2010 Folio 1444 |
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
COMMERCIAL COURT
Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
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1) Mr Munib Masri 2)Mr Lee Manning (Receiver) |
Claimants |
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- and - |
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1) Consolidated Contractors International Co SAL 2) Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Co SAL 3) The Judicial Administrators 4) The Nexen Companies |
Defendants |
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(instructed by Simmons & Simmons) for Mr. Masri
Michael Green Esq, QC (instructed by Bargate Murray) for Mr. Manning
James Lewis Esq, QC & Ben Brandon Esq
(instructed by S C Andrew LLP) for the First & Second Defendants
Anthony Boswood Esq, QC & James Cutress Esq
(instructed by Hannah & Mould) for the Judicial Administrators
Timothy Howe Esq, QC
(instructed by Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP) for the Nexen Companies
Hearing dates: 1st December 2010; 14th & 15th December 2010
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Gloster, DBE:
Recent Procedural History
The without notice orders made on 1 December 2010
"… over and in respect of all oil and rights to oil which CCOG is or may from time to time hereafter become entitled (including oil not yet allocated to CCOG) under the terms of the Joint Operating Agreement ('JOA') between the participants in the Masila Concession, as referred to in the said Order of 20 December 2007."
"… to receive, take possession of, sell, deal with or otherwise dispose of all such oil, and to exercise all such rights to oil, in the name of and on behalf of CCOG. … The Receiver shall hold all such oil and any proceeds thereof to the credit of this action and to the order of the Court."
"2. For the purposes of receiving and taking possession of the oil and rights to oil as set out in paragraph [1] above, the Receiver shall be entitled to exercise in the name of CCOG, to the exclusion of CCOG or any other agent thereof, all associated rights of CCOG as set out in the JOA, including in particular CCOG's right to be provided with information concerning oil production by Canadian Nexen Petroleum Yemen ("the Operator") and to make nominations of quantities of oil thereunder. For the avoidance of doubt, all obligations under the JOA shall remain the responsibility of CCOG, including the obligation to pay cash calls, and the Receiver shall have no liability in relation thereto.
"3. For the avoidance of doubt, by reason of the appointment referred to above, CCOG shall be restrained as follows.
1) CCOG shall not receive or take for its own account, to the exclusion of the Receiver, any Masila oil to which it is or has become entitled under the JOA and must not sell, encumber or otherwise deal with any such oil. In the event that CCOG obtains possession or control of any such oil, it shall immediately take steps to transfer the same to the Receiver; and
2) CCOG shall not commence any proceedings, nor take steps in any existing proceedings, in any jurisdiction in the world (other than in the European Union) the object or effect of which is to interfere with or obstruct the receivership, including by interfering with or obstructing the arbitration proceedings referred to at paragraph [4] below or any orders of this Court in support of such proceedings including the order referred to at paragraph [5] below, and shall not procure that others do so
from the date hereof until such time as the Receiver shall have confirmed that he has received oil (or the proceeds thereof) to the value set out in paragraph [9] below.
4. That the Receiver be and hereby is directed to commence arbitration proceedings in the name of CCOG against the Operator under Article 17 of the JOA for the purposes of establishing his right in law as against the Operator to the receipt of the oil (and to exercise associated rights under the JOA), as Receiver for and on behalf of CCOG. The Receiver shall raise the question of his recognition by the arbitral tribunal as an issue for determination in the arbitration.
5. That the Receiver be and hereby is directed to seek in the name of CCOG an order from this Court in the form of the attached draft Order against the Operator in support of the arbitration proceedings or prospective arbitration proceedings referred to in paragraph [4] above, to preserve CCOG's entitlement to Masila oil in the hands of the Operator pending the outcome of the said arbitral proceedings.
6. The Receiver shall take no steps pursuant to the extension of his appointment by reason of this order pending the return date or further order of the Court except in relation to the commencement of the arbitration proceedings referred to in [4] above and in relation to the asset preservation order referred to in [5] above. For the avoidance of doubt, the Receiver shall be entitled to enter into communications as necessary (including with the Operator, the Receiver, the arbitral tribunal or any body responsible for appointing such tribunal), and shall be entitled to take steps to enforce or otherwise ensure the effectiveness of this order and the said asset preservation order.
7. That the Receiver's powers under paragraph 3 of the Order of 20 December 2007 shall continue to apply to his appointment as extended pursuant to the present order. The Receiver shall in addition be entitled to take any further steps necessary in connection with the taking of possession, storage, sale or disposal of the oil, including instructing brokers or other agents for such purposes, arranging for the transport of oil by chartering vessels or entering into contracts of carriage, arranging insurance and any other steps incidental to such taking of possession, storage, sale or disposal."
"IF CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS (OIL AND GAS) COMPANY SAL DISOBEYS THIS ORDER, THE COMPANY'S ASSETS MAY BE SEIZED.
IF CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS (OIL AND GAS) COMPANY SAL DISOBEYS THIS ORDER, YOU, EDGARD ELIAS JOUJOU, IN YOUR CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SAID CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS (OIL AND GAS) COMPANY SAL, MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT. THIS NOTICE IS GIVEN WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY REPRESENTATIONS YOU MAY MAKE AS TO YOUR CAPACITY AND POSITION UNDER LEBANESE LAW AND DOES NOT REPRESENT A DETERMINATION OF ANY SUCH ISSUES.
IF CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS (OIL AND GAS) COMPANY SAL DISOBEYS THIS ORDER, YOU, SAID TOUFIC KHOURY, TOUFIC SAID KHOURY, SOUHEIL HASSIB SABBAGH, SAMER SAID KHOURY, SAMIR HASSIB SABBAGH AND WAEL S. KHOURY, IF FOUND TO ACT AS DIRECTORS OR OFFICERS OF THE SAID CONSOLIDATED CONTRACTORS (OIL AND GAS) COMPANY SAL, MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT
ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS THE RESPONDENT TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY ALSO BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE IMPRISONED, FINED OR HAVE THEIR ASSETS SEIZED"
"Anyone served with or notified of this order [to] apply to the court at any time to vary or discharge this order (or so much of it as affects that person)"
"18. The terms of this order will affect the following persons in a country or state outside the jurisdiction of this Court:
(A) the Defendant or its officer or agent appointed by power of attorney;
(B) any person who—
(1) is subject to the jurisdiction of this court;
(2) has been given written notice of this order at his residence or place of business within the jurisdiction of this court; and
(3) is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which constitute or assist in a breach of the terms of this order; and
(C) any other person, only to the extent that this order is declared enforceable by or is enforced by a court in that country or state or is enforced, recognised or given effect to by an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over that person (whether such arbitral tribunal has its seat within or outside England and Wales).
19. Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside England and Wales, prevent any third party from complying with—
(A) What it reasonably believes to be its obligations, contractual or otherwise, under the laws and obligations of the country or state in which those assets are situated or under the proper law of any contract between itself and the Defendants; and
(B) any orders of the courts of that country or state, provided that reasonable notice of any application for such an order is given to the Claimant's solicitors."
"2. Until the return date or further order of the Court, CNPY must not permit any person to carry out any lifting of oil to which Consolidated Contractors (Oil and Gas) Company SAL ("CCOG") is entitled under the terms of the Masila Joint Operating Agreement as amended ("JOA") relating to the concession known as Block 14 or the Masila Block in Masila, Yemen and must not otherwise dispose of or deal with any such oil, other than with the written consent of Mr. Manning acting as receiver for CCOG PROVIDED HOWEVER THAT CNPY may permit a lifting of such oil after the date hereof where CNPY is contractually obliged to do so by virtue of specific lifting arrangements in relation to a particular quantity of oil which were finally concluded prior to CNPY having notice of the terms of this order."
"10. Persons outside England and Wales
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) below, the terms of this order do not affect or concern anyone outside the jurisdiction of this court.
(2) The terms of this order will affect the following persons in a country or state outside the jurisdiction of this court—
(a) The Defendants and CCOG or their officers or agents appointed by power of attorney
(b) Any person who—
(i) Is subject to the jurisdiction of this court;
(ii) Has been given written notice of this order at his residence of place of business within the jurisdiction of this court; and
(iii) Is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the jurisdiction of this court which constitute or assist in a breach of the terms of this order; and
(c) any other person, only to the extent that this order is declared enforceable by or is enforced by a court in that country or state.
11. Assets located outside England and Wales.
Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside England and Wales, prevent any third party from complying with—
(1) what it reasonably believes to be its obligations, contractual or otherwise, under the laws and obligations of the country or state in which those assets are situated or under the proper law of any contract between itself and any of the parties to the present proceedings; and
(2) any orders of the courts of that country or state, provided that reasonable notice of any application for such an order is given to the Claimant's solicitors."
The hearing on 14 and 15 December 2010
i) CCOG and its co-judgment debtor, Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL ("CCIC") (together "the Judgment Debtors"), appeared by leading and junior counsel, Mr. James Lewis QC and Mr. Ben Brandon;
ii) Mr. Edgard Elias Joujou ("Mr. Joujou"), the lead judicial administrator, and his two co-administrators[1], who were appointed by an order dated 20 December 2008 of the First Instance Court of Beirut ("the Judicial Administrators") to manage the Judgment Debtors, appeared by leading and junior counsel, Mr. Anthony Boswood QC and Mr. James Cutress;
iii) the Judgment Creditor appeared by junior counsel, Mr. Simon Salzedo and Mr. Colin West;
iv) the Receiver appeared by leading counsel, Mr. Michael Green QC; and
v) CNPY appeared by leading counsel, Mr. Timothy Howe QC.
"… in his personal capacity … to discharge [the Third Receivership Order] insofar as it relates to him personally."
and, on behalf of the Judicial Administrators, to discharge the Third Receivership Order insofar as it affected them personally[2]. The Judicial Administrators were not seeking, on behalf of CCOG to discharge the Third Receivership Order insofar as it related to CCOG, although many of Mr. Boswood's submissions in fact suggested that that should be the result.
"7. The Companies are presently without instructions from the Judicial Administrators as to what action to take in respect of this application. It is understood directions will have to be sought from the Lebanese Court. It is clear that there are serious issues to be tried and the Court of course can refuse to re-make the order of its own motion. The issues on the order are that it gives rise to concerns over sovereignty, comity and exorbitance, because:
7.1 it purports to exercise jurisdiction over the assets situated abroad in Yemen;
7.2 it purports to interpolate a receiver as a form of manager exercising direct rights to take possession of oil abroad under a contract with a third party in a foreign territory;
7.3 it indirectly impleads the State of Lebanon, which, since the commencement of the Judicial Administration, has controlled CCOG, an entity created under its law and jurisdiction;
7.4 it infringes the sovereignty of the Lebanese Court over an entity which was created under its law and jurisdiction and which is subject to its judicial administration:
7.4.1 by directing it to do that which the Lebanese court has forbidden it to do, and
7.4.2 by addressing a penal notice to the Lebanese Court's officer, in Lebanon, demanding that he act contrary to the laws of Lebanon both in Lebanon and in other territories outside the United Kingdom."
In the light of the absence of instructions from Mr. Joujou, no further argument was presented on behalf of the Judgment Debtors at the hearing.
"…
(a) In place of paragraph 18(A) of the Receivership Order and Injunction, the following wording shall apply:
'the Defendant or its officer or director or any other person acting (either alone or jointly with others) in the capacity of, or in place of, a decision making organ of the Defendant'
(b) Paragraph 18 shall apply subject to the following proviso:
'For the avoidance of doubt, it is not a breach of the Receivership Order and Injunction for the Judicial Administrators of CCOG to seek directions from the Courts of Lebanon as to their conduct of the Judicial Administration of CCOG.'[3]
2. So far as may be necessary, time for filing an appellant's notice at the Court of Appeal shall be extended until 14 days after the hearing at which judgment on the Judicial Administrators' application shall be handed down.
3. So far as may be required, and subject as aforesaid, costs and all other consequential orders shall be adjourned to the hearing at which the said judgment shall be handed down."
I shall refer to this order as "the revised Third Receivership Order".
Earlier history of the litigation in the English courts
i) The Judgment Debtors are jointly and severally liable to the Judgment Creditor in an amount currently in excess of US$ 75.6 million, pursuant to my judgments on liability and quantum, and the quantum order of Tomlinson J[4] and a decision of the Court of Appeal[5]. I held that the Judgment Creditor had a ten percent interest in CCOG's ten percent interest in the valuable Masila oil concession in Yemen; and the Court of Appeal, on the Judgment Creditor's cross-appeal, held in his favour that he had a further entitlement to a percentage of "Operating Costs" recovery. If estimates for the Judgment Creditor's entitlement for 2008-2011 are taken into account, the total sum owed (including interest) is in the region of US$ 99.4 million.
ii) After initially and unsuccessfully objecting to the jurisdiction of the English Court, the Judgment Debtors expressly submitted to the jurisdiction and participated fully in the liability and quantum proceedings before me, and in all subsequent proceedings before other courts, regularly exercising all rights of appeal open to them (except where a pre-condition of their having leave was payment into court of the judgment debt). CCOG is domiciled in Lebanon and has its "statutory seat" there, but is registered as an offshore company which, according to the Judgment Creditor's evidence, means that its operations are not, and cannot be, based in Lebanon. The Judgment Creditor has always contended that CCOG was and is managed from London. CCOG has always denied that, but has given contradictory evidence in these proceedings about whether it is managed from Greece or Lebanon. On its appeal from the First Receivership Order, CCOG sought to contend that it was also domiciled in Greece for the purposes of Article 60 of Council Regulation 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters ("the Brussels I Regulation"). However, the Court of Appeal refused to allow the point about Greek domicile to be taken by CCOG and also considered that there was nothing in the point[6]. Accordingly, it approached the matter on the basis that the English court had clear in personam and subject-matter jurisdiction under the normal principles of English law[7].
iii) As other judges have previously found, there is no doubt that the Consolidated Contractors Group (the group to which CCOG and CCIC belong, and which is beneficially owned and controlled by members of the Khoury and Sabbagh families[8] ("the CCC Group")) in general, and the Judgment Debtors in particular, have more than sufficient funds to meet the judgment debt without imperilling their ability successfully to carry on business if they wish to do so. The revenues from the Masila oil concession alone are more than sufficient to enable the Judgment Debtors to discharge the judgment debt. Thus, on the evidence before me, there is no doubt that both CCOG and CCIC are solvent.
iv) On several occasions, judges at first instance and in the Court of Appeal have concluded that the Judgment Debtors have no intention of paying the judgment debt and are determined to do everything possible to frustrate the Judgment Creditor's efforts to enforce the judgment in whatever jurisdiction such efforts may be made. It is also likely that Lord Bingham had such considerations in mind when, on 26 June 2008, speaking for the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords, he said that "the circumstances and history of this case call for an unusual order".
v) On 25 May 2007, HHJ Mackie QC (sitting as a judge of this court) made an anti-suit injunction against CCOG and CCIC. I refer to this in greater detail below, in the context of proceedings brought by the Judgment Debtors in Yemen.
vi) On 20 December 2007, in addition to the First Receivership Order, I also made an order requiring the Judgment Debtors to provide certain information about their assets ("the First Affidavits Order") and a freezing order prohibiting CCOG from assigning or dealing with its rights in the Masila Concession ("Freezing Order No. 1"). The First Receivership Order contained, at paragraph 15 a provision in the following terms:
"Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside England and Wales, require the Defendants and/or their directors to disobey the order of any court of competent jurisdiction in relation to such assets."
As can be seen, this protected the Judgment Debtors in respect of any order, wherever made, irrespective of whether assets were located in the particular jurisdiction.
vii) The Judgment Debtors appealed the First Receivership Order and Freezing Order No. 1. On 4 April 2008, the Court of Appeal (Lord Neuberger, Ward LJ and Lawrence Collins LJ (as he then was)) dismissed their appeal and confirmed the appointment of the Receiver by way of equitable execution over CCOG's rights to the revenues from oil sales relating to the Masila Concession and Freezing Order No. 1[9]. The House of Lords gave the Judgment Debtors leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal's decision, but only on condition that the Judgment Debtors paid the entire amount of the judgment debt into court. The Judgment Debtors failed to comply with that provision so their appeal was struck out.
viii) After a three-day inter partes hearing in August 2008, on 21 October 2008, Tomlinson J (as he then was) made a second receivership order ("the Second Receivership Order") appointing the Receiver as receiver over CCIC's contractual receivables under 25 major international construction projects (other than the Masila Concession). The Second Receivership Order extended far wider than the First Receivership Order. Tomlinson J also made various other freezing orders on the same date restraining:
a) CCIC and CCOG from dealing with or diminishing the value of funds in certain bank accounts ("Freezing Order No. 2");
b) CCIC from receiving or dealing with the receivables over which he had appointed a Receiver ("Freezing Order No. 3"); and
c) CCOG from disposing of or dealing with, or diminishing the value of, any interest in shares in other companies ("Freezing Order No. 4").
ix) However, unlike the First Receivership Order, paragraph 15 of the Second Receivership Order only excused the Judgment Debtors from non-compliance with the English Court order if a contradictory order was made by the courts of a jurisdiction in which the assets were located. Thus, paragraph 15 provided as follows:
"Nothing in this order shall, in respect of assets located outside England and Wales, require the Defendants and/or their directors or officers to disobey the orders of any court of competent jurisdiction in the jurisdiction in which those assets are located. If the Defendants become aware that any such order as would require them not to comply with any provision of this order has been made or applied for, or is likely to be made or applied for, they shall, so far as they are reasonably able to do so, give all information available to them about such order or application or proposed application to the receiver and to the claimant's solicitors as soon as practicable." (emphasis added)
In a judgment dated 13 November 2008, the Court of Appeal (Lawrence Collins and Goldring LJJ) dismissed the Judgment Debtors' application for permission to appeal against the Second Receivership Order and Freezing Orders Nos. 2 to 4.
Proceedings in the Lebanese Courts and the relevant events relating to the Judgment Debtors
"… that the [Judgment Debtors] have deliberately set out to obtain from the Lebanese court an order preventing compliance with the orders of a court to whose jurisdiction they have relevantly submitted, viz, the orders of Gloster J, and that they could procure the setting aside of that order if they perceived it as in their interests to do so."
"In our capacity as members of [CCIC/CCOG];
Having received from the British law firm Simmons & Simmons a letter addressed to each one of us which includes a threat of criminal pursuit and of imprisonment in case we do not provide information regarding the business of the company,
And having been notified previously of a Lebanese decision precluding the provision of any information to the British courts because such provision of information would constitute a disclosure of confidential information.
Therefore,
And in order for us to preserve the interests of the company while avoiding legal pursuit before the Lebanese or British courts,
We decide to resign from the board of your esteemed company, wishing it the best,
Provided that such resignation shall have immediate effects."
"Whereas the position of the shareholders is that they do not oppose the judicial administration aiming primarily at electing a new Board of Directors.
Therefore, and in reference to both clauses 598/604 C.C.P., the judge hereby decides to appoint Messrs. George Sakhour and Dr. Jihad Al-Hajjar and Mr. Edgard Elias Joujou to administer the Company. Until their tasks are determined later on and until the initial two members summon a general assembly to elect a new board of directors for the Company, it is the responsibility of the administrators to represent the Company, both internally and externally either jointly or independently.
Decision issued in Beirut dated 20/12/08"
"… the very purpose of the judicial administration, as conceived by the Lebanese Court itself, is to insulate or immunise the Companies, as creatures of Lebanese law, from the pressure derived from the sanction of contempt of court contained in the extra-territorial orders made by the English Courts in support of the enforcement of the English judgment debt. The position is exactly the same as in the aforementioned Fruehauf case where a judicial administrator had been appointed over a French company to perform a contract that was contrary to an embargo decided by the US government."
Professor Naffah did not purport to act as an independent expert, and his affidavit did not contain the usual expert's declaration. The purpose to which he refers (i.e. to prevent enforcement of the English court orders) does not appear to be the same purpose as that stated by the Lebanese Court in its order of 20 December 2008.
"To entrust Mr. … Joujou with the management of the Company with the assistance of [the co-administrators] on the understanding that the tasks will be defined later, provided that Mr. … Joujou shall conduct the ordinary business of the company with the obligation to seek the prior approval of the Court for any matter that is important or not covered by the above."
"… not to oppose the above-mentioned exequatur constitutes a circumvention of the court of first instance decision in respect of the case pending before it and raised by the [Judgment Debtors] in July 2007."
which appears to be a reference to the proceedings for declaratory relief that the English judgments should not be enforced.
"After considering the matter,
We Decide:
To approve the proposal of the Judicial Administrator in respect of convening the general assembly of the shareholders and to instruct the two assisting judicial administrators to execute this task.
To approve instructing the judicial administrator Mr. … Joujou to supervise the pleading and defences in England provided that no binding decisions are to be taken before seeking directions from this Court.
To charge the applicants to pay the advance on the fees to proceed with the above steps."
i) payment of the judgment sum constituted an important matter which could only be decided upon by the Lebanese Court, pursuant to the order dated 14 January 2009;
ii) payment could be made prior to the determination of the exequatur proceedings; and
iii) whether the Judgment Debtors' opposition to the exequatur orders should be continued.
It does not appear that any request was made to the court by Mr. Joujou, in the petition dated 29 May 2009, for its approval to permit the payment of the judgment debts or even that the court should consider whether it was consistent with business ethics or in the interests of the Judgment Debtors to do so, given the ongoing costs consequences of appealing the exequatur orders and resisting enforcement measures, and the fact that judgment had been given by a court to whose jurisdiction the Judgment Debtors had submitted. Nor does it appear from the evidence before me that the Lebanese Court was informed of the fact that the meetings which the Judicial Administrators had been directed by the Court to hold had been inquorate, and therefore ineffective.
"Having received the petition dated 20 May, 2009
And based on the fact that the decision on the payment of the English judgment sum of sixty five million US dollars by the Company is not a matter than can be decided by the judicial administrator without the consent of the Court,
We hereby instruct the judicial administrator to take all necessary actions and measures to defend the interest of the Company by all legal and judicial means he considers appropriate including the continuation of the legal actions outlined in the petition dated 20 May, 2009."
"To instruct the Judicial Administrator not to take any step leading to the carrying out of the decisions issued by the foreign courts at the request of Mr Munib Masri unless and until they are granted exequatur by the Lebanese courts, in particular in relation to any requests for the disclosure of documents or the disclosure of confidential information relating to the Company to Mr Masri, or the transfer of monies to the English receiver appointed by the English courts, or the cooperation with the latter through the provision of information and other steps."
The reasons given by the Lebanese Court for this decision were as follows:
"Whereas the Company had initially and on purpose taken the decision not to pay the amounts requested by Mr Munib Masri before the order instituting the judicial administration was given,
Whereas, pursuant to the obligation of the Court supervising the judicial administration to preserve the interests of the Company and to abide by the principle of caution in respect of the issue of payment of large debts, specifically those that have been the subject of opposition by the Company before the court prior to the institution of the judicial administration,
Noting the necessity to abide by the obligation not to pay until and after the rendering of a court decision obliging said payment and issued by the competent Lebanese judicial authority,
Whereas, the foreign orders are not enforceable against the Company and hence are not binding upon the Company until they are granted exequatur by virtue of a decision given by the Lebanese courts,
Whereas, it does not appear, as to date, that such decision has been rendered regarding any of the judgments issued by the English courts in spite of Mr Masri's application to the Lebanese courts to obtain orders granting exequatur,
Noting that Mr Masri has not made any opposition nor any request in the proceedings before this court."
Mr. Joujou
The Yemeni Proceedings
Proceedings in Greece
Proceedings in other jurisdictions
The basis for extending the scope of the December 2007 Receivership Order
i) The First Receivership Order has not proved effective in enabling the Receiver to collect CCOG's revenues from the sale of its oil entitlements because of CCOG's refusal to provide information identifying purchasers and its refusal to account to the Receiver for revenues which it has received to his order. CCOG has failed to instruct the purchasers of the oil to pay the sales proceeds of oil to the Receiver. The Receiver has not to date been able to collect any oil revenues.
ii) None of the orders granted by the English courts or those of other jurisdictions have yet resulted in the Judgment Creditor receiving any substantial sums in respect of the judgment debt. Certain amounts have been paid into court, or are subject to provisional attachments in the Cayman Islands and Switzerland, but these sums total less than US$ 1 million. The reasons for the failure of the First Receivership Order to bear fruit have been the Judgment Debtors' determined efforts to circumvent the various orders.
iii) Part of the Judgment Debtors' strategy appears to involve delaying execution long enough that the Judgment Debtors will have no significant assets left. Their business affairs are being deliberately run down. The concession expires in December 2011 and certain of the Judgment Debtors' other contracts will expire shortly thereafter. Neither CCOG nor CCIC are taking on new projects, such projects being taken on by other companies in the CCC Group. Since the vast majority of both companies' assets consist of contractual revenue streams, this practice alone makes it inevitable that the assets of the companies are diminishing. Further, accounting information disclosed by the Judgment Debtors shows clearly very significant decreases in the value of their assets between mid-2007 and early-2008.
iv) If the Receiver were put in a position himself to stand in CCOG's shoes and himself to deal with CCOG's oil entitlements (rather than merely to collect the proceeds of CCOG's sales of CCOG's oil entitlement), he would have actual control of sales of oil. He himself would arrange sales of CCOG's oil and third party purchasers (potentially including other participants in the Masila Concession) and collecting the proceeds of such sales. The likelihood is that the Receiver would be able to arrange sales on FOB terms which would mean that the purchasers would be responsible for taking delivery of the oil at the export terminal.
v) The reason why this approach has a reasonable prospect of being effective in terms of enforcing the judgment debt (and a better chance than the existing receivership order) is that CCOG's right to oil itself takes the form of a contractual right under a contract subject to English law (namely the JOA) and to arbitration against an independent third party (CNPY) which is itself based in jurisdictions where English judgments or arbitration awards are likely to be enforceable without difficulty. It is the JOA which provides the contractual nexus and would enable the Receiver (if the Receivership were extended) to receive, on behalf of CCOG, the oil of which CNPY has physical possession as operator of the concession.
vi) The right of CCOG, acting by the Receiver, to lift the oil and transport it from the terminal, is a right that the Receiver (if the First Receivership Order were extended) could enforce by arbitration proceedings in England, brought on behalf of CCOG as against CNPY under the terms of the JOA. Such proceeding would effectively determine the question whether CNPY would receive a good receipt as against CCOG, if CNPY delivered the oil to the Receiver acting on its behalf.
vii) CNPY, as an entity beyond the personal jurisdiction of the court, under principles of comity, is not required to recognise the Receiver's rights without more. However, the appropriate mechanism for the determination of that dispute is arbitration under the Arbitration Act 1996, as envisaged under the JOA. Thus, the tribunal with competent jurisdiction over CNPY for the purpose of determining the question whether CNPY should treat the Receiver (or any other person) as acting on behalf of CCOG to call for the oil under the JOA is an arbitral tribunal established in accordance with the arbitration agreement contained in the JOA. Accordingly, this court has supervisory jurisdiction over any such arbitration proceedings pursuant to the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996.
viii) Such a mechanism together with an asset preservation order preventing CNPY from lifting any oil to which CCOG is entitled under the terms of the JOA save with the consent of the Receiver, would be an efficient and proportionate means of enforcing the judgment.
The Judicial Administrators' argument why the Third Receivership Order should be discharged or not continued against them personally
i) As a matter of English law the court had no jurisdiction to order the service of the order out of the jurisdiction on Mr. Joujou, or to name him in the penal notice. There were a number of reasons why the English court lacked jurisdiction:
a) First, the English court had no personal jurisdiction over the Judicial Administrators. So far as the proceedings were concerned, he was a third party. Professor Naffah's evidence showed that, as a matter of Lebanese law, he was not an officer or agent of CCOG or CCIC. Rather, Mr. Joujou represented the Lebanese Court in relation to its custodianship of the Judgment Debtors' affairs. He therefore did not fall within the standard Babanaft[16] proviso as set out at paragraph 18(A) of the Third Receivership Order ("the Defendant or its officer or agent appointed by power of attorney").
b) Second, even if Mr. Joujou were an officer or agent of the Judgment Debtors (which, submits Mr. Boswood, he is not), since the decision of the House of Lords in Masri (No. 4)[17], the fact that a corporate judgment debtor is subject to the English court's jurisdiction does not mean that its directors or officers are likewise so subject. Accordingly, the Babanaft proviso in its current form (as it appears, for example, in Appendix 5 of the Admiralty and Commercial Courts Guide) is wrong. It fails to reflect the statement of Lord Mance at paragraph 34 of his opinion in Masri (No. 4):
"Leaving aside situations where the non-party is the alter ego of the party to existing litigation, any suggestion that any non-party can be served without leave under CPR r.6.30(2) with any ancillary summons issued by either party in any proceedings properly brought and served within the jurisdiction clearly cannot be right."
See also per Nicholls LJ in Babanaft (supra) at page 45 B - C:
"Secondly, the defendants will be restrained from doing the prohibited acts by any means whatsoever, whether by their servants or agents or otherwise. In that respect the order will have the usual, wide ambit. But the order should be confined in its effect to the defendants personally, thus excluding everyone else, even the defendants' servants or agents. The defendants' servants or agents, as much as banks and other third parties, may be acting outside the jurisdiction, so that the problem of extraterritorial effect may be as much relevant to them as it is to banks and others."
c) Third, in any event, even if (contrary to the foregoing) there were personal jurisdiction, there was no subject matter jurisdiction to justify the service of an order out of the jurisdiction or the naming of Mr. Joujou in the order. It would therefore be illegitimate for him to be served with the order within the jurisdiction because of the absence of subject matter jurisdiction. As stated by Hoffmann J in MacKinnon v Donaldson[18] at 493:
"The principle is that a state should refrain from demanding obedience to its sovereign authority by foreigners in respect of their conduct outside the jurisdiction".
This principle was cited with approval by Lord Bingham in Société Eram Shipping Co Ltd v Compagnie Internationale de Navigation & Ors[19] at paragraphs 22 and 23, and by Lawrence Collins LJ in Masri[20] at paragraph 33, who went on to make clear (at paragraph 35) that:
"... the mere fact that an order is in personam and is directed towards someone who is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the English court does not exclude the possibility that the making of the order would be contrary to international law or comity, and outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the English court."
On the basis of Société Eram, Lawrence Collins LJ concluded (at paragraph 47) that:
"… it is not permissible as a matter of international law for one State to trespass upon the authority of another, by .... compelling its citizens to do acts within the foreign State's boundaries".
In Babanaft v Bassatne (supra), at page 44 B – C, Nicholls LJ likewise made clear that:
"It would be wrong for an English court, by making an order in respect of overseas assets against a defendant amenable to its jurisdiction to impose or attempt to impose obligations on persons not before the court in respect of acts to be done by them abroad regarding property outside the jurisdiction. That, self evidently would be for the English court to claim an altogether exorbitant, extraterritorial jurisdiction."
d) Fourth, accordingly, as a matter or principle, it is therefore impermissible for the English courts to attempt to compel the Judicial Administrators to act in a certain way outside the jurisdiction. Yet the order seeks to do just that. Indeed, on the basis of the authorities referred to above it is difficult to see the new, extended receivership order as other than wholly exorbitant, as it purports to be an order which interposes a receiver into a contract in relation to and as manager of assets located overseas in Yemen; and it purports to "… impose obligations on persons not before the court in respect of acts to be done by them abroad regarding property outside the jurisdiction….", namely the Judicial Administrators, in relation to their duty to deal with a Lebanese company's assets outside England.
e) Fifth, because Mr. Joujou was named in the penal notice, he was wrongly deprived of the protection of the Babanaft proviso contained in paragraph 18(C) of the Third Receivership Order. It was wrong to require Mr. Joujou, as an officer of the Lebanese Court, to assist in the enforcement of an English judgment before such time as the Judgment Creditor had obtained exequatur of the English judgment from the Lebanese Court; at present, the Judgment Creditor had lodged an appeal to the Lebanese Court of Cassation, against the discharge of the exequatur order granted in his favour. Indeed, in the absence of any order of exequatur from the Lebanese Court, it was wrong that there should be any extension of the First Receivership Order even as against the Judgment Debtors themselves.
f) Sixth, on any basis, as in Masri (No. 4), there was no gateway permitting service of contempt proceedings out of the jurisdiction. The English Court should not be seen to be threatening non-parties outside the jurisdiction with imprisonment unless there was proper jurisdiction over them.
g) Seventh, the terms of the Third Receivership Order, and in particular the provisos entitling the Receiver to exercise CCOG's rights to the exclusion of CCOG or any agent or officer of CCOG, and restraining CCOG from receiving or selling any oil, or from taking any steps in any jurisdiction in the world the object or effect of which is to interfere with the receivership, place Mr. Joujou in impermissible double jeopardy so far as the Lebanese Courts are concerned. On the one hand, if he fails to comply with the Third Receivership Order, he is under threat from the English Court for contempt of court; on the other hand, if he takes any steps to carry out the order or to co-operate with the Receiver, he will be acting in breach of orders of the Lebanese Court, exposing him to serious professional and legal sanctions. As Lawrence Collins LJ said in Masri (No 2)[21]:
"[It] would be an exorbitant exercise of jurisdiction to put a third party abroad in a position of having to choose between being in contempt of an English court and having to dishonour its obligations under a law which does not regard the English order as a valid excuse."
h) Eighth, in any event, the Judicial Administrators are "an emanation of the Lebanese State. Professor Naffah states[22]:
"… as a matter of Lebanese law, a judicial administrator is an officer of the Lebanese courts. This means that the judicial administrator is to be considered as an organ of the Lebanese judiciary and consequently the Lebanese state itself. The conduct which he carries out in accordance with the directions of the Lebanese Court are the acts and omissions of the Lebanese Court itself as he is an officer of the Lebanese Court."
As such, the Judicial Administrators are entitled to state immunity under the State Immunity Act, 1978. The penal notice is effectively warning the Lebanese Court that they may be in contempt of court if the Judicial Administrators disobey the English court's orders. That is quite wrong.
i) Accordingly, the Third Receivership Order should be discharged in its entirety (i.e. as against the Judgment Debtors as well) or at least insofar as it affects Mr. Joujou and the other Judicial Administrators personally who, the evidence shows, are completely independent of any of the shareholders in the CCC Group.
j) Tenth, moreover, the order should in any event be discharged on grounds of non-disclosure, since counsel for the Judgment Creditor did not bring to the court's attention, either sufficiently or at all, the relevant legal principles, the evidence relating to Lebanese law and double jeopardy or the status of the Judicial Administrators as emanations of the Lebanese State.
Reasons for continuing the Third Receivership Order in its modified form
"The demands of justice must always be the over-riding consideration in considering the scope of the jurisdiction under section 37(1) [of the Senior Courts Act 1981]." [23]
"… must as always, have regard to its international obligations and take care not to arrogate to itself powers which properly belong elsewhere."[24]
The terms of the penal notice
"… officer or director or any other person acting (either alone or jointly with others) in the capacity of, or in place of, a decision making organ of the Defendant."
as opposed to being identified as merely "any other person" within paragraph 18(C) of the Third Receivership Order, and therefore having the benefit of the standard Babanaft proviso:
"… only to the extent that this order is declared enforceable by or is enforced by a court in that country or state or is enforced, recognised or given effect to by an arbitral tribunal with jurisdiction over that person."
Should Mr. Joujou (or, indeed, his co-administrators) be included in paragraph 18(A) of the Third Receivership Order (and consequently the penal notice)[29]?
Issues
i) As a matter of jurisdiction and in the light of the decision in Masri (No. 4) (supra) is it ever appropriate to include foreign officers or persons "… acting in the capacity of, or in place of, a decision-making organ of the defendant" or "directing minds"[30] of a defendant company subject to the jurisdiction of the English court, in a standard paragraph such as paragraph 18(A) as being directly affected by an injunction granted by the English court in respect of property outside the jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the order has not been recognised in the state were the foreign officer resides?
ii) Even if there is personal jurisdiction over Mr. Joujou or the other Judicial Administrators is there subject-matter jurisdiction?
iii) Are the Judicial Administrators "emanations" of the Lebanese State and consequently not to be included in any order?
iv) Are the Judicial Administrators persons "… acting in the capacity of, or in place of, a decision-making organ of" CCOG?
v) As a matter of discretion, should the English court make an order which might put the Judicial Administrators in conflict with the orders of the Lebanese courts and/or expose them to double jeopardy because of those court orders, in circumstances where the Judgment Creditor has not yet obtained exequatur of the liability judgments in Lebanon?
Issue i): the impact of Masri (No. 4) on the standard Babanaft proviso – personal jurisdiction
Issue ii): even if there is personal jurisdiction over Mr. Joujou or the other Judicial Administrators is there subject-matter jurisdiction?
Issues iii) and iv): the role of Mr. Joujou – emanation of the Lebanese State and/or "directing mind"?
"the Defendant or its officer or director or any other person acting (either alone or jointly with others) in the capacity of, or in place of, a decision making organ of the Defendant."
"33) Once the judicial administrator is in place, 'the immediate consequence is that all the powers of the then-acting directors are removed so that all powers are transferred to the (judicial) administrator and therefore the original directors cannot engage the company, or initiate proceedings in its name or lodge any appeal' (Samir Abou Zamel, …)
34) Thus, it has been ruled that 'the appointment of a judicial administrator with the task to manage the company … triggers the withdrawal/suspension [desseisissement] of the corporate organs that were in place until such a moment' (Cass. 3e civ., 25 October 2006, …)
35) Such withdrawal/suspension of the existing corporate organs, and in particular of the directors of the company, is the 'automatic consequence' of the appointment of the judicial administrators. Once a judicial administrator has been appointed, he is 'the only one who has the power to represent the company in court and, more generally, to carry out any legal act on behalf of the company; (R. Vatinet, 'Administration provisoire, Juris-classeur Sociétés, p. 23, para. 68 and 69).
36) The judicial administrator 'is a manager of the company who replaces the legal organs of direction of the company in the framework determined by the judge. In other words he is the legal representative of the company by virtue of a judicial decision' (Samir Abou Zamel …)."
Professor Slim agrees with this description in material respects.
"Thus, in respect of the handling of the corporate crisis, the judicial administrator, as a court officer, exercises directly a public function, and he is specifically empowered to exercise the elements of the public authority. These are sovereign acts of the Lebanese Court."
"4.27 The power of the judicial administrator derives from the Court that appointed him. But he cannot be considered as the emanation of the public authority, i.e. the State, for several reasons:
4.27.1. First, the emanation of a public authority is a person/body who/which provides a public service under the control of government.27. The judicial administrator has no public authority and does not provide a public service.
4.27.2. Second, the judicial administrator is not paid by the Court or by the State or by any public authority. He is paid by the Company and the Court specifies the level of his fees.
4.27.3. Third, if the judicial administrator was to be considered as the emanation of the public authority, the State should then be liable for any negligence from his part.
But this is not the case neither [under] Lebanese Law nor under French Law. On the contrary, whether under Lebanese Law or under French Law the judicial administrator is personally liable in case of negligence.
It follows that I am not in agreement with my colleague Professor Georges Naffah that a judicial administrator can be considered as an 'organ of the Lebanese judiciary and consequently the Lebanese State itself' (para. 43) ….
4.27.4. Fourth, there is a specific category of persons in France known as 'citizen in charge of public service'. This category includes persons who accomplish a mission recognized as a general interest mission by exercising the prerogative of the public authority. The French Cour de cassation ruled that a receiver acting in insolvency proceedings does not belong to this category. Given that, as stated by my colleague Professor Georges Naffah, the 'legal nature of the functions of the provisional administrator are probably not very different from those of a judicial administrator acting in insolvency proceedings' (receiver or trustee) (para.44), it must be accepted, in accordance with the aforementioned judgment of the French Cour de cassation, that a judicial administrator is not even a 'citizen in charge of a public service', particularly since there is also an important distinction between an administrator acting in insolvency proceedings (where he has a broader duty to consider the interests of creditors) and a judicial administrator acting in order to resolve an internal corporate issue (where he is simply acting in the interests of the company).
4.27.5. Fifth, the judicial administrator, as stated by Mr. Samir Abou-Zamel, 'is not the agent of the Company because he is appointed by Court and is not further the agent of the Court because he does not carry out any legal acts for the interest of the Court. In our view, the correct answer is that the judicial administrator should be considered as a company's director who replaces the legal managers of said company within a framework established by the Court, i.e. as the Company's representative appointed by virtue of a judicial decision'.29. This view is not far from that of the French scholar Charles LAPP who considers that 'the administrator appointed by a court decision is an agent of the Company, despite the fact that he is enabled by the Court that invests him with his powers'.30.
27 'Emanations of the state', were defined by the European Court of Justice in Foster, A. and others v. British Gas plc, Case C-188/89, [1990] as 'a body, whatever its legal form, which has been made responsible, pursuant to a measure adopted by the state, for providing a public service under the control of the state and has for that purpose special powers beyond that which result from the normal rules applicable in relations between individuals.'….
29 S. Abou-Zamel, op. cit., p. 28 ….
30 Charles LAPP, op. cit. p.793 …."
Issue v): double jeopardy
"The Judge of Urgent Matters
Having examined and considered the five matters brought forward in the last petition submitted by the Judicial Administrator dated 17 December 2010,
And in accordance with previous orders made by this Court in this file,
Decides:
To direct the Judicial Administrator to continue taking all steps in order to preserve the rights and interests of the Company, including those relating to the Masila oil concession, in particular the lifting and sale of oil and nomination of vessels, such steps to be taken before all authorities and officials, including administrative, judicial and arbitration bodies."
i) According to the evidence, there are no assets of the Judgment Debtors within the Lebanese jurisdiction. That being so, there are no steps, on the evidence before me, that Mr. Joujou is required to take within the jurisdiction of the Lebanese Court pursuant to the Third Receivership Order that would create any conflict with any of the orders of the Lebanese Court.
ii) Insofar as the directions of the Lebanese Court require Mr. Joujou to take steps, or to refrain from taking steps, outside the jurisdiction of the Lebanese Court which may be in conflict with the Third Receivership Order, or other orders of this court (for example, the order of 7 January 2011 requiring Mr. Joujou to take steps "to preserve" CCOG's rights and interests including those relating to the lifting and sale etc of CCOG's oil from the Masila concession), or to make representations in relation to the arbitration proceedings, I consider there would be very little realistic likelihood of Mr. Joujou being subject to any sanctions from the Lebanese Court, or to professional sanctions, if he failed to comply with such directions because of his concerns about his potential liability under orders of this court.
iii) Given my findings (as set out at paragraph 71-75 above) that the constraints of the Lebanese Court orders to which CCOG and the Judicial Administrators are purportedly subject, are the result of the adoption of a deliberate anti-enforcement strategy on the part of the Judgment Debtors, I have little doubt that, if Mr. Joujou requested the Judgment Debtors to do so, and if they chose to do so, the Judgment Debtors (and their controlling shareholders) could ensure either that the directions of the Lebanese Court were varied, or that Mr. Joujou were relieved of the obligation (if any) on his part to act in contravention of the order of the English court in Yemen or elsewhere.
iv) The orders of the Lebanese Court do no more than direct Mr. Joujou to act in a certain way, or give liberty to him to act in certain ways. They do not impose any obligation upon him to act in a particular way in relation to the take up of oil. Indeed, the evidence shows that he has left CCOG's employees to deal with these matters.
v) It is clearly open to Mr. Joujou (and his co-Judicial Administrators), whose fees are being paid voluntarily by the Judgment Debtors, to resign or stand down at any time from their office as Judicial Administrators, if he or they consider that they are being put in a difficult or impossible position because of the orders of the English court and their alleged conflict with the orders of the Lebanese Court. This is not a case where the appointment of the Judicial Administrators by the Lebanese Court can be said to be justified on the basis of any wider public interest (such as, for example the court appointment of administrators in the case of the insolvency of the subject company, in the interests of creditors). The appointment here was merely to serve the private interests of the Judgment Debtors, to render themselves judgment-proof.
vi) The evidence of Professor Slim (which I prefer to that of Professor Naffah in this respect) concludes that Mr. Joujou is not likely to be the subject of criminal sanctions for failing to follow the directions of the Lebanese Court, or for breach of his judicial oath.
vii) I have taken into account the fact that Mr. Joujou has professional duties and obligations to the Lebanese Court, and also, no doubt, to those who sought his appointment. However, one cannot disregard the reality that there is no obligation (professional or otherwise) upon an independent professional to continue to act as an instrument in the implementation of a deliberate anti-enforcement policy, in the interests of a judgment debtor and its shareholders, when there is no reason (other than concerns about personal exposure of directors to liability for breach of the orders of the English court) which prevents the Judgment Debtors' shareholders themselves from appointing directors to manage the companies' affairs, and thereby bringing the judicial administration to an end.
Conclusion
Note 1 The other two administrators were Mr. Georges Zakhour and Mr. Jihad Al-Hajjar. [Back] Note 2 Paragraphs 4 and 13 of his affidavit. [Back] Note 3 This amendment was made as Mr. Salzedo made it clear during the course of argument that he had no intention of seeking any order that prevented the Judicial Administrators from seeking the guidance of the Lebanese Court as to the conduct of the judicial administration. [Back] Note 4 These are respectively reported at [2006] EWHC 1931 (Comm) and [2007] EWHC 468 (Comm). [Back] Note 5 [2007] EWCA 688. [Back] Note 6 see paragraphs 84 – 92 of [2008] EWCA (Civ); [2008] 2 LLR 128 [Back] Note 7 ibid paragraphs 92 and 106. [Back] Note 8 Mr. Said Khoury and Mr. Hasib Sabbagh, the respective heads of the two families, were the founders of the CCC Group. They and Mr. Masri were all leading Palestinian businessmen who were once friends and business associates, although Mr. Sabbagh was inactive since suffering a stroke in 2004, and has recently died. [Back] Note 9 see [2008] EWCA 303 (Civ); [2008] 2 LLR 128. [Back] Note 10 [2008] EWHC 2492 (Comm). [Back] Note 11 This order was dated 27 August 2009: see paragraph 69 of Mr. Bartlett’s affidavit. [Back] Note 12 This order was dated 16 April 2009: see exhibit ACB 2/9/9 to Mr. Bartlett’s affidavit. [Back] Note 13 It was common ground that the Lebanese Court which appointed and supervises the Judicial Administrators is a different court from that which dealt with the exequatur applications and the blocking orders. [Back] Note 14 See his petition to the Lebanese Court dated 29 May 2009. [Back] Note 15 [2010] 1 AC 90. [Back] Note 16 Babanaft International Co SA v Bassatne [1990] 1 Ch 13. [Back] Note 17 Masri v Consolidated Contractors International (UK) Limited (No 4) (supra). [Back] Note 20 [2008] EWCA Civ 303. [Back] Note 21 Masri v CCIC [2009] QB 450 CA. [Back] Note 22 Paragraph 43 of the Naffah Affidavit. [Back] Note 23 See per Lawrence Collins LJ at paragraph 183 of his judgment in Masri (No 2) (supra) and paragraph 15 of the Tomlinson Judgment. [Back] Note 24 See paragraph 13 of the Tomlinson Judgment. [Back] Note 25 See paragraph 5.15.5 of the expert report of Professor Hadi Slim dated 15 December 2010 and filed on behalf of the Judgment Creditor. Unlike the Naffah Affidavit, sworn in the contempt proceedings, Professor Slim’s report contains the required declaration of independence. [Back] Note 26 See paragraph 28 of the Tomlinson Judgment. [Back] Note 27 See paragraph 4.26 of Professor Slim’s report. [Back] Note 28 See paragraph 5.15.6 of Professor Slim’s report. [Back] Note 29 Mr. Salzedo did not suggest that Mr Joujou’s co-Judicial Administrators should be included in the penal notice, as they are not, apparently, in charge of the day-to-day running of the Judgment Debtors. [Back] Note 30 See the wording of paragraph 18(A) of the revised Third Receivership Order. [Back] Note 31 See, for example, paragraph 19 of the standard form at Appendix 5 to the Commercial Court Guide, and the Practice Direction supplementing CPR Part 25. [Back] Note 32 [1990] 1 Ch 65. [Back] Note 33 See paragraph 6.03. [Back] Note 34 See paragraph 26. [Back] Note 35 [1985] 1 FLR 418, where Lord Donaldson MR held that contempt proceedings could be served out of the jurisdiction. [Back] Note 36 See Kuwait Airways Corporation v Iraq Airways Co [2010] EWCA (Civ) 741, where the Court of Appeal made very stringent orders against the Director-General of the defendant judgment debtor, who happened to be within the jurisdiction. Paragraph 59 of the judgment of Sir David Keen is particularly on point. [Back] Note 37 See per Lord Hoffmann in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission of New Zealand [1995] 2 AC 500, at 507. [Back] Note 38 See Section V, paragraphs 29-72 of the judgment of Lawrence Collins LJ. [Back] Note 39 [1995] 1 WLR 1147. [Back] Note 40 [2010] EWCA (Civ) 741. [Back] Note 41 See the order of the Lebanese Court dated 14 January 2009, entrusting Mr. Joujou with the management of the Judgment Debtors, with the assistance of his co-Judicial Administrators. [Back] Note 42 At paragraph 26 of the Tomlinson Judgment. [Back] Note 44 [2000] CP Rep 65 [Back] Note 45 See the Court of Appeal’s judgment refusing CCIC leave to appeal: [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1367 at paragraph 31. [Back]