention."
"ScopeThis glossary is a guide to the meaning of certain legal expressions as used in these Rules, but it does not give the expressions any meaning in the Rules which they do not otherwise have in the law."
(1) Has a claim been 'served'?
i. Whether a document has been "served" is an objective question, not a subjective one. One does not look at what either party thought they were doing but only what they in fact did. As to this, I agree with and follow the judgment of Clarke J in Asia Pacific para.19.
ii. The common thread in the authorities and rules is that the party serving the document delivers it into the possession or control of the recipient or takes steps to cause it to be so delivered in accordance with the rules. Per Clarke J at para 20 in Asia Pacific, and also consistent with the CPR Glossary.
iii. A party delivering the claim form may say that he is not delivering it by way of service, but for information only. If he does so he is to be taken at his word[2].
iv. It may be unjust and contrary to the overriding objective to treat a claim form as served in circumstances where the claim was merely (judged objectively) being drawn to a party's attention for information without steps amounting to service having been taken. (United Utilities , per HHJ Wood para 68).
v. Following Cranfield v Bridgegrove (applied in Hills at para. 45) what is required under the CPR generally for good service (in addition to the other requirements such as location of service) is delivery of a hard copy document as sealed and issued by the court save where the rules expressly or by necessary implication permit a copy (such as service by fax or email) or where the unusual circumstances such as those in Weston v Bates apply.
vi. The above is consistent with the definition of "Service" in the CPR Glossary which, in the light of the authorities, one can logically break down into the core ingredients of valid service as follows:
1. Steps (ie something must be done by the party)
2. Which are required by rules of court (ie, for valid service the steps must be those required by the rules)
3. Which are steps taken [for the objectively judged purpose of] bringing documents used in court proceedings to a person's attention.
(2) Scope of rule 6.15(2) in validating otherwise defective service (issues 1 and 2)
i. When considering relief under r. 6.15(2) it is critical (ie, necessary as a minimum) that the form and contents has come to the defendant's attention (see Abela).ii. However the mere fact that a claim form and its contents has been delivered in such a way that it has come to the attention of the defendant is not enough by itself to justify retrospective validation of otherwise invalid service. More is needed. (Per Lord Neuberger in Abela, paras. 33-36). As regards the scope of rule 6.15(2), if a claim form and contents have not come to the attention of a defendant then relief is not available under rule 6.15 (2).
iii. MB Garden Buildings Limited v Burton can be understood as being an example of a case where the basic critical requirement in Abela was not met, since the court had concluded that there had been "Non-service" and stated that it did "not think that CPR 6.15 and in particular the retrospective power given to the court under CPR 6.15([2]) was designed for the purpose of curing that sort of failure to comply adequately with the civil procedure rules". In MB Garden Buildings, the content of the claim form came to the attention of the defendant after it had expired and so that case is not on all fours with this on its facts.
iv. In my judgment it would defeat the policy and purpose of the 'Asia Pacific' exception (ie that a party must be taken at his word if he states that the purpose of delivery of the claim form is for 'information only' rather than for service) if despite that clear principle a defendant was left open to the risk that after the event such a claim form, which was objectively and purposefully not served on him but provided only for information (therefore coming to his attention as a result of steps taken for that purpose), could later be retrospectively validated as served using rule 6.15(2). There is no good reason in my judgment to introduce such uncertainty into the rules as to service and validation of service. I therefore reject the argument by C that the content of the letter enclosing the copy claim form is immaterial in a case where objectively delivery was for information and not by way of service.
v. Reading Asia Pacific and Brown together, given the above point, one in my judgment should understand 'steps taken' in rule 6.15(2) as meaning steps which, objectively judged, are taken for the purpose of bringing the claim to the attention of the defendant, provided that the steps were not incompatible with service. Thus a claim form accompanied by a letter stating that it is provided expressly for information only (ie not for service) will not be one for which rule 6.15(2) will offer relief even though doing so crosses the first (necessary but not sufficient) hurdle in Abela[3] ie that the claim form and its content came to the attention of the Defendant as a result of steps taken. By contrast a claim form bearing no such statement was treated as served in Asia Pacific.
vi. If I am wrong as to (iv) and (v), it is nonetheless the case that a statement that a document is provided 'for information [only]' forms part of all the circumstances as to whether there is a good reason, or not, for validating service.
vii. In my judgment approaching rule 6.15(2) by attempting to divide cases into those of "Mis-service" and "Non-service" is not of real assistance. The distinction was drawn and applied by the District Judge in United Utilities and was upheld by HHJ Woods on appeal but it is clear that the learned judge himself felt it did not sit comfortably in cases where the error was one of form. One might then foresee the notion that one could have cases of "Mis-service", "Non-service" and perhaps a third category of error such as "error of form", and so on. I do not think such an approach would be helpful and is likely to amount to an irresistible intellectual challenge to advocates in terms of generating case law as to the boundaries of such categories and their implications.
viii. I do not accept D3's argument that the wording of rule 6.15(2) leads to the conclusion that the court lacks the power to validate service which took place at the wrong location and in the wrong manner, if the other circumstances bring the case within the rule. As a matter of policy in my judgment it would sit ill with the Overriding Objective if a court was disempowered from validating service where (let us say) a minor error as to both location and manner took place, whilst being able in principle to waive more significant errors as long as they were 'either' as to method 'or' as to location. Moreover as a matter of drafting it seems probable that the word "either" would have been included if the use of the word "or" was intended to be "exclusive or" (XOR in formal logic terms) rather than "inclusive" of the case where both types of defect arise.[4] It would also be a conclusion which rather conflicts with the established practice of the court in suitable cases to allow alternative service under rule 6.15(1), where it is commonplace to direct service both by novel means and at otherwise unauthorised places if an application is made and the court is satisfied that such is appropriate.
Provided,(a) critically, that the content of the existence of the claim form and its content has in fact come to the attention of the defendant; and
(b) if, judged objectively and not subjectively, the purpose of the steps taken was to bring it to his attention for service rather than solely for information,
Then
rule 6.15(2) is, subject to the requirement for "good reason" and the exercise of the court's discretion, available to validate the steps taken for that purpose even if the errors are both errors of method of delivery and errors of place of delivery.
How to approach the question of "good reason" once one is satisfied that rule 6.15(2) is available in principle.
(i) The court should simply ask itself "whether in all the circumstances of the particular case, there is a good reason to make the order sought" (Per Lord Neuberger in Abela, para 35).
(ii) "good reason" within the meaning of CPR r. 6.15 is something less than "exceptional circumstances" and I follow OOO Abbott v Econowall, at 43-48, discussing Bethell Construction Ltd v Deloitte and Touche.
(iii) The "relevant focus is upon the reason why the claim form cannot or could not be served within the period of its validity" (Abela, para. 48). Barton v Wright Hassall is a useful example discussing that approach.
(iv) The conduct of the parties is relevant under rule 6.15: Kaki v National Private Air Transport Co. and Ors. at 33.
(v) The absence of a Limitation Act time bar is a factor to take into account in favour of granting the application but equally there is in such a case nothing to stop a claimant from re-issuing and to enable it to obtain a ruling. There may often be higher issue fees as a result, but that is a consequence of the claimant's failure to serve in time and is not a 'good reason'. (Gee 7).
(vi) Even where there is no identifiable prejudice to the defendant, such is a factor in the claimant's favour but does not on its own amount to a 'good reason' (Gee 7).
(vii) I note that in Kaki, Aikens LJ with whom the remainder of the court agreed, interpreted the Supreme Court decision in Abela as not stating that there is a 'two stage test' whereby a good reason must first be identified and then secondly whether the court should exercise discretion to allow the application. He suggested that the comment at 6.15.3 of the white book to that effect citing Lightman J in Albon might need reconsideration. However in this case I do not have to express a view on that aspect in view of the conclusion I have reached that there is no 'good reason'.
Generally
Conclusions
(a) the claim form and contents came to the attention of D3 before expiry. The method and form of service was defective because D3's solicitors were not authorised to accept service and because (in the case of the postal copy), what was delivered was a copy and not an original.
(b) In my judgment the sentence in the letter of 16 November 2015 stating "We enclose a copy of the Claim form and Particulars of Claim for your information" is sufficient objective evidence (when understood in the context that Quality Solicitors were not instructed to accept service, a fact of which both sides were aware), to amount to a statement equivalent to "for information only". Objectively judged the purpose of delivery was therefore to bring the claim to the attention D3 but the evidence is also inconsistent with those steps being capable of service in principle, because C had elected to state that delivery was 'for information'.
(c) Moreover even if I am wrong as to my conclusion at (b) immediately above it would be unjust and contrary to the overriding objective (and hence there would be no 'good reason') to permit documents expressly delivered on the basis that they were not being served, to be validated, after the event, for the very service which C had disavowed in the first place and upon which D3 was entitled to rely. C should be held to its word and a party should be able to know that when its lawyers receive documents which on their face are not being served, that such can be relied on.
(d) It follows that in my judgment rule 6.15(2) does not provide the court with the power to validate service on these facts, and that alternatively even if I am wrong and I do have such a power, the fact of them being provided expressly for 'information' only is a very powerful factor pointing to there being no 'good reason' to make an order under the rule.
(e) I do not consider that, if one gets as far as the 'good reason' test, the facts taken together would justify making an order under r.6.15(2) or are capable of supplying a 'good reason' to consider taking that course. There was no sensible reason why the claim form could not be validly served in time in this case especially once it was known that service was disputed whilst the form was still valid. C simply had not taken advantage at all of the generous time period allowed for service when serving validly would have been easy. That is all the more so since the dispute over validity of service was known to C prior to expiry of the claim form, so that remedying it would have been perfectly straightforward. The fact that re-issuing would cost a further issue fee is simply the consequence of C's error and is not a good reason, and delay caused to the case is for the most part delay which has in any event already been caused by the default itself: C could have re-issued already if it chose, to save the delay of this application. The failure of the process server to serve, in law, is the failure of the Claimant - and hence I take into account the trite principle that in modern litigation incompetence is not a good reason for relief to be granted - but I do not of course go as far as attributing the dishonesty of the process server to the Claimant.
(f) There was suggestion to me that relying on Albon that rule 6.15(2) imputes by its wording a two stage approach to exercise of the power under that rule, ie the decision as to 'good reason' and then consideration, if there is good reason, whether to make an order. I have already noted the interpretation placed on Abela by the Court of Appeal in Kaki in this respect above and the comments there about Albon. However that point does not arise for me to decide here given my decision that there is no good reason in any event.
MASTER VICTORIA MCCLOUD 31/7/17
Note 1 This is a typographical error in the judgment in MB Gardens and in context is plainly intended to refer to rule 6.15(2). [Back] Note 2 Per Clarke J in Asia Pacific at para. 20. Thus in Asia Pacific a fax copy with no indication that it was for information only was held to have been, objectively, served. Likewise in Weston v Bates, my decision upheld on appeal was that where a colour copy on paper had been delivered to an address in Monaco, and where the law of Monaco permitted such a means of service, service was valid (in circumstances where on the same facts for service in England and Wales a copy was not permitted and would not have been valid).
[Back] Note 3 Whilst it is also possible to interpret the above dictum of Andrew Smith J as meaning that relief can be granted even where a claim form has not come to the attention of a defendantbut steps have been taken for that purpose, such a wide reading of Brown would be inconsistent, in my judgment, with the Supreme Court authority ofAbela. [Back] Note 4 Following Nutifafa Kuenyehia (2) Doris Enyonam (3) Lartisan Services Inc. v International Hospitals Group , it is no doubt (per Neuberger LJ at 26) the case that
the power [ie, to dispense with service: not the rule with which one is concerned in this case] is unlikely to be exercised save where the claimant has either made an ineffective attempt in time to serve by one of the methods of service permitted by r.6.2, or has served in time in a manner which involved a minor departure from one of those permitted methods of service . But that is not the same thing at all as a conclusion that the power to validate service or dispense with it where errors of method and of location have taken place does not exist at all as a matter of principle under rule 6.15(2) with which we are concerned. [Back] Note 5 The BBC in the case of Al-Haddad v BBC, who (with the other parties were invited to draw my attention to any matters in this judgment at draft stage which arguably were relevant to my decisions in their cases, informed me of a very recent decision of relevance. Their submission to me drew attention to recent decision of Popplewell J in Sociιtι Gιnιrale v Goldas Kuyumculuk Sanayi and others [2017] EWHC 667 (Comm) at [49(1)] [49(8)]. I am grateful to them for drawing this decision to my attention. It is appropriate that I should see it but it does not lead me to a different decision here (and nor were the BBC or any party suggesting it should). I say that of course without resolving the question in issue between the BBC and Al-Haddad as to whether in point of law that decision affects or is applicable in the the Al-Haddad case, which is in issue in Al-Haddad.
[Back]