QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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MRS OZLEM KUPELI & Others |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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(1) KIBRIS TURK HAVA YOLLARI SIRKETI (TRADING AS CYPRUS TURKISH AIRLINES) |
First Defendant |
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(2) ATLASJET HAVACILIK ANONIM SIRKETI |
Second Defendant |
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Mr Jonathan Adkin QC and Ms Sophie Holcombe (instructed by Zimmers Solicitors) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25 and 29 February 2016
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Whipple:
INTRODUCTION | 1-4 |
LITIGATION HISTORY | 5-9 |
BACKGROUND FACTS | 10-23 |
OVERVIEW OF EVIDENCE | 24-26 |
ALLEGATIONS OF OVERBOOKING | 27-49 |
THE DEFENDANT'S RESERVATION SYSTEM | 50-51 |
THE CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS | 52-75 |
THE INDIVIDUAL CASES | 76-150 |
Category 1 Individual Cases | |
Nazife Atesogullari | 77-95 |
Serdar Ozkes | 96-111 |
Gulhan Akguc | 112-119 |
Category 2 Individual Cases | |
Perihan Harman | 120-125 |
Turkan Manto | 126-129 |
Mulla Bozdere | 130 |
Category 3 Individual Cases | |
Mehmet Ali Caglar | 131-135 |
Nedim Yuzudik | 136-140 |
Cumali Sendur | 141-143 |
Fahriye Korkmaz | 144-148 |
QUANTUM OF DAMAGES CONTRACT | 149 |
DENIED BOARDING REGULATIONS | 150-154 |
THE LIST OF ISSUES | 155-160 |
CONCLUSION | 161-162 |
INTRODUCTION
LITIGATION HISTORY
i) Category 1, Claimants who had tickets issued by Atlasjet but whose tickets were cancelled;ii) Category 2, Claimants who were informed that the flights would be operated by Atlasjet and were told they should attend the relevant airport with their flight tickets as issued by CTA; and
iii) Category 3, Claimants who were promised that they would be provided with new replacement tickets by Atlasjet.
BACKGROUND FACTS
"… flights are suspended until further notice.
Passengers with valid CTA tickets due to fly after 21st of June 2010 can re-arrange their flights via Atlasjet under the CTA-ATLASJET cooperation scheme. …"
"As per the instructions that we are given shortly before, as of now if KTHY passengers apply at the airports on flight days with their KTHY tickets they will be accepted to Atlasjet's flights. Passengers without KTHY tickets are going to be accepted with a written approval given by authorised KTHY personnel (our prior application). Upon acceptance procedure following procedures shall be done. For your information.
- Passengers shall be accepted manually as a spare passenger"
(The word "spare" in the bullet point could equally be translated as "stand-by".)
This appears to be the earliest Atlasjet communication of any sort, indicating the system which was to operate for CTA passengers to travel on Atlasjet flights.
"Atlasjet undertakes to fly all the KTHY passengers who bought and paid for their tickets to destinations England (London – Manchester) Ankara Istanbul Adana Ismir without charging any fee. If Passengers who bought tickets for cities other than mentioned above could go to the above mentioned airports will be undertaken under the same conditions. The costs arising out of flying these passengers will be set off to the 50% profit payment to the KKTC Growth Fund (except 12000 one way ticket)"
"Passengers holding KTHY tickets should go to the airport at the date and time of their flights. In case of availability on the Atlasjet scheduled flight (detailed list in FAQ) they will be accepted on the flight with KTHY tickets."
A list of the scheduled flights was set out. The number of flights was smaller than the number previously operated by CTA, and the Defendant would not fly to all the same destinations as CTA had flown to. Accompanying FAQs confirmed that passengers with CTA tickets would be accepted on the Defendant's flights.
"All KTHY passengers must show up at the airport with their KTHY tickets. … The passenger will be allowed to fly on Atlasjet scheduled flight and additional flights only if said flights have available seats. …"
"Regulation of ACCEPTANCE OF CTA PASSENGER on Atlasjet flights operating since July 5th, 2010:
…passengers and agencies can apply for tickets by completing the CTA tickets form through the Atlasjet website"
Can I use the same tickets which I purchased for CTA?
No, you can not use it. You will be accepted on the flight according to the above-mentioned conditions".
"if you are sure with the validity of the KTHY ticket; you can issue the ticket right away without waiting for confirmation email…"
ii) The first system operated from 23 June 2010 to 4 July 2010 on a "first come first served" basis: CTA passengers were invited to come to the airport with their CTA tickets, where they would be ticketed for an Atlasjet flight if there was availability (as per Regulation 1).ii) The second system was a "request" system, which involved the CTA passengers via their agents requesting replacement tickets on Atlasjet flights (as per Regulation 2). This system seems to have developed from the outset of the Defendant's operations on 23 June 2010 and to have lasted for the duration of Atlasjet operations in the UK. The re-booking system was formalised (and streamlined) by the electronic form appearing on the Defendant's website from 5 July 2010 which enabled requests to be submitted via a portal, but even then, each request had to be dealt with individually.
iii) The third system was a variation on Regulation 2. It was re-booking via the CARI Button, which gave the relevant agent direct access to the Defendant's reservation system, and enabled that agent to issue tickets to the CTA passenger once the reservation was made. This system was in operation from 5 July 2010. It was not used by all agents. There was a dispute before me as to whether the CARI Button was available only to the shortlist of Atlasjet authorised agents or to a wider community of travel agents who dealt with the CTA passengers. I found the evidence on this aspect of the case very unsatisfactory. For reasons set out below, in the end I do not think this point matters, and I simply note here the confused state of the evidence and make no finding about who precisely could use the CARI Button.
OVERVIEW OF EVIDENCE
ii) The extent to which (if any) the Defendant's flights were overbooked, a matter initially addressed by Mr Ersoy, which was then picked up by Mr Teker; andii) The reservation system operated by the Defendant at the material time, which includes the cancellation system, a matter addressed by Mr Teker in the main.
I will set that evidence in its context, and make findings in relation to each of these two issues, before turning to the contractual analysis, and consequent on it, the determination of the test claims.
ALLEGATIONS OF OVERBOOKING
The issue
Evidence about passenger numbers
Court of Audit Report
Defendant's evidence
ii) Mr Bradley put to him that the Claimants had found it difficult to get seats on flights. His answer was that there was space on every flight which the Defendant flew from the UK. This was an assertion not previously made by the Defendant.ii) Mr Bradley put to him two documents obtained from the Court of Audit. Although I have concluded above that the Court of Audit documents themselves do not assist in resolving this case, the answers Mr Ersoy gave on questioning were as follows:
a) On the first document [Bundle D3, tab 18, page 2] which listed details for each flight operated by the Defendant and which contained negative numbers in an "empty seats" column in relation to some flights, he accepted that it appeared to show that some flights were overbooked. For one flight there was a negative figure of 155, which appeared to indicate the flight was overbooked by 155 people. He thought this might relate to standby passengers; but could not explain this. He said the position needed to be checked; andb) On the second document [Bundle B, tab 1, page 118] which appeared to show that 374 passengers were on a given flight from Stansted to Lefkosa via Ankara, he claimed that this total figure, greatly in excess of the aircraft capacity of 318, included those passengers who had flown only to Ankara and disembarked, as well as those who had got on at Ankara and flown to Lefkosa. But this was obviously incorrect given the flight designations for each passenger on the list (which showed that none had got on in Ankara).iii) In answer to the suggestion of overbooking, Mr Ersoy said that he had logbooks for each of these flights in his office in Istanbul which he could produce, which would show the precise number of passengers on each flight, and would show the number of empty seats there were on each flight. The Defendant had not previously listed the logbooks as part of its disclosure, nor mentioned their existence.
iv) Mr Ersoy was adamant that the Defendant would not overbook flights because it was prohibited by Turkish aviation rules, and he asserted that no flight was overbooked.
v) Mr Ersoy could not explain why the UK Civil Aviation Authority recorded only 32,612 passengers as having been flown by the Defendant from UK airports, when he asserted the figure to be 70,000.
vi) Mr Bradley put to him that many of the claimed UK flights in fact related not to CTA passengers at all, but to passengers who had purchased seats on the Defendant's scheduled flights, but Mr Ersoy denied that.
ivii) A third witness statement from Mr Teker dated 23 February 2016 ("Teker 3"). Teker 3 attached (i) a spreadsheet (the "Teker spreadsheet") containing data which had been recovered from the Defendant's inventory system (a different system from the reservation system, and a system not previously referred to anywhere in evidence, nor, so far as I am aware, previously interrogated in preparation for this trial); and (ii) a number of screenshots taken from the inventory system relating to the flights on which the Category 1 Claimants had reservations. I will return to Mr Teker's evidence below.viii) Two lever arch files containing the documents to support the Teker spreadsheet. This was a mixture of newly disclosed and previously disclosed material, now gathered and presented flight by flight. In relation to each of the 138 flights operated by the Defendant between 23 June 2010 and 31 October 2010, the following documents were collated and tabbed: the log book, and, where available, the passenger manifest produced by the handling agents, and the customs form. To be clear, the manifest included in these files is not the same as the PNL or APL (those being the Defendant's documents, generated from information held on its reservation or inventory systems); rather, this was a document which, in the case of UK flights, was generated by the Defendant's ground handling agents, a copy of which was given to the Defendant's on-board flight attendants just before the aeroplane doors closed, and which was then handed to the customs office on arrival at the destination: I refer to this class of documents as the "Stansted manifests", since most of the UK flights left from Stansted. The log books were held by the Defendant; the Stansted manifests and customs documents were obtained by the Defendant from the customs authorities in the various destinations to which the Defendant flew, because (I was told) copies were no longer held by the Defendant or by its ground handling agents in the UK (the latter had since ceased trading, I was told).
ii) He explained that the PNL was sent by the Defendant to the ground handling staff in advance of the flight; the PNL reflected the number of passengers shown on the Defendant's inventory system as registered for that flight (I therefore understand the PNL to be a list of all passengers with the status of a confirmed booking on the system; it is a document generated by and belonging to the Defendant). As Mr Teker conceded, the PNL would not include any passenger who simply showed up at the airport with a CTA ticket and was allowed to fly on a "first come first served" basis.ii) For that reason, he accepted that he was wrong to assert in his witness statement that 52 passengers had flown on a flight departing from Stansted on 2 July 2010. That figure had been taken from the PNL. The actual figure according to the customs document was 185.
iii) The Teker spreadsheet recorded the total passengers shown on the PNLs for each flight, considered at various dates prior to the flight's departure (3, 2 and 1 week(s) before departure, and on the date of departure). It also recorded actual passenger numbers for those flights, taken from the customs record (a document produced by the Defendant for the customs authority at the receiving airport, held by that authority), corroborated by the Stansted manifests prepared by the ground handling agents and the logbook (a document prepared and held by the Defendant, with total numbers on board signed off by a member of the Defendant's crew when the flight took off). In almost all cases, the PNL column for the date of departure showed a different number from the actual passengers figure. The differences in some cases were large (for example, on 14 July 2010, the PNL showed 315, the actual passengers were shown as 296).
iv) The PNL for the (one) flight which the Defendant operated from Stansted that day to Antalya, showed 0. Mr Teker accepted that this meant that no one had a confirmed reservation on that flight. Yet that flight flew at full capacity with 174 passengers. Mr Teker accepted that all the passengers who boarded were "stand by": they came to the airport and booked onto the flight at the airport. The first 174 would have got on; anyone else waiting for a flight that day would have been sent away disappointed.
v) In some cases, the numbers shown on the customs form did not match the figure shown on the Stansted manifests and the log books. These documents should all have shown the same number. But where they did not, Mr Teker had preferred the customs form as the most authoritative when compiling the Teker spreadsheet. This had occurred for example for the 14 July 2010 flight where the customs form and manifest recorded that there were 296 passengers on board (recorded as "actual passengers"), but the log book recorded 285 passengers on board: Mr Teker could not explain how this had happened. On other dates, the discrepancy between these documents was smaller, being in single figures, but Mr Teker could not explain why the figures did not match.
vi) The number of "no show" passengers recorded on the Teker spreadsheet for each flight was a calculated number, being the difference between the passenger number shown on the PNL for that flight and the actual passengers recorded.
vii) There was also a column shown for empty seats, and this too was a calculated number showing the difference between the PNL and the aircraft capacity; in some instances this gave rise to a negative number. One such negative number was explained by a late change in the aircraft used for a particular flight which reduced the overall capacity but it was not clear how the other negative empty seats numbers could be explained. He agreed that a negative number meant that the aeroplane was overbooked.
viii) He insisted, however, that the Defendant's reservation system would not permit overbooking on any flight. Once the capacity maximum was reached, a passenger could only be put on a waiting list.
My conclusions about alleged overbooking
THE DEFENDANT'S RESERVATION SYSTEM
ii) There were times when revised PNLs were sent to the ground handling staff by the Defendant. The circumstances in which the PNLs came to be revised was unclear, but may have related to late reservations being made.ii) He did sometimes make changes to reservations on the system, where he could see that there were errors, for example where the tickets were for the wrong date or the wrong destination; in those circumstances he would cancel the tickets but issue a new ticket with the right details – if there was availability.
iii) He did at times manually alter the capacity figure for each flight on the system, to show a figure in excess of the aircraft's actual capacity. This was done where travel agents wanted to replace cancelled passengers with new passengers, but did not want to take the risk of losing the seats if the cancellation was executed first in order. This excess capacity figure was permitted to remain on the system for a few minutes (and depended on Mr Teker going into the system to restore the lower capacity figure a few minutes later).
iv) The system required a phone number to be entered at the time of making a booking. Because Mr Teker often did not have a telephone number to hand, he would enter a "fake" number simply to complete the booking. This was logged on the system as "11". He agreed that where the system recorded that notifications of cancellations had been sent by SMS message to "11", that in fact meant that an SMS had been sent to a non-existent phone number, and that no notification had in fact been given. There was no other system of notification apparent on the system, either to the passenger or the agent.
v) He acknowledged instances where he had apparently cancelled reservations. One example concerned a group of 14 passengers booked to fly on 20 July 2010 whose reservations were cancelled by the Defendant without a request from the agent or passengers (he thought there had been a reason for this, namely a late flight cancellation).
vi) He acknowledged that he sometimes made mistakes in booking flights, which mistakes were then rectified by him going into the reservations system and changing the booking: Mrs Manto's case provided an example of where this had happened.
vii) The "RCVD" column on the reservation system was "free text" so that he could write whatever he wanted in this column if he was using the system. There was no set procedure for what was entered in that column.
THE CONTRACTUAL ANALYSIS
General
Category 1
"once a customer has a PNR and a confirmed booking that person will be entitled to board the relevant Atlasjet flight".
He thereby acknowledged that the entitlement to board was consequent on a passenger having a confirmed booking.
"the KTHY customers were permitted to cancel their re-booked flights with Atlasjet in order to change the time, date or destination".
He thereby acknowledged that CTA passengers who were rebooked on the Defendant's flights were permitted to alter a booking without penalty (subject, of course, to availability on the chosen replacement flight(s)), and there was flexibility on their side. However, Mr Teker also maintained that he would not cancel or amend any booking without having received a specific request to that effect from the agent or passenger; I have addressed that evidence above (and rejected it as evidence of Mr Teker's practice, in fact) but I accept that evidence as representing the position as it ought to have been, and as was understood by both parties as part of the agreement, namely that once a booking was made, the Defendant had no unilateral right to change it (possibly, unless there was some unavoidable force majeure or crisis – this caveat was not the subject of argument and not relevant on the facts of the individual cases before me).
"I would send the Atlasjet ticket, or more often an email confirming the new PNR and the flight details, to the travel agent."
It is clear that tickets were not invariably issued to passengers with confirmed bookings, and that the issue of the ticket did not assume any particular importance for either party. I conclude that the issue of the ticket was not, on an objective analysis, the point at which the contract came into existence. The critical moment, when the CTA passenger's status changed from being a "hopeful applicant" to being a passenger with a contractual right to be carried on the Defendant's flights, was when the booking was confirmed on the Defendant's system. This was an electronic "event" not necessarily accompanied by the issue of any separate document of entitlement in the passenger's name. Although emails should have been sent according to Mr Teker's practice, this was not invariably done (there are examples in the papers where no email was sent, or so it appears), and when it was done, it was done at a time convenient to Mr Teker, in order to confirm the reservation which had already been made; the emails were not themselves contractually significant.
Category 2
i) a series of emails from the Defendant to various travel agents and other recipients in which the Defendant asked the recipients to note the system in operation at that time and spread the word that CTA passengers should come to the airport if they wanted to fly with the Defendant. One of these emails listed certain named travel agents who would deal with the exchange of tickets;ii) a notice in the members' area of the Association of British Travel Agents, again describing the system and asking ABTA travel agents to spread the word; and
iii) the Defendant's own statements aimed at CTA passengers, published on their website, inviting CTA passengers to contact travel agents to rebook their flights.
Category 3
Conclusion on Contract
THE INDIVIDUAL CASES
Category 1 Individual Cases
Nazife Atesogullari
Serdar Ozkes
Gulhan Akguc
Category 2 Individual Cases
Perihan Harman
Turkan Manto
Mulla Bozdere
Category 3 Individual Claims
Mehmet Ali Caglar
Nedim Yuzudik
"quota of our flight number STN-AYT dated 13 July is unfortunately full. In this case we have cancelled this PNR. Please determine the dates which are convenient for passengers from the website www.atlastjet.com and make your request accordingly".
Cumali Sendur
Fahriye Korkmaz
QUANTUM OF DAMAGES IN CONTRACT
DENIED BOARDING REGULATIONS
"1. This Regulation shall apply:
(a) to passengers departing from an airport located in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies;
(b) to passengers departing from an airport located in a third country to an airport situated in the territory of a Member State to which the Treaty applies, unless they received benefits or compensation and were given assistance in that third country, if the operating air carrier of the flight concerned is a Community carrier.
2. Paragraph 1 shall apply on the condition that passengers:
(a) have a confirmed reservation on the flight concerned and, except in the case of cancellation referred to in Article 5, present themselves for check-in,
- as stipulated and at the time indicated in advance and in writing (including by electronic means) by the air carrier, the tour operator or an authorised travel agent, or, if no time is indicated,
- not later than 45 minutes before the published departure time; or
(b) have been transferred by an air carrier or tour operator from the flight for which they held a reservation to another flight, irrespective of the reason.
3. This Regulation shall not apply to passengers travelling free of charge or at a reduced fare not available directly or indirectly to the public. However, it shall apply to passengers having tickets issued under a frequent flyer programme or other commercial programme by an air carrier or tour operator.
…"
THE LIST OF ISSUES
"(1) The Protocol between Atlasjet and the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
1) Can the English Court recognise this document, given that one 'party' to the agreement is a minister of the Government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus signing on behalf of that Government?
2) If so, what is the governing law of the Protocol?
3) Can the Protocol be enforced as against Atlasjet by reason of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999?
4) If so, what is the identifiable class and/or the particular description of third parties under the Protocol within the meaning of S.1(3) of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999?
5) If so, what, on their true construction, were the enforceable obligations of Atlasjet to this class/description of third parties under the Protocol?
6) Was the Protocol in any event abandoned by Atlasjet and the TRNC and, if so, when?
7) Insofar as Atlasjet can be said to have assumed obligations to the Claimants pursuant to the Protocol, prima facie enforceable at the suit of those Claimants, what is the effect on those obligations of the Protocol dated 9th February 2011?"
None of these issues were aired at trial, which I take to signify the Claimants' abandonment of these points, and acceptance of the Defendant's case that the Claimants could not rely on the Protocols. Given the Claimants' concession, there is no need to consider the issues individually.
"(2) Agency of CTA.
8) Did CTA have actual authority from Atlasjet to act as its agent?
9) If so, what was the scope of that authority?
10) In light of the answers to the above, what is the status, if any, of the notice published by CTA on its website as referred to in paragraph 8 of the Particulars of Claim vis-à-vis Atlasjet?
11) Were the passengers' contracts of carriage with CTA frustrated by the suspension of CTA's operations on 21st June 2010?"
None of these issues were aired at trial, which I take to signify the Claimants' acceptance that the Defendant was not CTA's agent. Given the Claimants' concession, there is no need to consider the issues individually.
"(3) Regulation EC261/2004 issues common to some or all of the Claimants
12) Was Atlasjet the operating carrier of the Flights listed in Schedule 1 to the Particulars of Claim, or any of them?
13) If the relevant flights were not the flights listed in Schedule 1, but were some other flights (ie 'rearranged' flights), does EC261/2004 apply given the provisions of Article 3 thereof?
14) In either case, does EC261/2004 in any event apply to:
i) Flights departing Turkey
ii) Flights departing the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus?
15) Were the Flights in Schedule 1 cancelled and, if so, on what date?
16) Does Article 12 of EC261/2004 operate as a set off to damages claims?"
The Claimants did advance a generic claim under the EU Regulations, which I have addressed above; of the specific issues listed above (12-16), only issue 16 remained in issue before me, and my conclusion on that is set out above. Otherwise, the Claimants abandoned these points and there is no need to deal with them individually.
CONCLUSION