England and Wales High Court (Commercial Court) Decisions

This action forms part of the Lloyd's Litigation. The Lloyd's Litigation is the largest and most complex piece of civil litigation this jurisdiction has ever seen. The Commercial Court's approach to the case management of the Lloyd's Litigation is referred to in chapter 5. The Court decided a number of preliminary issues which (subject to appeal) were designed to assist in resolving issues of principle common to one or more of six categories of cases (LMX Cases, Long-Tail Cases, Personal Stop Loss Cases, Portfolio Selection Cases, Central Fund Litigation and Other Cases). The Court in addition selected from cases in a particular category lead or pilot cases for trial as to liability (and principles relating to quantum) in the hope that decisions in these cases would provide broad guidance in relation to other cases in the same category.

At the time of the R&R settlement offer of July 1996 there were about 90 syndicate based Action Groups with relevant litigating syndicate years of account.

In September 1996 a market settlement was arrived at. About 95% of Names accepted the market settlement. 1,752 Names did not accept. About 180 Names have since reached individual settlements with Lloyd's. Of the remaining Names, 216 Names are parties to this action.

Appendix 1 hereto contains a list of cases forming part of the Lloyd's Litigation (and related litigation) both before and after the market settlement in September 1996.

There are (or have been) proceedings against Lloyd's in the United States of America, Canada, Australia, Belgium, and before the European Commission.

This trial is concerned with the Threshold Fraud Point being the issue whether Lloyd's made misrepresentations which it knew to be untrue and/or as to which it was reckless whether they were true or false, and whether such misrepresentations were communicated to the Names and if so, when? The trial is confined to allegations of fraud during the Relevant Period 1978 to 1988. The Names' case is in tort for fraudulent misrepresentation. The Names say that certain alleged representations derived (i) from the Brochures and (ii) from the Lloyd's Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31 12.81 to 31.12.87 made by Lloyd's to external Names when they were applying to join Lloyd's or considering whether to continue as underwriting members of Lloyd's, were false and fraudulent to the knowledge of Lloyd's. The Names say that Lloyd's knew or was reckless as to the fact that: (i) the Lloyd's market's exposure to asbestos-related claims required reserves and RITC to be set at figures far in excess of those which were set out in the Lloyd's Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 31.12.87; and (ii) to the extent that there was under-reserving, the burden would be borne by Names underwriting in future years.

Lloyd's deny that they made the alleged representations in the Brochures and the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 31.12.87. Further Lloyd's say that none of the elements of the tort of deceit are made out and in particular all allegations of fraud are emphatically denied.

The relevant legal principles as to the tort of deceit are set out in chapter 9. In order to sustain an action in deceit, there must be proof of fraud. Nothing short of fraud will suffice. Fraud is proved where it is shown that a false representation has been made (i) knowingly, or (ii) without belief in its truth, or (iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. To prevent a false statement from being fraudulent, there must be an honest belief in its truth.

The Names' case must be judged against the relevant structure and background. It is necessary to have regard to and understand the way the Lloyd's market worked in the Relevant Period. Thus it is necessary to consider the administrative structure and governance of the Lloyd's market (chapter 10); the regulatory background for the auditing and accounting regime at Lloyd's (chapter 11); the rules and procedures governing the admission to underwriting membership of Lloyd's and related matters (chapter 12); RITC - the role of the managing agents/underwriter (chapter 13) and the role of the auditors (chapter 14).

I set out in chapter 15 a broad description of the evidence of the witnesses and my assessment of that evidence.

An overview of the nature and development of asbestos-related claims in the United States is set out in chapter 16. Between 1973 and the beginning of 1981 there were 8,000 to 10,000 asbestos-related claims. In the period between 1981 and the Wellington Agreement (June 1985) the filing pattern was remarkably steady at 500 new claims per month. The opening inventory of the ACF in mid-1985 was about 25,000 claims. In the 18 month period after the Wellington Agreement the rate of claims rose initially to 700 per month and then to around 1,000 per month. In 1987, the claims rose to 2,000 per month (a fourfold increase in the level of claims pre the Wellington Agreement), and then went up to 3,000 per month, before settling at 1,500 per month for a while. By 1990, this had risen again, so that in the early 1990s the rate was about 24,000 a year; an annual total which was broadly comparable to the entirety of claims between 1973 and 1983. The current rate of claims is around 60,000 a year. The current total volume of claims (including those that have been settled) is approximately 450,000. There were a number of interlinked reasons why things looked so different at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, from the way in which they had looked in the early 1980s.

Differing views were held as to the likely outcome of asbestos-related claims in the Lloyd's market (and elsewhere) in the late 1970s and early 1980s. One illustration of this is the fact that Outhwaite, Merrett, Meacock and other syndicates wrote a number of run-off contracts.

The Brochures and the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 31.12.87 did not contain the alleged representations. Further the other ingredients of the tort of deceit were not made out. In particular the Names have not proved fraud in the relevant sense.

The Names' case is confined to asbestos-related losses. The losses suffered by the market in and after the Relevant Period were caused by a number of factors in addition to asbestos-related claims including (i) pollution and other long-tail claims; (ii) the North European storms in 1987; Piper Alpha and Hurricane Gilbert in 1988; Hurricane Hugo, the San Francisco Earthquake, Exxon Valdez, and Phillips Petroleum in 1989 and the North European storms in 1990; and (iii) the LMX Spiral.

As the Names' case is confined to asbestos-related losses, it is necessary to single out the impact of these losses.

Significant protections should have been afforded to Names on long-tail syndicates by the role and duties of the managing agents/underwriter and of the auditors. Further it was for the members' agent (not Lloyd's centrally) to advise prospective Names/ Names as to the risks inherent in long-tail syndicates, along with all other material risks.

If there were factors which affected or might affect the adequacy of the reserves, the syndicate auditor was required, under Clause 3 of the Audit Instructions, to report to the Committee and obtain their instructions before issuing the Audit Certificate/Syndicate Solvency Report. The letter from Neville Russell dated 24 February 1982 as to asbestos-related claims, was written pursuant to Clause 3. I find that the Murray Lawrence letter was sent to all underwriting agents (including members' agents) and all active underwriters, as stated in the final paragraph of the letter. Further, I find that the Murray Lawrence letter and the Randall letter (both dated 18 March 1982) were an honest response to the issues raised by the Neville Russell letter.

The allegation that Lloyd's knew or was reckless as to the fact that the Lloyd's market's exposure to asbestos-related claims required reserves and RITC to be set at figures far in excess of those which were set out in the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 31.12.87, is rejected. The Committee/Council of Lloyd's were generally entitled to assume that auditors were performing their duties competently. The allegation that the 1979 year of account should have been left open by syndicates affected by asbestos-related claims is also rejected.

For the reasons set out in the judgment I find for Lloyd's, and against the Names, on the Threshold Fraud Point. The costs of these proceedings will be subject to rigorous taxation.

I make a number of further observations (see chapter 25). It is high time that the Lloyd's Litigation and related litigation here and overseas came to an end.

Despite all the reforms described in the judgment, the catalogue of failings and incompetence in the 1980s by underwriters, managing agents, members' agents, and others (established by judgments of the court, by disciplinary hearings and other means referred to in chapter 24) is staggering (and brought disgrace on one of the City's great markets). External Names (whether they accepted R&R or not) were the innocent victims of the failings and incompetence. Many Names have suffered enormously in financial and personal terms. A fair overall solution (as between Lloyd's and those who did not accept R&R and have not settled since R&R) is unlikely to be achieved without independent assistance. Such an overall solution is in the interests of Lloyd's and the Names. An independent review by an independent panel set up by Lloyd's should consider the individual cases of those Names who did not accept R&R (and who have not settled since R&R).

I wish at the outset of this judgment to refer to the impact in personal terms, on Names and others, of the events at Lloyd's in and about the 1980s.

On the one hand (i) membership of Lloyd's involved considerable risks; and (ii) asbestos and pollution claims, the exceptional number of catastrophes in the late 1980s and other factors would have caused widescale losses if managing and members' agents had acted competently throughout.

On the other hand there was widespread incompetence on the part of some underwriters/managing agents (and some members' agents). I recognise that no words can adequately describe the devastation that has been caused to many individuals in financial and personal terms.

I asked the parties to attempt to agree a short statement as to the impact on Names and others but they were unable to do so. I accordingly set out their respective positions.

The Names

The Names say that the difficulties that Lloyd's faced during and after the Relevant Period caused (a) average losses per person of approximately £120,505 for working Names: (b) average losses per person of approximately £263,400 for external Names: (c) average losses per person of approximately £469,051 for Jaffray litigants. The resulting hardship varied on an individual basis.

Many UNO members suffered financial ruin.

The UNO membership has paid to Lloyd's, through drawdowns on bank guarantees, loss of funds deposited at Lloyd's and by direct payments approximately £66,000,000 (an average of £308,000 each). The same people, together, have judgments against them amounting to approximately (a further) £50 million in respect of Equitas premia. This does not include the Central Fund writs which Lloyd's have reinstated.

Currently, 14 UNO members qualify for Legal Aid. As the result of drawdowns of bank guarantees, or other bank borrowing to pay Lloyd's, 62 UNO members have been evicted from or forced to sell their homes and/or businesses and are living with relatives or in cheap rented accommodation.

Many non-UNO Names (accepting and non-accepting) have been made bankrupt by Lloyd's and by banks and institutions.

About 60 UNO members are currently in receipt of statutory demands/bankruptcy petitions from Lloyd's and fear they will be made bankrupt.

Fear of bankruptcy and homelessness continues to take its toll on UNO members, litigants in person and other Names. Names say that Lloyd's difficulties were the cause of, or probable explanation for, 15 suicides - also of marriage breakdowns, divorce and the break-up of families. Two non-UNO Names have attributed the suicides of their children to Lloyd's.

Many Names, of all categories, have suffered. Doctors have attributed a range of serious illnesses to Lloyd's problems.

Lloyd's Comments on the Names' Submissions as to the Hardship Caused as a Result of the Difficulties Faced by the Lloyd's Market

Lloyd's regrets the undoubted financial hardship and distress caused to many Names and their families from the massive losses incurred in the very late 1980s and 1990s. Similar statements of regret were made by Mr. Murray Lawrence and Sir David Rowland, both former Chairmen of Lloyd's, during the course of their evidence in this case. Indeed throughout the 1990s (starting with his appointment as chairman of the Task Force in 1991) the principal focus of Sir David's work at Lloyd's was to find a way of assisting Names to meet their liabilities at Lloyd's, permitting them to trade through where appropriate and achieve finality where they so wished.

The culmination was, of course, the R&R Settlement Offer worth £3.2 billion to Names. R&R

provided very substantial assistance to many Names, being accepted by an overwhelming majority of membership. Lloyd's never sought to argue that the settlement could undo the

hardship many had already suffered, but it was the best alternative that could be provided and was the result of an enormous amount of work over a period of years. Sir David summed up the position when introducing the detailed terms of the offer in the Settlement Information Document:

"I deeply regret the events that have made the reconstruction plan necessary. They must never be allowed to recur. I am reminded daily of the damage membership of Lloyd's has caused to thousands of people. We in the Lloyd's market have a clear responsibility to develop a solution that offers the best prospect of alleviating this damage.

I believe we have such a solution in the reconstruction plan. It is not perfect: we do not command unlimited resources and time is no longer on our side. But it offers better prospects than continued litigation. It offers assistance not otherwise available for those Names who have borne the heaviest losses. And it offers Names the chance to carry on with their lives, relieved of the uncertainty caused by their membership of Lloyd's.

I have said many times that no compromise settlement can eradicate our recent history; the losses and their consequences were real. We have sought - and I believe achieved - the best result possible in the interests of the whole Society".

Lloyd's questions the reliability of the figures put forward by the Names as to the personal effect of the losses at Lloyd's. Lloyd's does not believe that these figures can or should be relied upon as representing an accurate statement of the position.

Based on their finality statements, Lloyd's has provided the court with the aggregate total gross and net liabilities as at the same time of R&R of the 216 Names who are parties to this action. On average, each of these Names faced a gross liability of £364,000; the average amount they would have had to pay under R&R was £64,000. Only one of the 216 Names had to pay in excess of £100,000. Others would have qualified for additional assistance had they accepted the offer, reducing their net liabilities even further. Post R&R means based settlement offers were made to 63 Jaffray Names. Lloyd's does not accept that there is any justification for any Jaffray Name who is unable to pay his/her Lloyd's debt not seeking a settlement with Lloyd's.

Only 7 of the 216 Names who are parties to this action have been put into bankruptcy on the petition of Lloyd's. Following the Garrow decision, any statutory demands against Jaffray Names were set aside and any outstanding bankruptcy petitions were dismissed.

The Names say that they have identified 15 individuals who were Lloyd's members and who, they say, committed suicide for reasons that were or may have been associated with losses they suffered through underwriting at Lloyd's. Of these individuals three were formerly working members of Lloyd's. In correspondence with More Fisher Brown, Lloyd's has questioned the reliability of the figures produced by the Names for Lloyd's related suicides. Lloyd's further questions the ability to ascribe reasons for the circumstances surrounding the suicide of an individual without examining the detailed facts in each case.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

ABBREVIATIONS/ACRONYMS

AARD Accounting and Auditing Review Department

AASC Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee

ACF Asbestos Claims Facility

AGGREGATE RESULTS Financial information, produced by Lloyd's prior to the Global Accounts as at 31 December 1982, relating to the underwriting results of the Lloyd's Market and released to underwriting agents and the public.

ALM Association of Lloyd's Members

ANNAN Association of Non-North American Names

APCAuditing Practices Committee of the Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies

AR Attorneys' Report

AWP Asbestos Working Party

BIBA British Insurance Brokers' Association

CCAB The Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies

CCR Center for Claims Resolution

CEG Chief Executive's Group

CIS Claims Information System

DES Diethylstilbestrol

DTI Department of Trade and Industry

ECG Environmental Claims Group

EPA US Environmental Protection Agency

GAD Government Actuary's Department

IBNR Incurred but not reported

ICA 1982 Insurance Companies Act 1982

ICA 1974 Insurance Companies Act 1974

LATF Lloyd's American Trust Fund

LAUA Lloyd's Aviation Underwriters' Association

LIBC Lloyd's Insurance Brokers' Committee

LMCS London Market Claims Services

LMUA Lloyd's Motor Underwriters' Association

LMX London Market Excess of Loss

LNAWP Lloyd's Names Association Working Party

LPSO Lloyd's Policy Signing Office

LUA Lloyd's Underwriters' Association

LUAA Lloyd's Underwriting Agents' Association

LUCRO The Marine Market Claims Office

LUNCO Lloyd's Underwriters' Non-Marine Claims Office

LUNMA Lloyd's Underwriters' Non-Marine Association

MAIR Members' Agent's Information Report

Merrett Judgment The judgment of Cresswell J in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1997] LRLR 265

MSSC Members' Solvency and Security Committee

MSSD Members' Solvency and Security Department

MPRs Minimum PercentageReserves

Murray Lawrence letter The letter of 18.3.82 set out in full in chapter 19

NDA Names Defence Association

OPL Overall Premium Limit

PI Premium Income

PSL Personal Stop Loss

PTF Premiums Trust Fund

RBUA Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies Ltd

Relevant Period 1.1.78 to 31.12.88

RITC Reinsurance to close

SRF Special Reserve Fund

SSC Solvency and Security Committee

SSOB Statutory Statement of Business being the annual return required by statute to be furnished by Lloyd's to the Board of Trade or the DTI (known as Annual Statements prior to 1982 year end).

UAAD Underwriting Agents and Audit Department

UNO United Names Organisation

XL Excess of Loss

This action forms part of the Lloyd's Litigation. An account of the Lloyd's Litigation is set out in chapter 5, followed by a summary of proceedings against Lloyd's in other jurisdictions (chapter 6).

In view of the significance of this case domestically and internationally, I set out below in some detail the way the Lloyd's market worked in the Relevant Period, so that the essential background to the issues in this case is identified.

This trial is concerned with the Threshold Fraud Point (chapter 7) being the issue whether Lloyd's made misrepresentations which it knew to be untrue and/or as to which it was reckless whether they were true or false, and whether such misrepresentations were communicated to the Names and if so, when? The Names' Pleaded Case and the Names' Case as Summarised in Closing Submissions are set out in chapter 7. Lloyd's Case is set out in chapter 8.

The Relevant Legal Principles are set out in chapter 9.

The way the Lloyd's market worked in the Relevant Period is described in chapters 10 to 14:-

- The Administrative Structure and Governance of the Lloyd's Market (chapter 10);

- The Regulatory Background for the Auditing and Accounting Regime at Lloyd's (chapter 11);

- The Rules and Procedures Governing the Admission to Underwriting Membership of Lloyd's and Related Matters (chapter 12);

- RITC - Some General Principles - The Role of the Managing Agents/Underwriter (chapter 13); and

- RITC - The Role of the Auditors (chapter 14).

I set out in chapter 15 a broad description of the evidence of the witnesses and my assessment of that evidence.

There follows:- an Overview of the Nature and Development of Asbestos-related Claims (chapter 16), an account of the Differing Views as to the Likely Outcome of Asbestos-Related Claims and The Writing of Run-Off Contracts (chapter 17), and reference to the extent to which the number of Open Years increased during the Relevant Period (chapter 18).

In chapter 19 I set out a chronology of certain important events in 1978 to 1988 being The Years in Question. 1989 and Subsequent Years are considered in chapter 20 and Developments in Relation to Capital Structure in chapter 21.

My analysis of and conclusions as to the Threshold Fraud Point are set out in chapter 22.

In chapter 23 I consider E&O Cover at Lloyd's and in chapter 24 The Market Scandals and The Failings revealed by the Lloyd's Litigation.

My conclusions are set out in chapter 25.

The Tables and Appendices are listed at the beginning of this judgment.

The Lloyd's Litigation is the largest and most complex piece of civil litigation this jurisdiction has ever seen.

The Commercial Court's approach to the case management of the Lloyd's Litigation has been described in earlier judgments. The Lloyd's Litigation was divided into the following categories:-

(a) LMX Cases.

(b) Long-Tail Cases:-

(i) Run-Off Contract Cases

(ii) Reinsurance to Close Cases.

(c) Personal Stop Loss Cases.

(d) Portfolio Selection Cases.

(e) Central Fund Litigation.

(f) Other Cases.

The Court identified and decided a number of preliminary issues which (subject to appeals) were designed to assist in resolving issues of principle common to one or more categories of case.

The Court in addition selected from cases in a particular category, lead or pilot cases for trial as to liability (and principles relating to quantum), in the hope that decisions in these cases would provide broad guidance in relation to other cases in the same category. A variety of case management techniques (e.g. use of sample Names and limitations on formal discovery) were employed in group cases.

I refer to the statements issued by the court from time to time reporting on progress in the six categories of cases listed above.

The R&R settlement offer of July 1996 listed 85 syndicate based Action Groups with relevant litigating syndicate years of account. A letter from More Fisher Brown dated 24 July suggested that there were at least five additional Action Groups.

In September 1996 a market settlement was arrived at. About 95 % of Names accepted the market settlement. 1,752 Names did not accept. About 180 Names have since reached individual settlements with Lloyd's. Of the remaining Names, as at 1 November 1999 about 148 were claimants in this action and about 1,420 were not. A number of the remaining Names have joined this action since 1 November 1999. Thus there are 216 Names who are parties to this action.

I refer to the three statements I made in relation to the management of this case on 1 November 1999 and 21 January and 3 February 2000.

Appendix 1 hereto contains a list of cases forming part of the Lloyd's Litigation (and related litigation) both before and after the market settlement in September 1996.

A. United States of America - California

An action by David, Deborah and Susan West was until recently proceeding against Lloyd's in the Superior Court in the State of California (the State Court). I was informed by letter dated 2.11.00 from Freshfields that this action had been settled on terms which are confidential.

B. Canada

(I) New Brunswick

There are a number of actions ongoing against Lloyd's. None of the plaintiff Names are parties to the Jaffray action.

Ten Names have commenced proceedings directly against Lloyd's. These proceedings were commenced in 1997/8. The Names claim that they were victims of fraud and fraudulent misrepresentation by Lloyd's inducing them to apply for membership of Lloyd's and that the information provided to them was a violation of the New Brunswick Securities Act. The factual allegations underlying the Names' claims of fraud cover similar ground to the allegations being made by the Names in the Jaffray action. (The New Brunswick Names also allege inter alia that Lloyd's acted fraudulently in respect of the "LMX spiral activity".)

In respect of these proceedings Lloyd's has brought motions permanently to stay the actions on applications based primarily on the Names' execution of the General Undertaking which provided that any disputes relating to their membership of or underwriting at Lloyd's would be subject to the jurisdiction of the English Courts and subject to English Law and in the alternative on forum non conveniens grounds.

In three cases Lloyd's motion has been heard and in each case the decision of the Judge has been to order a permanent stay (one was by consent). In the two contested cases the orders (both made in January 1999) were subject to certain conditions should the Names bring action against Lloyd's in England (which they have not done), namely that:

(i) Lloyd's would not require security for costs;

(ii) Lloyd's would waive any precondition that any judgment it obtains against the Names would be satisfied before they could proceed; and

(iii) they would waive any contractual provision that required the Names to pay any contractual obligations arising between the Names and Lloyd's before any action might lie against Lloyd's by the Names.

In these two cases the New Brunswick Court of Appeal in January 2000 dismissed the Names' appeals. Leave was sought by both Names to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, but this was refused on 5 October 2000.

No hearing date has been fixed for any of Lloyd's other motions. There is an agreement amongst Counsel that the motions will be bound by the result in the matter in which leave is currently sought.

Eight Names have joined Lloyd's as a third party to proceedings brought by the Royal Bank of Canada against them for indemnity for monies paid by the bank to Lloyd's following calls made on letters of credit/bank guarantees held by Lloyd's as security for the Names' underwriting. Lloyd's was joined to the proceedings in April 1998 and brought motions permanently to stay the third party proceedings (on the same basis as set out above). The claims made by the Names in these third party proceedings are the same as in the direct actions referred to above. No hearing date has been fixed for any of these motions and Counsel have agreed again to accept the determination of the two contested matters.

(ii) Prince Edward Island

Eight Names commenced actions against Lloyd's in Prince Edward Island in January 1999. In this action the Names allege that Lloyd's, directly and through agents, subjected them to fraudulent misrepresentations and fraudulent, deceitful and reckless practices, but for which they would have neither become members of Lloyd's nor have undertaken particular underwriting obligations. The Names also allege that Lloyd's failed to comply with the licensing, prospectus and other disclosure and filing requirements of the Prince Edwards Island Securities Act.

The factual allegations underlying the Names claims of fraud cover similar ground to those allegation being made by the Names in the Jaffray action, to which these Names are not a party. (These Names also allege, inter alia, that Lloyd's acted fraudulently in respect of the "LMX Spiral" and made misrepresentations in connection with the use of time and distance policies).

Lloyd's brought motions permanently to stay these proceedings primarily on the basis of the forum selection and choice of law clauses in the General Undertaking executed by the Names, and in the alternative on the basis of forum non conveniens. On 7 April 2000 the Judge granted a stay subject to the same conditions imposed by the New Brunswick Court but with one further condition namely that:

"Should the plaintiffs proceed expeditiously to bring an action for fraud against the defendant [Lloyd's] in England and be denied access to English Courts for hearing the action, the plaintiffs can apply to this Court to end this stay of proceedings".

No appeal has been made though time for doing so has not yet expired.

C. Australia

Proceedings have been commenced against Lloyd's in Australia by 8 Names, all of whom are counterclaimants in the Jaffray proceedings. The most advanced of the 8 cases is White v Lloyd's. Proceedings were commenced by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia against Mr White in the Victorian State Court concerning letters of credit issued by the bank to support Mr White's underwriting at Lloyd's. Subsequently, in December 1998/February 1999 Mr White served Lloyd's with a Third Party Notice. As regards the other proceedings, a Mr Luxton issued proceedings against Lloyd's in the Victorian State Court on 2 September 1999, and 6 other Australian Names issued proceedings against Lloyd's in the New South Wales State Court on 3 September 1999. Apart from the White proceedings, none of the other Writs has been served on Lloyd's.

Lloyd's is not permitted to view the Writs issued (but not served) in the New South Wales jurisdiction, but has been able to view the Writ issued, but not served, by Mr Luxton, due to the different procedural rules in Victoria. That Writ sets out substantially the same causes of action and a similar factual basis as the Third Party Notice served by Mr White and, whilst it is not known, it is suspected that the same is the case with the Writs issued in New South Wales.

As regards the legal basis for his claims against Lloyd's, Mr White has pleaded several statutory causes of action arising under the Australian Trade Practices Act and the Corporations legislation, including:

· Section 51A and Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Mr White pleads that Lloyd's conduct was misleading and deceptive and relies on Section 51A of the Trade Practices Act, which deem a representation as to a future matter to be misleading unless the corporation has reasonable grounds for valuing the representation); and

· s.83 of the Companies Act 1961 and ss.169-171 of the Companies (Victoria) Code: Mr White pleads that Lloyd's made an offer or invitation to the public to subscribe for or purchase membership at Lloyd's and failed to perform its statutory obligations of disclosure.

In addition, Mr White has pleaded negligent misstatement against Lloyd's, and relies upon the doctrines of "public policy" and "unconscionable" bargain in seeking to impugn or avoid, amongst other provisions, the exclusive jurisdiction clause contained in the 1986 General Undertaking which Mr White signed. Whilst the legal basis for the claim is somewhat different to the fraudulent misrepresentations relied upon by the Names in the Jaffray proceedings, the factual basis for Mr White's claim is very similar to the factual basis of the claims being made by the Names in the Jaffray action and, indeed, the original White pleading appears to draw heavily on the original pleading in the English action.

Lloyd's challenged the jurisdiction of the Victorian Court to hear the claims made by Mr White on several grounds, including the fact that Mr White (like the other 7 Australian Names) had signed the General Undertaking 1986 (which contains an exclusive jurisdiction clause in favour of the English Court). On 29 July 1999, his Honour Justice Byrne decided that, notwithstanding the exclusive jurisdiction clause, the Victorian Court could hear the claims made by Mr White. Lloyd's applied to the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria for leave to appeal, but Lloyd's application was refused on procedural grounds. Subsequently, Lloyd's applied to the High Court of Australia for special leave to appeal, but special leave to appeal was again refused on procedural grounds by the High Court on 11 February 2000.

Following that judgment, Lloyd's applied for an anti-suit injunction from the English Court to restrain the 8 Australian Names from progressing their claims against Lloyd's in Australia, pending the outcome of the Jaffray trial. The application was made on notice, but Mr White and the other Australian Names chose not to be represented at that hearing, although they did lodge written submissions prepared by their Australian lawyers. Mr Justice Cresswell granted a temporary anti-suit injunction against the 8 Australian Names on 3 March 2000.

Since 3 March 2000, and in reliance upon the anti-suit injunction granted by the English Court, Lloyd's has sought a stay in the Victorian Court of the White proceedings pending the outcome of the Jaffray trial. In order to be able to apply for a stay, Lloyd's entered a Notice of Appearance in the White proceedings on 6 March 2000 and attended a hearing for directions on 10 March 2000. Lloyd's application for a stay was postponed and was later heard before her Honour Justice Warren on 18 and 19 April 2000. The decision of the Victorian Court was handed down on 21 June 2000. Her Honour Justice Warren granted Lloyd's application to stay the White proceedings pending delivery of judgment in the Jaffray proceedings or until further order.

As regards the other 7 Australian Names, they were also subject to the temporary anti-suit injunction and, to date, have not served their Writs on Lloyd's.

D. Belgium: André Milhoux

Mr Milhoux is a Belgian Name who, in the summer of 1996, obtained an order from a court in Brussels which purports to have the effect of freezing his deposit at Lloyd's. His deposit is made up of a Bank Guarantee issued by the Banque Bruxelles Lambert. A demand has been made by Lloyd's on the guarantee but the Banque has not met this because of the court order. £55,449.24 remains of that Guarantee. Lloyd's has intervened in the proceedings, in the Tribunal de Première Instance, Brussels, seeking to have the court's order set aside.

Pleadings have not closed and a hearing date has not been set.

Mr Milhoux is a litigant in the Jaffray proceedings. In his Belgian pleadings, he claims that Lloyd's demand on the guarantee is a consequence of the fraud to which he claims the Names were victim and therefore fraudulent itself.

He alleges intentional fraudulent presentation of the yearly accounts, deliberate complicity by Lloyd's in the syndicates' failure to constitute sufficient reserves to cover asbestos claims, intentional fraudulent presentation of profits by Lloyd's in the annual accounts, tolerance of a false representations by the syndicates of their financial situation and he says that Lloyd's aggregate accounts encouraged 20,000 new Names to join, who would not have done so if they had realised the true state of affairs.

E. European Commission

(a) A short petition has been sent to the European Parliament with supporting documents.

(b) A complaint has been made to the European Commission alleging a failure by the UK government to comply with the First European Non-Life Insurance Directive (EC73/239).

This trial is concerned with the Threshold Fraud Point being the issue whether Lloyd's made misrepresentations which it knew to be untrue and/or as to which it was reckless whether they were true or false, and whether such misrepresentations were communicated to the Names and if so, when?

The trial is limited to and by reference to three selected or sample Names namely Captain Hindle who joined Lloyd's in 1979, Sir William Jaffray who joined Lloyd's in 1982 and Mrs. Dona Evans who joined Lloyd's in 1988. The trial is confined to allegations of fraud during the period 1978 to 1988.

Table 1 below sets out certain information which explains the background to the Threshold Fraud Point.

(1) The Names' Pleaded Case

The Names' pleaded case is as follows.

Knowledge or awareness on the part of Lloyd's are alleged to be references to the knowledge or awareness of the persons listed below during the period 1978 - 1988:

(i) Certain members of the Council and/or Committee of Lloyd's: Sir Peter Green, F. Barber, Richard Ballantyne, D.J. Barham, J.R.K. Beckett, I.R. Binney, P.G. Bird, B.J. Brennan, A.H. Chester, M.H. Cockell, D.E. Coleridge, P. T. Daniels, R.D. Hazell, C.O. Gibb, C.D.D.Gilmour, A.W. Higgins, V.V. Hudson, R.J. Kiln, W.N.M. Lawrence, S.R. Merrett, Sir Peter Miller, C.K. Murray, E.E. Nelson, A. Parry, I.R. Posgate, Sir David Rowland, C.H.A. Skey (including, where relevant, their membership of Audit and Membership Committees and their statements in the Global Reports and Accounts as LUNMA Chairmen respectively during the Relevant Period). The Names say that where any one or more of these persons acted during any year between 1978 and 1988 as Chairman or a Deputy Chairman of the Committee/Council of Lloyd's they carried special responsibilities in the oversight and administration of the Lloyd's market and had particular influence which was likely to be decisive in matters relevant to the problem of asbestos-related claims.

(ii) K.E. Randall.

(iii) H.R. Rokeby-Johnson, Robin Jackson, Bryan Kellett and Michael Williams (the other LUNMA Chairmen who contributed to the Global Reports and Accounts in the Relevant Period).

(iv) Certain members of the Asbestos Working Party during the Relevant Period (E.E. Nelson, H.R. Rokeby-Johnson, R.A.G. Jackson, D. Tayler, C.H.A. Skey).

The Names say that the persons listed at (i) to (iv) above were the principal sources of Lloyd's knowledge of the asbestos problem during the Relevant Period and constituted the directing minds of Lloyd's.

The Names say that by express decision of Lloyd's no mention of problems related to asbestos was made at Rota Committee interviews to persons joining as external Names for the years 1981 to 1989.

The Names say that by virtue of the Lloyd's Acts 1871 - 1982 Lloyd's had a continuing duty and responsibility to act at all times in good faith in accordance with its objects.

As to the Names' case in fraud, the Names say that certain representations made by Lloyd's to external Names when they were applying to join Lloyd's or considering whether to continue as underwriting members of Lloyd's, were false and fraudulent to the knowledge of Lloyd's.

The Names say that from at least 1975 until 1988 it was the established policy of Lloyd's to encourage the recruitment of new members and the expansion of the market's underwriting capacity.

Lloyd's Representations - Representations Derived from the Brochures - Representations Derived from the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 31.12.87

The Names say that the Lloyd's Brochures from time to time contained statements which constituted representations to the effect that a Name joining Lloyd's:

(i) Could have confidence in Lloyd's as an institution to safeguard his/her interests;

(ii) Could trust those who were chosen by Lloyd's to regulate the Lloyd's market and manage its affairs;

(iii) Because of the way in which Lloyd's regulated and monitored underwriting accounts year by year:

(a) could rely on syndicate accounts;

(b) could in underwriting and/or deciding whether to remain a member of Lloyd's have confidence in the audited syndicate results, for results of past years;

(c) could be sure that Lloyd's as part of its regulatory duties would ensure that when prospective liabilities were reinsured by one syndicate year into another, such liabilities were being fairly assessed and quantified as between the two syndicate years.

The statements in the Brochures relied upon by the Names as supporting these alleged (derived) representations are set out in Appendix 3 to Sir William Jaffray's Re-Amended Points of Defence and Counter-claim. The statements relied upon include statements in:-

(a) Notes for Applicants for Underwriting Membership 1975/1977 version;

(b) Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership: issued by Lloyd's January 1980;

(c) Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership: issued by Lloyd's December 1981;

d) Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership: issued by Lloyd's December 1983;

(e) Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership: issued by Lloyd's December 1984;

(f) Membership: The Issues: December 1986;

(g) Membership: The Issues: December 1987.

The relevant documents allegedly seen by Captain Hindle prior to joining Lloyd's in 1979 were the 1975/1977 version of Notes for Applicants for Underwriting Membership.

The relevant documents allegedly seen by Sir William Jaffray prior to joining Lloyd's in 1982 were the 1980 edition of Lloyd's Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership and a schedule of the previous 7 closed years of account of his proposed syndicates.

The relevant documents allegedly seen by Mrs. Evans prior to joining Lloyd's in 1988 were the 1986 edition of Membership: the Issues and the Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.84 and 85.

The Names say that Lloyd's knew and intended that prospective Names would read and rely upon the Brochures and where applicable Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87 and the statements and representations contained therein, for the purposes of considering whether or not to become a Name.

It is alleged that induced by, and in reliance upon, the representations derived from the Brochures, Captain Hindle joined Lloyd's in 1979, Sir William Jaffray joined Lloyd's in 1982, following Rota Committee interviews. It is alleged that induced by, and in reliance upon, the representations derived from the Brochures and/or from the Global reports and Accounts as at 31.12.84 and 85 (see below) Mrs. Evans joined Lloyd's in 1988, following a Rota Committee interview. The Names say that Rota Committee interviews gave Lloyd's an opportunity, which it did not on any occasion take, to correct misrepresentations made by it as to the sound financial position of the Lloyd's market by giving due warning to prospective Names as to the impact of asbestos-related liabilities on the Lloyd's market. By its continuing failure to give that warning Lloyd's invited Names joining Lloyd's during the Relevant Period to place continuing faith and reliance upon the image of Lloyd's contained in the Brochures including the above representations.

Captain Hindle underwrote business at Lloyd's for the years of account 1979 to 1994, Sir William Jaffray for the years of account 1982 to 1989 and Mrs. Evans for the years of account 1988 to 1993 (all inclusive).

It is alleged that in deciding to remain a member of Lloyd's for each of the further underwriting years beyond the first, Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans continued to rely upon the above representations derived from the Brochures. Further it is alleged that (where applicable) in deciding to remain a member of Lloyd's for each of the underwriting years beyond the first, Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans relied upon representations derived from the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87.

The alleged representations derived from the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 31.12.87 were as follows:-

(a) that the Lloyd's market was in a sound financial condition;

(b) that Names could safely join Lloyd's and/or continue their membership of Lloyd's and/or increase their Premium Income Limit with confidence that known and projected claims had been prudently and adequately reserved to ultimate.

The Names rely on specific statements in the said Appendix 3 as supporting these representations. They say that Lloyd's knew and intended that Names and prospective Names would read and rely upon the said Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts and the statements and representations contained therein for the purposes of considering whether to continue membership of Lloyd's and/or increase Premium Income Limits or to join.

It is alleged that induced by, and in reliance upon, the representations derived from the Brochures and the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87 Captain Hindle, Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans continued his/her membership of Lloyd's and/or increased his/her Premium Income Limit.

Falsity of Lloyd's Representations

The Names say that the representations derived from the Brochures were false at the time Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans joined Lloyd's in that:

(i) The minimum audit reserves were manifestly inadequate in the light of Lloyd's knowledge of the Lloyd's market's exposure to asbestos-related liabilities such that:

(a) Lloyd's regulation of Lloyd's annual audit and solvency test was not stringent and could not be reasonably regarded as such;

(b) The annual solvency test was not a "searching" one in practice and could not reasonably be regarded as such; and/or

(c) Lloyd's annual audit procedures did not give "ample" margins of security, but in fact gave no margin of security at all.

(It is alleged that the MPRs as determined by the Committee for each of the relevant years were set to Lloyd's knowledge or recklessly below Lloyd's own estimate of what was required to maintain the solvency of Lloyd's).

(ii) Lloyd's failed to make proper and full disclosure, or ensure such disclosure was made, of material information relating to the exposure of the Lloyd's market to potentially huge and escalating asbestos-related claims and failed to regulate properly or at all the manner in which syndicates or their auditors reserved for and accounted for such potential liabilities;

(iii) Lloyd's had not strictly regulated the activities of agents operating in the Lloyd's market;

(iv) Lloyd's had in relation to the closing years of syndicates exposed to asbestos-related claims failed to implement or apply appropriate audit regulations with the result that an equitable premium for RITC as between the reinsuring members and reinsured members was not assessed and charged having regard to the nature or amount of the liabilities to be reinsured;

(v) The insurance market at Lloyd's was not and had not been properly regulated by Lloyd's;

(vi) Those chosen to regulate and manage the affairs of Lloyd's and to protect Names' interests and disseminate information, prior to and from the date of Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans becoming a member of Lloyd's, withheld from him/her and/or misrepresented information concerning asbestos-related liabilities to which he/she was likely to become exposed as a member.

The Names say that the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts for the period 31.12.82 to 87 were (insofar as a Name joined Lloyd's in reliance on the said Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts) false at the time when the Names joined and false at the time when Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans increased his/her Premium Income Limit and/or continued as a Lloyd's member and/or to underwrite from year to year in that as Lloyd's were well aware at all material times:

(i) Lloyd's syndicates were exposed to huge and escalating asbestos-related claims which had not been adequately reserved and/or reserved to ultimate;

(ii) the RITC represented in the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 and subsequent years did not reflect the true exposure of the Lloyd's market for known and projected claims for asbestos-related losses relating to the closed year and to all previous closed years.

Further or in the alternative it is alleged that the representations derived from the Brochures and the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87 became false.

The Names say that the representations derived from the Brochures and the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87 were made by Lloyd's knowingly or recklessly without any honest belief in their truth and that Lloyd's omitted information known to it about the affairs of the Lloyd's market, with the result that the Brochures and Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts, taken as a whole, deliberately gave a false impression of the profitability of the Lloyd's market and the financial risks posed to Names by becoming and/or remaining a member of Lloyd's.

Particulars of Lloyd's Knowledge/Falsity/Recklessness

The Names set out particulars of Lloyd's knowledge/falsity/recklessness by reference to each of the eleven periods/years in question.

The Names' Case Against Lloyd's as Summarised in the Pleadings

In summary the Names' case against Lloyd's is as follows.

The Names say that Lloyd's knew or was reckless as to the fact that:

(i) The Lloyd's market's exposure to asbestos-related claims (even to the extent that those liabilities could be quantified) required reserves and RITC to be set at figures far in excess of those which were set out in the Lloyd's Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87; and

(ii) To the extent that there was under-reserving, the burden would be borne by Names underwriting in future years.

It is alleged that Lloyd's knew or was reckless as to the fact that the implications of asbestos-related liabilities were such that Lloyd's ought:

(A) To have made full and proper disclosure to Names, when publishing the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87, of the estimates of the likely extent and growth of future asbestos-related claims;

(B) To have given, and repeated as appropriate, directions as to the minimum levels of reserves necessary for syndicates with any material exposure to asbestos-related claims to cater for their potential liabilities;

(C) To have given clear and appropriate directions to syndicates with any material exposure to asbestos-related claims, in relation to keeping open the 1979 and subsequent years of account, wherever such syndicates were unable to assess and quantify fairly such claims for the purposes of fixing the RITC;

(D) To have given clear and appropriate directions to underwriting agents or otherwise have ensured that full and proper disclosure was made to all Names of their syndicates' exposure to asbestos-related liabilities and the treatment by those syndicates in their accounts of their liability to such claims;

(E) To have given clear and appropriate directions to Lloyd's auditors in relation to the treatment of asbestos-related liabilities in syndicate accounts so as to ensure that inequitable or inadequate figures for RITC were not incorporated into syndicate accounts.

The Names say that Lloyd's knowingly or recklessly failed at any material time to take the above steps or any of them.

Further, it is alleged that Lloyd's knowingly or recklessly failed to respond at any material time adequately or at all to the questions and issues raised in the letter sent to it by Neville Russell on 24 February 1982. The two letters both dated 18 March 1982, one addressed to Lloyd's Panel of Auditors from Mr. Randall, the other addressed to Lloyd's underwriters from Mr. Lawrence, were recklessly and/or deliberately concealed by Lloyd's from the members' agents and thereby the Names in that they were not sent to or received by the vast majority of members' agents. Further, it is alleged that Lloyd's knowingly or recklessly took no or no adequate steps to secure that appropriate measures were taken by syndicates and/or syndicate auditors in response to the letters from Mr. Lawrence and/or Mr. Randall.

The Names say that recklessly and/or deliberately, Lloyd's failed to advise or warn Names of the nature and extent of the asbestos problem facing Lloyd's at the material times.

It is alleged that the representations derived from the Brochures and the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87 were made fraudulently in that Lloyd's published the Brochures and Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts knowing or not caring that the representations contained therein were false or not caring or being reckless as to whether the representations were true or not and without any honest belief in their truth.

Alternatively it is alleged that Lloyd's fraudulently failed to correct the said representations knowing that they had become false and/or not caring or being reckless as to whether they were true or false. In so far as the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 87 published by Lloyd's were aggregations of syndicate results, Lloyd's knew or were reckless as to the fact that the aggregated reserves under-reserved for the asbestos liabilities overhanging the market and failed to deal equitably with RITC.

Further or alternatively the Names say that throughout the Relevant Period the accounts which Lloyd's published as Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts were a mere aggregation of syndicate results. Lloyd's deliberately chose not to make an independent investigation and assessment of the global exposure of the Lloyd's market to asbestos-related claims (including IBNR). Instead, Lloyd's put forward as safe and reliable, year by year, figures which could not be reconciled with current claims information and closed their eyes throughout the Relevant Period to the implications for external Names.

Reliance

It is alleged that but for Lloyd's representations (derived from the Brochures and/or where appropraite the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts for the period 31.12.81 to 87) Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans:

(i) Would not have proceeded to join Lloyd's as a Name and/or join any syndicates exposed to asbestos-related liabilities and/or would have resigned from underwriting business at Lloyd's; and/or

(ii) Would not have increased his/her underwriting premium limit in the years in which he/she underwrote business at Lloyd's; and/or

(iii) Would not have signed the General Undertaking effective from 1 January 1987.

In the event and in reliance on the representations derived from the Brochures and/or where appropriate the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts for the period 31.12.81 to 87 Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans took (and in the case of resignation, failed to take) all the above steps.

It is alleged that by reason of the foregoing Captain Hindle/Sir William Jaffray/Mrs. Evans suffered loss and damage.

The issues to be determined at this trial include whether each of the sample Names relied upon any of the pleaded (fraudulent) misrepresentations during the period 1978 to 1988.

Alternative Claim

The alternative claim is outside the ambit of this trial.

Allegations not made by the Names

The Names' case is confined as follows:-

(i) No allegations of fraud are made against any of the Chief Executives of Lloyd's;

(ii) No allegations of fraud are made against any non-working (i.e. nominated or external) members of the Council of Lloyd's;

(iii) No allegations of fraud are made against any employees of Lloyd's, except Mr. Randall;

(iv) Except as above, no allegations of fraud are made against any underwriters on any Lloyd's syndicate, nor against any other persons concerned in the management of such syndicate or in its year-end audit;

(v) The Names do not seek to investigate at trial the position of any particular Lloyd's syndicates or seek to show that any such syndicates wrongly closed any years of account;

(vi) The Names do not make any allegations of fraud against any panel auditors, nor do the Names seek to investigate at trial the manner in which any particular firm or firms of auditors, or individual audit partners, conducted the audit of any Lloyd's syndicate for any particular syndicate year of account;

(vii) No allegations are made that any material information was withheld from underwriters or auditors by or with the connivance of Lloyd's, save that it is alleged that Lloyd's failed to distribute the Murray Lawrence letter of 18 March 1982 to members' agents, adequately or at all.

(2) The Names' Case as Summarised in Closing Submissions

Mr. Goldblatt QC summarised the Names' case in his closing submissions as follows.

The Names' case is one in tort for fraudulent misrepresentation. They contend that Lloyd's intended to make and did make representations in its Brochures and annual Global Reports and Accounts; that those representations were not true; that it did not honestly believe them to be true; and that external Names were intended to and did rely upon them in deciding whether or not to join Lloyd's or to continue their membership of Lloyd's.

The Representations - The Brochures

Lloyd's Brochures from time to time contained statements which constituted representations to the effect pleaded, see (1) above.

The Global Reports and Accounts

The representations to be derived from the Aggregate Results/Global Reports and Accounts as at 31.12.81 to 31.12.87 were as pleaded, see (1) above.

The Falsity of the Representations

The Names say that these representations, made by Lloyd's, were untrue, for two principal reasons:

(i) that the market was under-reserved for asbestos-related losses; and/or,

(ii) that there were systemic problems affecting the market's ability to quantify accurately future losses for asbestosis such that the ultimate cost of the asbestos losses which would affect the Lloyd's market was not capable of quantification.

The Names say that the evidence before the Court which proves both under-reserving and radical uncertainty comes in the following forms:

Under-Reserving

(i) The document provided to the Court by Equitas under the terms of the Court's confidentiality orders.

(ii) The numerous contemporary comments and documents of individuals both within and outside Lloyd's to that effect.

(iii) The information contained in the AU38 forms. These documents also provide clear evidence of the impact of asbestos liabilities on the Lloyd's market and demonstrate that it was very considerably under-reserved for asbestos liabilities even on the syndicates' own market projections.

(iv) The charts prepared by Mr Louw on the basis of Mr Rayment's figures.

Uncertainty

(v) The numerous contemporary comments and documents of individuals both within and outside Lloyd's to that effect.

(vi) The attorneys' reports coming into Lloyd's from US attorneys were a critical source of information to all within the market. Analysis of the reports demonstrates how consistently and powerfully these attorneys' reports detailed the massive scale of the asbestos liabilities and the indeterminacy of their ultimate cost both globally and to Lloyd's. One key feature of the attorneys' reports to be borne in mind is that, as Attorney H reported on 20/1/83:

'The Working Party wish to draw the Market's attention to the fact that no allowance is made for IBNR, due to the many uncertainties that exist'.

This remained the position throughout the Relevant Period, Attorney H reporting on 24/8/87 that:

'It is extremely difficult for us to provide any reliable advice as to how the asbestos problem is likely to develop over the ensuing years except to the extent that it now appears that the total insurance limits of most insureds could be consumed by this enormous problem'.

Knowledge

The Names say that the knowledge of relevant individuals of this under-reserving and uncertainty is proved by a variety of forms of evidence before the court:

(1) The attorneys' reports coming into Lloyd's from US attorneys, were a critical source of information to all within the market.

(2) Contemporary comments during the course of the Relevant Period by individuals amongst the 33 and other documentary evidence indicating their knowledge. The evidence of the key witnesses called by Lloyd's from amongst the 33, (Mr. Murray, Mr. Murray Lawrence, Sir Peter Miller, Mr. Kellett, Mr. Jackson and Sir David Rowland) was partial. Their purported lack of memory of key events and documents was unconvincing as were their attempts to explain away damaging documents.

(3) The inferences to be drawn in respect of those witnesses Lloyd's chose not to call.

(4) The critical period during the Relevant Period when the documentary evidence most clearly demonstrates such knowledge is from the latter half of 1981 to the first half of 1982. A key event within this period was the discussion of and issue of the Murray Lawrence letter by the Committee of Lloyd's. A further significant aspect of the Names' case relates to the restricted circulation of this letter. The Names say that the evidence points to a restricted circulation of the letter; to members' agents as a general body not receiving it as they ought to have done; and to Mr. Lawrence and/or Mr. Randall as being those most likely to be responsible for that restricted circulation.

(5) The charts prepared by Mr. Louw and the evidence of Mr. Sturge on the 'feel' which a simple set of calculations would have given the market are also relevant. A 'back of the envelope' exercise was a straight-forward means of gaining a 'feel' for what order of exposure to asbestos Lloyd's had. Whilst it may be crude, it would certainly give such a feel and it is inconceivable that many of those at the heart of Lloyd's with knowledge of the market and of asbestos did not gain such a 'feel' themselves. The documentary evidence makes it plain that Mr. Nelson for one did precisely that.

The Names say that Lloyd's is fixed with the knowledge of these relevant individuals and hence liability for the misrepresentations because:

(i) In the course of the formal decision to publish the representations complained of there were people at Lloyd's who failed to speak out. These people were, or were amongst, the 33 against whom the Names allege fraud. Those with guilty knowledge who withheld it were the primary representatives of Lloyd's in relation to the critical omission (in failing to include a 'health warning' or qualification to the Brochure/ Global Reports and Accounts).

(ii) Those responsible for the content of the statements from the Chairmen of the Society and of the Market Associations of Lloyd's were amongst those identified above. (a) Such individuals acted as, or were held out as, agents for Lloyd's in making these statements. (b) These individuals were the primary representatives of Lloyd's in relation to the making of these statements. Either (a) or (b) is sufficient to fix their knowledge upon Lloyd's.

Mr. Aldous QC for Lloyd's summarised Lloyd's case in his closing submissions as follows.

Many of the original allegations which may have encouraged some Names to reject the R&R proposals and to sue Lloyd's have been shown to be unreliable or are now abandoned.

The Names have adopted an inconsistent position concerning the Lloyd's market's reserving for asbestos and pollution. Further, in instituting these proceedings, the Names seem to have been unaware of:

(i) the extent of information about asbestos which was available to all syndicates and the role of the AWP in distributing up to date information across the market;

(ii) the extensive information about asbestos which was provided to panel auditors annually;

(iii) quite how the asbestos problems increased in ways which were not predicted within Lloyd's and the insurance market generally; and

(iv) the underwriting activities of many of the 33, including their personal underwriting, which were inconsistent with their alleged dishonesty.

It is essential to have regard to the context in which the allegations are said to have occurred:

(a) In considering the Names' allegations, it is of assistance to look at other events in the Relevant Period and see the attitude and approach of those accused of fraud, the atmosphere of the times and the views of external bodies who looked at the structure and governance of the Lloyd's market. During the Relevant Period there was a process of vigorous regulatory reform, the aim or purpose of which (better disclosure, new accounting standards etc) was the very antithesis of the allegations of concealment of and a connivance in under-reserving. There were also two independent inquiries into the regulation of the Lloyd's market, which did not disclose any of the failings in the Lloyd's system which it is now alleged were known to the 33 at the time, and whose recommendations were implemented with efficiency and zeal. There were crises which demanded urgent attention and response - such as the "scandals" of 1982 and the PCW affair - which were responded to by Lloyd's in a serious and open manner.

(b) The Relevant Period (11 years) cannot be approached as though it is a single or unified event. Perceptions, concerns and preoccupations altered as opinions were changed by developing events and the different perspective which they gave. In addition new issues emerged which demanded urgent attention. Market conditions and outlook also changed: there were periods when market conditions engendered real optimism for the future (in particular the period 1985 to 1987).

The Names' case is founded upon allegations of fraudulent misrepresentation contained in the various Brochures issued by Lloyd's during the Relevant Period and Global Reports and Accounts of market results.

(i) The Brochures and Globals were prepared and reviewed with considerable care to ensure their accuracy and published with the approval of the Committee or Council. The LUNMA Chairmen's statements were not produced or prepared by Lloyd's, but by the LUNMA Chairmen without interference.

(ii) The implied representations which the Names allege cannot be found in the Brochures. The contrived implications relied upon are a disguised attempt to impose regulatory obligations on Lloyd's which the Courts (in the Ashmore and Clementson decisions) have previously held do not arise. The contrived nature and content of these representations reflects the real heart of the Names' complaint, a claim of alleged regulatory failure by Lloyd's. To circumvent section 14(3) of the Lloyd's Act, the Names have sought to force this claim into a case of fraudulent misrepresentation for alleged breaches of obligations which the Court (having read the Brochures) had previously held Lloyd's had not agreed to undertake. Moreover the Names have no justifiable complaint against Lloyd's for alleged regulatory failure.

(iii) The collegiate nature of the decisions of the Committee and Council to publish the Brochures and the Globals is important when considering the test for attributing a particular state of mind to Lloyd's in relation to those documents. In order to establish that that state of mind was dishonest, it is necessary for the Names to show that the majority of the body who approved and made the decision to publish the Brochure or Globals had such a state of mind. In relation to the Chairman of Lloyd's statement, the Chairman had no authority to include a statement in the Globals without consideration and approval of the Committee (for the 1981 to 1984 years of account) and the Council (for the 1985 to 1987 years of account). His statement was a commentary on the results in the form in which the Committee/Council had approved them and cannot sensibly be separated out from those Global results when considering the issue of attribution. Again, therefore, it is necessary for the Names to establish that a majority of the Committee/Council were aware that the Chairman's statement was untrue or were reckless as to the same. In those areas where the Chairman's statement expressed his own view, it is necessary to show that the majority of the Committee/Council (as appropriate) were aware that the Chairman did not hold such an opinion.

(iv) The LUNMA Chairmen's statements were not statements made by or on behalf of Lloyd's, but individual statements by the Chairmen of one of the market associations. In order to establish that Lloyd's acted dishonestly in relation to the publication of such a statement, the Names would have to show both that the relevant individual had a dishonest state of mind in relation to the contents of his statement, and that a majority of the body approving publication were likewise acting dishonestly in publishing it.

There are a number of features of the Names' case which make an analysis of the structure of the Lloyd's market, and of the respective roles of Lloyd's, the managing agents, the members' agents and the auditors within that market, of crucial importance:

(a) The Names are forced to look for contrived representations in two types of document only, the Brochure and the Globals, because of the very limited interaction between Lloyd's and applicants or Names (the Name's principal relationship and channel of communication being with his/her underwriting agents, members' and managing).

(b) The representations alleged seek to fix Lloyd's with obligations (such as the obligation to advise Names) which are properly the members' agents responsibilities. The allegation that Lloyd's "turned a blind eye" by not conducting some form of macro-reserving project or second-guessing syndicates' audited results, is an attempt to impose on Lloyd's an obligation to perform the functions of managing agents and auditors.

(c) The allegations of fraud against Lloyd's are not premised upon any suggestion that Lloyd's had access to special information or insight not available to the participants in the market, be they managing agents, their auditors or members' agents (indeed the Council and Committee consistently had less knowledge than the market about asbestos).

(d) If the Names' allegations are factually correct, then it would follow that each managing agent of a syndicate exposed to asbestos-related claims, each firm of panel auditors concerned with such a syndicate, each members' agent advising Names on syndicate selection, and the DTI as the overall regulator of the insurance industry, should have drawn similar conclusions to those which the Names allege Lloyd's should have drawn. It would equally follow that each of these bodies, in their own conduct throughout the Relevant Period, also acted dishonestly, and "turned their back" on the obvious. The Names' case requires an acceptance of extensive dishonesty throughout the market and of all the bodies operating in that market; an entirely improbable state of affairs which the Names have not sought to assert, still less to prove. It entails the suggestion either that there was the (improbable) coincidence of a series of unconnected and individually dishonest acts which ensured that no single group revealed the dishonesty of any other group, or that the dishonest acts were somehow connected and inter-dependent (the grand conspiracy theory).

(e) This is also true of members of the Council and Committee who are not accused of dishonesty (including the two Chief Executives, the many working members of the Council against whom no allegations of fraud are made, and external and nominated members of the Council) and the many members of the Corporation staff against whom allegations of fraud have not been made, such as Mr Tony Parkington, Mr Simon Tovey, Mrs Catherine Stynes and Mr Alan Pollard.

(f) The evidence establishes that the solvency and audit system was perceived by Lloyd's to be operating properly during the Relevant Period. At no stage during the Relevant Period did the regulatory system signal that the process by which managing agents and auditors participated in establishing reserves was one which could no longer safely be relied on. On the contrary, through the increases in reserves seen in response to a deteriorating claims situation and the increasing number of open years, the system worked. The accounting reforms and developments implemented during the Relevant Period included the introduction of a requirement of true and fair accounting, the production of the Audit Manual, the publication of the Audit Brief and the on-going introduction of new firms onto the auditors' panel.

The argument that Lloyd's turned its back on under-reserving is premised on an allegation that Lloyd's perceived during the Relevant Period that the scale of asbestos claims was so great and their final number so uncertain that either reserves could not equitably be set, or the total of reserves established by the Lloyd's market was perceived to be manifestly insufficient based on some form of "back of the envelope" calculation. To support their allegations, whilst eschewing an allegation of fraud against the AWP in the order of 1 July 1999, the Names have alleged that the AWP decided that attorneys should not make reserve recommendations which reflected future projections and claims. Various quotations have been culled from reports and periodicals to support the allegation that asbestos was perceived as a claim which was too uncertain to permit reserves to be equitably set; and crude "macro" calculations have been put forward of the Lloyd's market's share of outstanding and future asbestos claims.

Lloyd's submits:

(i) The AWP was a market body whose members did their best to ensure that asbestos claims received the serious attention which they deserved, and that syndicates had access to the most accurate and up-to-date information available. Issues relating to IBNR were left to individual syndicates to determine, utilising that information in the context of their individual books of business and protections. The Committee of Lloyd's did not attempt to influence the form in which reserve advices were produced.

(ii) The insurance industry did not foresee the scale of asbestos claims which were eventually to come. Insurance companies throughout the world and Lloyd's syndicates believed that exposure to asbestos claims could be fairly reserved for. These reserves were later shown to be inadequate because of the unforeseeable manner in which asbestos claims continued to develop, with new classes of claims and new categories of assureds emerging. This deterioration did not present itself as a continuing and inevitable event, but as a series of developments which, as they occurred were factored into reserving calculations, but which did not themselves presage the further deterioration to come.

(iii) This perception of asbestos claims was not limited to the insurance industry, but extended to other bodies which made judgments as to the future number of claims. The views that assureds such as Johns Manville formed when settling coverage disputes, and which the US Bankruptcy Court formed when approving the Johns Manville reorganisation, were shown by hindsight to be equally inadequate, but were arrived at in good faith and were regarded as a proper foundation on which to take important decisions at the time.

(iv) The Names rely on figures from the Califano statement, Dr Selikoff's research and the Commercial Union and MacAvoy reports, but have chosen not to rely on reports such as Conning and Munich Re. The figures which the Names rely on were regarded as at the outer fringes of contemporary statements of view, and remain so even with hindsight. The development of claims numbers during the Relevant Period was not consistent with the problem being one of the scale suggested by these figures. Many sources in the world insurance industry and amongst producers believed in the early 1980's that the likely total of claimants would be of the order of 40-50,000. Even towards the end of the Relevant Period, when matters had deteriorated considerably, the likely total was viewed as one in the 80,000-100,000 range.

(v) The Names' allegation that Lloyd's could and should have performed a "back of the envelope" calculation which would have revealed that the Lloyd's market was under-reserved for asbestos claims is misconceived. No witness with relevant expertise agreed that such an exercise could be performed, nor is there any evidence that anyone either made such a calculation, or believed that it could be made, at the time. Where it has been possible to test the figures for Lloyd's share of known outstanding claims put forward by Mr Louw, it is clear Mr Louw's figures wildly over-state the position.

The Names' allegations as to the various steps which Lloyd's should have taken during the Relevant Period are premised on a fundamental misconception of the nature of the Lloyd's regulatory role, and the fundamental distinction between that role and the executive, managerial, advisory and auditing role performed by agents and auditors.

The allegation that Lloyd's engaged in a strategy of recruiting Names or encouraging existing Names to increase their capacity in order to meet asbestos losses (the recruit to dilute allegation) was misconceived. The evidence establishes that the Lloyd's market capacity grew in response to external market factors, that growth was spread across different sectors of the Lloyd's market, and that Lloyd's competitors also grew to a similar or greater degree at this time.

The Names' allegation that MPRs were deliberately set at too low a level in order to encourage under-reserving should be rejected. The allegation misunderstands the purpose of MPRs and the alternative reserving tests almost universally applied to long-tail business. The proposed MPRs, and the market settlement statistics which were collected to assist in establishing the MPRs, were widely distributed to the DTI, the auditors and the market associations for comment and review and were initially suggested by Corporation staff. Again the allegation that MPRs were set deliberately too low entails allegations of dishonesty against many other persons and bodies.

The events of the pivotal period demonstrate an honest and entirely proper regulatory response to the issue of reserving for asbestos claims. Important and useful information was provided by Lloyd's to underwriting agents and to auditors to assist them in the audit. The auditors' concerns in the Neville Russell letter were treated with due seriousness, and received a proper response in the form of the Murray Lawrence letter. The evidence establishes that the Committee intended that that letter should be sent to all underwriting agents (members' and managing agents) and panel auditors; that it was so sent; and that thereafter asbestos was dealt with through the terms of the Audit Instructions and the annual meeting with panel auditors at which Lloyd's arranged for a member of the market body concerned with asbestos claims (the AWP), to give an up-date on the development of these claims. After the Murray Lawrence letter was sent, there was no occasion on which the auditors repeated the concerns they had expressed in the Neville Russell letter about the manner in which some syndicates were reserving for asbestos claims.

As to the Outhwaite syndicate, the existence of the run-off market in which this highly regarded syndicate was so heavily engaged, and the way in which different syndicates responded to that market, confirms that the perception of the future development of asbestos claims in the early 1980s was very different to that for which the Names contend. The series of events by which the Outhwaite 1982 year came to be left open in early 1985 reveal the proper working of the Lloyd's audit and agency system. Lloyd's did not acquire any information or insight from its involvement with the Outhwaite syndicate, whether in 1985 or thereafter, which suggested that there were any widespread problems in the audit system.

The PCW settlement of 1986/1987 confirms that even in the most difficult of circumstances, it was believed that equitable reserves could be established for syndicates with significant asbestos exposures. The subsequent deterioration of the syndicates' run-off reflects the unforeseen developments in asbestos and pollution claims. Nominated members of the Council and senior members of Corporation staff such as Mr Lord were intimately involved in the Council's consideration of the affairs of the PCW syndicates and did not themselves draw the conclusion that there was any problem with the audit regime.

As to the Names' allegation that Lloyd's should have warned Names in Rota of the risks posed by syndicates touched by asbestos, the Rota interview was the culmination of an extended admission process. Its limited purpose was to verify that the Name's agent had explained the fundamental features of membership to Names. It was not the context in which advice could be given, nor did this form part of the Rota Committee's role.

As to the Inland Revenue investigation into rollover policies and rollover policies themselves, the investigation was premised on the allegation that the Lloyd's market was over-reserved and seeking to defer the payment of taxable profit. Rollover policies (which in the vast majority of cases did not involve any impropriety on the part of the underwriters who took them out) evidenced the desire of syndicates to protect their Names against any risk of catastrophe claims or claims from the old years which had not been foreseen and for which no specific reserve had been allocated.

As to certain conspiracy theories which the Names have advanced during different stages of this trial (the allegation that the Bank of England sent Lloyd's a copy of a letter warning of "asbestos Armageddon" and the exposure of clearing banks to the Lloyd's market in 1982; the allegation that a secret Lloyd's department or committee, FOLDRUG, was monitoring the market's exposure to asbestos claims; and the allegation that Lloyd's had destroyed copies of Ian Hay Davison's book), each of these allegations is misconceived.

As to the allegations of reliance by the three sample witnesses, the claim that these Names either perceived or relied upon the representations alleged to be contained in the relevant Brochure or Global Reports and Accounts has not been substantiated. These Names have not even established that they received and considered the documents in question, still less that they understood them to make the representations pleaded, and relied on such representations. The evidence suggests that the Names relied on the advice of their members' agents.

The Tort of Deceit

The relevant legal principles as to the tort of deceit are as follows:-

(1) In order to sustain an action in deceit, there must be proof of fraud. Nothing short of fraud will suffice. Fraud is proved where it is shown that a false representation has been made

(i) knowingly, or

(ii) without belief in its truth, or

(iii) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false.

The following account of the Administrative Structure and Governance of the Lloyd's market is drawn from a statement of agreed facts. Where I have decided a matter in dispute between the parties this is shown in square brackets.

A. INTRODUCTION

I set out below the governance and administrative structure of the Lloyd's market and identify the functions of particular committees, sub-committees, departments and personnel over the Relevant Period and of the various participants in the Lloyd's market.

B. THE OPERATION OF THE LLOYD'S MARKET GENERALLY

Structure of the Lloyd's Market

The Society and Corporation of Lloyd's regulates and provides services to an insurance market (the Lloyd's market) comprising individual underwriting members known as Names. All underwriting members appoint underwriting agents, registered and regulated by Lloyd's to conduct insurance business on their behalf. Names underwrite insurance through their agents on a several basis for their own profit or loss.

By the Lloyd's Act of 1982 the constitution of the Society was refashioned and a new Council was created, equipped with wide powers to regulate the conduct of the practitioners in the market and to provide protection for the policyholders whose risks are insured and for the Names who underwrite those risks.

[Prior to the Lloyd's Act 1982 more restricted functions were carried out by the Committee of Lloyd's as reflected in the Fisher Report.]

The Nature of the Lloyd's Market

Lloyd's is an insurance market in which underwriting members (the Names) provide insurance cover for policyholders (the assured). The Names operate through underwriting agents who have complete authority to act on their behalf in dealing with brokers, the agents of the assured. Underwriting members at Lloyd's can be categorised according to whether they are, or have been substantially involved in the market as agents or brokers or their employees (the working Names), or whether they have no professional involvement (the external Names).

The way in which a Name puts his or her wealth at risk at Lloyd's in providing insurance cover is as follows. He/she has to demonstrate that he/she possesses sufficient capital appropriately invested. These investments and the returns on them constitute reserve capital which is called upon only if, as a result of the underwriting carried out on his/her behalf, the premiums received from the assured (and any amounts derived from the reinsurance of the risks underwritten) do not cover claims from policyholders. In the event that his/her capital is called, the Name's liability is unlimited; he/she is liable, if necessary, to sacrifice his/her entire personal fortune to pay valid claims, even if in total they go far beyond the amount originally declared. This is one of the two fundamental principles of membership of Lloyd's. The other is that Names underwrite on the basis of 'each… for his/her own part and not for another'… If a Name suffers a loss he/she cannot call on other members to share it, nor can they call on him/her to share theirs. Likewise he/she is not called upon to share his/her profits.

Although Names are sole traders, the effective operation of the market demands that they underwrite in groups, or syndicates, of varying sizes. Syndicates are grouped principally into four main markets (marine, non-marine, aviation and motor). Syndicates enable members to co-operate in underwriting risks, or proportions of risks, which would be too large for an individual to cover and they permit most of the participants to leave the actual business of underwriting to one or more working members acting on behalf of the whole syndicate. But syndicates themselves have no separate corporate status. Each member contracts directly or indirectly with his/her underwriting agent that he/she will be responsible for only a percentage of the syndicate's underwriting business, known as his/her 'line' which may vary from year to year.

There have evolved two distinct types of underwriting agent. The organiser and manager of one or more syndicates is known as a managing agent. The day to day management of each syndicate is carried out by a main (or 'active') underwriter who is an employee (and often a director or partner) of the agency. It is the active underwriter and his team who accept risks on behalf of syndicate members, receive premium income and settle claims.

The managing agent does not recruit syndicate members directly save in the case of a combined agency. That is the task of another type of agent, the members' agent, who introduces prospective Names to Lloyd's, advises them on syndicate membership and acts as an intermediary between Names and managing agents. The latter agree with members' agent that they will make available specified amounts of syndicate capacity which those members' agents can then allocate to individual Names.

The Society of Lloyd's was formed in 1811 and incorporated by an Act of Parliament as the Society and Corporation of Lloyd's. The objects of the Society are as follows:

(i) The carrying on by members of the Society of the business of insurance of every description including guarantee business;

(ii) The advancement and protection of the interests of members of the Society in connection with the business carried on by them as members of the Society and in respect of shipping and cargoes and freight and other insurable property or insurable interests or otherwise;

(iii) The collection, publication and diffusion of intelligence and information;

(iv) The doing of all things incidental or conducive to the fulfilment of the objects of the Society. (Section 4, Lloyd's Act 1911).

The Society does not itself underwrite insurance.

Active underwriters at Lloyd's must be members of the Society and, with certain limited exceptions, brokers must be approved by the Society in order to place business with Lloyd's underwriting agents on behalf of their clients.

Underwriting Members or Names

A Name is the 'insuring entity' that underwrites risk in the market through participation in syndicates and that earns the underwriting profit or sustains the loss. Each Name trades individually for his or her own account. In order to be eligible to underwrite insurance at Lloyd's, an individual must apply and be accepted as a member.

The amount of business a Name is permitted to underwrite is circumscribed by the level of resources placed at Lloyd's and is referred to as an Overall Premium Limit. (The premium limit is based on a multiple of the membership means requirement). This does not, however, apply to premiums received for reinsurance to close earlier years of a syndicate on which the Name is placed, where the placing and receiving syndicate are substantially similar.

During the Relevant Period:

(i) changes were made in relation to deposits and assets to be shown by Names; and

(ii) there were distinctions, in relation to means and deposit requirements, between working members and external members.

As a result of recommendations by the Bird Working Party in 1984, Names were required to "come into line" with any new deposit and means requirements introduced since they joined.

Syndicates

Names underwrite in groups called syndicates. A syndicate aggregates the underwriting capacities allocated to it by individual Names. It has no legal status or personality independent of the Names. Most Names allocate capacity to a number of different syndicates. Each Name underwrites risk though a managing agent aggregating the underwriting capacities of the various Names who appoint him/her, so that larger risks may be accepted. Names trade on the basis of several liability and so are not responsible for the liabilities of other Names within the syndicate.

Names underwrite through syndicates which write business allocated to a single calendar year (known as the year of account). Syndicates are reconstituted at the beginning of each year with a membership which may well differ, at least to some degree, from the previous year. The syndicates are therefore sometimes described as annual ventures. The outstanding liabilities of a particular year of account of a syndicate are reinsured at least 2 years after the end of the year of account, usually by the next succeeding year of account of the same syndicate. This reinsurance is known as reinsurance to close. Accordingly, the management of a syndicate's business is effectively an ongoing venture, carried out by a managing agent.

According to the practice at Lloyd's, every year of account of a syndicate is kept open for not less than three years from the beginning of that year of account. A year of account begins on 1 January of each year. At the end of three years, a year of account may (but need not) be closed into a later (usually the next oldest open) year of account, by means of a contract known as a Reinsurance to Close.

The management and underwriting of Names' insurance business is carried out on their behalf by the managing agents of the syndicates in which they participate. A managing agent employs underwriting and administrative staff (including the active underwriter) who run the syndicate's business from year to year. The services provided by the underwriter can include general management, accounting, business development, computer services and other shared services. The cost of the services so provided is charged to the members of the syndicate as part of the costs of underwriting. In addition, the managing agent charges a fee, based on the capacity allocated to the syndicate by each Name, and receives a profit commission on the syndicates' profits.

The following were among the principal features of a syndicate:

(i) Working members were entitled to be, and often were, Names on the syndicates for which they worked;

(ii) Clause 5 of the Standard Agency Agreement scheduled to the Agency Agreements Byelaw No 1 of 1985 provided that: "The Agent shall have the sole control and management of the underwriting business and the Name shall not in any way interfere with the exercise of such control or management." This provision reflected the contractual provision that prevailed prior to Byelaw No. 1 of 1985;

(iii) The active underwriter was a key figure in a syndicate.

Most managing agents are now limited companies (one or two are partnerships), which are privately owned or, in a few cases, publicly quoted. Prior to the divestment process required by Lloyd's Act 1982, some of the managing agencies were owned by Lloyd's brokers but, as result of the divestment requirements, the brokers were required to dispose of their interests in the managing agents (and vice versa). See further paragraphs 12.03 to 12.07 of the Fisher Report. A period of five years was allowed for the process of divestment.

Active underwriters were required by paragraph 21 of the Underwriting Agents Byelaw (No. 4 of 1984) to be directors of the managing agency.

There were three types of agent. Originally, the managing agent fulfilled the role of introducing new Names to the market and managing their affairs as underwriting members. Over the past 30 years, a second category of agent has evolved within the Lloyd's market: the members' agent, whose function was to introduce new Names and advise them on syndicate selection and other issues.

Some members' agents operate, so far as Lloyd's agency functions are concerned, exclusively as members' agents. Some of these agents are part of broking groups, who were able to retain ownership of members' agencies when they were required to sell off their managing agencies by the divestment provisions of Lloyd's Act 1982. Other members' agents are owned by, or are members of a group that includes, a managing agent in which case they and the managing agent are referred to as combined agents.

Divorce of managing and membership functions was voted on prior to the promotion of the Lloyd's Bill and was rejected by a very large majority.

Members' agents are remunerated on a similar basis to managing agents, receiving both a fee based on allocated capacity and a profit commission.

Categories of Business Conducted at Lloyd's

The business of Lloyd's was traditionally divided into four principal categories: marine, non-marine, aviation and motor. Managing agents often describe the syndicates they manage by reference to the main category in which they have traditionally operated. However, these descriptions are not comprehensive and do not define syndicates which frequently write a broader range of business than those titles might suggest.

Marine syndicates wrote, in some cases, an incidental non-marine account. Some of these incidental non-marine accounts carried an exposure to long-tail asbestos-related liabilities. Asbestos-related claims were made on some aviation syndicates.

Each syndicate writes a different mix of business, with each category of business carrying different risks. There is an important distinction between "short-tail" and "long-tail" risks. The term "short-tail" is applied to business on which claims generally arise and are settled relatively soon after the risk is accepted and the premium paid; "long-tail" denotes business for which the notification or the settlement of claims, or both, may take many years.

The US $ "All Other" class of business included both longer long-tail risks and shorter long-tail risks.

Lloyd's syndicates underwrite both "direct business" (where the policyholder has a direct interest in the underlying risk insured) and "reinsurance" (where the policyholder is an insurance company or another Lloyd's syndicate). Reinsurance can be of an individual risk (a facultative reinsurance) or a portfolio or specified part of risks previously written or yet to be written (treaty reinsurance).

Facultative-obligative (or fac/oblig) is one of a number of categories of reinsurance treaties. Some syndicates wrote retrocession as well as reinsurance business.

XL and LMX business are dealt with below.

The insurance industry is international and, in many areas, highly competitive. In many countries, insurance can only be provided by locally-based licensed insurers. However, Lloyd's underwriters have been authorised to provide insurance under local insurance legislation in a number of countries including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. In many of the countries where Lloyd's underwriters are so authorised, they are required to fulfil a number of local requirements, which may include the appointment of a general representative, the maintenance of local deposits and the filing of statistical reports. In other countries, Lloyd's underwriters are able to accept business without having to be licensed insurers. For example, in the USA, although licensed to write direct insurance only in Illinois, Kentucky and the US Virgin Islands, Lloyd's underwriters are eligible (except in Kentucky and the US Virgin Islands) to accept excess or surplus lines business (i.e. business which locally licensed insurers are unable or unwilling to underwrite) in all states. Lloyd's underwriters are also able to write reinsurance of insurance companies, even in countries where they are unable to write on a direct basis.

The Production and Placement of Business

Business is brought to Lloyd's by the world-wide networks of the Lloyd's brokers. Managing agents and active underwriters depend primarily upon Lloyd's brokers bringing insureds and cedant insurers to them. Business is also underwritten on behalf of syndicates through binding authorities. Binding authorities are arrangements whereby third parties (often brokers) are authorised to accept risks on behalf of the members of the syndicate subject to certain conditions and limits.

A Lloyd's broker is a partnership or corporate body permitted by the Council to broke insurance business at Lloyd's on behalf of its clients. Most of the largest broking firms in the world own a Lloyd's broking subsidiary. Lloyd's brokers do not place all of their business through the Lloyd's market. They also deal with UK insurance companies and overseas insurance markets.

The Lloyd's broker is the final link in a chain from the policyholder to the Lloyd's underwriters which may include a number of other intermediaries. The remuneration payable to the Lloyd's broker (usually expressed as a percentage of the premium payable by the insured) may be shared amongst all the intermediaries. The Lloyd's broker is normally responsible for preparing the documentation which is used for presenting the risk to underwriters (the "slip"). A typical risk will be placed with a number of syndicates, with one particular underwriter (the "leader") setting the premium rate, approving the policy wording and, frequently, underwriting the largest "line" - or percentage - of the risk. In most cases, once the risk has been placed, the broker issues a cover note setting out the basic terms and conditions of the insurance, and the proportion of the risk accepted by each insurer. There may be some participants in the cover from outside the Lloyd's market. However, there will only be one policy document for the participating Lloyd's syndicates. That document is usually prepared by the broker, and checked by the Lloyd's Policy Signing Office, which issues it on behalf of the subscribing underwriters.

Lioncover

As a result of large losses suffered by the Names on those syndicates managed by PCW Underwriting Agencies Limited (caused mainly by the fraud of its active underwriter), Lioncover was formed in 1987 by the Society (as a wholly-owned subsidiary under its control) as a vehicle to reinsure the liabilities of syndicates formerly managed by PCW (later Richard Beckett Underwriting Agencies Limited). It subsequently also reinsured WMD Underwriting Agencies Limited, an associated agency. 73 syndicates were managed by these agencies. They were broad-based marine, non-marine and aviation accounts, including a large exposure to non-marine long-tail casualty business.

All PCW syndicates and Names were reinsured to close into Syndicate 9001. This was a syndicate formed specifically to enable Names on PCW syndicates to obtain reinsurance to close, thereby ending their involvement in the PCW syndicates for regulatory and tax purposes and enabling them to be released from membership of Lloyd's. Syndicate 9001 conducts no other business. Lioncover (as retrocessionaire) entered into a whole account retrocession agreement with Syndicate 9001 (as retrocedant).

The Society gave indemnities to each of the members of Syndicate 9001 who were Mr. Murray Lawrence, Mr. Alan Parry and Sir Peter Miller.

Centrewrite

Centrewrite Limited, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Society, and under its control, was formed in 1991 to provide reinsurance, on an arms-length, unlimited basis, for syndicates in run-off and for individual members of such syndicates. From1993, it underwrote Lloyd's members' Estate Protection Plans.

XL and LMX Business

Under an excess of loss reinsurance contract, the reinsurer agrees to indemnify the reinsured in the event of the latter sustaining a loss in excess of a pre-determined figure, (the deductible). The reinsurer is liable for the amount of the loss in excess of the deductible up to an agreed amount, the deductible being the amount retained, (or retention), for the reinsured's own account. The purpose of excess of loss reinsurance is thus to limit the exposure of the reinsured on any loss, whether this arises from a large individual risk or through an aggregation of losses from a number of risks affected by a single event or loss occurrence.

XL protection may be obtained through whole account or general reinsurance, which provides cover for all or a proportion of losses, net of recoveries, on underlying policies. In practice, cover will normally be purchased in layers, rather than through one single policy. Specific XL treaties provide protection in respect of specific portfolios of business accepted by the reinsured (e.g. hull, cargo, oil rigs). The term XL can be used to describe all these types of excess of loss business.

In providing cover to primary insurers, accepting reinsurers may themselves accumulate exposures higher than they wish to retain. To meet their requirements for protection, the retrocession of excess of loss reinsurance developed as a mechanism that was intended to spread exposures more widely.

LMX is not a term which is uniformly used. It is excess of loss reinsurance written by London market entities. It is written by both corporate reinsurers and Lloyd's syndicates. The nature of LMX business is the same as that of other excess of loss treaty reinsurance. LMX business is distinguished from other excess of loss business in that it is, depending on usage, (i) reinsurance underwritten by underwriters operating in the London market of risks originating in this same market, as opposed to general excess of loss business that is reinsured on a worldwide basis, or (ii) is an excess of loss reinsurance written in London of an excess of loss contract. The "London" distinction is thus almost entirely a geographical and cultural phenomenon, encouraged by certain brokers who specialised in this business and reflecting their knowledge of and trading relationships with the parties involved.

The Spiral

Writing high level XL on XL business on a catastrophe account is high risk. The working of the spiral which developed in the 1980s was complex, and it is convenient to describe it only in a simplified form. The phenomenon of what is described as the spiral was not new or peculiar to the operation of the market in the 1980s. Before Hurricane Betsy in 1965, a similar spiral had developed in the London market, and the losses that followed that catastrophe demonstrated the effect of the spiral. The lesson had been forgotten by the 1980s. Many syndicates which wrote XL cover took out XL cover themselves. Those who reinsured them were thus writing XL on XL. They, in their turn, frequently took out their own XL cover. There thus developed among the syndicates and companies which wrote XL business a smaller group that was responsible for creating, in relation to some risks, a complex intertwining network of mutual reinsurance, a spiral. When a catastrophe led to claims being made by primary insurers on their excess of loss covers, this started a process whereby syndicates passed on their liabilities, in excess of their own retentions, under their own excess of loss covers from one to the next, rather like a multiple game of "pass the parcel". Those left holding the liability parcels were those who first exhausted their layers of excess of loss reinsurance protection. Following Hurricane Alicia in 1983, the non-marine market introduced higher retentions, co-insurance and the exclusion of XL of XL business from whole account or general programmes written. The marine market did not take similar measures.

So far as the individual syndicates were concerned, the effect of the spiral was to magnify many times the number of claims flowing from a particular loss. This is because claims were repeatedly made in respect of the same loss as it circulated in the spiral. For example, claims in respect of the Piper Alpha loss exceeded by a multiple of about 10 the net loss that was covered on the London market.

This gearing effect did not result in an ultimate payment of a greater indemnity than the initial loss. As the loss passed through the spiral, however, it impacted repeatedly on successive layers of reinsurance cover (which it progressively absorbed), and once the total underlying retention was breached, ultimately concentrated on those reinsurers who found their cover exhausted.

The spiral effect of claims was, however, diminished or extinguished by individual retentions, whether before reinsurance protection commenced or after it had been exhausted, by co-insurance and by 'leakage' to reinsurers who did not reinsure with the same insurers. The effect of the spiral, however, significantly reduced the comfort that could properly be derived from being exposed only to what appeared to be a very high layer of loss.

Lloyd's Underwriting Claims and Recovery Office saw 43,000 claims on 11,500 excess of loss policies in respect of the Piper Alpha loss. In the case of Piper Alpha, gross claims transactions totalled about $15 billion for the whole of the London market, whereas the actual loss was $1.4 billion.

There was a claims turnover of ten times the actual loss in relation to the Exxon Valdez claim.

Growth of the LMX market during the 1980s

Certain underwriters identified commercial opportunities in writing substantial LMX business in the 1980s. It was perceived that there was an opportunity to write profitable LMX business in circumstances in which underwriting capacity was increasing rapidly and other underwriting business (eg marine) was sluggish or in decline. However, the business involved exposures and a need for judgments different from those with which many of these underwriters were familiar. In the event, a number of Lloyd's syndicates and others in the London market suffered very heavily from their decision to write such business. Further details of the nature of the XL spiral, and the reasons for the heavy losses suffered, are contained in the decisions of Phillips J in the Gooda Walker and Feltrim litigation. The parties have agreed the facts set out in those judgments relating to the manner in which the business was written on those syndicates, and the findings of Phillips J as to the negligence of the underwriters concerned.

There was also an increase in the number of companies in the so-called "fringe" market in London at this time. Many of the companies that then went into reinsurance were highly inexperienced in reinsurance and were used by the brokers to drive prices down or to get unacceptable clauses accepted. One reason that brought people into the market was the opportunity for so-called "cash flow" underwriting. The 1980s were a time when returns on investment were high. A high cash flow would produce high investment returns. This led to some reinsurers pricing reinsurance at rates that would in normal circumstances have been considered too low in terms of pure underwriting rates of return. The big continental reinsurance groups in many cases also made pure underwriting and overall losses on specific catastrophe accounts but were able to spread the losses across other segments of business. There were only a very few years when they lost large amounts overall. The worst hit were those who did not have a spread of business; this also applied to the worst hit syndicates in Lloyd's. Continental reinsurers generally had the benefit of equalisation and other reserves which enabled them to weather the bad years by spreading their losses over more than 12 months.

Gross premiums for business written in the 1988 account showed a 61% increase by comparison with premiums for business written in the 1983 account, with a growth of 201% in premium income of the LMX syndicates over the same period. Gross premium income of the LMX syndicates as a proportion of Lloyd's total gross premium income rose from 13.1% for the 1983 account to 24.6% in 1988 and 26.4% in 1990. Premium rates for LMX business fell substantially in the 1980s.

In the period 1987 to 1990, insurance and reinsurance markets were impacted by an unprecedented number of major catastrophe losses, viz 1987, North European storms; 1988, Piper Alpha and Hurricane Gilbert; 1989, Hurricane Hugo, the San Francisco Earthquake, Exxon Valdez, and Phillips Petroleum; 1990, North European storms. The cumulative impact of these losses was severe on both companies and syndicates. For the 1987 North European storms, Piper Alpha, Hurricane Hugo and the 1990 North European storms, companies (including direct insurers and major reinsurers) carried 69%, 45%, 64% and 64% of the liability respectively, but still leaving substantial losses for Lloyd's syndicates. On the basis of the syndicates analysed in the Walker Report, losses were concentrated on a relatively small number of syndicates: although 87 syndicates were writing significant LMX business in 1988 or 1989 – in one case 93% of that syndicate's stamp capacity – 95% of the losses attributable to those syndicates for the 1988 account were encountered on 12 of those syndicates and 79% of the losses of the LMX syndicates for the 1989 account were attributable to 14 of them.

In the 1980s premium rates for LMX business fell substantially. In circumstances of apparently reasonable profit levels (in the years between 1965 and 1987, the worldwide reinsurance market was relatively undisturbed by major catastrophes, thus generally leaving reinsurers with a 22 year span of profitable results) and increasing capacity, premium rates in 1987 and 1988 had fallen to only 10% of those being charged ten years earlier and were reduced in higher layers as a consequence of the perceived diminution in exposure.

Catastrophe reinsurance rates have risen since 1989. The expectation of the world-wide reinsurance industry in April 1995 was that substantial withdrawals of capacity from the industry as a whole that had taken place would keep reinsurance rates hard over the medium term.

The Risks

The high risk nature of the spiral exposures accepted by the syndicates and the level of reinsurance accepted by the syndicates and the level of reinsurance purchased to protect them was not appreciated by many Names. Had the Names been better aware of the risks involved they might have ceased or reduced their participation.

C. GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE

Prior to the 1982 Lloyd's Act, powers were conferred upon the Society of Lloyd's by four earlier Acts of Parliament: the Lloyd's Acts of 1871, 1911, 1925 and 1951. The Committee of Lloyd's was charged with the management and superintendence of the affairs of the Society, but was subject to control and regulation by general meeting of the members (Section 29 Lloyd's Act 1871).

In summary, the powers of the Society were:

(i) to make, revoke or amend byelaws (by general meeting, re-confirmed by a further general meeting within 28 days and subsequently approved by the Recorder of the City of London) in respect of a number of defined purposes (Section 24 Lloyd's Act 1871);

(ii) to suspend members for a period not exceeding 2 years for any "act or default discreditable to him ... in connection with the insurance business" (Section 12 Lloyd's Act 1911);

(iii) to expel a member for a breach of the rules of the Society or for committing a discreditable act following a determination of guilt by 2 arbitrators and on the vote of four fifths of the members attending at a general meeting convened for that purpose (on at least 6 days notice) (Section 20 Lloyd's Act 1871);

(iv) to investigate and punish any frauds or felonies which relate to the insurance business carried out by members (Section 11 Lloyd's Act 1911);

(v) to raise or borrow money (Section 3 Lloyd's Act 1951);

(vi) to guarantee payment of claims (Section 9 Lloyd's Act 1911); and

(vii) to act as trustee (Section 8 Lloyd's Act 1911).

The Committee was originally established under the 1871 Act and comprised 12 individuals appointed under that Act (Section 11 Lloyd's Act 1871). Prior to the start of the Relevant Period the number of Committee members was increased to 16 (See Byelaw 44 of the 1973 edition of Lloyd's Byelaws). One quarter of the Committee retired by rotation each year and new members were elected by a vote of all the members at general meeting. Individuals who had retired from the Committee were eligible for re-election one year after they had stood down. Newly elected Committee members would be invited to attend the Committee meeting at the end of the year.

The Council of Lloyd's

The Council of Lloyd's was established by the Lloyd's Act 1982 and was formed on 1 January 1983. The first meeting of the Council took place on 5 January 1983. Under the Act the Council became the body charged with the management and superintendence of the affairs of the Society and the power to regulate and direct the business of insurance at Lloyd's (Section 6(1) Lloyd's Act 1982). To that end, the Council was empowered (by special resolution of separate majorities of the working members and of the external and nominated members together) to:

(i) make such byelaws as from time to time seem requisite or expedient for the proper and better execution of Lloyd's Acts 1871 to 1982 and for the furtherance of the objects of the Society, including such byelaws as it thinks fit for any or all of the purposes specified in Schedule 2 of the Act; and

(ii) amend or revoke any byelaw made or deemed to have been made thereunder (Section 6(2) Lloyd's Act 1982).

Under Section 6(4) of the Lloyd's Act 1982, any byelaw passed by the Council may, within 60 days, be challenged at a general meeting by a majority of those voting, such majority being at least a third of the total membership, on the petition of not less than 500 Names.

The composition of the Council was established by the Lloyd's Act 1982 as comprising 16 working Names, 8 external Names and 3 Names nominated by the Council and confirmed by the Governor of the Bank of England (Section 3 Lloyd's Act 1982). In July 1987, following the Neill Report, the composition was altered to 12 working Names, 8 external and 8 nominated Names.

The composition of the Council was (after the Relevant Period) subsequently further altered and the number of working Names reduced to 6.

Working members of the Council are elected by the working members of the Society and external members of the Council are elected by external members of the Society (Section 3(2) Lloyd's Act 1982). The conduct of elections of members of the Council is regulated by byelaws passed by the Council. During most of the Relevant Period elections for both working and external Council members were held by postal ballot on the same day as the general meeting in November each year (Byelaw 13 of 1983, paragraph 2). Council members were elected for 4 years (save for nominated members of Council who served for 3 years at a time). Council members were required to take a sabbatical year after serving on the Council before standing for re-election. The date on which the elections were held was changed in 1987 (Byelaw 1 of 1987).

The Chairman and Deputy Chairmen of Lloyd's are elected on an annual basis by the Council (Section 4 Lloyd's Act 1982).

The Committee of Lloyd's

From January 1983 the Committee of Lloyd's was comprised of the 16 working members of the Council (Section 5(1) Lloyd's Act 1982). This was reduced to 12 in July 1987. By means of special resolution, the Council was able to delegate certain functions to the Committee, namely:

(i) the making of regulations regarding the business of insurance at Lloyd's; and

(ii) the carrying out or exercise of any duties, responsibilities, rights, powers or discretions imposed or conferred upon the Council by any enactment (other than an enactment in the Act) or regulation made in pursuance thereof or by any other instrument having the effect of law or by any other document or arrangement whatsoever, whether or not such enactment, regulation, instrument, document or arrangement was in force or in existence on the day when the Act came into force, insofar as such delegation was not prohibited by any enactment, regulation, instrument, document or arrangements (Section 6(6) Lloyd's Act 1982).

Other powers and functions under the 1982 Act and the power to make directions regarding the business of insurance at Lloyd's may be delegated to the Committee or to the Chairs of Lloyd's or to the Chairs of the Committee (Section 6(5) Lloyd's Act 1982).

The Chairs

The Chairman was the ambassador and principal spokesman of Lloyd's to the outside world, including external Names. [He was the team leader of a team that was the fountainhead of authority and policy. He liaised regularly with Market Association Chairmen. For the proper performance of his functions it was necessary for him to inform himself of important market activities and problems.]

[The two elected deputy Chairmen deputised for the Chairman when he was not available. Where appropriate, any member would be allowed direct access to the Chairs.]

Committee Structure

In turn, the Council and the Committee have delegated functions to certain committees. The roles of certain committees relevant to the present dispute (both before and after the 1982 Act) are set out below.

(a) Audit Committee

The Audit Committee was a policy and advisory committee reporting to the Committee of

Lloyd's on matters affecting the solvency of members of Lloyd's and the security underlying

Lloyd's policies. The Audit Department of the Corporation provided administrative support to the Audit Committee and was directly responsible to it.

The Audit Committee existed from 1960 until 1983 when it was replaced by the Members' Solvency and Security Committee. (The name was changed to Solvency and Security Committee in 1986.)

The MSSC was responsible for making recommendations to the Committee of Lloyd's on all aspects relating to the annual solvency test and the protection of Lloyd's policyholders. The MSSC liaised with the AASC (see below) in relation to accounting and audit considerations relevant to the conduct of the annual solvency test.

(b) Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee

The AASC was set up in 1983 (effectively taking over the work of two Fisher Task groups: 4 & 15) to define the accounting and related auditing requirements applicable to Lloyd's brokers, underwriting agents and syndicates, the reporting of information to Names and the introduction of manuals to reflect the Council's requirements as to accounting and audit.

(c) Membership Committee

The Membership Committee existed from January 1977 to December 1985. It was a policy and advisory committee which reported and made recommendations to the Committee of Lloyd's on matters relating to membership requirements.

The Membership Committee considered the terms of the rota brief, and consulted the LUAA and others, from time to time. In March 1982 the question whether the subject of latent disease should be "introduced" into Rota Committee was addressed by Mr. Murray Lawrence to the Membership Committee.

Functions and Structure of the Corporation of Lloyd's

The executive and administrative functions of Lloyd's are fulfilled by the Society's employees (known colloquially in the market as 'the Corporation').

Prior to the introduction of the 1982 Act, the Corporation staff were divided into a large number of departments which were grouped into the following areas:

(i) the Corporation services group including the catering, office services, personnel, premises, redevelopment, the superintendent of the Room's department and training departments;

(ii) the Management services group which was divided into data processing (called computer services in 1982), system development, technical and, also from 1982, planning;

(iii) the Publicity, Information and Press department whose responsibilities included the many Lloyd's publications including co-ordinating the production of the annual report and distribution of information to Names;

(iv) the Advisory, Brokers and Legal departments;

(v) the Finance group which encompassed the finance department, and accounts, investment, tax and internal audit departments;

(vi) LUCRO, the marine market claims office;

(vii) the Aviation department which included sections dealing with surveys (including accident investigation) and intelligence;

(viii) the Agency department which dealt with settlement of claims abroad, salvage arbitration, cargo certificates and also included an administration section dealing with more general matters;

(ix) LPSO which issued all policies written in the Lloyd's market on behalf of underwriters; and

(x) the Membership Services group incorporating the Membership, Underwriting Agents and Audit, and Deposit departments.

While the Secretary-General was responsible for the Corporation staff, the head of each department reported to the Chairman of Lloyd's. The Chairman was assisted in this task by the Deputy Chairs who acted as a point of contact for some of the departments.

Secretary-General

From 1975 the senior member of the Corporation staff was the Secretary-General. The Secretariat ensured that departmental papers and representatives were available at Committee discussions. Following the introduction of the office of Chief Executive in 1983, the Secretary-General's main role was as advisor to the Chairs and secretary to the Council. From 1984 the Secretary-General became known as the Secretary to the Council. When Mr. Ian Hay Davison became Chief Executive a subsidiary role was created for the incumbent Secretary-General and, upon his retirement, he was not replaced.

The Secretary-General was responsible for co-ordinating the work of the different departments including the supervision of the agenda for the weekly Committee meeting.

"O" Group

The "O" Group existed from the 1970s to the early 1990s. It had no terms of reference as such but was effectively a small informal group set up to co-ordinate the presentation of papers to Council and Committee. It included the Chairman and Deputy Chairmen, the Secretary-General, the Chief Executive and typically the group heads. Its role included the review of papers to be submitted at Council/Committee meetings and consideration of general policy issues. Given the informal nature, the precise role played by the 'O' Group was dependent on the Chairs and Chief Executive at the relevant time.

Chief Executive

The creation of this post was instigated by the Bank of England, who nominated Mr. Ian Hay Davison as a suitable candidate.

Terms of reference for the Chief Executive were laid down in 1983. The Chief Executive is also a Deputy Chairman of Lloyd's and a nominated member of the Council.

In May 1983 the Chief Executive put forward proposals for a new organisational structure comprising 6 group heads reporting directly to him. Departmental managers would in return report to the group heads. Mr Davison's organisational proposals were accepted and implemented by the Council.

The new structure comprised the following groups:

(i) Finance. This group was responsible for the Corporation's financial affairs including internal audit, treasury, financial information and market financial services. From 1984 the Finance group was combined with the Market Services group.

(ii) Market Services. This group was responsible for co-ordinating organisations which provided direct services to the market including LPSO, LUCRO and the Aviation department.

(iii) Regulatory. This group was responsible for the self-regulation of the Society. The departments falling within its control included membership, underwriting agents and audit, deposits, advisory and brokers.

(iv) Systems and Communications. This group provided computer and telecommunications services to the market and was responsible for developing systems to aid both the market and the Corporation in their work.

(v) External Relations. This group included departments dealing with information, legislation and taxation but by 1984 responsibility for taxation and legislation had been transferred to the Regulatory group and for information to the Finance and Market Services Group.

(vi) Corporation Services. This group was responsible for the catering, personnel, training and premises departments within the Corporation. Departments within this group became part of a new Administration group in 1988.

The Secretary-General initially retained control over the legal, secretarial, research and disciplinary functions but these subsequently fell under the umbrella of group heads.

Chief Executive's Group

The CEG was established in 1983 and consisted of the group heads together with the Secretary- General and the Chief Executive. The CEG was a management group which discussed co-ordination of the activities of the Corporation. Towards the end of the Relevant Period the group also adopted an administrative role in co-ordinating the production of papers for Council.

Role of the Department of Trade and Industry

The basic regulatory arrangements governing carrying on insurance business in the UK are now provided for by the Insurance Companies Act 1982. (Prior to the introduction of the ICA 1982, similar regulatory arrangements were provided for by the Insurance Companies Act 1974). Insurance may normally be carried on only by bodies authorised to do so by the Secretary of State. It is the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry who is responsible for this sector, and the powers of the ICA 1982 were generally exercised on his behalf by the DTI. The ICA 1982 provides that individuals may only underwrite insurance business in the United Kingdom if they are accepted as members of Lloyd's.

In view of the regulatory regime provided by the Lloyd's Acts, Lloyd's is exempted from some of the requirements of the ICA 1982. However, pursuant to the ICA 1982 and regulations made under it (i) the requirements to pay all premiums into Premiums Trust Funds were imposed; (ii) accounts of every underwriting member had to be prepared and audited annually and a certificate of solvency of each underwriting member delivered to the DTI; and (iii) the Council had to file an annual return summarising the extent and character of the insurance business done by the members of Lloyd's.

Under the terms of the ICA 1982 and the Insurance (Lloyd's) Regulations 1983, the members of Lloyd's taken together are required to maintain a minimum margin of solvency. A failure to comply with this requirement is one of the grounds on which the DTI is entitled to exercise extensive powers of intervention for the protection of policyholders.

The powers of the DTI if it intervenes include:

(i) the power to require maintenance of assets in the European Union or the United Kingdom of value equal to the whole or a specified proportion of Names' liabilities;

(ii) the power to stipulate who should hold the assets as trustee;

(iii) the power to obtain information; and

(iv) a residual power to require a Name to take such action as appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate for the purposes of protecting policyholders against the risk that the Name may be unable to meet his/her liabilities.

D. MARKET ASSOCIATIONS

In addition to the committee and departmental structure, there are a series of market associations which represent the interests of the various market constituencies but do not involve themselves in underwriting decisions. A separate association exists for each underwriting market. They are independent of the Society and Corporation of Lloyd's and do not act under its control. They are: the LUNMA (non-marine), the LUA (marine), the LMUA (motor) and the LAUA (aviation). Details of these and other market bodies are dealt with below.

LUNMA

In 1910 what is now Lloyd's Underwriters' Non-Marine Association Ltd was formed with the object of meeting periodically to consider matters relating to fire and non-marine business at Lloyd's. One of the chief functions of that association was then, and still is, to gather and circulate to its members information relating to non-marine business throughout the world. Within the purview of LUNMA was the wording and effect of standard policy forms for use by the non-marine market. LUNMA was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee on 3 January 1991.

Membership of the association comprises all the active underwriters at Lloyd's underwriting non-marine business and they elect a committee.

LUA

Lloyd's Underwriters' Association was formed in 1909 and represents the interests of the marine market at Lloyd's. The committee of the association meets regularly to discuss the underwriting and general administrative problems which affect marine insurance. It frequently makes recommendations to all members of the association with a view to improving the efficiency and profitability of marine insurance. Also, the association keeps its members supplied with pertinent information that is likely to have some bearing upon the underwriting of marine insurance at Lloyd's.

LMUA

The introduction of compulsory third party insurance in 1930 led directly to the formation of the Lloyd's Motor Underwriters' Association in June 1931.

LAUA

Lloyd's Aviation Underwriters' Association was formed in 1935 to represent the interests of the Lloyd's aviation market. Membership comprises active underwriters of any Lloyd's syndicate writing aviation business. The committee acts on behalf of the members as a whole, keeping them informed (particularly in relation to foreign legislation and international conventions governing the liability of air carriers) and sometimes making recommendations designed to improve the efficiency of the market.

Throughout the Relevant Period:

(i) the Chairs were ex officio members of the four market associations (LUNMA, LUA, LAUA and LMUA);

(ii) there were individuals who were members of both the Committee of Lloyd's and the market associations.

LUAA

Lloyd's Underwriting Agents' Association was formed in 1960 to look after the interests of underwriting agents and to examine and report on matters which might be referred to it by the Chairman or Council of Lloyd's. The association has no regulatory power. The association acts as a forum for its members and, when necessary, speaks collectively on their behalf. The association is represented on a number of standing and ad hoc committees at Lloyd's and it liaises with the various departments of the Corporation of Lloyd's on matters affecting agents and the Names for whom they are responsible.

Underwriting agents are a single category within Lloyd's regardless of whether managing, members' or combined.

BIBA

The British Insurance Brokers' Association was a single national body representing the interests of insurance brokers in the United Kingdom. The purpose was to ensure that, for the future, united action was taken on measures to protect and promote the interests of the British insurance broking industry and that a single representative body existed which was able to react to or express opinion on matters affecting the industry. BIBA is not a body within Lloyd's regulatory ambit.

LIBC

The Lloyd's Insurance Brokers' Committee was an autonomous committee of BIBA. It was the direct successor of Lloyd's Insurance Brokers' Association, which was formed in 1910 but merged into BIBA in 1978. While the LIBC was one of the regional committees of BIBA, in so far as matters affecting the interests of Lloyd's brokers were concerned, it was autonomous and the interests of Lloyd's brokers remained in the hands of a committee of 16, elected by Lloyd's brokers themselves. It therefore continued to represent Lloyd's brokers on, inter alia, all matters peculiar to their relationships in the Lloyd's community.

Asbestos Working Party

The AWP was formed on the initiative of leading non-marine underwriting agents in August 1980. Interested underwriters were advised of the AWP's formation.

The functions of the AWP, as set out in a letter from Elborne Mitchell to all interested underwriters dated 1 December 1981, included the following:

(i) to provide a forum for discussing problems relating to asbestosis claims and to seek market agreements to assist underwriters in their handling of claims;

(ii) to advise on coverage matters when requested to do so by the leading underwriters;

(iii) to consider facultative re-insurance as well as direct insurance;

(iv) to explore solutions to the asbestosis problem otherwise than by litigation or traditional claims handling; and

(v) to assist in the establishment and development of a database to provide claims information for reserve purposes.

The AWP did not undertake any executive function; it acted in an advisory capacity and to facilitate and co-ordinate the dissemination of information to the insurance market as a whole. It considered that it was not its place to usurp the functions of underwriters and others to whom it communicated in the market with regard to information that came to hand.

The AWP, which was not a Lloyd's initiative but rather a market initiative, had no agency or other legal relationship with Lloyd's, and Lloyd's is not, and never has been, responsible for the acts or omissions of the AWP.

The AWP was created after consultation between the signatories to the letter of 5 August 1980. Its work was intended to embrace a matter of importance to some Lloyd's syndicates and London companies. In December 1982, Mr EE Nelson was asked by Mr. Peter Green to give a brief summary regarding the position of asbestos-related claims when the MPRs for the US$ All Other Business category were discussed at the Committee meeting. Panel auditors during the Relevant Period were addressed by Mr. Murray Lawrence, Mr. Ted Nelson, Mr. Ralph Rokeby-Johnson and Mr. Robin Jackson on the question of (amongst other things) asbestos-related claims. The AWP sought authority from Lloyd's syndicates and companies in the London market for the handling of claims. Individuals (including Mr. R.A.G. Jackson) who were members of the AWP, or its claims committees, were amongst those involved in negotiating the Wellington Agreement and assisting in the establishment of the Asbestos Claims Facility. US attorneys reports were sent to the AWP and distributed to insurers at interest in the London market. The AWP was responsible for the decision to establish Toplis and Harding Asbestos Services Ltd. (later Toplis and Harding Market Services Ltd.) to which attorneys' reports were subsequently addressed. Toplis and Harding Inc. (a US company) was purchased by Lloyd's in 1984. Alexander Grant, a firm of US chartered accountants, was retained by the AWP in 1981 to establish a database containing claims information. Toplis and Harding Inc. assisted in inputting information into the database.

Other Working Parties

In addition to the AWP, a number of other working parties were formed by underwriting agents to study particular claims related issues of interest to the market, for example, the Computer Leasing Working Party and the Environmental Claims Group.

Mr. Murray Lawrence was chairman of the Computer Leasing Working Party.

Mr. Ian Posgate was a member of the working party. The Computer Leasing Working Party retained Elborne Mitchell as its solicitors. For a short period, computer leasing formed part of the brief to Rota Committee Chairmen.

Market Representation of Names

Names are represented through the external members of the Council elected by them. A number of associations have also been created to represent their interests including the Association of Lloyd's Members. Prior to the formation of the Council, external Names were entitled to vote alongside working Names for the Committee candidates. Upon formation of the Council, external Names were entitled to vote only for external members of the Council. The responsibilities of members of the Council, to have regard to the interests of Lloyd's as a whole, did not vary from Council member to Council member. Names' action groups have existed since at least 1979 (when the Sasse action was in existence).

E. DEVELOPMENT OF SELF-REGULATION AT LLOYD'S

Lloyd's was established as a society of underwriters in 1811 when a Deed of Association was executed by the members at that time. By 1871, the business of Lloyd's had increased in size to the extent that it was considered necessary to promote an Act of Parliament to establish the Society of Lloyd's in a more permanent fashion. The Lloyd's Act 1871 incorporated the then members and all persons subsequently admitted as members into the Society and Corporation of Lloyd's. That Act, with a few basic amendments, established the Committee of Lloyd's as responsible for managing the affairs of Lloyd's and set out the framework upon which Lloyd's affairs were conducted during the ensuing 110 years. It laid down (inter alia) and confirmed two fundamental rules for Names, that underwriting must be conducted only in the Underwriting Room and a Name shall be a party to a contract of insurance underwritten at Lloyd's only if it is underwritten with several liability, each underwriting member for his/her own part and not for another, and if the liability of each underwriting member is accepted solely for his/her own account.

During the late 19th and early 20th Century, the market saw the development of new forms of underwriting and the Lloyd's Act 1911 extended the objects of Lloyd's to include the carrying on by Names of insurance business of every description (previously it had been limited to marine business). The Act also introduced the power of the Society to suspend temporarily any Name if the Committee considered him/her to have been guilty of any act or default discreditable to him/her as an underwriter.

The Lloyd's Act 1925 gave enabling powers in respect of the making of byelaws by the Society and modified some of the rules governing the operation of the Committee. A further Lloyd's Act in 1951 was promoted to give the Society full powers to borrow money. Several parts of the Acts referred to above were repealed by the Lloyd's Act 1982, the purpose and provisions of which are considered further below.

The Cromer Report

In November 1968, Lord Cromer was asked to head a Working Party to investigate and recommend "what should be done to encourage and maintain an efficient and profitable Lloyd's underwriting market of independent competing syndicates, which would be of a size to command world attention". The Cromer Report was delivered to the Committee of Lloyd's at the end of December 1969. The Cromer Report was made available by Lloyd's to Names in 1986. The Cromer Report pointed out that in order to maintain its share of the world market in insurance, which was expanding at 7 to 10 per cent. per annum, Lloyd's would need an increasing amount of capital.

The Fisher Report

In 1979, the Committee of Lloyd's established a working party, chaired by Sir Henry Fisher, its terms of reference being:

"To enquire into self-regulation at Lloyd's and for the purpose of such enquiry to review:

(i) the constitution of Lloyd's (as provided for in Lloyd's Acts and Byelaws);

(ii) the powers of the Committee and the exercise thereof; and

(iii) such other matters which, in the opinion of the Working Party, are relevant to the enquiry.

Arising from the review, to make recommendations".

The principal recommendation of the Working Party in May 1980 was that:

"... the constitution is no longer appropriate and the Committee's powers are inadequate for self-regulation in modern conditions. We have, therefore, recommended that the Committee of Lloyd's should promote a new private Act of Parliament so that the constitution of Lloyd's can be brought up to date and the powers of self-regulation enlarged."

The report of the Working Party contained a draft bill to amend Lloyd's Acts 1871-1951. That draft was the basis of the bill approved by the Lloyd's membership at a meeting on 4 November 1980. On 27 November 1980, the Committee presented the draft bill to Parliament for passage as a private Act of Parliament. The Bill received Royal Assent on 23 July 1982.

The Neill Report

In January 1986 the Financial Services Bill was published and did not include Lloyd's within its scope. However, during the second reading of the Bill, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry announced that the Sir Patrick Neill would head an inquiry into the administrative and disciplinary framework of Lloyd's and the operation of Lloyd's Act 1982. The terms of reference of the Neill Committee were:

"to consider whether the regulatory arrangements which are being established at Lloyd's under the 1982 Lloyd's Act provide protection for the interests of members of Lloyd's comparable to that proposed for investors under the Financial Services Bill".

The Neill Committee reviewed the byelaws and codes of conduct made since 1983.

The Neill Committee did not recommend that the regulation of membership of Lloyd's should be brought under the auspices of the Securities and Investments Board. Nor did it recommend any amendments to Lloyd's Act 1982; it stated that its recommendations could be effected by byelaws and resolutions of the Council.

The Committee expressed a number of views on the relationship between external and working members of Lloyd's and made a total of 70 recommendations. These related to the following areas:

(i) the constitution of the Council of Lloyd's: in particular, it recommended increasing by four the number of members nominated and approved by the Governor of the Bank of England and reducing by four the number elected from working Names;

(ii) admission to membership;

(iii) the relationship between Names, members' agents and managing agents: in particular, the structure and terms of the standard agency agreement;

(iv) syndicate accounting and disclosure;

(v) registration of underwriting agents, Lloyd's brokers and syndicate auditors;

(vi) conflicts of interest: especially in relation to common ownership of managing and members' agents;

(vii) enforcement of the system of regulation;

(viii) compensation of and complaints by Names.

Implementation

A chart listing all the byelaws passed by the Council of Lloyd's since the introduction of the 1982 Act and as a consequence of the development in self-regulation is at Appendix II to the statement of agreed facts.

Central Fund Byelaw (No 4 of 1986)

The Lloyd's Central Fund is held and administered by the Society of Lloyd's in accordance with the Central Fund Byelaw (No. 4 of 1986). Members contribute to the Fund each year based on a percentage of their gross allocated capacity.

As part of Lloyd's solvency procedure, certain assets of the Fund may be used to cover underwriting deficiencies of Names at the preceding 31 December, to enable them to pass the solvency test and meet the requirements of the DTI.

Evolution of the Central Fund Byelaw

The 1986 Central Fund Byelaw (No. 4 of 1986) replaced the Central Fund Agreement of 1927. This embodied the provisions of the guarantee scheme (the immediate predecessor of the 1927 Agreement). The Fund was set up to meet the liabilities of members who had been declared in default of their obligations, and was also available for the "advancement and protection of members", at the Council's discretion. It was funded through contributions from members based on premium income of the previous year. The catalysts that provoked the making of the 1927 Agreement were the Burnand (1903) and Harrison (c.1923) cases. Both involved deliberate fraud on the part of the underwriters and caused considerable losses for Names. As a direct result, the Chairman in the mid 1920s, Mr Arthur Sturge, suggested that £200,000 be subscribed by all underwriters in proportion to their premium incomes.

Clause 3 of the 1927 Agreement stated as follows:

"The Central Fund shall consist of (a) £49,988-8s-0d now in the hands of the Society and arising from earlier guarantee schemes which have now been discontinued (b) the contributions of the Subscribing Members hereinafter mentioned (c) the investments for the time being representing such fund and contributions and (d) any other monies which may be at any time added to the Central Fund".

The Central Fund was held and administered by the Committee of Lloyd's (and, following the recommendation of the Fisher Working Party, the Council), on behalf of all members in accordance with the 1927 Agreement and subsequent amendments.

The 1927 Deed was replaced by the Central Fund Byelaw (No. 4 of 1986) as a result of the findings of the Fisher Working Party in 1980. The Fisher Working Party recommended that the Council of Lloyd's should be given express power by an amendment to Lloyd's Acts to maintain the Central Fund, to decide (and to alter from time to time) the purposes to which money in the Fund may be applied, to require members of Lloyd's to contribute to it, and to fix the rate of contribution and to alter it from time to time. Whether or not this was done, they considered that the 1927 Agreement required consideration by the Council with a view to possible revision. In particular the Council should review:

"(a) the purpose for which money in the Fund may be used;

(b) the investment of the Fund in the light of the purposes for which the money in the Fund may be required;

(c) the provision that money in the Fund may not be applied in payment of claims on policies underwritten by a Member until he has been declared to be in default;

(d) the rates of contribution fixed by the 1927 Agreement, and the procedure for increasing contributions in case of need;

(e) the practice in relation to the formalities required for adhesion to the 1927 Agreement." (Fisher Report, para 24.16).

Fisher Task Group 19 was given the task of considering these recommendations. It recommended that:

(i) Names should be required as a condition of membership of Lloyd's to consent to variation of the Central Fund 1927 Agreement

(a) removing the maximum contribution limit of 0.45% of premium income and empowering the Committee by regulation to levy contributions at rates to be determined;

(b) removing the proviso against increasing the financial liability of Names;

(c) enabling future modifications or variations to the Central Fund 1927 Agreement to be effected by Byelaw rather than by Deed;

(ii) the 1927 Agreement should be amended to allow payment of claims without a declaration of default where Names subscribing a risk cannot be identified;

(iii) the default declaration proviso in Clause 10 ("no part of the Central Fund shall be applied in paying or making good or purchasing claims or returns on Policies...(a) unless and until he shall be been declared by a Resolution of the Committee to have made such default as aforesaid...") should not be immediately removed but by amendment to Clause 15 (to be agreed to by Names in a supplemental deed) the Council should be empowered subsequently to remove it by Byelaw;

(iv) a Byelaw should require all Names to subscribe to the Central Fund.

All the Task Group recommendations were agreed by the Committee with two modifications: first, they proposed a maximum rate of contribution of 2½% of premium income to the Central Fund, and secondly, they proposed that it remain necessary for a member to be declared in default before his claims could be met by the Central Fund.

The recommendations were considered by the Council on 21 March 1983. The Council approved the recommendations made by the Task Group save that it agreed with the Committee that the default declaration provisos should not be removed. The Council did not, however, agree to the suggested maximum rate of contribution, but deferred a decision until a final decision had been taken as to the future form of the Fund.

The Council also approved the Committee's proposal that, as from 1984, the basis for calculating the levy should be gross premium income (i.e. without deduction of reinsurance premiums paid) instead of net premium income. It was calculated that the change was equivalent to increasing the levy on net premium income from 0.45% to 0.60% and that this increase was an amount which was not less than the premium which Names would have been required to pay for the guarantee policies which ceased to be required in respect of years of account later than 1981 (and the premiums on which ceased to be paid in the 1984 year of account).

F. LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NAMES AND THEIR AGENTS

Legal Relationships Between Names and Agents

There are three types of agents, a members agent, a managing agent and a combined agent, which performs both the roles of members' agent and of managing agent. From the early 1970's insurance in the Lloyd's market could only be effected through an agent if that agent was listed in the Register of Approved Lloyd's Underwriting Agents (Byelaw No. 87 (18 November 1970)). In 1984 the Register was divided to record separately those agents approved as managing and members' agents (Byelaw 4 of 1984). In deciding whether the agent was "fit and proper" to be registered, the Committee would take into account the suitability of its directors, partners or staff, the suitability of the active underwriter(s) (in the case of a managing agent) and its ability to supervise and service all of its activities and responsibilities (Byelaw 4 of 1984, paragraph 8). It was agents who decided whether they wished to be managing agents, members' agents or combined agents and to seek registration accordingly.

Until the introduction of the standard agency agreement, there was no mandatory standard form of agency agreement. On 11 March 1985 the Agency Agreements Byelaw No. 1 of 1985 was passed which stipulated that from 1 January 1987 insurance business could not be underwritten in the Lloyd's market unless the Name had entered into a Standard Agency Agreement. The Standard Agency Agreement governed the relationship between the Name and his/her members' agent (or a combined agent acting as members' agent). Where that members' agent or combined agent delegated some or all of the underwriting to a managing agent a Standard Sub-Agency Agreement contained the terms of that delegation.

There was no direct contractual relationship between a Name and his/her managing agent, unless the members' agent also acted as managing agent. (The position changed in 1990 with the implementation of the Agency Agreements Byelaw (No. 8 of 1988) which prescribed standard form agency agreements and introduced a direct contractual relationship between the Name and his/her managing agent). However, the House of Lords in Henderson v Merrett Syndicates Ltd [1994] 3 WLR 761, upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal that the delegation of the conduct of underwriting business did not remove the implicit promise by the members' agent that the work of the managing agent would be carried out with reasonable care and skill. In addition, the managing agents were under a similar, non-contractual duty to Names to exercise reasonable care and skill.

The Role and Duties of a Members' Agent

A members' agent is an agent to whom members delegate complete control of their Lloyd's affairs and who enter into sub-agency agreements with managing agents to place Names on their syndicates. A members' agent does not underwrite any risks. Although many Names remain with the same members' agent throughout their membership of Lloyd's, it is possible to transfer to another members' agency. The new members' agent may not be able to secure a Name's participation in syndicates on which that Name had previously underwritten, and accordingly a transfer of members' agent may involve a change in the Name's syndicates.

The primary role of a members' agent is to manage a Name's Lloyd's affairs other than the actual management of the underwriting. The main duties of a members' agent were summarised by:

(i) Gatehouse J in Brown v KMR Services [1994] 4 All ER 385 at 390 as:

"to advise the Name which syndicates to join and in what amounts...to keep him informed at all times of material factors which may affect his underwriting...to provide him with a balanced portfolio and appropriate spread of risk; a balanced spread of business on syndicates throughout the main markets at Lloyd's...to monitor the syndicates on which it places the Name, and to make recommendations as to whether the Name should increase his share on a syndicate, join a new syndicate, reduce his share, or withdraw...to keep regularly in touch with the syndicates to which the Name belongs and...to advise and discuss with the Name the prospects and past results of syndicates on which he could be placed" and

(ii) Hobhouse LJ in Brown v KMR Services [1995] 4 All ER 598 at 633 to 634:

"to advise the Name which syndicates to join and in what amounts. This is a duty which has to be performed each year when the decisions have to be made for the following underwriting year. The advice therefore must cover both the selection of the syndicates and the amount of premium to be allocated to each. In selecting the syndicates regard must be had to the class of business in which the member wishes to become involved, to the quality of the individual syndicates, what business they write and to the sectors of the market to be covered...

"Further the agent must give the member such information as is necessary for the member to make a reasonably informed decision about the recommendations which the agent is making... But where a particular syndicate involves some additional risk it is incumbent upon the agent... to give an appropriate additional warning coupled with appropriate information."

The following account of the Regulatory Background for the Auditing and Accounting Regime at Lloyd's is drawn from a statement of agreed facts. Where I have decided a matter in dispute between the parties this is shown in square brackets.

A. INTRODUCTION

I set out below the regulatory background for the auditing and accounting regime at Lloyd's. I also describe the procedures culminating in the production by Lloyd's of the statutory statements of business and the Globals.

The sections below take as their starting point, where applicable, the regime for the preparation of syndicate accounts and solvency audit as at 31 December 1977, which encompasses the closure by reinsurance to close of the 1975 year of account into the 1976 year of account. The sections below conclude by describing the regime for the year ended 31 December 1987, which encompasses the closure of the 1985 year of account into the 1986 year of account. The description of the procedures for the production of the statutory statements of business and globals covers the same period.

B. BACKGROUND TO THE AUDIT/ACCOUNTING PROCESS

Lloyd's Three Year Accounting System

Lloyd's operated a three year accounting system, under which the results of underwriting by a syndicate in any one year were normally not determined until a further two years had elapsed. As a general rule, distribution to Names of their proportions of the syndicate's profit could only be made after the end of the third year and then generally only when the relevant year of account had been reinsured to close. The composition of each syndicate was likely to vary year by year, and each year's trading was a separate venture. The accounts of each syndicate were, as a result of the three-year accounting system operated at Lloyd's, necessarily left open for the first and second year. A syndicate specialising in Personal Stop Loss operated a four year accounting system.

Reinsurance to Close

The closure of a year of account was effected by the payment of a premium (the RITC premium) in respect of the members' underwriting liabilities allocated to that year to reinsure these liabilities into the following year of account. If a decision was taken not to close the relevant year of account, the account was described as having gone into "run-off" and no RITC premium was payable. The subsequent two years of account over the three year accounting period that were not being (or entitled to be) closed were known as "open years". Thus the first two years of the three-year accounting cycle were "open years." If a syndicate year was not closed by RITC, that year was "left open".

As reported in the Chairman's statement in the 1987 Globals, at the end of December 1987 there were 76 syndicates with a total of 120 years of account left open. Problems associated with asbestos and pollution risks, together with other US liability business, appear to account for the vast majority of the run-off years.

In the 1980s, there was a growing number of syndicates which did not close their accounts at the end of their third year.

Against the payment of a RITC premium, all syndicate members' undischarged liabilities in respect of risks allocated to the relevant year of account (including liabilities in respect of RITC of any preceding year of account) were reinsured without limit in time or amount into a succeeding year of account of the same syndicate; they could also, on occasion, be reinsured to close into a later year of account or by another syndicate. When RITC was underwritten by the same syndicate, the premium was set by the managing agent of both syndicates, in conjunction with the underwriter, acting for the Names on both years of account.

The amount charged by way of premium was required to be equitable between Names on the reinsured and reinsuring syndicates, having regard to the nature and amount of the liabilities being reinsured. RITC into a subsequent year of the same syndicate was not treated as premium income for the purposes of premium income monitoring. The Syndicate Premium Income Byelaw (No 6 of 1984) dealt with circumstances in which RITC by a different syndicate would form part of premium income for premium income monitoring purposes.

Syndicate Accounts

The managing agent of each syndicate was required to prepare syndicate financial statements as at 31 December each year for the closing year of account and for the two subsequent open years and to arrange for them to be audited. The managing agent was required to send the financial statements, together with certain other specified information, to the Names on his syndicate, either direct or through the Names' members' agents. The requirements for the preparation and publication of syndicate accounts changed over the period 1978 to 1988.

The Solvency Test

Each Name at Lloyd's was required, under the provisions of the ICA 1982, to meet an annual solvency test (the Name level test). (The requirements for the years ended 31 December 1981 (and prior years) were contained in ss73-74 of the ICA 1974). In addition, all members of Lloyd's taken together had to satisfy a global annual solvency test (the global test). The requirements for the solvency test were sent out in the annual Instructions for the Guidance of Lloyd's Auditors (Audit Instructions) and Covering Letter to the Instructions for the Guidance of Lloyd's Auditors (Solvency Letter) prepared by Lloyd's, which included the basis on which the Names' liabilities were calculated, as approved by the Secretary of State DTI (Board of Trade in earlier years) pursuant to Section 83(5)(b) of the ICA 1982.

The paragraph in the earlier brochures (e.g. the 1979 and 1980 brochures) headed "Lloyd's Audit", which referred to a "rigorous audit conducted by a member of a panel of chartered accountants approved by the Committee of Lloyd's", referred to the annual solvency test. The phraseology in the brochure was changed in 1983.

The Name Level Test

Under the provisions of Section 83 of the ICA 1982, each Name was required to provide annually to the Committee/Council of Lloyd's and to the DTI a certificate of solvency in a prescribed statutory form, signed by an approved auditor. (The forms of certificate are set out in:

(i) The Assurance Companies Rules 1950 (1950 No. 533), paragraph 16;

(ii) The Lloyd's (Audit Certificate) Regulations 1982 (1982 No. 136), for the year ended 31 December 1981;

(iii) The Insurance (Lloyd's) Regulations 1983 (1983 No. 224) for the year ended 31 December 1982 and thereafter).

The certificate stated (inter alia) whether the value of the assets available to meet the Name's known and estimated future underwriting liabilities in respect of his/her insurance business at the previous year end was correctly shown in the Name's accounts, both assets and liabilities being calculated in accordance with the Audit Instructions. The Name would generally not be personally involved in carrying out the procedures for the Name level test, but might be required to provide further assets in the event of a solvency shortfall.

The Global Test

The solvency requirements in relation to insurance companies are set out in Section 32 of the ICA 1982, which implemented article 16 of the First Council Directive on Non-Life Insurance. Thus, the section provides that insurance companies shall maintain a margin of solvency of such amount as may be prescribed in accordance with regulations made for the purposes of that section. Section 32 is applicable to the "members of Lloyd's taken together": see Section 84(1) of the ICA 1982. Accordingly, all members of Lloyd's taken together had to satisfy a "global test"; i.e. the solvency margin requirements under the ICA 1982. For this purpose, the assets and liabilities of all the members of Lloyd's were aggregated. Assets included each Name's funds at Lloyd's, the assets in his/her premium trust funds, and certain other assets. Account was also taken of the assets and liabilities of Lloyd's in addition to the assets and liabilities of the Names: see Regulation 3(2) of The Insurance (Lloyd's) Regulations 1983. Such assets included, for example, the Central Fund. Liabilities were, in aggregate, those for the most recent closed year of account, the two subsequent open years and any run-off years of account.

The forms submitted annually to the DTI as part of the statutory statement of business included information as to the assets and liabilities of all members of Lloyd's taken together. In particular, from the SSOB for the year ended 31 December 1982, Form 9 required a consolidated statement of assets and liabilities of underwriting members of Lloyd's. Accordingly, in effect, the members of Lloyd's taken together had to pass a global annual solvency test. (Prior to 31 December 1982, Lloyd's was required under Section 74(1) of the ICA 1974 to deposit annually with the DTI a statement summarising the extent and character of the insurance business done by the members of Lloyd's. The form of statement was set out in The Assurance Companies Rules 1950 and required Lloyd's to confirm that it had received an audit certificate in respect of each Name).

For some years before the SSOB form required for the year ended 31 December 1982 became mandatory, Lloyd's had submitted voluntary returns to the DTI, in a form similar to the SSOB presented pursuant to The Insurance (Lloyd's) Regulations 1983, in addition to the statutory returns prescribed by The Assurance Companies Rules 1950.

The purpose of insurance company supervision, as enshrined in the ICA 1982, is (inter alia) to ensure that margins of solvency are complied with.

The Statutory Statement of Business

Lloyd's was required under Section 86(1) of the ICA 1982 (for the year ended 31 December 1981 and prior years, Section 74 ICA 1974) to lodge a statutory statement of business with the DTI every year, in the form prescribed by The Insurance (Lloyd's) Regulations 1983 (for the year ended 31 December 1981 and prior years, The Assurance Companies Rules 1950 (SI 1950/533)). The SSOB summarised the extent and character of the insurance business done by all members of Lloyd's in the twelve months to which the statement related. The SSOB certified solvency for the purposes of the global test described above and could not be filed unless unqualified audit certificates had been received in respect of each Name, taking account, if necessary, of any Central Fund earmarking which had occurred.

The information required in order to complete the SSOB was provided principally by syndicate auditors in certain specified returns.

The auditors made returns in the form in which Lloyd's from time to time required these to be made. In general the returns were a collation of the results shown in those syndicate accounts for which any particular firm of auditors was responsible.

The Global Accounts

Lloyd's reported annually to the market on the underwriting results for the third year of account.

Panel/Registered Auditors

Under Section 73(4) of the ICA 1974, and Section 83 of the ICA 1982, the accountants who audited the Names' results for the purposes of the annual solvency test had to be approved by the Committee/Council of Lloyd's. Lloyd's had accordingly established a panel of auditors from which managing agents and members' agents selected their auditors. In practice, the panel auditors were also those who audited the syndicate accounts.

[ The role of a syndicate auditor was consistently regarded as requiring special skill and experience. In some cases syndicates engaged two firms as joint auditors. The responsibility for selecting an auditor from Lloyd's panel – subsequently the approved list – lay with the managing agent, not the members' agent. The practicability of syndicate Names appointing the auditors was considered by Lloyd's but not adopted. Following changes in the system, members' agents appointed the auditors to issue Members' Solvency Reports.]

On 10 December 1984, the Council passed The Syndicate Audit Arrangements Byelaw (No. 10 of 1984) which set out arrangements for a new list of registered auditors, containing all persons entitled to act as syndicate auditors. The byelaw replaced the panel auditor arrangements, and included the criteria for admission to and removal from the list. In a letter to underwriting agents, active underwriters, market associations and panel auditors dated 11 December 1984, Lloyd's stated that the Council had resolved that in future approval of auditors for the purpose of the annual solvency test would be determined by reference to the inclusion of a firm's name on the list of recognised auditors.

The panel or registered auditors had an annual meeting with Lloyd's. Further meetings occurred from time to time on an ad hoc basis (for example on 15 January 1982, 24 February 1983 and 8 February 1984). In addition, the panel auditors used to meet informally to discuss Lloyd's accounting rules and other issues arising out of the audit of syndicate accounts and solvency audit. Representatives of panel audit firms also sat on the Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee.

C. SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LLOYD'S REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT

Departmental Structure Prior to the Lloyd's Act 1982

Prior to the passage of the Lloyd's Act 1982, Lloyd's statutory duties in relation to the solvency audit and the preparation of the SSOB were exercised by the Committee of Lloyd's. The Underwriting Agents and Audit Department (or Audit Department) was the department within Lloyd's responsible for day-to-day matters affecting the solvency audit and the preparation by Lloyd's of the SSOB. It supported the Audit Committee which in turn reported to the Committee of Lloyd's.

The Committee was the governing body of Lloyd's until January 1983, after which it was subordinated to the Council.

Lloyd's also produced a Manual for Underwriting Agents, which set out the obligations of managing agents in relation to syndicate accounts and the solvency audit.

The Fisher Report and Lloyd's Act 1982

The regulatory structure within Lloyd's changed as a consequence of the Fisher Report, which was published in May 1980. The Fisher Report made certain recommendations as to the accounting regime and recognition of auditors as follows:

"71: Council to lay down rules as to minimum information to be disclosed in syndicate accounts and applicable accounting standards and principles.

72: Council to require audited syndicate accounts to be accompanied by a report by the Agent on matters of specific interest to Names.

73: Council to have the right to call for production of accounts and require a second audit to be carried out by accountants nominated by Council.

74: No Syndicate Auditor to be changed without Agent discussing proposed change with Committee.

75: Admission procedures for Panel Auditors."

The Fisher Report had appended to it a draft bill to amend the Lloyd's Acts 1871-1951. The draft bill, which received royal assent on 23 July 1982, provided for the establishment of a Council to manage and superintend the affairs of the Society, in place of the Committee, and proposed that the Council should have the power to make byelaws, including a byelaw:

"For requiring that annual accounts of underwriting syndicates be audited and that reports and audited accounts be furnished annually to members of the syndicate and for regulating the form and content of such reports and accounts."

The Lloyd's Bill was a much debated private measure and the enactment procedures took a considerable time. In November 1980 members, by a large majority, approved the promotion of a Bill. The Chairman wrote to members on several occasions thereafter reporting progress and soliciting continuing support.

As a consequence of the recommendations in the Fisher Report on the accounting regime and certain other comments made in the Fisher Report on the solvency audit, Lloyd's established two task groups, Task Group 4 and Task Group 15, in September 1980. Task Group 4's terms of reference were directed towards considering the provision of information to existing Names, with particular reference to syndicate accounts and accounting standards. Task Group 15's terms of reference included the consideration of procedures in relation to syndicate accounts, Lloyd's solvency test and global results, and all aspects of the "licensing" of panel auditors. It was recognised that the work of the two Task Groups was closely interrelated insofar as Task Group 15 was concerned with the audit of syndicate accounts.

Lloyd's established 21 Task Groups to consider the Fisher recommendations and their implementation. Lloyd's gave an undertaking to Parliament through counsel relating to (inter alia) paragraph 23.22 of the Fisher Report.

[The work of Task Groups 4 and 15 set up in September 1980 became part of the review in respect of which Lloyd's gave an undertaking to Parliament through counsel relating to the Fisher Report.]

In November 1982, Lloyd's set up, with the approval of the Bank of England and the DTI, a working party under the chairmanship of Mr. Ian Hay Davison, the managing partner of Arthur Andersen and Chairman of the Institute of Chartered Accountants. The overall aim of the working party was to review the requirements of the Lloyd's solvency audit with particular attention to both the information which should be sought by auditors and to the information which underwriting agents and underwriters should provide to their syndicate auditors; and to consider disclosure of interests by underwriting agents. In addition, the working party was required to review the annual Audit Instructions for the solvency audit. It was intended that the working party should consider urgently what changes should be implemented for the solvency audit as at 31 December 1982. It was announced that the working party hoped to provide some input for the 1982 audit while expecting to complete its study during 1983. It was noted in the terms of reference that it was essential to demonstrate that self-regulation was effective.

Task Group 4 issued its consultative document "The Annual Financial Report for Underwriting Members of Lloyd's" in December 1982, and attached to it a draft accounting manual, including proposed Statements of Lloyd's Accounting Practice. A letter from Lloyd's dated 21 December 1982 requesting comments on the document and summarising the points of difference between Task Group 4 and the Committee of Lloyd's was also circulated.

Mr Ian Plaistowe, a senior partner of Arthur Andersen, replaced Mr Hay Davison as chairman of the working party (renamed the Plaistowe working party) in February 1983 on Mr Hay Davison's appointment as Deputy Chairman and Chief Executive of Lloyd's. The work of the Plaistowe working party was built upon by the AASC.

Task Group 15 issued its consultative document "Lloyd's Auditing Manual" in 1983. The Task Group had taken as its starting point the draft accounting manual produced by Task Group 4 and had incorporated that into an overall accounting and audit manual. It also made recommendations as to the "licensing" of panel auditors.

Changes in Lloyd's Departmental Structure

In late 1983 the departmental responsibilities within Lloyd's changed. The Audit Committee and Audit Department were respectively replaced by the Members' Solvency and Security Committee and Members' Solvency and Security Department, and a new department and committee were established in October 1983: the Accounting and Auditing Standards Committee and, supporting it, the Accounting and Auditing Review Department. The terms of reference of the MSSC and AASC are set out in the minutes of the meeting of the Council of Lloyd's on 3 October 1983.

This reorganisation was one of a number of administrative and department changes which took place during the Relevant Period.

Under its terms of reference, the MSSC was responsible for making recommendations to the Committee of Lloyd's on all aspects relating to the annual solvency test and the protection of Lloyd's policyholders.

The AASC reported to the Council of Lloyd's. It effectively took over the work of Fisher Task Groups 4 and 15. Under its terms of reference, it was, in general terms, required to define the accounting and related auditing requirements applicable to Lloyd's brokers, underwriting agents and syndicates, the reporting of information to Names and the introduction of manuals to reflect the Council's requirements as to accounting and audit. It was also required to establish criteria for the approval or otherwise of panel auditors.

Although the AASC's terms of reference included the production of the annual Audit Instructions and their agreement with the DTI, in practice this responsibility remained with the MSSC. The MSSC liaised with the AASC in relation to accounting and audit considerations relevant to the conduct of the annual solvency test.

Both the MSSC and the AASC met about once a month to discuss matters falling within their terms of reference.

On 2 December 1983, Lloyd's published a Provisional Accounting Manual. The Manual relied heavily on the Draft Accounting Manual produced in December 1982 by Fisher Task Group 4 and the work done by the Plaistowe working party in relation to the Manual.

The Plaistowe working party was wound up in January 1984 and handed over much of its outstanding work to the AASC or MSSC.

A series of byelaws were issued by the Council of Lloyd's during 1984 and 1985 which established the revised accounting and auditing regime for syndicates as follows:

(a) The 1983 Annual Reports of Syndicates Byelaw (No. 2 of 1984);

(b) The Disclosure of Interests Byelaw (No. 3 of 1984);

(c) The Syndicate Premium Income Byelaw (No. 6 of 1984);

(d) The Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No. 7 of 1984) and explanatory notes dated 8 October 1984;

(e) The Syndicate Audit Arrangements Byelaw (No. 10 of 1984) and explanatory notes dated 10 December 1984;

(f) The Agency Agreements Byelaw (No. 1 of 1985);

(g) The Reinsurance to Close Byelaw (No. 6 of 1985); and

(h) Further explanatory notes to Byelaw No. 7 of 1984 relating to RITC, issued in December 1985.

1986 Audit Brief

While the new accounting byelaw regime was under discussion, Lloyd's approached the Auditing Practices Committee of the Consultative Committee of Accounting Bodies to propose that an audit brief be produced by the APC addressing the audit of Lloyd's syndicates. A working party of the APC was set up in 1984 to develop the audit brief, under the chairmanship of Mr Frank Attwood, a senior partner of Robson Rhodes, comprising members of the accounting profession and Mrs. Cathy Shorthouse, manager of the AARD in Lloyd's.

A draft brief was produced in about April 1985. Following discussions with the AASC, the draft audit brief was published in the autumn of 1985. The final audit brief was issued in April 1986. The Audit Brief stated that its purpose was to give "guidance on the special factors to be considered in the application of Auditing Standards to the audit of the financial statements of Lloyd's syndicates". Its status was as an informative publication, intended to assist auditors in the discharge of their duties. While it did not have the same authority as Auditing Standards or Auditing Guidelines, the Audit Brief was treated as the standard, in the absence of Auditing Standards or Guidelines dealing with any particular issue.

Statements of Lloyd's Accounting Practice featured in, for example, the 1983 Provisional Accounting Manual, but did not feature in the byelaw regime that was subsequently introduced.

The Neill Report

In January 1986, a committee was formed under the chairmanship of Sir Patrick Neill to consider whether the regulatory arrangements being established under the Lloyd's Act 1982 provided protection for the interests of Names comparable to that proposed for investors under the Financial Services Bill. The Neill Committee was a Committee of Inquiry set up by the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The Neill Report "Regulatory Arrangements at Lloyd's" was published in December 1986.

[The Neill Report made certain recommendations relating to syndicate accounting. The AASC was primarily responsible for reviewing the recommendations. The majority of the recommendations were implemented by The Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No. 11 of 1987) which became effective on 1 January 1988 and first applied to syndicate accounts prepared for the year ended 31 December 1987. Further recommendations were implemented for subsequent years of accounts.]

Involvement of Professionals in the Task Groups, Working Parties and the AASC and MSSC

Fisher Task Groups 4 and 15 each had two members representing the auditing profession. Mr NF Holland and, from October 1980, Mr JA Philpott of Ernst & Whinney were members of Task Group 4. Mr M Wildig of Arthur Anderson & Co and Mr AM Blake of Neville Russell & Co were members of Task Group 15. In addition, Mr JA Philpott and Mrs C Shorthouse of Ernst & Whinney produced initial drafts of the report for the Task Group's consideration. Mrs Shorthouse subsequently joined Lloyd's permanent staff, and became manager of the AARD.

(According to Lloyd's the CCAB was invited to nominate a representative to join Task Group 15. Mr TD Marks of Deloitte Haskins & Sells was nominated and attended two meetings, with Mr GC Wintle, the CCAB's under-secretary for Parliamentary and Law affairs. However, following the formation by the CCAB of a Lloyd's sub-committee, and to avoid possible duplication of effort, it was agreed that it was sensible for the CCAB representation on the Task Group to cease.)

The Hay Davison/Plaistowe working party was chaired initially by Mr Hay Davison, senior partner of Arthur Anderson & Co and subsequently by Mr I Plaistowe, also of Arthur Anderson & Co. In addition Mr C North Smith of Peat Marwick Mitchell & Co was a member of the working party.

The initial membership of the AASC included Mr C Brandon Gough of Coopers & Lybrand, as chairman, Mr I Plaistowe of Arthur Anderson & Co and Mr NF Holland of Ernst & Whinney. Mr Brandon Gough remained Chairman until 1986, when he was replaced by Mr A Hardcastle of Peat Marwick McLintock. Mr Plaistowe remained a member until 1986. Other members of the AASC included members of panel auditors. Mr Hardcastle became chairman of Lloyd's Regulatory Board when it was established.

The membership of the MSSC included two members drawn from the nominated or external members of the Council. From 1983 to 1985, Mr REM Elborne, of Elborne & Mitchell, solicitors, was one of these members.

D. THE ANNUAL AUDIT AND ACCOUNTING PROCESS

This section summarises the chronological process for the preparation of syndicate accounts, the solvency audit, the SSOB and the Globals for any particular year. The process broadly followed the same pattern throughout the period 1978 to 1988, and commenced in the summer of the year to which the solvency test was to apply (e.g. the summer of 1980 for the audit of syndicate accounts and the solvency test for the year ended 31 December 1980).

The following should be noted:

(i) the sub-division of "All Other" non-marine statistics into three currencies took place in 1981, and it was possible to obtain the historical figures within those currencies;

(ii) from time to time, the categories within which the figures were collected were changed by Lloyd's;

(iii) MPRs were regularly considered by the Audit Committee/MSSC and the Committee;

(iv) concerns were expressed from time to time at meetings of the Audit Committee/MSSC that if the percentages for the US$ "All Other" class of business were set too high, syndicates writing shorter-tail business within that class would be disadvantaged;

(v) Lloyd's made it clear to the DTI, and in the Audit Instructions, that the percentages were absolute minima (The Solvency Letter for the 1984 year end expressly states, at note (i)(a) to clause 6, that: "The scales of minimum percentage reserves represent the absolute minimum requirement for any syndicate."); and

(vi) the settlement statistics were compiled on the basis of net figures.

E. DUTIES OF THE AUDITOR AND THE AUDIT PROCESS

The Annual Audit Process

There were two separate (although related) aspects of the annual audit work carried out by the panel or registered auditors:

(i) the audit of syndicate accounts prepared by the managing agents. In this context the auditors' report was addressed to the members of the syndicates themselves; and

(ii) the annual solvency audit whereby auditors were obliged to report annually to Lloyd's and the DTI on the solvency of the Names.

(a) Audit of Syndicate Annual Accounts or Financial Statements

The first major function performed by syndicate auditors was the audit of the syndicate annual financial statements.

The Manual for Underwriting Agents, first published in 1971, required managing agents to send to Names underwriting accounts and a balance sheet and stipulated that syndicate auditors should be required to certify:

"(a) That in their opinion the books have been properly kept.

(b) That they have examined the Balance Sheet and Underwriting Accounts with the books and that they have been properly drawn up in accordance with the books.

(c) That they have verified the investments and cash balances.

(d) That they have received all the information and explanations they have required".

The Manual went on to say:

"The Agents and their Auditors may amplify, to any extent required, to cover such items as (a) the basis on which the Auditor has accepted the reinsurance to close, (b) the fact that the Audit Certificate has been sent to the Committee of Lloyd's and (c) the accounts are drawn up in accordance with the Agency Agreements."

The requirement to report in "true and fair" terms was introduced by The Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No.7 of 1984). This requirement applied to all accounts for the year ended 31 December 1985, although some auditors reported in "true and fair" terms on the accounts for the year ended 31 December 1984. The "true and fair view" report was required in respect of the profit or loss on the closed year of account. No such report was required in relation to the two open years of account, on which the auditors also reported, but in different terms.

The Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No.11 of 1987) revised the Lloyd's syndicate accounting rules which governed syndicate accounting and reporting to Names. In accordance with this byelaw the managing agent was required to prepare adequate documentation supporting the basis on which the RITC had been determined. The auditors' duties in respect of this were as follows:

"the syndicate auditor shall in preparing any report under this paragraph carry out such investigations as will enable him to form an opinion as to the following matters:

(i) whether the managing agent has kept proper accounting records in respect of the syndicate;

(ii) whether the managing agent has in respect of the syndicate established and maintained such systems and procedures, including maintenance of adequate accounting and other records, as are necessary to enable it to comply with the requirements of paragraph 4 of Schedule 4 to this byelaw; and

(iii) whether the annual report or personal account to which his report relates is in agreement with the accounting records and such other records as are referred to in (ii) above;

and if the syndicate auditor is of the opinion that the managing agent has not kept proper accounting records in respect of the syndicate, or has not established and maintained such systems and procedures (including maintenance of adequate accounting and other records), ...or if the annual report or any personal account to which the syndicate auditor's report relates is not in agreement with the accounting records and such other records as are referred to in (ii) above, the syndicate auditor shall state that fact in his report."

(b) Solvency Reporting

The annual solvency audit of underwriting members of Lloyd's was a statutory requirement. This was, until 28 January 1983, provided for under Section 73(4) of the ICA 1974 which provided that:

"The accounts of every underwriter shall be audited annually by an accountant approved by the Committee of Lloyd's or the managing body of the association, as the case may be, and the auditor shall furnish a certificate in the prescribed form to the Committee or managing body and the Secretary of State."

This section was replaced by Section 83(4) of the ICA 1982 which was in substantially similar terms.

The content of the audit certificate was addressed by Section 73(5) of the ICA 1974 which provided:

"(5) The said certificate shall in particular state whether in the opinion of the auditor the value of the assets available to meet the underwriter's liabilities in respect of insurance business is correctly shown in the accounts, and whether or not that value is sufficient to meet the liabilities calculated:

(a) in a case of liabilities in respect of long term business, by an actuary; and

(b) in the case of other liabilities, by the auditor on a basis approved by the Secretary of State."

The mandatory form of wording of the certificate to be issued in respect of each underwriting member of Lloyd's was set out in The Lloyd's (Audit Certificate) Regulations 1982 (1982 No.136), (Prior to the 1981 solvency test, the Assurance Companies Rules 1950 (1950 No. 533)). This had been made by the Secretary of State in the exercise of his powers under Sections 73(4) and 85(1) of the ICA 1974. With effect from 22 March 1983 the 1982 Regulations were replaced by The Insurance (Lloyd's) Regulations 1983 (1983 No.224) which (so far as is material) were in substantially similar terms to the 1982 regulations. The wording of the certificate (the Members' Solvency Report) in the 1982 regulations was as follows:

"2. The certificate mentioned in section 73(4) of the Insurance Companies Act 1974 (which requires the accounts of every underwriter to be audited annually by an accountant approved by the Committee of Lloyd's) shall, in respect of the audit as at 31 December in the year 1981 and in each subsequent year, be in the following form:

UNDERWRITING ACCOUNTS

IN THE NAMES OF

Through the agency of

To the Committee of Lloyd's and to the Secretary of State

INSURANCE COMPANIES ACT 1974

We have examined the accounts relating to the insurance business carried on by the above-mentioned Underwriters through the above-named Agency during the year ended 31st December 19 .. .., in accordance with the current Instructions for the guidance of Lloyd's auditors drawn up by the Committee of Lloyd's and approved by the Secretary of State.

In connection with our examination, we have relied upon a report in respect of the underwriting accounts from accountants approved by the Committee of Lloyd's as auditors of each syndicate in which each underwriter has participated during that year stating that in their opinion all assets have been valued and all liabilities have been calculated in accordance with the said Instructions (liabilities in respect of long term business having been calculated by an actuary) and that the profits or losses arising on the closed accounts and the surpluses or deficiencies arising on the open accounts have been allocated to each Underwriter in accordance with the arrangements for his participation in each such account.

In our opinion the value of the assets, valued in accordance with the said Instructions (in the case of each Underwriter's Lloyd's Deposit, as certified by the Committee of Lloyd's), available to meet each Underwriter's liabilities in respect of his insurance business is correctly shown in the accounts and is sufficient to meet his liabilities in respect of that business.

Date this .. .. .. .. day of .. .. .. .. 19.. ..

Accountants approved by the Committee of Lloyd's."

With effect from the 1981 solvency test, the solvency certificate was issued not by the syndicate auditors but by auditors appointed by the members' agents in respect of those Names underwriting through that members' agency. The members' agents' auditors were not required to audit further the affairs of all the syndicates on which the members' agents had placed Names. The wording of the audit report expressly permitted them to rely on certificates issued by the syndicate auditors. The certificate issued by the syndicate auditors for these purposes (the Syndicate Solvency Report) was in the following terms:

"Syndicate solvency report

This report is in respect of the Underwriting Members who participated in the ............................... Account(s) of Syndicate

No: - ........................

To the Committee of Lloyd's

We have examined the accounting records relating to the insurance business carried on by the above Underwriters during the year ended 31 December, 1981 in accordance with the current Instructions for the guidance of Lloyd's auditors drawn up by the Committee of Lloyd's and approved by the Secretary of State.

In our opinion:

(a) the profit or loss of the closed Underwriting account and the estimated surplus or deficiency of the open Underwriting accounts have been arrived at after valuing all assets and calculating all liabilities in accordance with the current Instruction for the guidance of Lloyd's auditors drawn up by the Committee of Lloyd's and approved by the Secretary of State; and

(b) such profit or loss and surplus or deficiency have been allocated to each Underwriter in accordance with the arrangements for his participation in each Underwriting account and are as set out in the attached schedule.

Dated this day of 1982

Accountants approved by the Committee of Lloyd's"

With effect from the 1981 solvency test:

(i) the syndicate auditor reported on the solvency position at a syndicate level, Name by Name to Lloyd's and to the auditors appointed by the members' agents;

(ii) the members' agents' auditors completed the solvency test at individual Name level, relying on the Syndicate Solvency Reports prepared by the auditors of all the syndicates in which each of the members' agency Names participated. The reports of the members agents' auditors were addressed to and sent to the DTI and the Committee/Council of Lloyd's.

Professional Standards

Panel and registered auditors were subject to broader professional standards, being certain relevant auditing standards and guidelines that applied to the profession.

The following conclusions can be drawn from the Merrett Judgment as to the duties of the auditors in relation to syndicate accounting and the solvency audit:

(i) the auditors should obtain relevant and reliable audit evidence sufficient to enable them to draw reasonable conclusions therefrom;

(ii) as to the nature of audit evidence, the sources and amount of evidence needed to achieve the required level of assurance were questions for the auditors to determine by exercising their judgment in the light of the opinion called for under the terms of their engagement. They would be influenced by the materiality of the matter being examined, the relevance and reliability of evidence available from each source and the cost and time involved in obtaining it;

(iii) as to representations by management, in certain cases, such as where knowledge of the facts was confined to management or where the matter was principally one of judgment and opinion, the auditors might not be able to obtain independent corroborative evidence and could not reasonably expect it to be available. In such cases, the auditors should ensure that there was no other evidence which conflicted with the representations by management and should obtain written confirmation of the representations;

(iv) from the year ended 31 December 1985, the audit report on the syndicate accounts should state whether a true and fair view was given on the results of the closed year (although some auditors also reported in true and fair terms on the 31 December 1984 accounts);

(v) the syndicate auditors should qualify their report if they were unable to obtain all the necessary information and explanations required. In the absence of a reference to these matters the syndicate auditors' confirmation thereof was implicit in an unqualified audit report;

(vi) in selecting materiality levels, the auditor should have regard to the impact of syndicate transactions on the personal account of each syndicate member; he should look behind the syndicate to its constitution, as well as to the syndicate as a whole, in making judgments relating to materiality;

(vii) the auditor would need to be satisfied that the premium for the reinsurance to close a year of account was equitable as between the Names on that account and those on the accepting year of account. The determination of the premium for the reinsurance to close involved the exercise of significant professional judgment and drew on the full experience of the underwriter;

(viii) since, from at least 31 December 1985, the audit report on syndicate financial statements was to be expressed in true and fair terms, the auditor would need to ensure that he had gathered evidence of sufficient quality to support such an opinion;

(ix) in relation to the reinsurance to close, the audit approach should recognise that the objective was to ensure that the reinsurance to close was within a zone of reasonableness rather than an arithmetically accurate figure;

(x) the auditor would need to consider such matters as the nature of the syndicate's business, the overall size of the syndicate, the impact of the reinsurance protection programme, and the accuracy of previous estimates as a part of his assessment of the appropriate range within which he would expect the premium for the reinsurance to close to fall;

(xi) the results derived from statistical techniques should be treated with a degree of caution, since historically derived data might not be an accurate guide as to uncertain future events. The auditor should, therefore, ascertain from the underwriter the underlying basis for his estimate of claims incurred but not reported, so that appropriate additional evidence could be collected to support the computation; and

(xii) other matters the auditor might consider as a part of the audit of the reinsurance to close included matters specific to the particular syndicate's business, for example, the syndicate might have reinsured the run-off of other syndicates or companies and the auditor must satisfy himself that due account had been taken of the liabilities which were likely to arise under such contracts. This evidence would usually take a similar form to that relating to the syndicate's own business.

F. REGIME FOR SYNDICATE ACCOUNTS

Regime Prior to Lloyd's Act 1982

Prior to the passage of the Lloyd's Act 1982 and subsequent byelaws, the obligations of agents with regard to syndicate accounting were set out in the Manual for Underwriting Agents. The Manual was first published in 1971, and reprinted in 1980, incorporating all the amendments that were then current. Further amendments were made thereafter. Among the main duties of agents set out in the Manual in this respect were:

(i) to effect the Reinsurance to Close (with discretion to keep an account open) (A3, para 1 (i) (d));

(ii) to accept responsibility for the underwriting and the records (A3, para 1(i) (f));

(iii) to keep Names informed of the progress of the underwriting and to arrange to provide annual audited accounts to them (A3, para 1(ii) (d)).

The duties of the managing agent with regard to the syndicate accounts and, in particular, the basic accounting procedures to be followed were set out in Section A10 of the Manual (Section A9 of the 1971 Manual for Underwriting Agents).

The agent also had certain obligations as to syndicate accounts in the Underwriting Agency Agreement (Paragraph 9(A) and (B) of Underwriting Agency Agreement). The agent was obliged to keep "such usual and proper underwriting books accounts and memoranda as are kept by Underwriting Agents at Lloyd's" and to send to the Name a copy of the accounts as soon as practicable after the end of each calendar year.

There was no requirement in the Manual for underwriting agents to send copies of syndicate accounts to Lloyd's.

The managing agent selected the auditor appointed to audit the syndicate accounts from the panel of auditors. A syndicate auditor auditing the syndicate's accounts also undertook the audit required under the Audit Instructions for the purposes of the solvency audit.

The managing agent was also responsible for maintaining the syndicate's books and records. Occasionally, some managing agents appointed a firm of accountants to maintain their books. An accounting firm maintaining the books and records of a syndicate was not permitted to audit its accounts or conduct the solvency audit. This restriction was set out in the Solvency Letter circulated with the annual Audit Instructions. Such an accountant was, however, permitted to act jointly with another firm, in which case both firms were required to sign the Audit Certificate or, for the 1981 solvency test and thereafter, the Syndicate Solvency Report required by the Audit Instructions.

Developments Following the Passage of the Lloyd's Act 1982

In December 1983, Lloyd's circulated the Provisional Accounting Manual to active underwriters, underwriting agents, market associations and panel auditors. In his covering letter dated 2 December 1983, Sir Peter Green stated that it had been decided not to make the Manual mandatory in respect of the accounts to 31 December 1983, in view of the short time available to the end of the year and the practical problems that might be faced in seeking to comply with the requirements for the first time. However, the provisions of the Manual were considered to be best practice. Mr. Peter Miller then wrote to panel auditors on 1 February 1984 enclosing a form of audit report and expressing the hope that auditors would encourage their clients to comply with the spirit of the Manual in preparing the 1983 syndicate reports. He also expressed the hope that auditors would at a minimum be able to report in the terms of the draft audit report. The notes to the syndicate annual report were to include a statement of the extent to which the annual report complied with the Provisional Accounting Manual.

The Provisional Accounting Manual required managing agents to prepare syndicate accounts comprising:

(i) separate underwriting accounts for the closing year of account and each open year;

(ii) a balance sheet;

(iii) notes to the accounts;

(iv) a personal account for each Name;

(v) a managing agent's report;

(vi) an underwriter's report;

(vii) a seven year summary of syndicate results; and

(viii) an audit report on the items in (i) to (iv) above.

On 13 February 1984, the Council passed The 1983 Annual Reports of Syndicates Byelaw (No. 2 of 1984). The byelaw imposed an obligation (enforceable by disciplinary measures) on managing agents to prepare audited syndicate accounts for the year ended 31 December 1983. The byelaw specified the contents of the accounts, which were the same as those required under the Provisional Accounting Manual, with the exception of the seven-year summary, and the timing for their completion and circulation to Names (direct or through members' agents) and to Lloyd's. Lloyd's itself was required to maintain a central file of syndicate annual reports, which were to be available to public inspection. The byelaw was a transitional byelaw and, in light of the provisional nature of the Manual, did not prescribe a standard form for audit reports, nor specify matters to be dealt with therein. A letter introducing the byelaw was sent by the Chairman to active underwriters, underwriting agents, market associations and panel auditors on 14 February 1984. The Chairman expressed the view that the requirement of the byelaw for the preparation of descriptive reports commenting on business transacted, future prospects etc., merely codified existing "best practice".

In addition, on 9 April 1984, the Council passed The Disclosure of Interests Byelaw (No. 3 of 1984) which required managing agents to disclose in the annual report details of agents' interests in syndicate transactions. The audit report on the syndicate accounts was also required to cover the disclosure of interests statement. This byelaw was applicable to syndicate accounts for the year ended 31 December 1983 onwards.

On 8 October 1984, The Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No. 7 of 1984) was passed by the Council. This byelaw set out the requirements for the preparation and audit of syndicate accounts for the year ended 31 December 1984 onwards and for the preparation and audit of individual Names' personal accounts. It contained full details as to the contents, timing, publication and circulation of syndicate accounts, and provisions relating to the accounting records to be maintained by syndicates, the accounting policies to be employed and the contents of managing agents' and underwriters' reports.

Byelaw No. 7 of 1984 introduced the requirement that syndicate auditors should report whether the syndicate accounts and members' personal accounts gave a true and fair view respectively of the profit and loss of any year of account closed at the relevant accounting date and the net result of the Name. The true and fair view requirement was only mandatory for the accounts prepared as from the year ended 31 December 1985, although some auditing firms did report in true and fair terms for the accounts for the 1982 year which closed as at the year ended 31 December 1984. This approach was encouraged by the Council of Lloyd's (See letter from Lloyd's dated 10 January 1985). Specific provisions relating to the audit of the accounts are set out in paragraph 11 of the byelaw.

The byelaw set out in schedule 3, paragraph 4, the requirement for equitable treatment as between syndicate members where items affected more than one year of account. Specifically, it made explicit the requirement that the RITC premium was to be equitable between reinsured and reinsuring Names on the same syndicate.

The byelaw provided for the Council to prescribe dates by which syndicate annual reports and accompanying documents were to be dispatched. As from the accounts for the year ended 31 December 1984, the dates prescribed were: 15 June for despatch by managing agents to members' agents, direct Names and Lloyd's; and 15 July for despatch by members' agents to Names. These were also the dates required by Byelaw No. 2 of 1984 in respect of the accounts for the year ended 31 December 1983.

Explanatory notes to Byelaw No. 7 of 1984 were issued with the byelaw and provided further details and explanation on the requirements of the byelaw. The explanatory notes commented on the true and fair view requirement and the requirement for equitable treatment between Names participating in more than one year of account, in paragraphs 11 and 51, respectively.

On 9 December 1985, Lloyd's published Further Explanatory Notes to Byelaw No. 7 of 1984. These notes were intended as a practical guide to managing agents and underwriters as to the procedures and documentary standards they should adopt in computing the RITC. They emphasised the factors to be addressed in determining the RITC but not the manner in which the underwriter should exercise his professional judgment in relation to his particular syndicate.

[The AARD instituted an annual review of the syndicate accounts submitted to Lloyd's commencing with the 31 December 1983 accounts to check that the formal requirements of Byelaws No. 2 of 1984 (for 1983) and No. 7 of 1984 (for 1984 and following) had been complied with and that key terms in the syndicate accounts reconciled with the equivalent items in the SSOB and Global accounts.]

Further changes to the regime were effected by The Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No. 11 of 1987), which applied to syndicate accounts for the year ended 31 December 1987 and thereafter.

Determination of RITC

The Further Explanatory Notes stated in paragraph 5:

"In relation to a closed year of account the overriding requirement of the byelaw is that the annual report should give a true and fair view of the profit or loss, such profit or loss having been determined after charging the reinsurance to close the year of account in question. Determination and presentation of the reinsurance to close is therefore of significant importance in ensuring that a true and fair view is given."

When, as was typically the case, the RITC for any particular year of account was underwritten by the same syndicate, the premium was set by the managing agent of both syndicates, in conjunction with the underwriter, acting for the Names on both years of account. The overall responsibility for setting the RITC rested with the managing agent who derived his authority to do so from the terms of the Underwriting Agency Agreement and, from 1 January 1987, from the agency agreements made pursuant to The Agency Agreements Byelaw (No. 1 of 1985).

[The managing agent/underwriter were concerned to determine the premium for RITC by reference to the syndicate's total estimated outstanding liabilities (including reserves for IBNR) in respect of risks allocated to the closing year of account, including undischarged reserves from previous years which had been closed by RITC into that year of account. The underwriter exercised his professional judgment in setting the RITC, taking into account the particular circumstances of the individual syndicate and years of account.]

The amount charged by way of premium was required to be equitable between the Names on the reinsured and reinsuring syndicates, having regard to the nature and amount of the liabilities being reinsured. Although this requirement was first made explicit in Byelaw No. 7 of 1984, it was a requirement for RITC for prior years.

[The Further Explanatory Notes, to which I refer, set out procedures relevant to compliance with the provisions of the Lloyd's accounting rules relating to the reinsurance to close and, in particular, those dealing with accounting records. They also set out the factors relevant in determining the reinsurance to close, including known outstanding claims and IBNR. The Further Explanatory Notes emphasised the exercise of the underwriter's judgment in determining the IBNR element, identifying the nature of the business written by the syndicate as one of the main factors affecting the size and relative importance of the IBNR element, the syndicate's loss experience and its reinsurance protection as matters which might fall to be taken into account.]

The Further Explanatory Notes set out the records that should be kept by the syndicate in order that the RITC calculation was supported by records in sufficient detail to "show and explain" the nature of the RITC. Overall, the underwriter was to have regard to the particular circumstances of his syndicate in carrying out the exercise, while it was noted that the syndicate auditors would review the documentation of the RITC as part of their audit of the accounts.

The Inland Revenue also took an interest in the calculation of the RITC. It was emphasised in annual letters accompanying the scales of MPRs recommended by the Committee for the purposes of the solvency test, that the Inland Revenue might, as in the past, require to be satisfied for purposes of taxation that the RITC premium was not excessive. In a letter to underwriting agents dated 17 December 1984, Mr Frank Barber, as Deputy Chairman, stated the following:

"Calculation of the 'right' price at which reinsurance to close is to be effected is a complex exercise in which a great many factors including equity between Names, have to be taken into account. The 'price' must be neither excessive nor inadequate and getting it 'right' involves a considerable exercise of judgment. This has to be a commercial judgment and the exercise of that judgment should not be influenced by tax considerations.

It is, however, important for tax purposes that the judgment can be shown to be well-founded. This requires evidence. If there is no evidence to justify the figure arrived at, that figure will be no more persuasive for tax than one that is plucked from the air."

The letter continued by describing the types of evidence that should be kept.

Run-off Accounts

The agent also had power not to close the year of account by RITC at all, but to leave it in run-off (Clause 9(F) of Underwriting Agency Agreement and The Agency Agreements Byelaw (No. 1 of 1985)). This would happen where the managing agent was unable to fix a premium which was equitable as between the reinsured and the reinsuring Names. In these circumstances, closure of the year of account might take a number of years. The managing agent had a duty to leave a syndicate year open where an equitable RITC could not be fixed.

G. REGIME FOR SOLVENCY AUDIT

The Manual for Underwriting Agents imposed an obligation on agents to comply with the Audit and other regulations (A3, para 1(i)(e)). The obligation was also set out in the typical Underwriting Agency Agreement at paragraph 9(A). The procedures to be followed by managing and members' agents for the audit of Names' accounts for the purpose of the solvency test were set out in Section F of the Manual and in the Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter. The Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter were updated every year and, following approval by the Committee of Lloyd's and the DTI, circulated to active underwriters, underwriting agents and panel or registered auditors.

Calculation of Audit Reserves

The Audit Instructions included rules relating to the calculation of the estimated cost of winding up the underwriting accounts for the year to which the solvency test applied and previous years (the audit reserves). These rules were approved annually by the DTI for the purposes of Section 83(5) of the ICA 1982 (previously s73(5) of the ICA 1974). Although Section 83(5) of the ICA 1982, and, previously, Section 73(5) of the ICA 1974, were expressed in terms which required the auditor to calculate the syndicate's liabilities, it was, essentially, the role of the managing agent, the role of the auditors being to review the calculation as part of their work on the solvency test. The Audit Instructions were clarified over the years to reflect this distinction in roles.

The tests for the audit reserves in relation to each category of business were set out in clause 6 of the Audit Instructions. For the year then in its third year of account at 36 months of development and any years of account in run-off, including, in each case, all years reinsured into it, the audit reserves were required (for most categories of business, including non-marine "All Other" business) to be the greater of the following:

(i) the application of a specified multiple to the net premium income for the respective year of account. The multipliers were known as the minimum percentage reserves. (For the oldest year of account specified in the Audit Instructions, which was expressed to include all previous years of account, there was an alternative test of outstanding liabilities, including IBNR);

(ii) the total of the outstanding liabilities on each year of account in question as at the year end for the solvency audit, including IBNR; or

(iii) the amount of the RITC for the closing year of account, including any previous years reinsured into that account. (This test did not apply to years of account in run-off).

It is to be noted that:

(i) there was little practical distinction between tests (ii) and (iii);

(ii) the calculation of the reserve figure under test (ii) (or the amount of the RITC under test (iii)) required consideration of the ultimate cost of settling the syndicate's liabilities; and where a year was not being closed, because it was considered that an equitable RITC could not be set, audit (i.e. solvency) reserves nonetheless had to be calculated.

Although, for the two open years then at the 12 and 24 month stages of development, the test was based on the MPRs, managing agents, when certifying the adequacy of the audit reserves, were required to "examine the Audit Reserves in the light of past run-off statistics and other relevant facts available to them" (Manual for Underwriting Agents (Section F, 1.8(ii)). In addition, the fact that the MPR scales represented the minimum requirement was emphasised in the Audit Instructions for the 1984 solvency test. From November 1980 onwards, underwriters at interest had available to them the information of the AWP in the form of (inter alia) attorneys reports; market letters from the AWP; (from late 1981) computer print-outs produced from the database created in the United States; and other information contained at (initially) the offices of Elborne Mitchell, and subsequently the offices taken by the AWP and then Toplis and Harding (Asbestos Services) Ltd.

In order to establish the MPRs, which were prepared on the basis of market averages, the Audit Department/MSSD obtained from underwriters in the summer of the year for which the solvency audit was being done (e.g. the summer of 1980 for the year ended 31 December 1980) details of net premiums received, and net settlements paid, by each syndicate during the preceding calendar year on a year of account basis. The net premium income and settlement figures on each year of account excluded any RITC premium received by the account from a previous closed year and premiums and claims relating to any previous closed year that might have been reinsured therein. The data were combined into the "Annual Review of Audit Reserves - Settlement Statistics" which set out, by class of business a market wide statistical analysis (in percentage terms) of net settlements which had arisen in previous years against net premiums received. The Audit Department/MSSD used the statistical analysis for the purpose of its recommendations as to the appropriate levels of MPRs for the relevant year's solvency test across all years of account in respect of which the Names' liabilities were to be calculated. Subject to the DTI, the final decision was taken by the Committee after reviewing the Settlement Statistics Packages.

As to the MPRs for the years 1970 to 1987 for non-marine "All Other" US$ business, the non-marine "All Other" category of business contained the widest range of types of risk, and was defined by exclusion as being non-marine risks which did not fall within the classes of non-marine "short tail" business, a list of which was set out in the notes to Clause 6 of the Audit Instructions. Which of the tests set out above was applied for the calculation of audit reserves for the purposes of the solvency test depended upon the circumstances of the individual syndicate and the categories of business it underwrote.

Approval Process

The Audit Department/MSSD provided copies of the Settlement Statistics to the DTI and the market associations for consideration. The DTI in turn provided copies to GAD which analysed the statistics on an actuarial basis against historical information and the statistics it had available from the insurance companies under the DTI's supervision.

The Audit Department/MSSD then put its recommendations to the Audit Committee/MSSC, with details of the comments received from the DTI and the market associations. After the Audit Committee/MSSC had approved the recommendations (with amendments if required) they were put to the Committee of Lloyd's for approval.

The Audit Department/MSSD also reviewed the rest of the Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter to determine whether any other changes should be recommended. These recommendations were also put to the Audit Committee/MSSC for consideration and then to the Committee for approval.

A meeting of the panel auditors was held towards the end of the process attended by representatives of the Audit Committee/MSSC and Audit Department/MSSD. This was a regular annual meeting at which the panel auditors were informed of any material changes to the Audit Instructions and any other material developments in the audit/accounting process. At the Panel Auditors meeting in November 1981, asbestosis was discussed under the heading "Any Other Business." It was agreed at that meeting to hold a further meeting in the new year in order to discuss the subject again, and the meeting took place on 15 January 1982.

Final approval by the Committee of the Audit Instructions took place thereafter on the basis of the recommendations put forward by the Audit Committee/MSSC. The Committee approved, inter alia, the dates for completion of the annual solvency test, changes to the Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter and the scales of MPRs.

The MPR scales approved by the Committee were then sent to the DTI, following which discussions between Lloyd's and the DTI/GAD as to the final levels could take several weeks. Once the Audit Instructions had been formally approved by the DTI they were printed and issued to active underwriters, underwriting agents and panel or recognised auditors.

It was usual practice to advise underwriting agents, active underwriters and panel auditors by letter of the year end requirements as soon as they had been approved by the Committee on the basis that they had not yet received the approval of the DTI, and were therefore subject to possible amendment.

Role of Auditors

(a) Division of Responsibilities Between Syndicate Auditors and Auditors Appointed by Members' Agents

Prior to the solvency test for the year ended 31 December 1981, the syndicate auditor was responsible for the production of the Audit Certificate for each Name required under s 73 of the ICA 1974. In some cases (where an individual members' agent managed its proportion of the syndicate premium trust fund) the Audit Certificate was produced by the auditor appointed by that agent, not by the syndicate auditor.

Prior to the introduction of a centralised computer system (the Central Solvency System) in 1981, Lloyd's itself had no direct involvement in the conduct of the annual solvency test of Names, other than in the case of funds held centrally by Lloyd's (i.e. Lloyd's Deposits and Central Fund) the availability of which for earmarking would be confirmed to the auditor by the Audit Department. The Audit Department did, however, supply all necessary forms and, before the solvency test for 1978, acted as a 'postbox' for the statements of estimated outstanding liabilities supplied by active underwriters for onward transmission to syndicate auditors.

Some syndicates comprise a very large number of Names, and many of those Names would participate in several syndicates audited by different firms of panel auditors making their own reports on solvency. There was, therefore, an exchange of information and correspondence between the firms of panel auditors, as auditors endeavoured to establish the existence and availability of audit surpluses, profits and other assets to cover Names' solvency deficiencies and losses.

In order to simplify the system, Lloyd's established the Central Solvency System to operate as a 'clearing house' for the information which was then passing between auditors, agents and Lloyd's, and which would meet the requirements for Names' solvency contained in the ICA 1982 and the relevant statutory instruments. The system commenced operation with effect from the solvency test as at 31st December, 1981.

The syndicate auditor's role in relation to the solvency audit changed from the practice for prior years, with effect from the year ended 31 December 1981. As from the 31 December 1981 audit, the syndicate auditor prepared a Syndicate Solvency Report on the solvency of the syndicate, and on the allocation of the syndicate's profit or loss and surplus or deficiency for the relevant years to individual Names on the syndicate, but did not report on the overall solvency of individual Names.

As from 31 December 1981, the Members' Solvency Reports were prepared by auditors appointed by the members' agent for the Names concerned. Under these regulations, the members' agents' auditor was entitled to rely on the Syndicate Solvency Reports furnished by the auditors for the various syndicates on which the Names underwrote. Each Member's Solvency Report produced by the members' agents' auditor reported on the solvency of the individual Name across all the syndicates on which he underwrote. The Reports were addressed to the Society of Lloyd's and to the DTI.

The Audit Instructions set out in detail the tasks required of the syndicate auditor and members' agents' auditor for the purposes of the solvency test.

(b) Role of the Syndicate Auditor in the Calculation of Audit Reserves

The form of Audit Certificate required for the purposes of the ICA 1974 required the syndicate auditor to report inter alia whether:

"The liabilities attaching to [the Names'] underwriting accounts have been calculated on the basis set out in the current instructions for the guidance of auditors..."

Similarly, the Syndicate Solvency Report obliged the syndicate auditor to report, having examined the syndicate's accounting records, that in his opinion:

"(a) the profit or loss of the closed Underwriting Account and the estimated surplus or deficiency of the open underwriting accounts have been arrived at after valuing all assets and calculating all liabilities in accordance with the [Audit Instructions] ..."

The syndicate auditor's duty required him to satisfy himself as to the adequacy of the RITC. Lloyd's did not know in the case of any particular syndicate, precisely what work the syndicate auditor had carried out as part of his audit.

The Chairman of Lloyd's could only sign the SSOB for the purposes of the annual global test once unqualified Audit Certificates/Members' Solvency Reports for all Names had been received.

If there were any factors which affected or might affect the adequacy of the reserves, the syndicate auditor was required, under Clause 3 of the Audit Instructions, to report to the Committee and obtain their instructions before issuing the Audit Certificate/Syndicate Solvency Report. The letter from Neville Russell dated 24 February 1982 was written pursuant to Clause 3.

(c) Principal Reports Produced by Auditors and Managing Agents

The syndicate auditor (and, for the 1981 solvency audit and thereafter, the members' agents' auditor) and the managing agent were required to produce a number of reports to Lloyd's arising out of the solvency audit. The forms used for the 1980 and prior solvency audits, originally called AU forms, were changed after the Central Solvency System to reflect the different information that was required. By 1986, the forms, with the exception of the AU38 form, had been replaced by CS forms. The system and the information provided did not change significantly over the intervening years.

Amongst the forms was Form AU38 (or AU38a) - "Matters to be reported by syndicate auditor". This form was completed by the auditors in relation to each syndicate audited by them. In particular it required the auditors to report in accordance with Clause 3 of the Audit Instructions and the Solvency Letter on the following:

(i) whether the RITC for the year prior to the year being closed at the current audit or the reserves created on any accounts in run-off, appeared to be inadequate, and, if so, by how much. The auditor was also required to set out any explanation for the apparent inadequacy given by the managing agent and the auditor's observations thereon;

(ii) which of the tests had been adopted for the audit reserves, whether the RITC (or amount placed to reserve where the account was running off) was less than the MPR levels, which accounts were running off and which had been closed by reinsurance. No figures for RITC or reserves were required.

The form AU38 was changed for the 1984 solvency audit to refer to apparent inadequacies in reserves rather than RITC in order to maintain the distinction between the RITC and the solvency test (see MSSC minutes of February 1985). In the years prior to the 1983 year-end, the Global Revenue Accounts produced by syndicate auditors were consolidated returns for all the syndicates which they were responsible for auditing. They contained details of (inter alia) the RITC premiums received and paid, if any, including reserves on accounts running-off. Individual syndicate returns were first required and obtained in respect of the 1983 year end.

[The AU38 form identified the extent of any apparent inadequacies in the particular syndicate's reserves for the year of account that had closed (or was running off) at the previous year end (i.e. for the year prior to the year of account then being closed). An apparent inadequacy with respect to the prior year's reserves had no bearing on the adequacy of the syndicate's audit reserves for the year of account closing at the date of the solvency test. The underwriting agent and active underwriter were also required to provide a certificate to the syndicate auditor and the Committee of Lloyd's certifying to the best of their knowledge and belief, the adequacy of the audit reserves being created for the current year's solvency test, including those for the year then closing (See form AU17). Those audit reserves should therefore have included an amount in respect of any apparent inadequacy identified for the prior year. Furthermore, the syndicate auditor was under a duty not to sign the Audit Certificate/Syndicate Solvency Certificate for the current year's solvency test if he was not satisfied with the calculation of the audit reserves for that test. From the introduction of the AU38(a) form as at 31 December 1982 the auditors were required to give an explanation for the inadequacy of the prior year RITC. There was a change in reporting requirements as at 31 December 1984 to report inadequacy in reserves for prior years as opposed to RITC.]

The Audit Department/MSSD conducted a review of the AU38s for each year and reported the results to the Committee of Lloyd's or, later, the MSSC. As from the review of the AU38s for the year ended 31 December 1984, where a syndicate's reserves for the year prior to the year of account being closed were found to have an apparent inadequacy greater than 15% of the reserves, and where no satisfactory explanation had been given, Lloyd's requested the managing agent to explain the reasons for the apparent inadequacy and the steps being taken to prevent a recurrence. Where the apparent inadequacy was greater than 30% of the reserve, the active underwriter and a director of the managing agent were called in for an interview with the MSSC Chairman or Deputy Chairman. Discussions in relation to apparent inadequacies are found in the following documents:

(i) minutes of special meeting of the Committee of Lloyd's on 5 December 1977;

(ii) minutes of special meeting of the Committee of Lloyd's on 8 December 1978;

(iii) minutes of special meeting of the Committee of Lloyd's on 14 December 1979;

(iv) review of audit requirements for the 1980 solvency test;

(v) minutes of special meeting of the Committee of Lloyd's on 11 December 1980;

(vi) paper for the Committee in respect of the 1981 solvency audit;

(vii) minutes of a special meeting of the Committee on 9 December 1982;

(viii) minutes of a special meeting of the Audit Committee on 26 September 1983;

(ix) minutes of special meeting of the MSSC on 17 October 1983;

(x) minutes of a meeting of the MSSC on 15 October 1984;

(xi) memorandum for MSSC meeting on 16 December 1985;

(xii) minutes of a meeting of the MSSC on 16 December 1985;

(xiii) minutes of a meeting of the SSC on 1 December 1986;

(xiv) memorandum for SSC meeting on 14 September 1987; and

(xv) minutes of SSC meeting on 17 September 1987.

Developments in the Regime for the Solvency Audit

The changes in the scales of MPRs referred to below are only those for non-marine "All Other" business, and, for the 1981 solvency test and thereafter, the non-marine "All Other" US$ business. The changes to the Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter are those that are relevant to the issues in these proceedings.

(a) 1977 Solvency Audit

As to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" business, increases were made in the percentages for years 2 to 8, and new reserves were applied to years 9 and 10 (with an alternative outstandings test for year 10).

As to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter, this was the first year in respect of which syndicate results were required to be provided to Lloyd's by 30 April.

(b) 1978 Solvency Audit

No changes to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" business, were made.

There were no material changes to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter.

(c) 1979 Solvency Audit

As to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" business, increases in the percentages were made for all years, and new reserves were introduced at the end of years 11 and 12 (with an alternative outstandings test for year 12). The Committee agreed that statistical information up to year 20 of each account should be requested, inter alia, in respect of non-marine "All Other" accounts. The Committee also agreed that certain matters should be considered during 1980, including the sub-division of the non-marine "All Other" account, the separate application of an alternative outstanding liabilities test for the third and subsequent years and the replacement of the existing system of relating reserves to premium income.

There were no material changes to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter.

(d) 1980 Solvency Audit

As to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" business, the MPR percentages were increased for years 2-12, and a new reserve of 3% (or outstandings) required for year 13.

There were no material changes to the Audit Instructions or Solvency Letter. The letter of 2 February 1981 enclosing the Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter drew auditors' attention to the effect on reserves of very long-tail business such as products liability and excess casualty reinsurance business.

(e) 1981 Solvency Audit

The scales of MPRs-non-marine "All Other" business were split to provide a separate, higher, scale for US$ business and a separate, lower, scale for non-US$ business. This split was a consequence of continuing efforts on the part of Lloyd's to provide a separation, for the purposes of the MPRs, of the diverse categories of business which were included within the non-marine "All Other" business category. Some of the categories within non-marine "All Other" business were shorter tail, and therefore warranted lower MPRs than other categories. Accordingly, efforts were directed, in consultation with the relevant market associations, and in particular LUNMA, towards refining the categories of business within that class with a view to refinement of the MPRs. Segregation was not, however, a straightforward matter, as revealed by the Committee minutes and other documents summarised below:

(i) in 1979 the Audit Committee requested the Audit Department to conduct a review of audit codes with a view to producing a system of common audit codes based on the length of tail. LUNMA, and other market associations, were contacted and asked to provide a list identifying every type of risk written by the non-marine market together with the relevant audit codes. But LUNMA declined to contemplate this task, stating that due to such a multiplicity of risks written by the non-marine market, it would be too great a task. The question of division was discussed by the Committee of Lloyd's on 14 December 1979;

(ii) in April 1980, the Audit Committee requested LUNMA to provide a list of those risks currently in the "All Other" scale which could be reclassified as "medium tail". By November 1980 the Audit Committee were contemplating the suggestion that there should be a division between US and non-US business, when Mr. Lawrence reported that he had asked LUNMA to reconsider their decision not to undertake a split of the non-marine "All Other" account;

(iii) segregation was further discussed:

(a) at the meeting of the Committee of Lloyd's on 11 December 1980, when Mr. Lawrence reported that LUNMA had supported a suggestion that percentage reserves should be considered in individual currencies rather than all currencies combined;

(b) in a paper placed before the Committee of Lloyd's in 1981;

(c) at the Audit Committee meeting held on 5 May 1981; and

(iv) at a further meeting of the Audit Committee (see the paper headed "Review of Audit Requirements"), the Audit Committee recommended that separate scales of reserves should be created for US$ and non-US$ business. This recommendation was approved by the Committee of Lloyd's on 7 December 1981, and was reflected in Mr. Randall's letter of 21 December 1981 and the Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter for that year end.

[Efforts to obtain a more refined segregation continued thereafter, and ultimately culminated in the introduction of new audit codes with effect from 1 January 1987.]

At the same time as efforts were made to obtain a more refined segregation for the purposes of the MPRs, Lloyd's also investigated and explored the possibility of developing a formula for reserving which was not based on percentages of premium income. Preliminary work carried out within Lloyd's was discussed at the Audit Committee meeting held on 5 May 1981, and referred to at the panel auditors meeting on 10 November 1981. An actuary, Mr. Sidney Benjamin, a senior partner of Bacon & Woodrow, subsequently began working on this question, and his work is referred to and discussed in various documents and minutes. Comparative tests of the "Benjamin method" against the traditional audit reserve calculations were undertaken during the mid 1980's, and the information generated was made available to the market and to registered auditors. In April 1983, a working group was formed to undertake limited testing of the Benjamin method. Their report was published in December 1983. Development of the Benjamin method was delayed after 1985 until a means could be found of obtaining gross settlement statistics, which were felt to be necessary if the system was to be effective.

[As to other changes to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter, clauses 1 and 2 of the Audit Instructions set out the form of Syndicate Solvency Certificate to be completed by syndicate auditors, which was required as a consequence of the introduction of the Central Solvency System. The Audit Instructions also set out the duties of the syndicate auditors with respect to the review of syndicate books and records.]

The Solvency Letter, in the notes on Clause 3, was amended to require underwriters and underwriting agents to draw to the attention of syndicate auditors any factors that affected or might affect the adequacy of the reserves as at 31 December 1981. The equivalent provision in previous Solvency Letters had required the auditors to ask this question of the underwriting agent and had drawn particular factors to the attention of the auditors. The Solvency Letter was in future to be addressed specifically to underwriting agents and active underwriters as well as to panel auditors to reflect the change in emphasis of this aspect of Clause 3. The non-exclusive list of factors in the notes to Clause 3 included "risks which included liability for latent diseases and product liability".

A letter was sent to Lloyd's by Neville Russell on 24 February 1982 pursuant to Clause 3 of the Audit Instructions in relation to reserves for asbestos-related liability. Lloyd's (by Mr. Randall) responded to panel auditors by letter dated 18 March 1982, enclosing a copy of the Murray Lawrence letter of the same date to underwriting agents and auditors (see chapter 19 below).

(f) 1982 Solvency Audit

Increases to MPRs - non-marine were made in the "All Other" US$ scale in each of years 1 to 11 and 14. In a letter dated 3 February 1983 Lloyd's advised managing agents and active underwriters that for the purpose of the statement of outstanding losses for the solvency test as at 31 December 1982, Lloyd's would require both gross and net outstanding losses for the 1980 and prior years of account to be shown.

As to amendments to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter, clause 2 was amended to impose additional requirements on the syndicate auditor to examine and satisfy himself as to the adequacy of the accounting systems and to undertake alternative procedures where the systems were inadequate. Further the auditor had to satisfy himself that all necessary information had been supplied. Clause 6 was amended to clarify that it was the responsibility of the managing agent to establish the audit reserves and the auditor's responsibility to audit that calculation. The syndicate auditor was required to ensure that the agent had discharged his responsibility in this regard in a reasonable manner consistent with available information on outstanding losses, statistics on underwriting performance, market experience and any relevant information and explanations.

(g) 1983 Solvency Audit

The scales of MPRs - non-marine "All Other" US$ business were unchanged from 1982.

The Audit Instructions were changed to require the syndicate auditor, where he believed the syndicate's accounting systems were not adequate, to make recommendations to the managing agent as to improvements for systems and controls and to require that certain reports be made on the systems. The syndicate auditor was also required to undertake "such other procedures as he considered necessary" to enable him to complete and sign the Syndicate Solvency Report.

(h) 1984 Solvency Audit

As to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" US$ business, the scales of reserves were increased from year 5 to year 13 and new reserves were added for years 15 and 16. In addition, years 10 to 15 were made subject to an alternative outstanding liabilities test (year 16 was in any case subject to an alternative liabilities test in accordance with usual practice).

As to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter, consideration had been given in the discussions on the MPR scales to a higher scale than eventually agreed. The higher scale was rejected but Lloyd's took the opportunity in the Audit Instructions to re-emphasise that the syndicate auditor must have regard to the fact that the MPR scales represented the "absolute minimum requirement" for any syndicate and had been compiled on that basis. Where professional judgment and statistical evidence suggested, provision had to be made over and above the MPRs to take account of the particular circumstances of individual syndicates. This was also re-emphasised in a letter to managing agents, active underwriters and panel auditors dated 12 November 1984 advising them of the MPR scales for the 1984 solvency audit. The letter reminded the addressees that any syndicate reserving at or near minimum percentage levels would have to demonstrate to its auditors that this represented an adequate provision.

In previous years, if a syndicate had wanted to set an RITC premium at less than the audit reserves calculated by reference to the MPRs, it was required to obtain the Committee's approval. Under Byelaw No.7 of 1984, auditors were now required to report in true and fair terms on the results of closed years. Therefore it was considered no longer appropriate for the Committee to approve the setting of RITC by a syndicate at less than MPR levels. Reflecting this change, syndicate auditors were now merely required to report to Lloyd's if the 1982 and previous years' accounts of each syndicate were closed by reinsurance at a lesser sum than the MPRs and if so to confirm that the audit reserve for the open year of account had been adjusted to reflect the difference between the RITC premium and the audit reserves calculated in accordance with the MPRs.

The Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter were accompanied by a letter from the MSSD dated 10 January 1985 alerting managing agents and registered auditors, inter alia, to:

(i) the requirement that no syndicate may have audit reserves less than those calculated in accordance with the MPRs; and

(ii) the true and fair requirement applicable to the 31 December 1985 accounts and the Council's encouragement that the accounts for 31 December 1984 should be drawn up on the same basis.

(i) 1985 Solvency Audit

As to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" US$ business, the scales remained the same, subject to the removal of the alternative outstanding liabilities test for years 10 to 15. The proposed scales of MPRs were circulated under cover of a letter dated 19 November 1985. A further letter was sent on 31 January 1986.

As to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter, clause 6(i)(d) of the Solvency Letter, which required any syndicates reserving at or near the minimum percentage to demonstrate to its auditor that this represented an adequate provision, was removed, because all syndicates needed to demonstrate to their auditors that their reserves were adequate regardless of whether they were at or near the MPR levels. It was misleading to state that this was only necessary where syndicates reserved at or near MPRs. Clause 3 of the Solvency Letter was changed to require auditors to report inadequacies in reserves created at 31 December 1982 (the prior closed year), rather than RITC. The reason was to distinguish between the syndicate accounts (RITC) and the solvency test (closing reserves). Clause 3(iii) of the Solvency Letter (managing agents to bring to auditors' attention factors which affect or may affect the adequacy of the reserves) was amended, inter alia, so that "any factors" was in bold, the words "but in no way limited to" were added to the introduction and sub-paragraph (a) read "risks which include liability for latent diseases "and/or" products liability".

(j) 1986 Solvency Audit

As to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" US$ business, the scales of MPRs were reduced for years 1, 2 and 16, and increased for years 11 to 15. A new reserve was added for year 17.

As to Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter, the Audit Instructions and Solvency Letter were combined into one document. This change was of form rather than substance, as explained in a letter to managing agents, active underwriters and recognised auditors dated 19 December 1986. In particular, the Audit Instructions now identified the principal responsibilities of the managing agent, syndicate auditor, members' agents and members' agents auditors in separate parts. The provisions as to the valuation of assets and the valuation of liabilities were in two further parts. It was stressed in Clause 6.1 (valuation of liabilities) of the Audit Instructions that the Instructions were applicable solely to the annual solvency test and were not determinative of the accounting standards applicable to the annual report prepared in respect of a syndicate.

(k) 1987 Solvency Audit

As to MPRs - non-marine "All Other" US$ business, the MPRs were decreased in respect of years 3 and 17 and increased in respect of years 5 to 16. A new reserve of 5% (or outstanding liabilities) was added in respect of year 18.

New audit codes had been introduced with effect from 1 January 1987 but separate minimum reserve levels could not be established immediately for these codes until sufficient data had been collected:

non-marine long-long-tail Code A1

non-marine medium long-tail Code A2

non-marine short-long-tail Code A3

bankers' business Code BB

The introduction of the new audit codes was a further consequence of the efforts made to refine the categories within the non-marine "All Other" business class following the division in 1981 between US$ and non-US$ business. The further discussions and efforts concerning segregation are revealed in the documents identified below:

(i) at the Audit Committee meeting on 1 March 1983, the Committee agreed that a further effort should be made to divide the non-marine "All Other" business account, and that LUNMA should be approached and requested to assist in extracting those classes of business which could form a "short all other" scale of reserves;

(ii) by the time of the Audit Committee meeting on 6 September 1983, a sub-committee had been set up to deal with the matter. By letter dated 26 October 1983, LUNMA reported that its Committee were of the view that there should be no new audit codes splitting the "All Other" category into statistical sub-divisions; a position reiterated at the meeting of the LUNMA Committee held on 13 September 1984;

(iii) at a meeting of the MSSC on 15 October 1984, it was considered that a further attempt should be made to sub-divide the "All Other" categories;

(iv) eventually, on 14 July 1986, the LUNMA Committee prepared a paper which recommended that there should be a further subdivision into bankers business, short long, medium long, and all other. They proposed that bankers' business should carry new minimum audit percentages immediately; that the other three categories would, for the time being, continue to be dealt with (for MPR purposes) as a single category. The proposal was discussed, and broadly accepted, by the MSSC on 22 October 1986; and their recommendations were put before the Committee of Lloyd's. The new audit codes (A1, A2, A3, and BB) were introduced with effect from 1 January 1987.

The new audit codes were referred to in a letter dated 4 December 1987, enclosing the Solvency Test Instructions for the year ended 31 December 1987. The letter stated:

"Non-Marine Reserves

With effect from 1 January 1987, new audit codes for non-marine business were introduced, namely codes Al; A2; A3 and BB. Until separate minimum percentage reserves can be established for non-marine short-long-tail, medium-long-tail and bankers business categories the existing non-marine all other (long-tail) solvency category will cover all these audit codes. However, as a result, the minimum percentage reserves for this category will not provide adequate levels of reserves even as a minimum for the longer tail classes [and], managing agents and recognised auditors are reminded that a thorough review is essential of outstanding claims and, in respect of liabilities unnoted and incurred but not reported (IBNR's)."

There were no material changes to Audit Instructions - now called Solvency Test Instructions.

H. REGIME FOR STATUTORY STATEMENT OF BUSINESS AND GLOBALS

Introduction

The process of collating material for the SSOB, Aggregate Results and Global Accounts was, in the relevant contemporaneous documents, called "the Global Process" and the end result "the Globals", notwithstanding the distinctions between the various documents.

To summarise the production of the SSOB and Globals:

Prior to the year ended 31 December 1982

(i) Lloyd's prepared the SSOB from consolidated returns made by syndicate auditors called "Global Statements". In addition syndicate auditors produced more detailed "Global Revenue Accounts" which were provided to the DTI although they were not strictly required by statute.

(ii) The Global Revenue Accounts were used by Lloyd's to prepare Aggregate Results, which used slightly different business categories (similar to Lloyd's traditional business categories) to those used for the SSOB. Aggregate Results were released by Lloyd's at its annual press conference along with statements made by the Chairman of Lloyd's and Chairmen of the various Market Associations. A summary of Aggregate Results and statements of the Chairmen were circulated to underwriting agents by the Publicity and Information Department. A summary of the Aggregate Results and statements of the Chairmen were also published in the Lloyd's Log. The Aggregate Results were also included in the accounts of the Corporation of Lloyd's for the 1978 year end (which contained the Aggregate Results for the closure of the 1975 year of account as at 1977) until the 1981 year end (which contained the Aggregate Results for the closure of the 1978 year of account as at 1980).

For the year ended 31 December 1982 and subsequent years

(i) Following the enactment of the ICA 1982 the form of SSOB was changed, from the year ended 31 December 1982, to replicate substantially the information previously provided by the Global Revenue Accounts. In particular, the number of business categories was increased. The SSOB also contained a number of additional returns to the DTI.

(ii) With effect from the year end as at 31 December 1982, the Globals were published in the form of a brochure containing, inter alia, the Global Accounts and statements by the Chairman of Lloyd's and Market Association Chairmen. The Globals were distributed at a press conference. The Global Accounts provided in the Globals were expanded (by comparison to the information previously made available to the press and public) to cover the same business categories as in the new form of SSOB.

(iii) The forms, on which the information for the SSOB and Global Accounts was collated, were changed to forms with a GL prefix. Initially syndicate auditors provided consolidated returns aggregating the results of all syndicates which they audited (as had been the case prior to 1982). Lloyd's then aggregated these returns manually to produce the SSOB and Global Accounts.

(iv) By the time of the SSOB and Global Accounts as at 1983 syndicate auditors were required to furnish returns for each individual syndicate but the SSOB and Global Accounts continued to be calculated from aggregated returns by syndicate auditors (i.e. returns that did not distinguish between individual syndicates). By the time of the SSOB and Global Accounts as at 1986, individual syndicate returns were used to produce the SSOB and Global Accounts. The process became computerised so that individual syndicate returns were aggregated by Lloyd's by computer.

The administrative departments responsible for producing the SSOB, Aggregate Results and Global Accounts over the Relevant Period were as follows:

DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTORY REGIME

(a) SSOB as at 31 December 1981 and Prior Years

Lloyd's has been required to lodge statements on Lloyd's business with the Board of Trade (or the DTI) since 1948. For the year ended 31 December 1981 and prior years, this requirement was set out in Section 74 of the ICA 1974. The Assurance Companies Rules 1950 (SI 1950/533) set out the prescribed form of SSOB at Rule 19 (then called the "Annual Statement"). The SSOB were required to be signed by the Chairman of Lloyd's, the Chairman of the Audit Sub-Committee and the Clerk to the Audit Sub-Committee.

There were four categories of business in respect of which statements were required:

Form A: returns relating to life assurance business;

Form B: returns relating to motor vehicle insurance business within Great Britain and Northern Ireland (other than reinsurance business);

Form C: returns relating to marine, aviation and transit insurance business; and

Form D: returns relating to all other assurance business other than long term business (i.e. other than life assurance business).

Each form certified that all the liabilities attaching to such business had been calculated by an auditor (or an actuary in respect of life assurance business) and that an Audit Certificate had been furnished by each underwriter to the Board of Trade and to the Committee of Lloyd's. Each form also set out the income and expenditure for each open year and the closed year of account as at the year end to which the Annual Statement related.

(b) SSOB as at 31 December 1982 and Subsequent Years

Following the enactment of the ICA 1982, a new form of SSOB was required to be furnished to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The SSOB was prescribed in Regulation 5 and Schedule 3 of the Insurance (Lloyd's) Regulations 1983, and applied to the audit as at 31 December 1982.

The SSOB was in the form of a general certificate to be furnished by Lloyd's and a number of supporting Forms. The general certificate stated that the SSOB had been completed in accordance with the ICA 1982 and that an Audit Certificate had been provided in respect of every underwriting member. The general certificate was signed by the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Secretary-General of Lloyd's. The supporting Forms to be completed pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Regulations and Schedule 3 covered revenue accounts, premium analysis returns, solvency margin calculations and a consolidated statement of assets and liabilities of Names.

Form 1 required "Three Year Revenue Accounts" for each of the open years and the closed year as at the year end to which the SSOB related. Regulation 5(2) and (3) specified that Form 1 returns were required for the following:

(i) for each of the following accounting classes of general business:

(A) accident and health;

(B) motor vehicle, damage and liability;

(C) aircraft damage and liability;

(D) ships, damage and liability;

(E) goods in transit;

(F) property damage;

(G) general liability; and

(H) pecuniary loss;

(ii) for long term business; and

(iii) for all insurance business.

Form 1 compared income and expenditure as in the earlier SSOB but in greater detail. One principal difference was that the reinsurance premiums received and paid, if any, were separately stated from the net premiums and net claims. These values included amounts placed to reserve in respect of estimated liabilities from previous accounts (i.e. reserves established on years of account in run-off).

The Production of the SSOB, Aggregate Results and the Global Accounts, the Development of Globals and the Process for the approval of SSOB and Globals are described in Appendix 4.

The following account of the Rules and Procedures Governing the Admission to Underwriting Membership of Lloyd's and Related Matters is drawn from a statement of agreed facts. Where I have added to the statement this is shown in square brackets.

A. THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK APPLICABLE TO ADMISSION TO UNDERWRITING MEMBERSHIP OF LLOYD'S AND RELATED MATTERS

Byelaw No. 87 (18 November 1970)

Under this byelaw, insurance business could be effected with Names through an underwriting agent only if that agent was at the time listed in the Register of Approved Lloyd's Underwriting Agents to be kept by the Committee of Lloyd's.

Manual for Underwriting Agents (1971 Version)

The procedure applicable to admission to underwriting membership of Lloyd's was set out in the Manual for Underwriting Agents which was first published in 1971. The Manual also set out the duties owed by underwriting agents (both members' and managing agents) to prospective and existing Names. These duties included (at Section A, paragraph 3.1(ii) of the Manual):

(i) advising and discussing with prospective Names the prospects and past results of the various syndicates on which the agent could place Names;

(ii) co-operating with the prospective Name's sponsor in submitting applications for membership;

(iii) agreeing with the Name the allocation of the Name's premium limits as between syndicates;

(iv) keeping Names informed of the progress of their underwriting;

(v) arranging to provide annual audited accounts to Names; and

(vi) passing on to the Name any relevant information or instructions contained in correspondence from the Committee of Lloyd's.

The Manual also set out the obligations on a managing agent to "keep the [members'] Agent fully advised of the progress of the underwriting account ... by periodical advice at least on a quarterly basis ... [and] by making available any such further information as may be requested ..." (at Section A, paragraph 9.2(iv) of the Manual).

The Manual was subsequently updated by means of replacement pages which were regularly issued in the form of sequentially numbered "Amendment Lists".

A brochure entitled "Notes for Applicants for Underwriting Membership" was prepared by the Membership Department of Lloyd's in 1971 and appended to the Manual. Various amendments were subsequently made to this brochure between 1971 and 1979 prior to its replacement by a separate brochure, the "Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership" in 1979.

On 22 December 1977, the Committee of Lloyd's issued a letter to all underwriting agents setting out detailed requirements as to information to be provided by agents to US citizens and residents applying for membership of Lloyd's. The letter also gave instructions as to documentation to be used by agents in connection with such applications, including a separate brochure for US applicants (appended at Part A to Exhibit D to the letter) and a "verification form" which was to be signed by US applicants at or immediately following his or her Rota Committee interview as part of the procedure for admission to underwriting membership of Lloyd's.

On 23 January 1979, the Committee of Lloyd's issued a further letter to all underwriting agents recommending that the same information that was to be disclosed to US applicants should be disclosed to all new Names who became Names through their agency. The letter also recommended that disclosure should be made to an existing Name at the time of his/her increasing his/her line on a syndicate, joining a new syndicate or employing a new agent. Finally, the letter advised that if a brochure was prepared by an agent for the purpose of disclosing information to new Names, the agent should notify its existing Names of the existence and availability of that brochure.

Again in January 1979, the brochure for non-US applicants entitled "Notes for Applicants for Underwriting Membership" was replaced by the "Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership".

On 5 March 1980, a letter was sent by the Manager of the Membership Department to agents indicating that all prospective Names or existing Names joining an agency or syndicate, irrespective of nationality, should be provided with the same information which was previously required to be disclosed specifically to US Names as set out at Section A, paragraph 16.5 of the then current version of the Manual. The letter also asked agents "to draw to the attention of new Names factors which may have affected past results or may affect future results, and to keep all Names informed of factors which might materially affect the results of the Syndicate".

Manual for Underwriting Agents (January 1980 Version and Amendments)

The Manual was reprinted in full in January 1980. Replacement pages continued to be produced throughout the Relevant Period up to and including 1988.

The amendments to the Manual made by Amendment List No. 49 on 2 May 1980 made reference to the following:

(i) the requirement (which had previously been notified to agents in the 5 March 1980 letter) that "Agents should keep all Names informed of facts that might materially affect Syndicate results" (Section A, paragraph 15.1, headed "Disclosure to Existing Names", of the amended Manual);

(ii) the requirement (which had also previously been notified to agents in the 5 March 1980 letter) that agents should provide prospective Names with "comments on factors which have materially affected past results or might materially affect future results" (Section A, paragraph 17.1(iii)(c) of the amended Manual);

(iii) the requirement that agents should explain to prospective Names the concept of unlimited liability (Section A, paragraph 17.1(i)(f) of the amended Manual);

(iv) the requirement that agents should provide to prospective Names the "results of operations for each Syndicate for at least 7 years which have been certified by Panel Auditors and most recent percentage settlement figures in respect of open underwriting years, together with an indication as to whether they are likely to show a profit or loss" (Section A, paragraph 17.1(iii)(c) of the amended Manual).

The requirements set out in Amendment List No. 49 that agents should explain the concept of unlimited liability to prospective Names and should show them the results of at least the last seven closed underwriting years (where applicable) for each proposed syndicate, had both previously been set out in the relevant Rota briefs and verification forms for both 1979 and 1980 joiners.

The Report of the Fisher Working Party into Self-Regulation at Lloyd's - May 1980

The Fisher Report made a large number of recommendations, including that under the anticipated new Lloyd's Act (which subsequently received Royal Assent on 23 July 1982), the Council and Committee of Lloyd's should be given extensive powers:

(i) "to regulate the admission and registration of Members, Agents and Brokers" (paragraph 4 of the Fisher Report); and

(ii) in relation to "the provision of adequate information by Agents to prospective and established Members [and] the proper treatment of Members by Agents under the terms of a generally standard form of Agency Agreement" (paragraph 8 of the Fisher Report).

The Fisher Report gave rise to the establishment of a number of "Task Groups". These included the following:

(i) Fisher Task Group 2 which considered byelaws and regulations generally;

(ii) Fisher Task Group 3 (Rules for Members);

(iii) Fisher Task Group 4 (Information to Names); and

(iv) Fisher Task Group 5 (Agency Agreements).

The work of these Task Groups in turn led to the passing of a number of byelaws, as set out below.

1983 Annual Reports of Syndicates Byelaw (No. 2 of 1984)

This byelaw imposed an obligation (enforceable by disciplinary measures) on managing agents to prepare audited syndicate accounts for the year ended 31 December 1983. The byelaw specified the contents of the accounts and the timing for their completion and circulation to Names (direct or through members' agents) and to Lloyd's. The timing was as follows:

Disclosure of Interests Byelaw (No. 3 of 1984)

This byelaw required that members' and managing agents must disclose to Names, through annual statements and syndicate annual reports respectively, all transactions and arrangements concerning the Name in which the agent had a material interest.

Underwriting Agents Byelaw (No. 4 of 1984)

Through this byelaw, the Committee of Lloyd's established a register of all underwriting agents, divided into members' agents and managing agents (paragraph 3 of the byelaw). An agent was not permitted to operate in the Lloyd's market unless it was registered under this byelaw (or was already registered under Byelaw No. 87 in which case the need to register under the 1984 byelaw was postponed until 22 July 1987) (paragraph 4 of the byelaw). The factors which the Committee would take into account in deciding whether the agency was "fit and proper" to be registered included the suitability of its directors or partners and its staff; the suitability of the active underwriter(s) (in the case of a managing agent); and its ability to supervise and service all of its activities and responsibilities (paragraph 8 of the byelaw).

Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No. 7 of 1984)

This byelaw set out the requirements for the preparation and audit of syndicate accounts for the year ended 31 December 1984 and onwards and for the preparation and audit of individual Names' personal accounts. It contained full details as to the contents, timing, publication and circulation of syndicate accounts, as well as provisions relating to the contents of managing agents' and underwriters' reports. The timetable for the circulation of syndicate accounts and accompanying documents was the same as that set out in the 1983 Annual Reports of Syndicates Byelaw.

Membership Byelaw (No. 9 of 1984)

This byelaw was supported by detailed secondary rules set out in the Manual for Members. The Manual for Members, which was prepared by the Membership Department, consolidated all of the existing rules relating to admission and was distributed to members' agents.

As well as dealing with the requirements for admission (paragraphs 4-8 of the byelaw), the byelaw gave the Council and Committee of Lloyd's the power to require Names to provide proof of means and required Names to notify the Committee in writing if their level of means fell below the qualifying level (paragraphs 3(b)(ii) and 14(c)-(d) of the byelaw).

Agency Agreements Byelaw (No. 1 of 1985)

As a result of this byelaw, insurance business could not be underwritten at Lloyd's after 31 December 1986 except in pursuance of a Standard Agency Agreement (set out in Schedule 1 to the byelaw) or a Standard Sub-Agency Agreement (set out in Schedule 2 to the byelaw).

1986 Brochures

In February 1986, both the US and non-US versions of the Brochure for Applicants for Underwriting Membership were replaced by the "Applicants' Guide for Underwriting Membership" which was introduced in respect of all applicants regardless of nationality. This in turn was replaced in December 1986 by a brochure entitled "Membership: The Issues", again in respect of all applicants.

The Report of the Committee of Inquiry Chaired by Sir Patrick Neill into Regulatory Arrangements at Lloyd's - January 1987

Among the conclusions of the Neill Report was the finding that "the formal [admission] process does contain many of the safeguards associated with modern investor protection legislation, for example, specific rules about the financial circumstances of the prospective Name and the information he/she is to be given, and a lengthy introductory procedure culminating in a Rota interview" (paragraph 4.8 of the Neill Report).

The Neill Report also noted that the members' agent "has a critical role to play in explaining in detail the financial requirements for Names laid down by Lloyd's, the financial consequences of membership, the services which the agent himself provides and the syndicates he can make available. A competent agent will be at pains to advise the applicant whether membership of Lloyd's is appropriate to his circumstances. It is then for the agent to guide the Name through the admission process" (paragraph 4.5 of the Neill Report).

It further noted that members' agents had to understand that they were "responsible for giving Names comprehensive and objective advice on the consequences of membership in the light of a thorough understanding of the Names' individual circumstances" (paragraph 4.33 of the Neill Report).

The Neill Report in turn gave rise to further byelaws and codes of practice, as summarised below.

Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No. 11 of 1987)

This byelaw set out revised requirements relating to the preparation and audit of syndicate accounts and to the preparation and audit of individual Names' personal accounts. Like the Syndicate Accounting Byelaw (No. 7 of 1984), it contained full details as to the contents, timing, publication and circulation of syndicate accounts, as well as provisions relating to the contents of managing agents' and underwriters' reports. As stated in a letter dated 11 December 1987 from the Council of Lloyd's to underwriting agents, market associations and recognised auditors, the revised timetable for the circulation of syndicate accounts and accompanying documents was as follows:

The revised timetable applied in respect of syndicate accounts and accompanying documentation for the year ended 31 December 1988 and onwards.

Members' Agents (Information) Byelaw (No. 7 of 1988)

Under this byelaw, which came into force on 1 January 1989, all members' agents had to compile annually a members' agent's information report containing "such information as would materially assist a reasonable applicant to make an informed assessment of the members' agent (and its business)" (paragraph 2 of the byelaw). The MAIR had to include, among other matters (listed in Schedule 2 of the byelaw):

(i) a statement as to whether the agent was independent or was associated with a broker or managing agent;

(ii) the number of Names which the agent had acted for and the total number of syndicates to which Names were or had been allocated by the agent in each of the last seven years of account (going back no further than the 1984 year of account);

(iii) for each such syndicate, numbers of Names and the aggregate capacity of those Names for each of the last seven years of account (going back no further than the 1984 year of account);

(iv) for the year of account commencing on the compilation date (i.e. 1 January of the calendar year in which the MAIR is compiled), a list of the directors or partners in the members' agent who were Names together with a list of the syndicates on which they underwrote business through that members' agent and their aggregate participation on each such syndicate;

(v) a statement of the average performance achieved by the members' agent (using the formula set out in Schedule 2, paragraph 5 of the byelaw) in each of the last seven years of account (going back no further than the 1985 year of account); and

(vi) a statement of policy concerning the special reserve fund and personal reserve arrangements; personal stop loss policies; the offering of capacity on syndicates managed by a managing agent associated with the members' agent as compared with other syndicates, and whether the same policy was applied to Names who were directors, partners or employees of the members' agent; and the payment of introductory commissions.

Members' agents were also required to compile annually a table of syndicate relationships (i.e. numbers of Names and the aggregate capacity of those Names for the past seven years of account, going back no further than the 1984 year of account) (paragraph 3 of the byelaw).

A members' agent could only issue a brochure if the brochure either (i) attached the current MAIR and any supplemental report prepared by the agent; or (ii) was a "qualifying brochure" (i.e. contained the information found in the MAIR and any supplemental report) (paragraph 4 of the byelaw).

Paragraph 5 of the byelaw provided that the Council of Lloyd's would set up and maintain a file of MAIRs and tables of syndicate relationships, containing a separate section in respect of each members' agent.

No members' agent could agree to act for an applicant without first giving that applicant either (i) a copy of the current MAIR; or (ii) a qualifying brochure; and in either case a copy of any supplemental report (paragraph 6 of the byelaw).

Agency Agreements Byelaw (No. 8 of 1988)

This byelaw provided that, in respect of the 1990 and subsequent years of account, no members' agent could act as members' agent of a Name, and no Name could appoint a members' agent or agree that the members' agent would continue to act in that capacity, otherwise than in pursuance of a written agreement in the form and terms of the standard members' agent's agreement set out in Schedule 1 of the byelaw (paragraph 2 of the byelaw).

Clause 4(a) of the standard members' agent's agreement required that the members' agent should "advise the Name as to the syndicates in which he should participate and as to the amounts of his overall premium limit which should from time to time be allocated to each such syndicate".

Clause 6.2(m) of the standard members' agent's agreement required that the members' agent should "disclose to the Name in good time any information in its possession relating to any of the Contracted Syndicates, or to any syndicate which the Agent has advised the Name to join or which the Name and the Agent have agreed that the Name should join, which could reasonably be expected to influence the Name in deciding whether to become or remain a member of, or to increase or reduce his participation in, any such syndicate, and use its reasonable endeavours to obtain any such information".

Similarly, in respect of the 1990 and subsequent years of account, no managing agent could, and no Name could authorise or continue to authorise a managing agent to, underwrite insurance business on behalf of a Name or provide any other services as a managing agent to a Name, otherwise than in pursuance of an agreement in the terms of a standard managing agent's agreement set out in Schedule 3 of the byelaw and, except where the managing agent is acting as the Name's members' agent, the standard agent's agreement set out in Schedule 2 of the byelaw (paragraph 3 of the byelaw).

Neither agents nor Names could vary the terms of any of these standard agreements without the written consent of the Council of Lloyd's (subject to limited exceptions) (paragraph 5 of the byelaw).

Code of Practice: "Know Your Principal" Guidelines for Members' Agents at Lloyd's (7 September 1988)

This code of practice stated that members' agents should promote and maintain, on a continuing basis, a flow of information from their principals (i.e. their Names) regarding the latter's personal and financial circumstances (paragraph A of the code of practice).

Members' agents had to satisfy themselves that (as set out in paragraph B of the code of practice):

(i) membership of Lloyd's and the type of business to be underwritten were appropriate in the principal's particular circumstances;

(ii) the principal understood the nature of the risks of membership;

(iii) the principal understood the concept of unlimited liability and how this might affect his/her personal commitments and/or financial obligations and also understood the limited role of any stop-loss policy taken out by him/her;

(iv) the principal was aware that control of his/her underwriting affairs would be delegated to his/her underwriting agents;

(v) the principal understood that he/she or his/her estate would remain liable until all the syndicates on which he/she participated had been closed by reinsurance to close; and

(vi) the principal could realise sufficient resources in the event of a sizeable loss and could maintain sufficient assets over and above those required to be maintained as a condition of membership to continue to meet his/her living expenses.

Members' agents had to seek confirmation from each principal that the implications of membership were compatible with the principal's financial objectives (paragraph B(vii) of the code of practice).

Members' agents also had to keep up to date records of each principal. These records had to demonstrate the suitability of the advice given by the members' agent in connection with membership (paragraph C of the code of practice).

B. 1978 ADMISSION PROCEDURE FOR PROSPECTIVE NAME SEEKING TO COMMENCE UNDERWRITING ON 1 JANUARY 1979 (1979 JOINER)

Categories of Membership

The requirements for admission differed in a number of respects, as detailed below, depending on the classification of the particular applicant. The principal categories of Name at Lloyd's were as follows:

(i) Lloyd's vocational Names (known as "Lloyd's Names" and, later in the Relevant Period, as "Working Names"), who had to be resident in the UK; have 5 consecutive years' qualifying service, i.e. full time service employment with a Lloyd's underwriting agent or a Lloyd's broker immediately prior to their election; and whose application had to be supported in writing by the chairman, managing director or senior partner of their employer (unless they had been an annual subscriber to Lloyd's or a substitute of another broker for five years immediately prior to their election and had a salary of not less than £10,000). (N.B. The "five year" qualifying period was sometimes reduced to two years for an active underwriter of a syndicate.) A vocational Name could be elected on reduced or nominal (i.e. zero) means. In either case, he/she had to provide a vocational undertaking to continue working in the Lloyd's market. Alternatively, a person working in the market could choose to be elected in accordance with the normal means requirement, in which case no vocational undertaking would be required.

(ii) "Connected or Associated Names", who did not have to be resident in the UK but had to have 5 years' qualifying service with one or more organisations connected with the Lloyd's market immediately prior to their election; be employed in an organisation connected with the Lloyd's market; and whose application had to be supported in writing by the chairman, managing director or senior partner of their employer, who had to verify that the candidate's work was substantially connected with the Lloyd's market. A Connected or Associated Name candidate could be elected on reduced (but not nominal) means. Unless he/she was elected in accordance with the normal means requirement, he/she would have to provide a Connected or Associated Names undertaking to continue working in an organisation connected with the Lloyd's market.

(iii) "Non-Lloyd's Names" (sometimes known as "External Names"), i.e. ones which did not fall into any other category.

Application Process

An application to become a Name and to commence underwriting on 1 January 1979 would be made during the course of 1978. Such an application could only be made through a registered members' agent, who would provide the prospective member with the necessary forms and would guide him/her through the application procedure. The members' agent's responsibilities would also include:

(i) explaining the structure of Lloyd's and the implications of membership;

(ii) advising prospective Names on their suitability for membership and the requirements and regulations applicable to becoming a member;

(iii) advising and guiding prospective Names through the admission procedure;

(iv) advising prospective (and existing) Names on syndicate selection;

(v) introducing them to the underwriters on their proposed syndicates (as recommended by the Committee of Lloyd's);

(vi) acting as an intermediary between the Name and the managing agent;

(vii) dealing with any changes in a Name's overall premium limit;

(viii) dealing with the administration of the investment of a Name's personal and special reserve funds;

(ix) accounting to Names for the results of their underwriting, including payment of profit and collection of losses or interim cash calls; and

(x) keeping Names informed at all times of material factors which may affect their underwriting.

The main duties of a members' agent were summarised in passages set out in chapter 10 above by:

(i) Gatehouse J in Brown v KMR Services [1994] 4 All ER 385 at 390;

(ii) Hobhouse LJ in Brown v KMR Services [1995] 4 All ER 598 at 633 to 634; and

Reinsurance To Close

The closure of a year of account was effected by the payment of a premium (the RITC premium) in respect of the members' underwriting liabilities allocated to that year to reinsure these liabilities into the following year of account. If a decision was taken not to close the relevant year of account, the account was described as having gone into "run-off" and no RITC premium was payable. The subsequent two years of account over the three year accounting period that were not being (or entitled to be) closed were known as "open years". Thus the first two years of the three-year accounting cycle were "open years." If a syndicate year was not closed by RITC, that year was "left open".

As reported in the Chairman's statement in the 1987 Globals, at the end of December 1987 there were 76 syndicates with a total of 120 years of account left open. Problems associated with asbestos and pollution risks, together with other US liability business, appear to account for the vast majority of the run-off years.

In the 1980s, there was a growing number of syndicates which did not close their accounts at the end of their third year.

Against the payment of a RITC premium, all syndicate members' undischarged liabilities in respect of risks allocated to the relevant year of account (including liabilities in respect of RITC of any preceding year of account) were reinsured without limit in time or amount into a succeeding year of account of the same syndicate; they could also, on occasion, be reinsured to close into a later year of account or by another syndicate. When RITC was underwritten by the same syndicate, the premium was set by the managing agent of both syndicates, in conjunction with the underwriter, acting for the Names on both years of account.

The amount charged by way of premium was required to be equitable between Names on the reinsured and reinsuring syndicates, having regard to the nature and amount of the liabilities being reinsured. RITC into a subsequent year of the same syndicate was not treated as premium income for the purposes of premium income monitoring. The Syndicate Premium Income Byelaw (No 6 of 1984) dealt with circumstances in which RITC by a different syndicate would form part of premium income for premium income monitoring purposes.

In the Merrett Judgment [1997] LRLR 265 at 313, I set out Some General Principles as to RITC.

As to the role of the managing agents/underwriter I said:-

"I turn to consider some general principles in relation to RITC and the role of the managing agents/underwriter and of the auditors.

"Reinsurance to Close" means an agreement under which underwriting members who are members of a syndicate for a year of account agree with underwriting members who comprise that or another syndicate for a later year of account that the reinsuring members will indemnify the reinsured members against all known and unknown liabilities of the reinsured members arising out of the insurance business underwritten through that syndicate and allocated to the closed year, in consideration of a premium and the assignment to the reinsuring members of all the rights of the reinsured members arising out of or in connection with that insurance business.

In computing a reinsurance to close the premium arrived at will take account of two elements: known outstanding claims and claims incurred but not reported (IBNR).

If a year is closed into a succeeding year the RITC is final. There is no mechanism for correcting past inaccuracies or inequities.

The Role Of The Managing Agents/Underwriter

The following propositions are largely derived from the regulatory materials...

1. The amount charged by way of premium in respect of reinsurance to close should, where the reinsuring members and the reinsured members were members of the same syndicate for different years of account, be equitable as between them, having regard to the nature and amount of the liabilities reinsured. Compliance with "equity between Names" had to be demonstrated by the underwriter and managing agent in determining the reinsurance to close.

2. By... [1985] it was strongly recommended that whilst the decision whether to close a year of account of a syndicate was the responsibility of the managing agent in consultation with the underwriter, no year of account should be closed before the managing agent determined whether the syndicate auditor intended to give a qualified audit opinion in respect of that year of account.

3. The determination of the IBNR element required the exercise by the underwriter of judgment as to the level of IBNR which was appropriate, having regard to all relevant materials and after appropriate enquiries. The Further Explanatory Notes to Byelaw No.7 of 1984 published on 9.12.85 set out in paragraphs 18 to 24 a number of matters which might fall to be considered in computing the IBNR. These include the nature of the business written by the syndicate as one of the main factors affecting the size and relative importance of the IBNR element of the reinsurance to close. Different classes of business gave rise to different considerations. The Further Explanatory Notes also stated that the reinsurance to close must be supported by records setting out the manner and bases upon which the final figure was determined in sufficient detail to "show and explain" the nature of the transaction. The Further Explanatory Notes also provided that it was important that the process of determining the IBNR, the more judgmental aspect of the reinsurance to close exercise, was documented to the same standard as was adopted in relation to outstanding claims. Documentation should include a record of the overall factors taken into account by the underwriter in arriving at his approach to the reinsurance to close. This should cover those factors which the underwriter considered had a significant impact on the year of account and might refer to those which did not and the reasons why such conclusions were drawn. Although the Further Explanatory Notes were published on 9.12.85, the matters referred to derived from the Notes probably reflected the approach that ought properly to have been followed in earlier years and in particular from [1985].

4. If the amount to be charged by way of premium in respect of the RITC could not be arrived at with a reasonable degree of accuracy having regard to the nature and amount of the liabilities reinsured, the account should be left open.

5. Where at its normal date of closure a year of account is left open an amount to meet known and unknown outstanding liabilities must nevertheless be included. The same considerations as apply to a reinsurance to close (with the exception of equity between names) will be relevant notwithstanding the fact that the objective is not to determine the final profit or loss for the year of account.

I wish to add one footnote which follows from the above propositions. If the amount to be charged by way of premium in respect of the RITC could not be arrived at with a reasonable degree of accuracy it would be fundamentally wrong, instead of leaving the account open, to close the account and seek to expand the syndicate in the hope that by doing so the (expanded) syndicate would be able to weather the difficulties."

In the Merrett judgment [1997] LRLR 265 at 314, I set out the following propositions as to the role of the auditors in relation to RITC:-

"The Role Of The Auditors

The following propositions are derived from the regulatory materials...

1. The auditors should obtain relevant and reliable audit evidence sufficient to enable them to draw reasonable conclusions therefrom (Operational Standard (issued April 1980)).

2. As to the nature of audit evidence, the sources and amount of evidence needed to achieve the required level of assurance were questions for the auditors to determine by exercising their judgment in the light of the opinion called for under the terms of their engagement. They would be influenced by the materiality of the matter being examined, the relevance and reliability of evidence available from each source and the cost and time involved in obtaining it (The Auditing Guideline - Audit Evidence (issued April 1980)).

3. As to representations by management, in certain cases, such as where knowledge of the facts was confined to management or where the matter was principally one of judgment and opinion, the auditors might not be able to obtain independent corroborative evidence and could not reasonably expect it to be available. In such cases, the auditors should ensure that there was no other evidence which conflicted with the representations by management and should obtain written confirmation of the representations. (The Auditing Guideline - Representations by Management (issued July 1983)).

4. For the purposes of the present case, from [1985] the report should state whether a true and fair view was given in the accounts.

5. As from [1985] the syndicate auditors should qualify their report if they were unable to obtain all the necessary information and explanations required. In the absence of a reference to these matters the syndicate auditors' confirmation thereof was implicit in an unqualified audit report.

(The following propositions are derived from the Audit Brief. Although the Brief is based on the Lloyd's Byelaws and the law as at 1.1.86 ...it reflected the approach that ought properly to have been followed from [1985]).

6. In selecting materiality levels, the auditor should have regard to the impact of syndicate transactions on the personal account of each syndicate member; he should look behind the syndicate to its constitution, as well as to the syndicate as a whole, in making judgments relating to materiality.

7. The auditor would need to be satisfied that the premium for the reinsurance to close a year of account was equitable as between the Names on that account and those on the accepting year of account. The determination of the premium for the reinsurance to close involved the exercise of significant professional judgment and drew on the full experience of the underwriter.

8. The Auditor's Operational Standard stated that "the auditor should obtain relevant and reliable audit evidence sufficient to enable him to draw reasonable conclusions therefrom". Since the audit report on syndicate financial statements was expressed in true and fair terms, the auditor would need to ensure that he had gathered evidence of sufficient quality to support such an opinion.

9. The reinsurance to close a year of account was normally the area of greatest audit difficulty, because it was derived with the benefit of a substantial degree of underwriting judgment. In common with all accounting estimates, it was one of a range of possible outcomes and the audit approach should recognise that the objective was to ensure that the reinsurance to close was within a zone of reasonableness rather than an arithmetically accurate figure. (See also paragraph 5 of Mr. Randall's letter of 18.3.82).

10. The auditor would need to consider such matters as the nature of the syndicate's business, the overall size of the syndicate, the impact of the reinsurance protection programme, and the accuracy of previous estimates as a part of his assessment of the appropriate range within which he would expect the premium for the reinsurance to close to fall.

11. The results derived from statistical techniques should be treated with a degree of caution, since historically derived data might not be an accurate guide as to uncertain future events. The auditor should, therefore, ascertain from the underwriter the underlying basis for his estimate of claims incurred but not reported, so that appropriate additional evidence could be collected to support the computation.

12. Other matters the auditor might consider as a part of the audit of the reinsurance to close included the following. The syndicate might have reinsured the run-off of other syndicates or companies and the auditor must satisfy himself that due account had been taken of the liabilities which were likely to arise under such contracts. This evidence would usually take a similar form to that relating to the syndicate's own business."

This passage from the Merrett judgment was accepted by the parties in the statement of agreed facts as to the Regulatory Background for the Auditing and Accounting Regime at Lloyd's (see chapter 11 above).

Witnesses Called By The Names

Mr. Christopher Stockwell

Mr. Stockwell became a Lloyd's Underwriter in 1979. He joined through the Outhwaite (Combined) Agency.

Mr. Stockwell was the first Name on the writ in Outhwaite I which was tried by Saville J. He was a member of the Outhwaite 1982 Names Association (but not of the Litigation Sub-Committee). A settlement was arrived at in about January 1992 whereby the Names recovered £116 million. Mr. Stockwell pointed out that this proved insufficient - "it went within 2 years".

In 1992 he became Chairman of the Lloyd's Names Association Working Party.

Mr. Stockwell chaired the Open Years Panel which reported in March 1993. In his witness statement Mr. Stockwell said that Mr. Robin Jackson and Mr. Merrett "were well aware of the fact that Lloyd's was grossly under-reserved for its liabilities in respect of asbestos and pollution and that it had been so under-reserved for over a decade at that time and that it had been a deliberate policy to only reserve enough to pay claims being settled, rather than to reserve for ultimate liability... I now have no doubt that we were told a fraction of what Jackson and Merrett knew and were being deliberately "steered" from making too dangerous a report for Lloyd's." The Report of the Open Years Panel is generally not consistent with the Names' case in this trial. I would have expected Mr. Stockwell to have learnt rather more about the asbestos problem in the course of the Outhwaite Litigation and his chairmanship of the Open Years Panel than he was prepared to accept in cross-examination.

Mr. Stockwell was adjudged bankrupt on 21.6.94 and discharged on 20.6.97. Over the course of 5 or 6 years (including this period) the action groups which were served by LNAWP paid about £600,000 on top of expenses in respect of Mr. Stockwell's services.

Mr. Stockwell was a member of the Kerr/Morse Panel.

Mr. Stockwell prepared detailed submissions on behalf of LNAWP to the Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee.

Mr. Stockwell's Trustee in Bankruptcy accepted the R&R Settlement Offer in the sum of about £5,000, but no payment was made.

Mr. Stockwell's public examination under oath took place in June 1997.

In his witness statement Mr. Stockwell said "Lloyd's ... grossly misrepresented the profitability of the market to the 20,000 Names who joined post 1980 or who increased their underwriting post 1980... If, at any time from 1978 onwards, Lloyd's syndicates had reserved in full for the known notified claims and had made proper reserves for their ultimate liability, Lloyd's would have declared huge losses and would have been obliged to leave the year of account open for a very substantial number of syndicates... New Names joining (if any) would not have taken on the inevitable losses... It is obviously possible that Lloyd's would not have survived the blow to its reputation that such losses would have meant; that fear clearly influenced the strategy of Committee Members who adopted a policy of letting tomorrow's income pay for tomorrow's claims. Their gamble did not work; it was in my view the oldest insurance fraud in the book - misrepresenting profitability by not reserving for known liabilities." When giving evidence Mr. Stockwell added that he came to the conclusion in 1997 that this was not simply a case of regulatory failure but a case of fraud.

When giving judgment on 20.12.1991 (on an appeal from a District Judge) in K.L. Construction Services Ltd v Charles Barr Furniture Ltd, His Honour Judge Rice described Mr. Stockwell as "a dishonest man, a man who is prepared to lie if he feels it will be of assistance to him...".

I have carefully considered Mr. Stockwell's evidence in this trial and formed my own opinion (independently of above comments). There are a number of aspects which cause me concern. In paragraph 17 of his witness statement Mr. Stockwell made serious allegations against the DTI by reference to a meeting which he did not attend. Mr. Stockwell failed to mention in his witness statement that he had himself attended other meetings with the DTI. In a further witness statement Mr. Stockwell described a meeting with Mr. Posgate on 30 October 1996 (where, he alleged, Mr. Posgate referred to a report prepared by the Bank of England on the "Armageddon" scenario of the current weight of asbestos claims). No mention of this part of the conversation with Mr. Posgate was made in paragraph 50 of his original statement, which described the same meeting with Mr. Posgate.

Mrs. Catherine Mackenzie-Smith

Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith (a member of the Bar) is one of the two co-chairmen of the United Names Organisation. She became a member of Lloyd's from 1.1.75.

It is evident that (as with so many other Names) Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith has suffered financially and in other ways as a result of her membership of Lloyd's, and I have every sympathy for her in this regard.

Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith's first witness statement contained an account of contact with and information received from Mr. John Osbrey-Taylor, a barrister who was found dead on 18 February 1999. Mr. Osbrey commenced proceedings in about 1991 against his members' agent, such proceedings falling within the Portfolio Selection category of the Lloyd's Litigation. Mr. Osbrey signed (i) a statement at the offices of ANNAN probably on 1 August 1995 and (ii) an affidavit in People of the State of California v Lloyd's, dated 15 February 1996. There are marked inconsistencies between (i) and (ii). In (i) Mr. Osbrey implied that he read a copy of the Murray Lawrence letter for the first time during 1994; in (ii) he stated that in or about 1989 he had been given a copy of the Murray Lawrence letter. In (i) he said that he saw Mr. Murray Lawrence in May 1995; in (ii) he said that in 1992 he went to see Mr. Murray Lawrence.

The most reliable guide to Mr. Osbrey's exchanges with Lloyd's from time to time is found in bundle M5, which contains documents passing between Mr. Osbrey and Lloyd's and file notes etc. A file note dated 30 June 1995 shows that Mr. Osbrey told Mr. Norwell (Manager, Membership Department) that as a result of a recent conversation with Mr. Murray Lawrence regarding the Murray Lawrence letter, Mr. Osbrey wished Lloyd's to sue him so that he could issue a counter-claim alleging fraud against both Mr. Murray Lawrence and Sir Peter Miller.

A document dated December 1998 shows Mr. Osbrey as a committee member of the Restitution Initiative.

Regrettably it appears that Mr. Osbrey was in a parlous financial state in his latter years (in receipt of substantial support from the Barristers' Benevolent Association) and to a considerable extent disturbed.

In a document entitled "Narrative Which Could Be Adapted To Become A Draft Affidavit" Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith wrote - "In the summer of 1994, I first saw the now famous Murray Lawrence letter... The letter came as a shock to me as it seemed to demonstrate that Lloyd's were not after all fraudulent but had in fact disseminated the information concerning impending losses to "all underwriting agents". I immediately made enquiries in all directions and learnt that no agent could be found who admitted having received the letter and that there was a possibility that it had never been sent."

The document entitled "Narrative Which Could Be Adapted To Become A Draft Affidavit" was exhibited to Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith's witness statement. Another version of this document with manuscript comments/corrections by Mr.Osbrey was found in the box of Mr. Osbrey's papers produced by Mrs. Ridley-Day (see below). Mr. Osbrey's comments/corrections are highly material and show that Mr.Osbrey would not have been prepared to put his name to the matters attributed to him in the document without substantial amendments.

Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith's account of her conversation with Mr. Ian Posgate in paragraph 42 of her witness statement was incomplete. It is important to note the amendments that Mr. Posgate made to the draft statement prepared for him.

When giving evidence Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith found it difficult to distinguish between the role of a witness and the role of an advocate.

Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith gave evidence as to the results of three mail shots directed to managing agents, members' agents and combined agents in an attempt to ascertain to whom the Murray Lawrence letter was sent.

Mr. John Henderson

Mr. Henderson is a consultant working for UNO and also a member of the Committee of UNO. He has assisted Names in other proceedings in this jurisdiction and in the United States.

Mr. Henderson referred to a meeting with Mr. Ian Posgate in March 1999 at the offices of UNO in Whitechapel Road. It is important to note the amendments that Mr. Posgate made to the draft statement prepared for him.

Captain Donald Hindle FNI, FRIN

Captain Hindle had a distinguished maritime career. In 1976 Trinity House invited him to become a Young Brother. He commenced underwriting at Lloyd's with effect from 1 January 1979. His members' agent was C. Rowbotham & Sons (Underwriting Agency) Ltd.

I should emphasise that I am not concerned with the question whether Captain Hindle might have had a portfolio selection claim (or any other form of claim) against his members' agent, or any claim against any managing agents.

I am concerned with the issue whether Captain Hindle as one of the sample Names relied upon any of the alleged (fraudulent) misrepresentations during the period 1978 to 1988.

It was clear from Captain Hindle's evidence that he misunderstood certain essential features of the Lloyd's market. He thought that the Committee of Lloyd's appointed syndicate auditors. Further he thought that "the underwriter was controlled to some extent by the policy signing office, which was in turn appointed by the Committee of Lloyd's". Captain Hindle said he would not have joined Lloyd's if he had known that his liabilities and the risk could extend beyond a three year period.

Captain Hindle said that he relied on Lloyd's Calendar 1978 when he joined Lloyd's. Subsequently he talked to his members' agent (and his witness statement refers to a number of conversations with his members' agent). There was not a copy of the relevant Lloyd's Brochure in Captain Hindle's files. He said that the Lloyd's Calendar 1978 "was on the ship and I remember reading it and that was the reason I joined Lloyd's...after (speaking) to my agent and (obtaining) more information."

Captain Hindle sustained very serious losses in respect of each of the years 1988 to 1994 and I have every sympathy for him. I doubt whether he was ever an appropriate candidate for membership of Lloyd's.

I am not persuaded that Captain Hindle relied upon any of the alleged (fraudulent) misrepresentations during the period 1978 to 1988 (assuming such misrepresentations could be made out).

Sir William Jaffray Bt.

At the time of his application for underwriting membership Sir William Jaffray was a fine art dealer. Prior to that he had had brief experience as a loss adjuster. Sir William commenced underwriting at Lloyd's with effect from 1 January 1982. His first members' agent was Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd.

I should emphasise that I am not concerned with the question whether Sir William might have had a portfolio selection claim (or any other form of claim) against his members' agent, or any claim against any managing agents.

I am concerned with the issue whether Sir William as one of the sample Names relied upon any of the alleged (fraudulent) misrepresentations during the Relevant Period.

Mr. Kingsley provided Sir William with a brochure prepared by Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd.

Sir William did not see the 1980 and 1981 Aggregate Results published in Lloyd's Log. It is unclear whether he saw the 1982 and 1983 Global Accounts.

In his affidavit in the Society of Lloyd's v Fraser and Others, Sir William said:-

"Robin Kingsley enthusiastically told me that Lloyd's was a sound, blue chip institution in which I would be well advised to invest. I was told by him that there was no prospect of me being out of pocket, as in the event of a loss I could simply write it off against taxed income. ...I told him that I wanted a reasonable return at a low risk. I recall that Robin Kingsley assured me that he would arrange a portfolio of syndicates which would produce a return of approximately £4,000-£5,000 a year at a low risk. As I was required by Lloyd's to do and as I did at all times subsequently, I relied upon the expertise of my members' agent as to the appropriate syndicates required to achieve my objectives. ...I was constantly being encouraged to increase my premium income limit by Robin Kingsley... In 1987 I changed my members' agent because the losses I suffered on the 1984 year of syndicate 553 (£107,466) were of such a magnitude that I lost all confidence in Robin Kingsley's conduct of my Lloyd's affairs. I in fact gave serious consideration to resigning from Lloyd's because I was appalled by my members' agent's conduct and what I considered to be his betrayal of my trust and confidence in placing me on a high risk, long-tail syndicate such as syndicate 553... Before I had a chance to tender my resignation, I was introduced to Sir Richard Colthurst of K.C. Webb (Underwriting) Ltd who persuaded me not to proceed with my resignation and instead to use his company as my members' agent. ...He quite forcibly said I ought to trade through my losses from syndicate 553. He talked me out of my reservations and gave me recommendations as to various syndicates..."

A document typed by Sir William in about the summer of 1987 shows that he was taking portfolio selection advice from persons other than his members' agent.

I am not persuaded that Sir William relied upon any of the alleged (fraudulent) misrepresentations during the Relevant Period (assuming such misrepresentations could be made out). In my view the probability is that Sir William relied on his conversations with his first and second members' agents (and possibly, but to a more limited extent, his conversations with his cousin).

At the end of his evidence Sir William said what he thought Lloyd's should have done "if they had been operating properly and in an honest manner". "The Chairman should have called an extraordinary general meeting in 1980 or, if one wants to be fair to Lloyd's, say, by 1982. There should have been no recruitment of Names beyond that point, that should have been stopped... There should have been a public statement. Reconstruction and Renewal or a similar salvage operation, plus an Equitas type reinsurance, should have happened between 1980 and 1982...and not 16 years later in 1996 when the vast quantity of damage had been done. If that had been done we would not be in this Court now."

I refer to Sir William's underwriting results. These show that he suffered significant losses on Gooda Walker 387 (personal stop loss) in 1983 and 1984 and a substantial loss on the Warrilow (long-tail) syndicate 553 in 1984 (see above). He suffered a further significant loss on syndicate 387 in 1985 and substantial losses on Gooda Walker syndicates 290 and 298 in 1989. Although Sir William was on Secretan 367 (a long-tail syndicate) between 1982 and 1989, his losses in 1988 and 1989 on that syndicate were modest compared with his losses in 1988 and 1989 on LMX syndicates.

Mrs. Dona Evans

Mrs. Evans commenced underwriting at Lloyd's with effect from 1 January 1988. At that time she was still married, but has since divorced. She has four children. Her members' agent was R.W. Sturge & Co.

I should emphasise that I am not concerned with the question whether Mrs. Evans might have had a portfolio selection claim (or any other form of claim) against her members' agent (her witness statement refers to a number of conversations with her members' agent), or any claim against any managing agents.

I am concerned with the issue whether Mrs. Evans as one of the sample Names relied upon any of the alleged (fraudulent) misrepresentations during the Relevant Period.

For some years Mrs. Evans has been co-chairman of the Norwich Union Action Group at times unpaid, at times paid. She has been on the committee of UNO since UNO started, but has not been paid for her work with UNO.

Mrs. Evans said that she was induced to join Lloyd's by a combination of matters. "It was certainly the reputation of Lloyd's as a very honourable market...I read all the Brochures. They were presented to me as if this was a really...good thing...it was the best time to join. I checked this out with people that I knew and then I went back to Mr. Coleridge and asked him. But the Brochures...were really the thing that did it...because they (were)...written...I would want something in writing as well, so the Brochures were very important to me...also...the Lloyd's building. It was totally spectacular, breathtaking, it was so futuristic. It spelt so much of the future. ...It seemed incomprehensible that they could...take...the kind of risks that they were taking with someone like me."

Mrs. Evans sustained very serious losses and I have every sympathy for her. I doubt whether she was ever an appropriate candidate for membership of Lloyd's.

I am not persuaded that Mrs. Evans relied upon any of the alleged (fraudulent) misrepresentations during the Relevant Period (assuming such misrepresentations could be made out). In my view the probability is that Mrs. Evans relied on her conversations with her members' agent.

Dr. Alexander Munn

Dr. Munn's witness statement was admitted in evidence (Lloyd's not having any cross-examination).

Dr. Munn is a registered medical practitioner. During 1985 he decided to become a member of Lloyd's. His wife became a member in 1987. In his witness statement Dr. Munn said:-

"I now know that at the time of my Rota interview there were massive impending liabilities arising from asbestos-related disease which were affecting the Lloyd's market. I have also come to know about...the Neville Russell letter and the Murray Lawrence letter...I was wholly unaware of these matters in 1985, and no mention was made in interview of the potential exposure to such liabilities."

Dr. Munn attached to his statement a letter from Lord Kimball an elected external member of the Council of Lloyd's and the Chairman of Dr. Munn's Rota Committee. The letter from Lord Kimball dated 17 February 1995 stated:-

"I cannot help you about "enormous losses from asbestos-related disease": I knew nothing about it, and I am confident that nothing had been said to other members of the Council".

Mr. Christopher Mackenzie-Smith

Mr. Mackenzie-Smith gave evidence about the availability of a book entitled "A View of the Room" by Ian Hay Davison. I do not accept that Lloyd's purchased copies of this work in order to destroy it.

Mr. David Blundell

Mr. Blundell's wife joined Lloyd's for the 1987 underwriting year with Bolton Ingham as her agents. Mr. Blundell gave evidence of a conversation with Mr. Skey in 1988/89/90. According to Mr. Blundell's witness statement Mr. Skey "told me on the basis (of) what he had discovered at Lloyd's, he had told his sister to resign immediately. I presume he had told her in the 1970s or perhaps in the early 1980s."

This evidence did not assist me. First, Mr. Blundell did not ask what Mr. Skey "had discovered". Second, it seems that Mr. Skey's sister did not resign from Lloyd's until much later.

Mr. Roger Bradley

Mr. Bradley joined Janson Green in October 1967 as an underwriter. He wrote marine business into syndicates 932, 933, 934, 941 and 989. From about 1970 he also wrote some non-marine business into syndicate 989. Mr. Bradley stayed at Janson Green until the latter half of 1977 when he was invited by Mr. Bryan Barrie to be his equal partner and active joint underwriter in the Bryan P. Barrie Underwriting Agency. Syndicate 901 wrote marine and syndicate 921 non-marine business. In his witness statement Mr. Bradley said " We specifically wanted to avoid asbestos liabilities being aware of the potential problem." The Bryan P. Barrie Underwriting Agency received three copies of the Murray Lawrence letter (one for the managing agency, one for Bryan Barrie as active underwriter of syndicate 901 and one for Mr. Bradley as active underwriter of syndicate 921).

In about 1993 or 1994 Mr. Bradley began to work for the Names Defence Association.

From about 1988 when Mr. Bradley resigned from Bradley Gascoigne, through to the time when he was working for the Names Defence Association, Mr. and Mrs. Bradley were in hardship. Mr. Bradley has received payment to date from the Names Defence Association of about £10,000.

I set out below examples of the unsatisfactory nature of Mr. Bradley's evidence.

The Lloyd's Golf Club Autumn Meeting at Walton Heath

In his witness statement Mr. Bradley said:-

"On 4 October 1973, I played in the Lloyd's Golf Club Autumn Meeting at Walton Heath. One of my opponents was Ralph Rokeby-Johnson, a leading non-marine underwriter with the Sturge Agency. Ralph Rokeby-Johnson asked me during the course of the match the following question: "Has Green got all his reinsurance for asbestos in place and has he got enough of it? Has he got it placed off-shore?". ...Later on the same day... Rokeby-Johnson spoke to me in the terms, which I shall never forget, which were as follows: "What I can tell you, my friend, is that asbestos is going to change the wealth of nations. Lloyd's will probably be bankrupted in the final chapter, unless something happens to intervene, i.e. the Government via the Bank of England or legal duress on the Americans, but it will happen and we cannot stop it." He spoke of possible claims of US$66 billion by 1990 and US$120 billion by the year 2000... At drinks, after the golf match...I asked him: "How do you know your estimates are on target?". He appeared irritated by this question and responded: "I don't know; it is only a judgment. US$6 billion or US$66 billion, it all depends on asbestos in buildings and how many time bombs there are". ... "Time bombs are victims walking, sleeping, talking, who are living but have lung cancer. When they die, as they will do up to the year AD2000, the lawyers are going to have a field day. We don't know how many are affected. They don't yet so pick a figure but it won't be far off the ones I have told you."

According to Mr. Bradley the next day he reported the conversation to Mr. Bill Maitland, a fellow underwriter at the Janson Green box. Mr. Maitland spoke to Mr. Peter Green who was very interested in what he (Mr. Bradley) had to say, but he was told not to gossip about the conversation with anyone in the market.

There were a number of unsatisfactory features of Mr. Bradley's evidence in relation to the alleged conversations at Walton Heath. They included the following: (i) When Mr. Bradley's various accounts of the alleged conversations with Mr. Rokeby-Johnson are compared, there are a number of material inconsistencies. (ii) In paragraph 3 of his draft affidavit for the Secretan Action Group dated February 1994 Mr. Bradley wrote "The next day I mentioned my conversation with Rokeby-Johnson to Bill Maitland in the box. Shortly after this he excused himself saying that he had something to do elsewhere. Obviously he then went to speak to Peter Green because the next day he told me that if I was asked about asbestosis I should refer the matter to Peter Green." On this account Mr. Bradley mentioned his conversation with Mr. Rokeby-Johnson to Mr. Maitland on Friday 4 October 1973 and Mr. Maitland spoke to Mr. Bradley again (having spoken to Mr. Green) "the next day" i.e. on the Saturday (not a working day at Lloyd's). (iii) In his draft affidavit for the Secretan Action Group Mr. Bradley wrote "My opponent was Ralph Rokeby-Johnson, the leading non-marine underwriter at Sturge". In fact Mr. Rokeby-Johnson was not the leading non-marine underwriter at Sturge at the time. When this was pointed out to Mr. Bradley in cross-examination, he said "We had better tear up this Secretan statement". (iv) In a statement dated 23 February 1995 Mr. Bradley wrote "Ralph Rokeby-Johnson spoke of possible claims of $66 billion by 1990 and $120 billion by the year 2000. These figures have now been confirmed as being the same figures as those in the Selikoff Report of 1964..." The alleged figures were not "the same figures as those in the Selikoff Report". When cross-examined as to this Mr. Bradley said "When I was making this, talking this over with the Names Defence Association, James Baird said to me...Those figures...are in...Selikoff". (v) In one of his manuscript accounts headed "Asbestosis at Walton Heath" Mr. Bradley wrote "It was either late 1969 or early 1970: the Lucifers match". This was subsequently corrected to read "It was 4th October 1973 (confirmed by Ian Jeffrey): Lloyd's GC Autumn Meeting". (vi) In his manuscript account headed "Asbestosis at Walton Heath" Mr. Bradley wrote "I was disturbed over the incident. I knew RJ was on the Asbestosis Committee and that they had not given the market much information." Mr. Bradley accepted that this was a "slip". The Asbestos Working Party was not set up until 1980. (vii) In the same manuscript account Mr. Bradley recorded Mr. Rokeby-Johnson as saying "See whether I am right or not - I shall be gone long before you". In fact Mr. Rokeby-Johnson is considerably younger than Mr. Bradley. (viii) In the same manuscript account Mr. Bradley wrote "Ralph, then on the back of his card, very quickly drew out a progression of known cases...". In cross-examination Mr. Bradley said "I don't think he did that; I think I did it". (ix) For the first time when giving evidence Mr. Bradley asserted that on 4 October 1973 Mr. Rokeby-Johnson specifically warned him off joining certain syndicates which were listed in a document, which Mr. Bradley produced when giving evidence. (x) Further (although this is a point of less significance) Mr. Bradley's various accounts referred to the alleged conversation taking place on differing holes on Walton Heath golf course.

Visit to the United States in 1979

Mr. Bradley went with other representatives of Lloyd's to the United States in May 1979 on the Keith Brown Foundation Study Tour.

In his witness statement Mr. Bradley said :-

"I...went to the offices of Citibank where I met Tom Hitchcock. After meeting Tom Hitchcock in the offices of Citibank I had dinner with him. ...I remember discussing with him that the Lloyd's market probably took approximately 40% of the US asbestos business. I cannot remember exactly how I knew that figure; perhaps Ralph Rokeby-Johnson had told me. ...Hitchcock said to me that he was concerned that there simply would not be sufficient money in the Lloyd's American Trust Fund to meet all known liability... He then suggested that the only way out of the crisis for Lloyd's would be for Lloyd's to try to increase its capital base by recruiting more Names. ...We talked in terms of between 25,000 to even 250,000 Names... I...promised Tom Hitchcock that I would raise the issue back in London and when I got back, I telephoned Ralph Rokeby-Johnson and Murray Lawrence and asked them if I could meet with them over coffee one morning. I met with them and went through my conversation with Tom Hitchcock and his request to me that I tell the Committee of Lloyd's that it needed more members to deal with the pending problem. I explained that he had told me that he had said this to every visiting Committee member of Lloyd's. Ralph Rokeby-Johnson said that they were aware of this problem and of Citibank's concerns and he recommended that I keep the knowledge to myself. He said that I had discharged my duty in passing on the message from Tom Hitchcock. He said there was an unofficial committee in the background looking at this problem and, in particular into the question of reserving into the future for asbestos, and the matter was under control. He said that Peter Cameron-Webb and Peter Green were also on it, but I was to keep this information to myself. This was, I believe, the forerunner of the Asbestos Working Party which was formed the next year on 5 August 1980."

There were a number of unsatisfactory features of Mr. Bradley's evidence in this respect. They included the following. When Mr. Bradley's various accounts of the alleged conversation with Mr. Hitchcock are compared, there are a number of material inconsistencies. The following points should be noted by way of example. The visit took place in May 1979 and not in September 1979 as asserted in his witness statement. In his witness statement Mr. Bradley said that Mr. Alan Parry was then chairman of the Foundation (but in fact Sir Henry Mance was Chairman). In his witness statement Mr. Bradley said that he was a member of the Keith Brown Advisory Committee at the time (but he was not). In a document in Mr. Bradley's handwriting written in about 1992 (and in a LNAWP newsletter dated January 1993) reference is made to Tom "Hopkinson" and not Tom Hitchcock. Mr. Bradley's account is difficult to reconcile with the draft itinerary (dated 7.5.79) and the unofficial notes on the New York trip prepared by Mr. R. M. Pateman dated May 1979. In a manuscript account dated about 1992 Mr. Bradley wrote "He urged that Lloyd's should build up to a membership of say 200,000 to 250,000 members to pull in the required capital needed to run the asbestosis tidal wave. He has told Lloyd's this - he told me Lloyd's was on a membership drive..." In a signed statement dated 23 February 1995 Mr. Bradley said "We did not calculate precisely the number of Names that Lloyd's should seek to recruit...we talked in terms of 25,000, 50,000 or possible even a 100.000 as a goal. I jokingly added "What about even 250,000?". He laughed and replied "Yes, why not?"

When Mr. Bradley gave evidence he said that he attended a private dinner with Mr. Hitchcock on Friday 18 May 1979. He was recalled for further cross-examination when it emerged (as a result of further statements from Mr. and Mrs. Hitchcock) that Mr. Hitchcock travelled to Japan that Friday, as confirmed by his passport. Faced with this evidence Mr. Bradley said that "there is the possibility it could be another person". Mr. Bradley added that he did not recognise the photograph in Mr. Hitchcock's passport - "I don't remember him being bald".

Conversation with Mr. Paul Schooling in January/February 1982

In his witness statement Mr. Bradley said:-

"In January/February 1982, Paul Schooling, the Deputy Secretary...handed me a document headed "In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term 1981 Number 81-1012 Insurance Company of North America (Petitioner) v Keene Corporation (Respondent) Motion for Leave to File - December 30 1981 (attached to this statement)". He said "Ralph Rokeby-Johnson asked me to give you this - it's very explosive and has caused some anxiety to some members in the NMA and as you are one, you ought to see it and let us know your comments, especially in the light of your recent visit to New York". I remember quickly reading this document and feeling very numb when its implications welled up inside me. I asked "What are his comments". Paul was quiet and then having sat down, said, Ralph said, "Remember what he told you at Walton Heath - moving the wealth of nations - Lloyd's will be bankrupted unless outside financial aid is brought in to play and legal duress on America is applied. Apparently, it is all there in this document dated December 1981! - Now does he believe me?". I responded, "Paul, I have always believed Ralph - it's just that out of the blue - the stark reality of what he said at Walton Heath was hard to take in!". Paul left and I filed this document away in my asbestos drawer and took the attached copy with me home where I filed it away safely. In fact, it was filed so safely that I only unearthed it very recently in November when I had a massive trawl through my documents. Having re-read this document again in November 1999, I feel even more numbed than I was in 1982..."

There were a number of unsatisfactory features of Mr. Bradley's evidence in relation to this alleged conversation. They included the following. The "attached copy" was not a copy Mr. Bradley "unearthed...very recently in November...1999". Further Mr. Bradley mentioned the alleged conversation with Mr. Schooling for the first time in his witness statement. It was not mentioned in his earlier accounts (see his draft affidavit for the Secretan Action Group dated February 1994, his statement of 23.2.1995 and his manuscript notes).

Telephone conversation with Mr. Charles Gibb

In his witness statement Mr. Bradley said that at the hearing on 1 February 1995 before the Treasury and Civil Service Committee he informed the Committee of a telephone conversation he had had with Mr. Charles Gibb, a one time deputy chairman of Lloyd's. He said:-

"I believe that it was late 1992 or 1993 (corrected to about July 1992)...I... inquired whether there had been a conspiracy at Lloyd's over asbestos...I still vividly recall him saying "I will go as far as saying that we side tracked the issue. We did not really know what the actual figures were, there were some terrible figures floating around, nobody could put a finger on what you were actually due to pay and the Bill was coming up. The 1982 Bill, we did not want any scarecrows or any skeletons in the cupboard ... We did side track the issue."

Mr. Gibb died in early 1993.

Mr. Bradley produced a tape of a conversation with Mrs. Gibb dated 28 March 2000. Mrs. Gibb was recorded as saying that she had changed her mind about providing Mr. Bradley with a letter, whereupon Mr. Bradley responded that he was going to pull out (from giving evidence). In the event Mr. Bradley attended pursuant to a witness summons.

Other matters

On 29 October 1990 Mr. Bradley wrote to Mr. Murray Lawrence setting out his thoughts on the future of Lloyd's entitled "Towards Two Thousand". When it was pointed out to him in cross-examination that there was no suggestion in that document of any of the type of complaints made in these proceedings, Mr. Bradley replied "If by producing that...I've cut the ground from under the Names in this court, I...hereby apologise to them."

On 18 November 1991 Mr. Bradley wrote to Sir Patrick Neill Q.C. (as Chairman of the Feltrim Loss Review Committee) describing the transcript of his evidence to the Loss Review Committee as "no different from a Frankie Howard script, at its worst, being studied with almost no cohesion or coherence."

In reasons for an arbitration award dated 5 July 1995 Mr. Jeffrey Gruder Q.C. said :-

"Mr. Bradley [who gave expert evidence] sought to convince me that the Respondents knew that asbestosis was a serious problem by mid-1987. ...I do not accept the argument that the presence of these problems had the consequence that any members' agent who did not recommend resignation from Lloyd's was automatically in breach of duty. It is necessary to examine the individual circumstances of each particular case and the portfolio recommended by the agent."

In an interim final award dated 10 February 1997 Miss Elizabeth Birch said of Mr. Bradley's evidence as a purported expert:-

"Unfortunately, Mr. Bradley did not appear to be experienced in giving expert evidence... His evidence did not focus particularly well on the issues raised in the arbitration. Mr. Bradley made a number of very sweeping allegations concerning the Lloyd's market as a whole and the position in relation to asbestos and pollution. Mr. Bradley set out to establish, not that the syndicates were inadequately reserved and that the Respondent should have been aware of this, but that the asbestos and pollution liabilities in America were, by 1988, such that the impact would be felt in all syndicates at Lloyd's and that "Armageddon was nigh". In short Mr. Bradley expressed the view that those in the market, including the members' agents, knew that Lloyd's as a whole was so heavily involved in asbestos and pollution that the losses would pervade across all or most syndicates and ultimately would be catastrophic. Hence, Mr. Bradley considered that it was negligent of any members' agent at this time to advise a Name to increase the size of his portfolio. He considered that the Respondent should have advised Mr. Huskinson to cease underwriting...or, at least, he should have been encouraged to stay small and purchase substantial stop-loss cover. This case was not one that had been pursued by Mr. Huskinson either in his submissions or in his evidence... Mr. Bradley contended that he had considerable experience of the practice of members' agents because he liaised with the members' agents side of Bryan P. Barrie Underwriting Agencies Ltd, when he was the active joint underwriter there between 1977 and 1980."

When cross-examined in this case Mr. Bradley was asked how many Names did the members' agents side of Bryan P. Barrie Underwriting Agencies Ltd have? He replied, one. In July 1996 in connection with the same arbitration Mr. Bradley wrote to the Financial Times Library "The Arbitrator has now instructed me to write to you asking if you would kindly supply me with the exact copy of [a] report in the Financial Times 26 July 1984". On 31 July 1996 the Arbitrator wrote to Mr. Bradley "...you are well aware that at no time have I asked you to write this letter. ...It is wholly inappropriate for you to represent that it is a request from me, when it is not."

Mr. Colin Mackinnon

Mr. Mackinnon was the underwriter on 927/935. He was also the underwriter on two specialist stop loss syndicates, 134 and 184. Syndicates 134 and 184 were two entirely separate syndicates with different sets of Names. Mr. Mackinnon was an articulate witness.

Mr. Mackinnon explained that a feature of a stop loss syndicate is that it closes its accounts at the end of the fourth year. He said that if he had known at the time, what is now known about APH claims, he would never have written the stop loss policies.

As to syndicate 927/935, the 1981 account was left open at the end of the third year but closed at the end of the fourth year into the 1983 account. One reason for this was the development of latent disease claims on the run-off of syndicate 60, contained within syndicate 935. The 1984 year of account of 935 was left open. The 1984 account of 927 was closed in the usual way.

In his underwriter's report dated 21 May 1987 Mr. Mackinnon wrote:-

"Within the syndicate 60 run-off there are a number of elements where prediction of future development remains impossible to quantify with any degree of accuracy. Development on asbestosis, environmental pollution, American court awards and the availability of reinsurance recoveries are areas that immediately come to mind. It is because of this wide and unpredictable range of possibilities relating to the run-off of the incidental non-marine syndicate, particularly the syndicate 60 content thereof, that we have felt obliged to keep the 1984 account of syndicate 935 open as at 31.12.86. The marine syndicate 927 has been reinsured into 1985 account in the usual way."

A limited run-off had been bought in 1982 which was written as to 50% by Outhwaite 317 and 50% by the Kellett syndicate.

Mr. Mackinnon said that each year he sought to reserve fully with the benefit of the information coming through from attorneys and the AWP. He thought he had got his reserving right using a pessimistic basis for determining the level of IBNR. When he bought a limited run-off in 1982, he refused an offer that would have provided greater protection. He left the 1984 year of 935 open at the end of 1986 in part because of a problem of a declining stamp and largely because the syndicate 60 run-off into 935 was very large in relation to the size of syndicate 935. He established reserves for the account in run-off but unpredicted increases in claims thereafter caused him to have to make further substantial increases in the reserves. Mr. Mackinnon did not believe at the time that the market was under-reserved, otherwise he would not have continued to write stop loss which he did until 1988. It is ironical that the accounts as at 31 December 1987 record that:-

"When the computations based upon the 1984 syndicate accounts were submitted to the Inland Revenue in the Autumn of 1987, ...the Inspector of Taxes...challenged the quantity of the amount set aside to meet future liabilities in respect of the unclosed incidental non-marine section of the syndicate. After correspondence with the Revenue and discussion with the syndicate auditors, it was reluctantly agreed to accept an aggregate disallowance of £250,000 in respect of the reserve set up."

At one point in his evidence Mr. Mackinnon said of asbestos-related claims "We knew how much we would pay as a syndicate for each claim. The multiple of claims was the problem..."

In his witness statement Mr. Mackinnon said "I am not aware of ever having received" the Murray Lawrence letter. When giving evidence he said "I maintain I have no recollection of having seen it...it was sent to underwriting agents, according to the letter. On that basis I should have seen it. I have no recollection of having seen it, but...I probably got a thousand letters from the Committee of Lloyd's during my life as an underwriter".

In early 1992 a Loss Review Committee sat in respect of 134 and 184.

Mr. Edward Cowtan

Mr. Cowtan joined the Alders syndicate (122/311/118) in 1967. He remained with that syndicate until the end of 1983. He was the Senior Claims Manager for the general non-marine section. 311 had a significant exposure to asbestos; 118 was exposed to a slightly lesser extent. In his last 18 months/2 years Mr. Cowtan occasionally sat in at a meeting of the AWP on behalf of Mr. Nelson.

Mr. Cowtan started underwriting at Lloyd's on 1 January 1974 as an assisted Name. Mr. Cowtan said that he increased his line on the Alders syndicate before he became aware of the seriousness of asbestos. He remained a Name until the end of 1978. When asked "What caused your decision to stop underwriting?", Mr. Cowtan replied "I was warned that there was a very serious problem arising from asbestosis and also there were a number of quite serious product claims". Mr. Cowtan was shown a letter from Bellew & Raven (Underwriting Agents) Ltd to the Manager of the Membership Department at Lloyd's dated 19 June 1978 which stated "Mr. Cowtan is worried about the increasing competition in the insurance world and has decided to wind up his Lloyd's affairs before his retirement." Mr. Cowtan said he had not seen the letter before and was very disappointed at its content.

Mr. Cowtan explained that he had not provided a witness statement to the Names because "It was being written for me...A number of the comments that were being put in there...were simply incorrect". He said that he thought the witness statement was prepared by Mr. Stockwell, although he could not be 100% sure of that.

Mr. Robin Kingsley

Prior to 1988 Mr. Kingsley ran three members' agents. After about 1988 Kingsley Underwriting Agencies Ltd and Sudbrook Underwriting Agencies Ltd merged into Lime Street Underwriting Agencies Ltd. Mr. Kingsley was a director of Holmes Kingsley Carritt Underwriting Agencies Ltd a managing agency, which was renamed Holmes Hayday Underwriting Agencies Ltd (syndicate 694) before being acquired by Sturge Underwriting Management Ltd. He resigned as director of the managing agent of syndicate 694 on 1 November 1985 to comply with the divestment provisions of the Lloyd's Act 1982. Mr. Kingsley was also a director of Hardcastle Underwriting Agencies Ltd a managing agency, which was renamed Cutler Underwriting Agencies Ltd (syndicate 319/318). He was in addition a director of Scott Underwriting Agencies Ltd., a Lloyd's members' agency. Mr. Kingsley is now retired.

Under the R&R settlement Mr. Kingsley was disentitled to debt credits of over £1.3 million. This was because he was an executive director of Lime Street Underwriting Agencies Ltd, who at the time were members' agents to Names who suffered excessive losses above market average. A large percentage of these Names were placed on the Feltrim and/or Gooda Walker syndicates. In cross-examination Mr. Kingsley agreed that with the benefit of hindsight a spiral was created - one set of Lime Street Names wrote stop loss cover for the other set of Lime Street Names, both sets also writing excess of loss cover on Gooda Walker and/or Feltrim.

In his statement Mr. Kingsley said "We were one of the first members' agents to produce a questionnaire which we completed together with each underwriter... whenever possible at his office. This was done with a view to establishing a pattern or proforma, for a dialogue with each underwriter, who we supported by placing our Names on their syndicates." Mr. Kingsley said that his agency started using questionnaires in about the late 1970s. They became more extensive in the light of experience. He produced an example dated 28.2.90 to which I refer. Unfortunately he was unable to produce examples directed to long-tail syndicates in the late 70s/early 80s.

Mr. Kingsley in cross-examination, was taken through the reports and accounts of syndicate 694. He agreed that this was a syndicate with a substantial long-tail element on its books written since 1977. The syndicate increased its reserves in most years, even though previous years' reserves were believed to be accurate.

Mr. Kingsley again in cross-examination, was taken through the reports and accounts of syndicate 319/318. The 1982 year of account of syndicate 319 was left open because (according to the Underwriter's Report) of "a worsening of settlements on the years 1978 to 1980 in respect of asbestosis, pollution and general US casualty claims. This unexpected increase in settled and outstanding claims has been caused by considerable deterioration in a syndicate run-off written in 1978 as well as a small number of London market casualty excess loss contracts. Because of the difficulty surrounding the estimating of reserves from these long-tail claims the 1982 year of account will be left open, with an audit deficiency of 139%". Mr. Kingsley said that the reserves proved reasonably adequate in 1985, 1986 and 1987, before a subsequent deterioration in 1988 and 1989.

In his witness statement Mr. Kingsley said " I was chairman or director of four separate Lloyd's agencies, yet I can categorically state that I never saw the Murray Lawrence letter at that time. I did not in fact ever see the letter until the early 1990s when I was very surprised to read its contents..."

In his witness statement Mr. Kingsley set out a schedule of certain run-off contracts entered into by Mr. Outhwaite in 1981 and 1982. He said "I have researched 32 run-off contracts placed partly or wholly with Outhwaite syndicate 317/661 between 1977 and 1983 and have noted that 28 of these related to Lloyd's syndicates. In the case of 27, I have noted some connection between the reinsured syndicate and one or more of the individuals identified in the pleadings being allegedly party to fraudulent representations by Lloyd's." Mr. Kingsley was cross-examined by reference to a rebuttal schedule prepared by Lloyd's.

When asked 'what went wrong?', Mr. Kingsley said that run-off contracts were placed with inside knowledge and that the 1979 year of account should have been left open by syndicates affected by asbestos-related claims.

Mr. Charles Cavenagh-Mainwaring

In about 1976 Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring joined R.H.M. Outhwaite (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd as an assistant agency manager. Whilst with the Outhwaite Agency Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring became an underwriting member of Lloyd's. In 1978 Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring joined the Oakeley Vaughan members' agency. In 1982 he moved to C.T. Bowring (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd (a combined members' and managing agents) on the members' agency side. When Mr. Sedgwick Rough was brought in 1985 or 1986 Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring ceased to have any responsibility for dealing directly with prospective Names. In about early 1987 Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring left Bowrings and joined Hinton Hill. Thereafter he worked for a time for the Outhwaite Action Group.

A dispute between Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring and Murray Lawrence Members' Agency Ltd (formerly Bowring Members' Agency Ltd) was the subject of an arbitration. Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring claimed damages for breach of contract and/or duty by the Respondent Agent in relation to his participation on Gooda Walker syndicate 290 for the underwriting year of account 1989. In November 1995 Mr. Stephen Ruttle as sole arbitrator determined that Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring's claim failed. In Reasons for the Award the arbitrator said "I have no doubt that (Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring) took his own decisions about his portfolio and that he did not rely in anything other than a most general way on the views and judgments of others at the Agent".

A letter dated 3 June 1982 sent by C.T. Bowring (Underwriting Agencies) Ltd to Names for whom they acted as members' agents, made specific reference to asbestos-related risks. Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring said that he did not think he would have seen the letter at the time because the main administration was two floors above the floor on which he worked. Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring said that he did not see and was not aware of the Murray Lawrence letter of 18 March 1982.

When asked 'what went wrong or what was wrong'?, Mr. Cavenagh-Mainwaring said that in the late 70s/early 80s there should have been much more co-ordination of intelligence being passed down to the members' agents and new Names. Rota Committee Chairmen should have mentioned asbestos-related risks.

Mr. John Donner

The Names served a notice complying with section 2(1) Civil Evidence Act 1995 and CPR 33.2 in respect of Mr. Donner's evidence. Mr. Donner's bodily health was identified as the reason why he was unable to attend to give evidence in person. This was confirmed by medical evidence. Due to the medical evidence tendered, Lloyd's did not apply to cross-examine Mr. Donner on his statement under CPR 33.4(1) or to exclude his evidence. Lloyd's served a notice under CPR 33.5 indicating its intention to attack Mr. Donner's credibility.

Lloyd's attacked the credibility of Mr. Donner by reference to a number of documents. These included a letter dated 10 January 1996 to Mr. Richard Rosenblatt which included the following - "...The evidence appears to indicate that most of the US fraud allegations and litigation are based on Donner evidence without, as far as I am aware, my express permission. This may be a cheap way of proceeding so far but it was bound to incur difficulties in the end, because you simply do not have the totality of evidence in my possession to give any fraud action the best chance of success. In order, therefore, to ease your position, I would be prepared to accept 50% of my fee in advance i.e. US$500,000 and, perhaps you would suggest the basis upon which an "exceedingly generous success fee" might be formulated."

Mr. Timothy Goodwin-Self

In the late 1970s Mr. Goodwin-Self joined PCW becoming a personal assistant to Mr. Peter Dixon. Mr. Goodwin-Self's job was to recruit direct Names for PCW. Mr. Goodwin-Self ran a sub-agency called Trewshire. He worked in PCW's fifth floor offices at 52 Lime Street.

Mr. Goodwin-Self said that in about May/June 1983 he saw documents being shredded. In his witness statement he said:-

"I found that the investment office was no longer functioning as such. Instead it had been filled up with crates and cardboard boxes and two or three of the girls who worked there were busy shredding paper from the boxes ...One of the girls...said "This has nothing to do with PCW. These are just Peter Green's personal documents." ...I discussed it with one or two people and eventually decided to leave PCW. I could think of no valid reason why papers belonging to the Chairman of Lloyd's should be brought to our PCW premises and our shredders should be used to have those papers destroyed. Dixon's secretary at the time was called Shirley Reynolds...She... said to me "They are just personal documents"."

When cross-examined Mr. Goodwin-Self confirmed that the investment department within the PCW offices was in the same room as that in which documents were shredded.

Mr. Alan Smallbone

Mr. Smallbone's witness statement was admitted in evidence (Lloyd's not having any cross-examination). Mr. Smallbone had considerable experience as an employee/director of Lloyd's brokers.

Mr. Michael Anstey

Mr. Anstey's witness statement was admitted in evidence (Lloyd's not having any cross-examination).

Mr. Anstey spent his business life in the London insurance market as an insurance broker. He said in his statement:-

"Until the emergence of the Lloyd's problems in the very late 1980s I was quite unaware of the problems surrounding the market in relation to its aggregate exposure to asbestosis, pollution and health risks, although I was aware of the existence of the Asbestos Working Party...I believe that there are many working Names in my position who only became aware of the problems when it was too late to take any corrective action."

Mr. Richard Hulse

Mr. Hulse's witness statement was admitted in evidence (Lloyd's not having any cross-examination).

Mr. Hulse spent most of his working life in the Lloyd's market. Between 1980 and 1984 he was Executive Director of Robert Barrow Ltd., Lloyd's brokers. Between 1985 and 1986 he was Chairman of H. Pitman & Co Ltd., Lloyd's brokers. Between 1986 and 1988 he was a Director of K.C. Webb & Co Ltd., a Lloyd's members' agency. In his witness statement Mr. Hulse said:-

"Neither as a Name, nor as a sub-agent, was I made aware of the existence of the Neville Russell letter, nor the Murray Lawrence letter, even though I had close contact with David Barham, David Gilmour Roy, Stephen Merrett and Ian Posgate, who were underwriters I used when placing aviation risks."

Mr. Paul Mason

In September 1954 Mr. Mason joined the marine claims department of the Lloyd's broker Sedgwick Collins & Co Ltd. He was with Sedgwick until the end of 1965. He left Sedgwick to join Pitman and Deane at the end of 1965 where he stayed for a short time before joining Clarkson. Mr. Mason joined Edward Bates in 1973 but returned to Clarkson in 1981. In 1987 the merger with Bain Dawes took place. Mr. Mason said that in 1979 he was asked to join Lloyd's. He spoke to Mr. Philip Froude the Claims Manager of Janson Green. Mr. Mason said to Mr. Froude "I am thinking of joining Lloyd's, but I know about asbestosis and I am concerned about the stories of mounting losses. Do you think I should join?" According to Mr. Mason, Mr Froude replied "I wouldn't join if I were you".

Mr. Mason said that it seemed to him in both 1979 and 1984 that there must be a mass of claims arising from hazards such as asbestosis that had not been notified to the market in general, which would be covered by the type of General Liability Contracts with which he was familiar from his time at Sedgwick.

Mr. Derek Steel

Mr. Steel was called at a very late stage in the trial. On 16.6.2000 he sent a fax to Mr. Freeman of Grower Freeman & Goldberg which read:-

"...I am prompted to write to tell you that in the summer of 1984 I heard Murray Lawrence say that "Lloyd's was virtually bankrupt." ...I was a marine reinsurance broker... and... founded Steel Burill Jones Ltd. In 1984 I was elected a member of the Lloyd's Brokers Committee. In the summer of 1984 I attended a dinner given by the Lloyd's Brokers Committee for the Chairs of Lloyd's viz. Sir Peter Miller, Michael Cockell and Murrary Lawrence, held at Trinity House. The Chairman of the LBC was Robert Kevill... who sat opposite Sir Peter. I was opposite Michael Cockell... and a former colleague, John Garner... a non-marine broker specialising in North American business, opposite Murray Lawrence. I was startled suddenly to hear an angry Murray Lawrence saying "But you brokers don't seem to realise that Lloyd's is virtually bankrupt." There was sudden silence until Michael Cockell said "I can illustrate that. When I took up the pen, the carry-in from previous years... was £5 million. As we sit here tonight we have paid out £20 million and are running another £12 million outstanding." The dinner was a private occasion where by custom anything could be said in private and no notes were taken. It was the first intimation I had of the situation which subsequently brought Lloyd's to its knees. And in my view such knowledge is incompatible with the stance taken by Murray Lawrence and others that they shouldn't be held responsible for the way the losses for latent disease subsequently developed. The number of the reinsurances - and the relatively high cost of them - placed to lay-off the incremental growth in the run-off of the back years shows precisely that those underwriters seeking the reinsurances had to have good reason i.e. foreknowledge, of the development of latent disease claims. And in the case of Murray Lawrence he clearly had that apprehension in 1984."

The above fax was exhibited to a statement from Mr. Freeman dated 19 June which included the following in paragraph 7:-

"Mr. Steel told me that following the dinner given by the Lloyd's Brokers Committee... he was very concerned by what he had heard. He felt that something was very wrong and remembers that he decided to leave the Dick Hazell syndicate 190."

When called to give evidence, Mr. Steel said that the dinner was in November 1986 and not in the summer of 1984. He said he heard Mr. Lawrence say "You bloody brokers, Lloyd's is nearly bust." Mr. Steel was not elected a member of the LIBC until 1986. When he gave evidence Mr. Steel said that at the time of the dinner the Chairman of the LIBC was not Mr. Robert Kevill but Mr. Simon Arnold. Mr. Steel in the course of his evidence produced a copy of Mr. Freeman's statement with manuscript corrections/notes thereon. As to paragraph 7, Mr. Steel had added in manuscript "He was not on any other long-tail NM syndicates." Mr. Steel said in the course of his oral evidence that the second sentence of paragraph 7 ("He felt that something was very wrong and remembers that he decided to leave the Dick Hazell syndicate 190") was wrong. That sentence should have read "I had already left the Dick Hazell syndicate 190." Mr. Steel had resigned from syndicate 190 in 1984 (i.e. 1984 was his last year of underwriting). Mr. Steel increased his underwriting at Lloyd's in 1986 and again in 1988. Mr. Steel was put in touch with Mr. Freeman by Mr. Harvey White (see below).

When cross-examined Mr. Steel said that he did not know who Mr. Lawrence had been talking to prior to the outburst which he described.

Mr. Steel was on the committee of LIBC for the years 1986 to 1989 inclusive.

In view of the many changes in Mr. Steel's account it is difficult to place reliance on his evidence. The positioning at dinner which he describes suggests that if any such conversation took place, it occurred towards the end of Mr. Steel's time on the Committee. Such material as survives suggests that the senior members of LIBC sat near to the Chairs at such dinners. In 1986 Mr. Steel was a new member of the LIBC.

Mr. W.G. Brown

The statement of Mr. W.G. Brown was admitted in evidence as Mr. Brown lives in Australia.

Mr. Anthony Charles Sturge

Mr. Sturge left the employment of A.L. Sturge & Co in 1972. He formed Chatset in 1981 with Mr. John Rew to collate and publish comparative syndicate results. His full-time employment with Chatset started in 1989.

Mr. Sturge spoke at a conference in February 1985 entitled 'The Future of Lloyd's' on the subject 'Lloyd's - An Outside Member's View'. The conference papers were published in about March 1985.

Mr. Sturge was a member of the Open Years Panel.

Mr. Sturge struck me as a careful witness who provided a reasonably balanced account.

In the Chatset Lloyd's Syndicates Results 1978 (published in 1981) Mr. Sturge wrote "Asbestosis has been described as the largest ever insurance loss and will not only affect the non-marine market."

Mr. Sturge was cross-examined about his perception of the asbestos problem facing the market as at certain dates. He said that in late 1982 his perception was as follows. Asbestos-related claims were potentially a serious problem for some Lloyd's syndicates. Any members' agent who read the press, the reports and accounts and Chatset would be aware that the Lloyd's market was facing problems as result of exposure to asbestos payments. The impression he formed from the underwriters' reports was that it was a serious problem, but containable. It was not something that was going to hit Lloyd's as a whole in a major way and cause the kind of problems that were seen later on. He was, however, not privy to the detailed information that the AWP had.

Mr. Sturge said in his witness statement that it was not until 1992 that he felt there was enough data in the public domain which an external analyst or Name could properly use to assess the full damage and impact on the market of latent liability.

Mr. Sturge emphasised the importance of the Settlement Statistics which "came my way when we were compiling the 1994 run-offs". Table 2 shows "Non-Marine All Other US Business". This document "opened one's eyes to the way that the US liability account had built up over the years and how, if one projected those figures forward, even in the early 1980's it was clearly apparent that the US liability account was running at a serious loss."

As to Mr. Aaronson's Report, Mr. Sturge said that in his opinion it was wrong to compare the Lloyd's 1985 year with companies in 1987 - "it would seem to be entirely flawed because in the 85 underwriting year Lloyd's was driven by factors in calendar year 85."

As to "recruit to dilute" Mr. Sturge said that up to 1985 he did not believe there was any "recruit to dilute". He was less happy about what happened in 1986 and 1987. He felt the Council of Lloyd's should have put some check on the growth of capacity - "the wrong people were becoming members of Lloyd's, those who did not really have any real wealth".

When asked about charts prepared for the purposes of the Outhwaite trial, Mr. Sturge said what struck him was the steep rise between 1982 and 1983 - "if you had looked at them I think you would have scratched your head and wondered what was happening, particularly on those that had written an aggressive long-tail account."

Mr. Sturge said that having been a member of the Open Years Panel, it did not appear that Lloyd's had ever attempted to assess the Lloyd's market's share of asbestos-related claims. Mr. Sturge added that with appropriate data it would be perfectly possible to calculate the exposure that Lloyd's/the London market might have to a particular type of risk.

Mr. Sturge produced Charts of Asbestos Liabilities at 31.12.94, to which I refer.

Mr. Sturge estimated that the cost to the Lloyd's market to date (paid and outstanding) of asbestos-related claims at $3.5 to 4 billion.

Mr. Dennis Fredjohn

Mr. Fredjohn, a distinguished industrialist, was a member of the Council of Lloyd's for the years 1983 and 1984, as one of the first external Names on the Council. Between 1986 and 1994 Mr. Fredjohn was a non-executive director of London Wall Holdings Plc (a Lloyd's Agency). Mr. Fredjohn joined the 1992 Outhwaite Names Association.

Mr. Fredjohn struck me as witness whose account was balanced and generally reliable.

Mr. Fredjohn said that the most important decision that a person makes when he/she joins Lloyd's is who he/she selects as members' agent.

Mr. Fredjohn said that in his opinion it was not the Council's job to try and second guess the work carried out by managing agents and auditors. The Council set the regulatory framework in which others operated.

Mr. Fredjohn said he did not have any special knowledge of asbestos or long-tail problems by reason of being a member of the Council of Lloyd's. He was unaware of the existence of the AWP during his time on the Council. He was also unaware of the state of knowledge of the size of claims lodged in the United States and of the rate at which claims were coming through. He did not remember any report being made as to the numbers or average cost of asbestos claims, while he was a member of Council or of any Lloyd's Committee. In his statement he said he did not know why the Council was not given the information in 1983 that was available to the Committee in 1982. He added that if he had known that information he would not have increased his underwriting as he did and would have avoided long-tail liabilities.

Mr. Fredjohn acted as a Chairman of Rota Committees for members joining Lloyd's when a member of the Council, and for about two years thereafter. He said he had a limited knowledge of long-tail liabilities affecting the market but, along with Sir Eddie Kulukundis, felt it important to emphasise to joining Names that syndicates and Names inherited liabilities for old years. He thought it was very (and increasingly) appropriate to mention long-tail liabilities such as latent diseases, but doubted whether working Names (who took most of the Rotas) were as conscientious. At some stage Mr. Merrett approached him to suggest that at the Rota Meetings he over emphasised the liabilities inherited from the past through RITC - Mr. Merrett "felt I was stressing too much the impact of the long term liabilities, and I said... to me it was one of the most important things... he accepted it."

Mr. Fredjohn was complimentary about certain persons against whom allegations of fraud are made in this case.

Mr. Fredjohn referred to the struggle between regulation and the retention of an entrepreneurial environment that was vital to the success of Lloyd's.

Sir Eddie Kulukindis

Sir Eddie Kulukindis served as an external (elected) Name on the Council of Lloyd's between 1983 and 1989. He was an impressive witness.

He said that he first saw the Neville Russell letter the day he gave evidence. He believed that he had not seen the Murray Lawrence letter before, but could not be sure. He was a member of the Second Outhwaite Action Group. He had not seen the minutes of the Lloyd's Committee Meeting of 9.12.1982 before the day he gave evidence.

Sir Eddie did not recollect any discussion in Council of asbestosis, in the sense of the number of cases and the cost of those cases.

Sir Eddie said that with 100% hindsight Names should have been advised at Rota not to join the Outhwaite or Merrett syndicates.

Sir Eddie was a member of the Bird Working Party which in October 1984 produced 'The Report of the Long Term Review Working Party on Membership Requirements'. As to this Sir Eddie said (1) there was no question of making it easier for people to become a member of Lloyd's; (2) in a number of respects the recommendations tightened matters, in particular the proposal that members should be brought into line; (3) the proposal that premium income should be looked at on a gross rather than a net basis represented a further tightening of security; (4) there was no hint from anyone on the Committee that it was necessary to recruit new Names in order to meet the losses of the past; (5) the recommendations of the Committee were not aimed at making it easier for people to join Lloyd's.

Sir Eddie was also a member of the Membership Committee. He said that he was satisfied that any Brochure with which he was concerned was accurate and that considerable care was taken in this connection.

Sir Eddie said that asbestosis was not generally regarded in the 1980s as a problem that was going to destroy the Lloyd's market.

Sir Eddie said that if he had been aware in late 1984 of what Mr. Kellett was saying to the Inland Revenue on behalf of Lloyd's, this would have affected his own personal underwriting.

Mrs. Sally Ridley-Day OBE

Mrs. Ridley-Day is married to Mr. John Ridley-Day (see below). Mrs. Ridley-Day was not a member of Lloyd's. Her husband was a Name who accepted the R&R Settlement.

Mrs. Ridley-Day produced typed up notes of numerous telephone conversations that she had with Mr. Osbrey.

Mrs. Ridley-Day was recalled to give evidence. Profoundly unsatisfactory matters emerged as a result of further cross-examination on day 27. When Mrs. Ridley-Day first gave evidence she did not mention that on about 16 February 2000 she collected a box of Mr. Osbrey's papers from Dr. Harvey White. According to Mrs. Ridley-Day, Mr. Freeman of Grower Freeman and Goldberg asked her to look through the documents to see "If there was anything useful". None of this material was disclosed to Lloyd's until day 27. In fact the box contained a number of documents highly material to the account that Mrs. Mackenzie-Smith and Mrs. Ridley-Day and other witnesses gave of conversations with Mr. Osbrey.

Further, Mrs. Ridley-Day said that in about the latter part of 1999 a tape, purporting to be a tape of recordings on Mr. Osbrey's answerphone, arrived by post in a brown envelope addressed to her. She said that she came across the tape in the early part of this year before she received the documents from Dr. Harvey White. Freshfields were notified of the existence of the tape by letter dated 10 February 2000.

Mr. Julian Lloyd

Mr. Lloyd's witness statement was admitted in evidence (Lloyd's not having any cross-examination). Mr. Lloyd's statement contained an account of conversations with Mr. Osbrey.

Earl Alexander of Tunis

The witness statement of Earl Alexander of Tunis was admitted in evidence (Lloyd's not having any cross-examination). This statement also contained an account of conversations with Mr. Osbrey.

Mr. John Ridley-Day

Mr. Ridley-Day's witness statement was admitted in evidence (Lloyd's not having any cross-examination). Mr. Ridley-Day's statement contained an account of conversations with and other matters relating to Mr. Osbrey.

Mr. Charles Purle Q.C.

Mr. Purle's witness statement dealt with his knowledge of Mr. John Osbrey. Before Mr. Osbrey's death, Mr. Purle was acting for Mr. Osbrey in connection with litigation against Mr. Osbrey's Lloyd's members' agents.

Mr. Harvey White

Mr. Harvey White is a surgeon specialising in general surgery and oncology. Mr. Harvey White and Mr. Osbrey became friends when they attended school together and remained friends

throughout school and university and their adult life. In addition Mr. Harvey White treated Mr. Osbrey in a professional capacity over the years until his death.

Mr. Harvey White gave evidence of the circumstances in which he came into possession of some of Mr. Osbrey's papers.

Mr. Harvey White was never a member of Lloyd's. He gave his account of conversations from time to time with Mr. Osbrey on the subject of Lloyd's.

It should be recorded that Mr. Harvey White showed great friendship to Mr. Osbrey throughout his life and paid for his funeral.

Mr. K. V. Louw

Mr. Louw has had experience within the reinsurance market both in underwriting (Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co Ltd between October 1965 and September 1972) and as a broker. He is a Fellow of the Chartered Insurance Institute. He has edited the most recent editions of "The Law and Practice of Reinsurance" by C.E. Golding. Mr. Louw is the managing director of Reinsurance Evaluations Ltd, a reinsurance consultancy specialising in inspections and audits of records, management of discontinued operations, litigation support and executive advice to the reinsurance market. He was called not as an expert witness but as a "technical" witness.

Before this case Mr. Louw had not seen the market reports and attorneys' reports in respect of US asbestos losses.

Mr. Louw was cross-examined by reference to the accounts of Mercantile & General Reinsurance Co Ltd. He agreed that the reserves in the 1980s were inadequate to meet the weight of asbestos-related claims and that it was not until the 1982 report published in 1983 that there was any specific mention of asbestos. He accepted that the Mercantile added to its reserves year by year in order to meet asbestos claims, but those reserves proved inadequate. The size of the reserves for asbestos and pollution claims in 1995 was greater than the entire reserves for the whole of the non-proportional account in some of the 1980s.

Mr. Louw prepared an Appendix which sets out a chronology of various reports, addresses the issue of what was known from the attorneys' reports and AWP meetings, calculates the asbestos liabilities indicated by the reports and shows how these were or were not reflected in the RITC figures in the Lloyd's Global Accounts. Mr. Louw concluded his report as follows:-

"The documents that I have seen do show that the market was creating asbestos reserves and reporting to Lloyd's. However, the increase in reserves bears no comparison with the size of the known liabilities projected over a period five to ten years by Mr. Nelson. From the beginning of 1983 onwards the loss projection for asbestos bodily injury losses was close to the $10 billion figure. For most years the Lloyd's market's share of the known and projected cost of asbestos bodily injury losses exceeded the total RITC for US Dollar General Liability business".

Mr. Louw based his calculations upon certain "conservative assumptions" as follows:-

(A) That the London market's share of liability for US asbestos losses on an exposure basis was 40%.

(B) That Lloyd's share of the London market's liability for US asbestos losses was some two thirds of 40% (say 25% overall).

(C) That although the Lloyd's liabilities should be shown as being net of reinsurance protections, no diminution in the figures was made for two reasons:

(i) "It is doubtful that the percentage (of reinsurance) placed in the London market outside of Lloyd's was very great."

(ii) The calculations were based upon the Lloyd's share of direct US business. They took no account of reinsurance and retrocessions from US carriers which formed a significant part of the Lloyd's exposure to asbestos losses.

In cross-examination Mr. Louw accepted that the RITC figures in the Lloyd's Global Accounts used in his calculations:-

(1) included reserves for inwards claims on direct policies and reserves for claims on reinsurance policies;

(2) were net of reinsurance in the sense that they were net of credits taken in respect of reinsurance recoveries;

(3) were net of credits taken in respect of time and distance policies;

(4) were net of discounting (if any) in RITC calculations;

(5) were net of credit (if any) taken in respect of rollovers (if any).

Lloyd's produced a schedule of Mr. Louw's calculations. In cross-examination Mr. Louw accepted that revisions should be made to his figures for the number of claims in 1985 and 1987.

Mr. Louw's percentage approach was challenged in cross-examination. It did not take account of the widening number of defendants in asbestos-related claims. Nor did it take account of the Johns Manville settlement.

Despite certain criticisms that can be made of Mr. Louw's approach and calculations, in fairness to him I should record that in my opinion he was doing his best to assist the court drawing on the limited information available to him.

Witnesses Called by Lloyd's

Each of the witnesses called by Lloyd's from among the 33 persons listed in chapter 7, emphatically denied the allegations of fraud/fraudulent misrepresentation made by the Names.

Sir Peter Miller

Sir Peter Miller joined Thos R. Miller & Sons full time from 1954. T.R.M. & S was a Lloyd's broking firm concerned mainly with marine business. In the 1960s with others Sir Peter founded a members' underwriting agency business (Thos R. Miller & Sons Underwriting Agents). He was never particularly concerned with the day to day work of this members' agent. Thus Sir Peter's background was as a marine broker.

Sir Peter was Chairman of the Committee of Lloyd's Insurance Brokers Association for 1976/1977. He was first elected as a member of the Committee of Lloyd's in 1977 and, with the exception of 1981, remained on the Committee until 1989. He was a member of the Council of Lloyd's from 1983 until 1989, during which time he served as Chairman of Lloyd's between 1984 and 1987.

Sir Peter was an articulate witness.

In his main witness statement Sir Peter addressed the following topics:-

(a) a description of relevant Lloyd's bodies and Lloyd's market bodies; (b) the key issues during his Chairmanship of Lloyd's; (c) the principal regulatory developments during the Relevant Period; (d) his personal knowledge of the asbestos issue during the Relevant Period; (e) Lloyd's Annual Results; (f) the Lloyd's Brochures; (g) Rota interviews; (h) capital expansion and the increase in membership; (i) Lloyd's dealings with the Inland Revenue; (j) Toplis & Harding Inc.; (k) his personal participation as a Name.

As to the role of the Council, Sir Peter said that it was not the role of the Council, nor the role of the Committee before it, to get involved in the business decisions of the syndicates and the market, whether in terms of the underwriting of risks or the settlement of claims.

As to the asbestos issue during the Relevant Period, Sir Peter's background was in marine insurance. Although he sat on the board of T.R.M. & S' non-marine broking subsidiary, it was not involved in the processing of asbestos-related claims on behalf of assureds or reassureds. T.R.M. & S did not own or have any interest in a Lloyd's managing agency and Sir Peter had little involvement in the day to day work of the Lloyd's members' agency. He had no recollection of ever seeing any attorneys' reports dealing with asbestos-related claims at any time relevant to this action. Sir Peter referred to his various statements in the Global Reports and Accounts and said that his concern was about losses across the non-marine general liability account as a whole.

Sir Peter said that his knowledge of asbestos has never been detailed, and it is not so even today. (Surprisingly) he said that he was not aware of the fact that serious conditions, on the whole, do not arise until 20 years or more after initial exposure.

Sir Peter accepted that from the time when syndicates received and acted upon the Murray Lawrence letter, they could have been asked what reserves had been identified for asbestos-related liabilities in closed and open years.

Sir Peter said that during the parliamentary procedures in 1982 there was no reason to mention asbestosis or latent disease to the House of Commons.

Sir Peter was asked "Did you during your first year as Chairman ask for figures about asbestosis claims?" He replied "...I observed what was said about them, which was in increasingly significant tones, but I was not aware of any figures being available to me of market participation in asbestos claims. It was too early for that to have emerged."

In the course of his evidence Sir Peter drew a distinction between problems which were considered to be superable and those which were considered to be insuperable.

Sir Peter said that three factors in combination led Lloyd's to the very difficult economic position in which it found itself in the 1990s:- (i) the general liability account; (ii) losses arising from catastrophes; and (iii) intense competition driving down the rates in the marine field to unrealistic levels.

At the conclusion of his cross-examination Sir Peter said "We turned our backs on nothing; we did our best. We may have made mistakes; no doubt we did, everybody does, but the regulatory failures were not what led to the asbestos problem. The asbestos problem, by itself, did not threaten the solvency of Lloyd's. ...It was the combination of that and other things that led to the economic difficulties of the 90s."

Mr. Murray Lawrence

Mr. Lawrence took over as active underwriter on composite syndicate 360 on 1 January 1970. Mr. Lawrence's day to day work with syndicate 854 consisted of contract property reinsurance, excess of loss and pro rata insurance of insurance companies worldwide (the greater part being US insurance companies).

On 1 January 1980, syndicate 360 was split into four individual syndicates. The non-marine syndicates, 360 and 854 joined together to form syndicate 362. Mr. Lawrence was the active underwriter of syndicate 362. After he became Chairman of the Computer Leasing Working Party and joined the Committee of Lloyd's in 1979 his involvement in the day-to-day affairs of syndicate 362 diminished and he gradually ceded control of operations to his deputy, Mr. Richard Keeling.

C. T. Bowring divested itself of the managing agency C.T. Bowring Underwriting Agencies Ltd on 1 January 1985. Mr. Lawrence set up Murray Lawrence and Partners which took over the managing agency functions (i.e. the underwriting) of C.T. Bowring Agencies. He was senior partner of Murray Lawrence and Partners, head of the agency and Chairman of the Board having given up his role as active underwriter on about 1 July 1984. Murray Lawrence and Partners was incorporated in 1989 to become Murray Lawrence and Partners Ltd. At the same time, two other companies were formed: a holding company, Murray Lawrence Holdings Ltd, and Murray Lawrence Members' Agency Ltd which purchased the members' agency from C.T. Bowring in 1988 or 1989. Mr. Lawrence was Chairman of all three Boards.

Mr. Lawrence was Chairman of LUNMA in 1978.

Mr. Lawrence became a member of the Committee of Lloyd's in 1979 and except for 1983 served on the Committee until 1991. He became a member of the Council of Lloyd's on 1 January 1984 and remained a member of the Council until 1991. He was Deputy Chairman of Lloyd's in 1982 and from 1984 to 1987. In 1988 he became Chairman of Lloyd's, retiring on 31 December 1990.

Mr. Lawrence joined Lloyd's as an underwriting member for the 1974 year of account. He remained a Name until 31 December 1998.

I am satisfied that Mr. Lawrence's evidence as to the distribution of the Murray Lawrence letter is accurate. I find that he did not take any steps to restrict circulation of the letter.

In his main witness statement Mr. Lawrence addressed the following topics:-

(a) the market associations in the Lloyd's market; (b) the Society of Lloyd's bodies; (c) the Computer Leasing Working Party; (d) the Asbestos Working Party; (e) the Lloyd's Brochure; (f) Lloyd's annual underwriting results; (g) the reinsurance to close process; (h) to (p) the periods up to the closure of the 1977 to 1985 years of account; (q) the recruitment of Names into the Lloyd's market; (r) the purchase by syndicate 362 of a run-off policy; (s) his personal underwriting.

Mr. Lawrence dealt with the meeting with the panel auditors on 10 November 1981, the Audit Committee, the Special Meeting of the Committee of Lloyd's on 7 December 1981, the meeting of panel auditors on 15 January 1982, the note from Mr. Ken Randall dated 22 February 1982, the Neville Russell letter dated 24 February 1982, the Audit Committee meeting on 2 March 1982, the panel auditors' meeting on 9 March 1982, the memorandum by Mr. Nelson on 12 March 1982, the memorandum to O Group dated 15 March 1982, the letter from Mr. Colin Murray dated 15 March 1982 ( the Bannockburn letter), the meeting of the Committee on 17 March 1982 and the two market letters dated 18 March 1982. "The first letter was sent out in my name on behalf of the Committee to all underwriting agents (which meant all managing agents, members' agents and combined agents), active underwriters and panel auditors. The second letter was sent by Mr. Randall to all panel auditors."

Syndicate 362 took out a rollover policy in about 1970 or 1971.

At the end of 1968 Mr. Lawrence was appointed underwriter designate of syndicate 360. He was horrified to learn that the syndicate was under-reserved and would have to increase its reserves considerably (which the syndicate did at 31 December 1968). As a consequence he decided to take the syndicate totally out of casualty business. "We wrote no more long-tail business (direct or reinsurance) during the 1970s and early 1980s (with the exception of certain types of US long-tail business which was not exposed to asbestos, such as medical malpractice and contingency clash business)".

In 1982, syndicate 362 placed an unlimited liability run-off policy. Two thirds of the policy were placed with Mr. Outhwaite's syndicate and one third was placed with Mr. Meacock's syndicate. Syndicate 362 paid a premium of US$2 million for the policy with an excess of US$55 million. The policy was in respect of losses arising from 1 January 1982 on the 1978 and all prior years of account.

On 15 April 1982 the syndicate purchased a further policy from Munich Re which provided US$10 million cover in excess of US$31.6 million for 1978 and prior years of account, at a premium of US$4 million. In 1984 reinsurance was purchased by Mr. Keeling to cover the gap of some US$13.4 million between the syndicate's reserves and the Munich Re reinsurance and the Outhwaite/Meacock run-off. This further cover cost US$4 million for US$13.4 million of cover. At around this time, the cover for the layer between US$31.6 and US$42 million was renegotiated and novated to NERCO.

Mr. Lawrence said that the Council, as with the Committee, did not seek to interfere in the day to day decisions taken by the entities operating in the Lloyd's market.

Mr. Lawrence favoured the division of the non-marine "All Other" category to try to reflect the different settlement patterns (i.e. the different lengths of "tail") of the business within it to produce more consistent statistics. He set out in his witness statement the steps taken to achieve this goal. Mr. Lawrence said that he knew Mr. Bradley but had no recollection of any conversation in 1979 (when Mr. Bradley allegedly reported to Mr. Murray Lawrence a conversation he had had with Mr. Tom Hitchcock of Citibank).

Mr. Lawrence explained the history of the "white papers".

Mr. Lawrence disputed Mr. Osbrey's allegations.

As to reserving for asbestos-related claims Mr. Lawrence said that with the benefit of hindsight "We can look back and say that reserves that we set up at any moment in time proved generally insufficient, but...at the time the reserves...were set up... conscientiously with every effort to see that they were fair, and reinsurance to close...only took place if the underwriter, the agent and the auditor were happy (that the reserves were fair)". Mr. Lawrence added "Just as (we) thought we had a hold on it some new wave of problems came up, and proved all the previous ways in which we looked at it insufficient...we got overtaken by events in future years, in ways which we couldn't have foreseen".

Mr. Lawrence said that asbestos on its own was never a threat to the solvency of Lloyd's. Late in the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s the coming together of (i) the asbestos problems (ii) the other long-tail problems including pollution (iii) the effects of the appalling number and severity of the catastrophe losses, cumulatively threatened the solvency of Lloyd's.

Mr. Lawrence did not believe that the Committee was in a position to comment on how the market was reserved unless a mini R&R had been taken on by the Committee, and that was totally impractical.

Sir David Rowland

Sir David Rowland was Chairman of Lloyd's from 1993 to 1997, and a member of the Council of Lloyd's from 1987 to 1990 and 1993 to 1997.

Sir David was first employed in 1956 by a firm of insurance brokers, Matthews Wrightson. Within this broking company, Sir David undertook training as a marine broker between 1956 and 1958, followed by three years experience in UK non-marine insurance, and then another three years specialising in credit and bond insurance. At the end of 1964, he was appointed to the Board of Matthews Wrightson. After joining the Board, he led the UK non-marine department in London. Increasingly he concentrated on the management of the company, its expansion, the acquisition of other businesses and, in particular, upon developing overseas business opportunities. A large part of his time concerned business outside the Lloyd's market. He was made Managing Director of the company around the end of the 1960s.

At about the end of the 1960s Sir David was appointed to the Board of the parent company of Matthews Wrightson. There then followed a corporate re-structuring of the Matthews Wrightson Group, following the acquisition of Bray Gibb (a firm of brokers) in 1970, the flotation of Matthews Wrightson on the Stock Exchange, and the subsequent merger with Stewart Smith & Co (another broking firm with a subsidiary underwriting agency) in 1972. This resulted in the Group being renamed Stewart Wrightson, with a parent holding company called Stewart Wrightson Holdings Plc. From about the time of this re-structuring, Sir David became the (joint) Chief Executive of Stewart Wrightson, joining the Board of the parent company. Subsequently he also joined the Board of the newly created intermediate parent company, which was called Matthews Wrightson Underwriting Ltd. Sir David emphasised that non-executive directors were introduced onto the Board of the intermediate parent company (including Sir Bernard Cohen who Sir David described as a representative of the Names). Below Matthews Wrightson Underwriting Ltd there were a number of companies dealing with the affairs of Lloyd's members and syndicate management. The principal companies were: (a) Pulbrook Underwriting Management Ltd, the managing agency for Pulbrook syndicates (including non-marine syndicate 90 and marine syndicate 334, as well as a motor and an aviation syndicate); and (b) Matthews Wrightson Pulbrook Ltd, the members' agency (which later changed its name to Stewart Wrightson Members' Agency in April 1985). The managing agency and the members' agency had been separated in about 1979 (at the same time that Matthews Wrightson Underwriting Ltd was created). Sir David was not on the Board of either of these subsidiary companies, except for a year or so in about 1978/1979, when he was on the Board of Matthews Wrightson Pulbrook Ltd. Syndicate 90's 1982 year was left open; syndicate 334's 1985 year was left open.

In 1980 Sir David was appointed Chairman of the overall parent company Stewart Wrightson Holdings Plc. He continued in that position until its acquisition by Willis Faber in 1987. When that acquisition took place, he joined the Board of Willis Faber, as a Deputy Chairman. In March 1988, he left Willis Faber to become Chief Executive of the Sedgwick Group Plc. He became the Chairman of Sedgwicks in 1989. He held this position until December 1992, when he became Chairman of Lloyd's.

The underwriting business within the Stewart Wrightson Group was only a small part of the Group's overall business activities. To comply with the divestment requirements imposed by Lloyd's, the managing agency, Pulbrook, was sold and transferred in January 1985 to Creechurch Syndicate Managers Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Merrett Holdings Plc.

Sir David was asked to lead the Task Force investigating the future capital structure of Lloyd's, which was set-up at the end of 1990, and which produced a report entitled "Lloyd's: A Route Forward" in January 1992.

Sir David was a highly articulate witness.

In his first witness statement Sir David addressed the following:-

(a) personal background; (b) response to the allegations; (c) specific allegations against Lloyd's; (d) allegations against Pulbrook syndicate 90; and (e) personal underwriting.

As to (d), syndicate 90 obtained cover of $13.5m (excess of $17.5m), for its 1974 and prior years, in December 1980 with the New English Reinsurance Company; the syndicate then obtained 70% unlimited cover (excess of $26.9m) with Outhwaite/Meacock in February 1982 for its 1974 and prior years. Thereafter the syndicate obtained slices of top-up cover for the 30% gap on the 1974 and prior years. Syndicate 334 obtained cover with First State Insurance Company in May 1981 in respect of its 1975 and prior years, covering US$8m excess of US$4m. The syndicate then obtained unlimited cover with Merrett 418/417 (excess of $12m) for its 1975 and prior years in September 1981. The outcome of the Outhwaite/Meacock run-off contracts is shown in Table 3 below. The Merrett run-off contract was avoided.

In his third witness statement Sir David addressed three further topics:- (f) E&O cover at Lloyd's; (g) training for underwriters and underwriting agents; and (h) developments in relation to the capital structure.

As to asbestos-related claims, Sir David said that there were widely differing views about the eventual outcome and that this was demonstrated by the fact there was an active market in writing run-off policies (Outhwaite, Merrett and Meacock).

When asked about his views in the early 1980s about the availability of the market in run-off contracts, Sir David said "Outhwaite (and Merrett)...were substantial market figures. They had very considerable followings and they took views which were not necessarily typical of the rest of the market and they had considerable charismatic impact on the market. ...I was delighted and much relieved (that these protections were available and) pleased that people were taking different views about the development of asbestos. ...There were large numbers of contrary views, and that people of that influence were prepared to put their money where their feelings lay seemed to me very significant."

In the Task Force Report, January 1992 reference was made to uncertainty as to pollution claims ("The greatest uncertainties surround the third area of latent liability claims, environmental pollution... in testimony to the US Congress Sub-Committee on Policy Research and Insurance, Amy S. Bouska of Tillinghast estimated the range of possible outcomes to lie between $40 billion and $1,000 billion. Clearly costs of this magnitude are far beyond the resources of the insurance industry... Assessing the range of Lloyd's possible exposure to pollution claims is subject to huge uncertainties. Should court decisions go against the industry as a whole, Lloyd's needs to have only a modest share of the problem for it to face very serious losses..."). Sir David cited pollution as an example where "the forebodings about the worst case scenario have not been borne out."

As to E&O cover, Sir David said that this covered 12 months at a time and was on a "claims made basis". It was possible that external Names were underwriting the E&O insurance of their own agent. "One of the very big problems (was) the recycling of the risk around the very people (the Names) who were involved in seeking to recover (in the Lloyd's litigation) from their agents." Thus E&O cover was provided within the very market it was intended to protect. The same was true for personal stop-loss. "It was this whole element of recycling and double counting which caused a great deal of (the) problems."

Sir David accepted that competence in areas of the Lloyd's market was seriously lacking in the 1980s. "The level of ability at Lloyd's (was not, during the Relevant Period) at the level I would wish, looking backwards." Sir David added that there was a great deal of variability in the quality of members' agents.

When asked "Does it cause you anxiety that it was not until sometime in or after 1987 that reference to the possibility of being stuck on an open year was introduced into the Rota verification procedures?" Sir David replied "There is much in that period which, looking backwards, I would like to (have seen) happen earlier."

Mr. Alan Lord

Between 1 March 1986 and 30 June 1992 Mr. Lord was Chief Executive of Lloyd's and the nominated Deputy Chairman. Prior to March 1986 Mr. Lord had a distinguished career with the Inland Revenue, the Treasury, the Department of Trade and Industry, Dunlop Holdings Plc and as a member of the Court of the Bank of England.

No allegation of fraud is made against Mr. Lord.

Mr. Lord was an impressive witness.

In his witness statement Mr. Lord addressed the following topics:-

(a) the duties and functions of the Chief Executive, Chairman and Deputy Chairmen; (b) the Council of Lloyd's and the Committee of Lloyd's; (c) principal issues facing Lloyd's; (d) knowledge of asbestos; (e) the Donner Inquiry; (f) Global Reports & Accounts; (g) recruitment and expansion; (h) Rota Committee meetings; (i) Toplis & Harding Inc; (j) fraud allegations.

Mr. Lord said that during his term as Chief Executive, his areas of responsibility fell into five groups, the second of which was responsibility for overseeing the establishment and maintenance of the self-regulatory regime at Lloyd's. "In this respect, I was particularly concerned with the interests of non-working Names so far as these were consistent with the successful operation of the Lloyd's insurance market."

As to Council or Committee debate, Mr. Lord said that he could not recall any Council or Committee member seeking to stifle or suppress discussion of any issue either prior to, or at, a Council or Committee meeting.

Mr. Lord referred to the many and varied issues being dealt with by the Chairs, the Council and the Committee. He did not recall asbestos being a significant topic during the period 1 March 1986 to 31 December 1988. It was merely one of a number of long-tail liabilities like pollution, and problems like US tort law reform, which were of concern to the market.

As to the fraud allegations, Mr. Lord said that at no time was he aware of, nor did he have any reason to believe that there was, any dishonest activity on the part of any of his Council and Committee colleagues. He believed his fellow Council and Committee members acted honestly and approached their responsibilities in the same way as he did. If he had been aware of any dishonest activities he would certainly have done something about them.

Mr. Lord defined a catastrophe as something with a cost of at least $1 billion. He said that half the insurance catastrophes in the twentieth century occurred in the years 1987 to 1990 - windstorms in north Europe, Piper Alpha, Exxon Valdez, various hurricanes etc.

As to recruitment, Mr. Lord said that he was not conscious of a recruitment drive. On average there were over three thousand applications for membership each year. There was a queue and the limiting factor was the availability of places on syndicates.

Mr. Lord accepted that there was a tension between addressing liabilities with a very long-tail and the structure of a 12 month venture under which it was hoped to draw a final line at the end of three years. "The one thing that you can guarantee about reinsurance to close is that it will not be right, but it must be right to the best of the underwriter's ability. When you start to find that you have liabilities which are 30 years old, which may... have been imposed on you by a foreign legal system which extends cover beyond the point which it was intended to cover...then it is very difficult to accommodate that kind of business within an annual venture."

Mr. Lord said that one sees now with hindsight that sections of the market were seriously under-reserved, but there was no sense of that at the time. As to reserving for asbestos-related claims, Mr Lord said that in the Lloyd's context the question is, are the syndicates with exposure to asbestosis aware of the situation and are they taking steps to deal with it properly? He added that in a Lloyd's context one would say to individual underwriters and auditors "Are you sure in the light of the available evidence that you are properly reserved, because its your business not mine." In his view that was what Mr. Murray Lawrence did.

Mr. Lord said that there is no doubt that information could have been assembled in an aggregate form. "One would then have had...the ability to say to the underwriters, 'Are you aware of this? Are you clear that in your reserving you have taken full account of the situation which this reflects?'. My problem is this: that if the underwriter had said, 'Yes I am, and I have done my triangulations with this in mind, and to the best of my ability my reinsurance to close reflects all this and my auditors have taken no exception to anything that I have done', then I think that in the Lloyd's system at that point one comes to an end." Mr. Lord added that the General Review Department would not have had the technical insurance expertise to re-work an underwriter's reinsurance to close. "One could only have done that by putting in a team of competing underwriters...to go through the numbers. That actually is what qualified Lloyd's auditors are supposed to do."

Mr. Lord pointed out that with about four hundred syndicates, to some extent in competition with each other, commercial information was particularly sensitive.

As to PCW, Mr. Lord said " For eight months we dealt with this matter with the greatest possible care" (with the assistance of Mr. Nigel Holland and Mr. Charles Skey) "and two years later it became quite clear that we got it wrong."

When asked "The one thing that we are looking at is whether people in senior positions with knowledge of the market knew (what you didn't)... that the market was under-reserved for asbestosis. Its as simple as that, isn't it?", Mr. Lord replied "Yes it is. It comes down to a question of whether the Globals...were written in good faith. Its my belief that they were".

Mr. Colin Murray

Mr. Murray was appointed active underwriter of non-marine syndicate 510/511 in 1974 and remained underwriter until 1985. He succeeded Mr. Kiln as Chairman of R.J. Kiln & Co Ltd in 1985 and remained Chairman until 1995. He was a member of the Committee and Council of Lloyd's from 1983 to 1986 and from 1989 to 1992. He was Deputy Chairman of Lloyd's from 1989 to 1990. Mr. Murray was elected to the Committee of LUNMA in about 1979 and resigned in 1984.

A general description of the book of business written by syndicate 510/511 is set out in the Merrett judgment.

Mr. Murray was a highly professional and skilful underwriter and I was assisted by his evidence.

In his witness statement Mr. Murray addressed the following topics:-

(a) background to R.J. Kiln & Co Ltd and the Kiln syndicates; (b) the Lloyd's market - general observations; (c) market bodies; (d) the asbestos problem; (e) reserving and reinsurance to close; (f) closure of the 1979 year of account/Murray Lawrence letter; (g) run-off reinsurance; (h) the Council and Committee of Lloyd's; (i) the Members' Solvency and Security Committee; (j) recruitment/capacity; (k) the Donner inquiry; (l) his personal underwriting.

As to run-off insurance, Mr. Murray said that in the early 1980s Mr. Winchester approached him and asked him if he wanted to purchase a run-off policy from Mr. Outhwaite in respect of syndicate 510/511. He received a quotation from Mr. Outhwaite for unlimited cover excess of US$7.5 million at a net premium of US$850,000. The policy was to be effective from 1 January 1982. The offer was not accepted.

Mr. Murray said that if he had felt that the situation would ultimately be as serious as it turned out to be, he would have behaved differently in relation to the purchase of reinsurance. He added that the insurance industry was as slow or slower than Lloyd's in coming to terms with the ultimate cost of asbestos-related claims. "We were part of the industry, the industry was slow, we were slower than we should have been, and unfortunately our slowness contributed to losses made by many Names."

In his Chairman's Report dated 3 May 1995 Mr. Murray wrote:-

"Syndicate 510 is certainly one of the few if not the only syndicate that wrote a general Non-Marine account in the 1960s and that does not owe its survival to a reinsurance policy purchased from the Outhwaite syndicate or from one of the very few markets that offered this cover. Our survival is due to the fact that we have always attempted to keep our acceptance of liability business in the United States to a low percentage of our overall account and because our total group capacity has grown from approximately £1 million in 1963 to approximately £500 million today."

Mr. Murray accepted that with the benefit of hindsight he under-reserved in 1981 and 1982, but said that 510/511 was over-reserved at the time of R&R. Mr. Murray said that Mr. Kiln in his booklet about the first 20 years at R.J. Kiln stated that "I did not get asbestos right, I did not realise how damaging it would be".

As to information to Names, Mr. Murray said he was keen to ensure that Names on the Kiln syndicate were kept informed of the opportunities and problems of the business, including the developing asbestos problem. He did this in two main ways. The first was in his reports (as underwriter) which accompanied the syndicate's annual accounts. The second way in which Names were kept informed was through annual meetings of the Names.

Mr. Murray wrote the "Bannockburn letter" (see chapter 19 below).

Mr. Murray said that he considered that the Conning Report of September 1982 (see Appendix 3) was particularly influential. I attach particular importance to this evidence.

Mr. Murray wrote to Mr. Outhwaite in June 1985. "I informed him that I thought that the acceptance of such aggregate liabilities was a matter of "great materiality" and that his managing agent should have advised Names and members' agents before adopting such an unconventional and hazardous underwriting policy. I said that "the effect of writing a run-off stop loss is that the burdens of the many are carried by the few." I gave notice of the cancellation of our sub-agency agreement and the withdrawal of all our Names from the syndicate with effect from 31 December 1985."

As to asbestos, Mr. Murray said that he gradually became aware that there was "a tiger in the undergrowth". Mr. Murray accepted that there must have been a time or period when asbestosis began to contribute to the threat to the solvency of Lloyd's. He added that if it was suggested to the ruling body, or if the ruling body of its own recognised, that there was a threat to the solvency of Lloyd's, then the ruling body would have taken an interest. Mr. Murray said that between 1988 and 1992 it may have been appreciated that asbestos might affect Lloyd's solvency.

Mr. Murray said the "asbestos and pollution experience...has...communicated to me that the annual venture with the reinsurance to close is almost impossible to apply to long-tail business...this is why I really believe the future of the market is for corporate capital."

When giving evidence Mr. Murray said "My contemporary view...was that although one did one's best at the time to fix the figure (to reinsure to close) which without discounting would pay all claims, the assuming Names did have the cushion of the investment income and the capital gain. Therefore, if one had got it wrong and one needed to increase the figure at the end of the following year, then the Names would (probably) not be financially damaged by having assumed (the) reinsurance to close...by not discounting there was an extra cushion."

As to reinsurance to close, Mr. Murray said that the culture at Lloyd's at the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s was to close a year by reinsuring it into the next year of account wherever possible, however expensive that might be for Names on a closing year. By the late 1980s, the incidence of open years had increased so much that the concept of leaving a syndicate open was regarded by some underwriters as preferable to closure. In some cases it allowed very severe losses to be collected from the Names over a longer period of time.

As to the Lloyd's market, Mr. Murray said that in his opinion it was no part of Lloyd's function to usurp the role of the agents, working in conjunction with their auditors, in relation to the closure of syndicates' years of account, nor did the Committee/Council of Lloyd's have the information, time or resources to interfere in this area of the agents' businesses. Mr. Murray said that if he had been told that when he joined the Council of Lloyd's he was expected to make an assessment about Lloyd's exposure to asbestosis or pollution or anything else, under no circumstances would he have stood for the Council because he would have known that that was an impossible brief.

Mr. Bryan Kellett

In 1973 Mr. Kellett set up his own non-marine syndicate 993/994. B. P. D. Kellett & Co became sole managing agents in about 1981 or 1982. In early 1987 the functions of members' and managing agencies were divided and Kellett (Holdings) Ltd was formed. Mr. Kellett wrote most classes of non-marine business, including leading property facultative and excess of loss treaty business, as well as some LMX. He did not however write US casualty business except to a limited extent. Mr. Kellett resigned as underwriter at the end of 1989.

Mr. Kellett was Chairman of LUNMA in 1987.

Mr. Kellett was a member of the Council and the Committee of Lloyd's between 1990 and 1992.

In his witness statement Mr. Kellett addressed the following topics:-

(a) the business of syndicate 993/994; (b) LUNMA; (c) other issues; (d) his personal underwriting.

Mr. Kellett was a member of the Equitas Reserving Group for the 1992 and prior years. He worked on problems on syndicates in the short-tail catastrophe market.

Mr. Kellett bought a rollover policy for the 1974 account. Premiums were paid out of each of the years of account from 1974 until about 1982. It was used to assist with the computer leasing problem.

In 1974 Mr. Kellett wrote a small number of run-off policies for syndicates whose accounts had included a fairly general US casualty account. The syndicates in question were H. G. Poland syndicates 105, 106 and 109; C. P. Attenborough syndicates 531, 905 and 223; and F. R. Bussell syndicate 870. In June 1977 he obtained reinsurance cover for these run-off policies from Outhwaite syndicate 661. In 1980 Mr. Kellett re-entered the run-off market. He wrote a policy which protected the Bishopsgate Insurance Co. He took about a third, with Mr. Outhwaite and Mr. Drysdale writing the majority of the remaining two thirds between them. The policy protected the Bishopsgate's 1966-7 years in relation to their Drivers casualty account and their 1972-1977 years in relation to Weavers. Additionally in 1981 the Bracey non-marine syndicate 917, which had gone into run-off, was looking for cover to enable it to close-off its account. Mr. Kellett agreed to take a 33% share of an unlimited run-off reinsurance which protected its 1968-1974 underwriting years of account. In April 1982, an opportunity arose to reinsure with Mr. Outhwaite, and Mr. Kellett ceded the risks to Mr. Outhwaite's syndicate, retaining the first £500,000.

Mr. Kellett retroceded his syndicate's computer leasing risks to Mr. Posgate. As to this Mr. Kellett said:-

"I refer to it as a sort of over due which is a policy which has been used in the marine market for hundreds of years. When a ship was missing it would be quite normal for those who had an involvement in the insurance of the ship to go to the over due market, who made a book of writing this specific type of business. It was less common in the non-marine market. ...We knew there had been losses on computer leasing. Mr. Posgate was taking a view on how much those losses would be, and was offering to reinsure if they should be in excess of a specified amount."

In 1987 the 1984 year of account of syndicate 993/994 was left open, because of the syndicate's involvement in policies which ran off the liabilities of deceased Names; these policies were picking up losses on the Outhwaite 1982 open year.

In November 1984 Mr. Kellett in company with Mr. Barber, Mr. Merrett, Mr. Holland and Mr. Parkington, made a presentation to the Inland Revenue. In the course of his presentation Mr. Kellett said in response to the Inland Revenue's contention that Lloyd's was over-reserved "...We are under-reserved. What concerns us is, how the industry can survive its under-reserving. ...The reinsurance to close, (will) in most cases continue to be placed with the following year of account... at what the underwriter believes to be its true worth, and what history will more probably show to be too little." These remarks by Mr. Kellett must be seen in the context in which they were made. He said there was a certain amount of hyperbole.

As to LUNMA, Mr. Kellett said that LUNMA was not part of the investigations branch or the regulator. It was a market association concerned to assist the market in doing what they wished to do in the market and facilitating the transaction of business around the world.

Mr. Richard Keeling

In 1970 Mr. Keeling commenced underwriting on syndicate 360 as deputy underwriter. Mr. Murray Lawrence was the active underwriter. Over time he assumed more responsibility for the syndicate's underwriting. Mr. Lawrence became Chairman of the Computer Leasing Working Party at the beginning of 1979; from 1979 he was also a member of the Committee of Lloyd's. These commitments took up a lot of his time and he therefore delegated much of the day to day underwriting responsibility to Mr. Keeling. In 1982 Mr. Lawrence effectively handed over the role of underwriter for syndicate 362 (as syndicate 360 had become) to Mr. Keeling. Mr. Keeling was appointed active underwriter of syndicate 362 in 1984. He continued as the active underwriter of the syndicate until the end of 1996.

Mr. Keeling was Deputy Chairman of Lloyd's in 1993 and 1994. He was Chairman of the Reserve Group established by Lloyd's for the purpose of the Equitas reserving exercise. At the conclusion of R&R he was awarded the Lloyd's Silver Medal.

Mr. Keeling struck me as a particularly astute underwriter.

Mr. Keeling addressed the following topics in his witness statement:-

(a) a description of syndicate 362; (b) the asbestos problem; (c) run-off reinsurance; (d) additional reinsurance protection; (e) disclosure to Names; (f) RITC process; (g) disputes with Outhwaite and Meacock; (h) recruitment; (i) his personal underwriting; (j) allegations made against Mr. Murray Lawrence.

I refer above to the run-off policy and other protections purchased by syndicate 362 (under the heading Mr. Lawrence).

As to his syndicate's asbestos reserves, Mr. Keeling said that total reserves for asbestos (including outstandings and IBNR) at 31 December 1981 were approximately US$7 million. This figure had risen to US$44 million by 31 December 1987.

As to certain reports relied on by the Names as to the possible impact of asbestos-related claims, Mr. Keeling said:-

"Six months ago we had some very learned Government experts saying Y2K was going to cost between $600 billion and $1.5 trillion...it actually came out at very little, if anything. ... As an underwriter, you see an awful lot of Governmental and scientific reports and you've got to value them."

Mr. Paul Archard

Mr. Archard was a partner in Murray Lawrence and Partners and later Managing Director of both Murray Lawrence and Partners Ltd and the holding company, Murray Lawrence Holdings Ltd. Mr. Archard has always been on the accountancy/management side. Mr. Archard was Chairman of the LUAA Committee in 1992 and held that post until he was appointed to the Lloyd's Regulatory Board in 1993. Between 1996 and 1998 Mr. Archard was a member of the Council of Lloyd's. He was re-elected to the Council in 1999 and is currently a Deputy Chairman of Lloyd's.

Mr. Archard struck me as a careful witness.

In his witness statement Mr. Archard addressed the following topics:-

(a) C.T. Bowring/M.L.P.; (b) the LUAA; (c) recruitment/rota; (d) asbestos knowledge; (e) the RITC process; (f) run-off reinsurance.

Mr. Archard referred to the run-off policy purchased by syndicate 362 ( 2/3rds from the Outhwaite syndicate and 1/3rd from the Meacock syndicate) as a "sleep at night policy". He pointed out that in April 1982 the syndicate purchased a stop loss policy from Munich Re and that in 1984 the syndicate purchased a further stop loss reinsurance policy. These arrangements are described in more detail under the heading Mr. Murray Lawrence.

As to rota Mr. Archard said that rota was not the forum for raising specific claims issues or risks, although the general point about inheriting risks from the past was always made.

Mr. Robin Jackson

In October 1960 Mr. Jackson joined the largest professional reinsurer in the United States, the General Reinsurance Corporation as a trainee casualty facultative underwriter. He worked for General Re for 11 years until June 1971 in their New York office. He underwrote casualty reinsurance (or, liability business as it is known in the UK). In 1971 following a move back to England he started Unionamerica Insurance Co. Ltd for a Los Angeles based financial institution. Mr. Jackson was the Managing Director and was in charge of all underwriting. Unionamerica underwrote most classes of non-marine insurance and reinsurance.

Mr. Jackson joined the Merrett agency in September 1976 to take over from Mr. Leslie Dew as the active underwriter of the non-marine syndicate from 1 January 1977. When Mr. Jackson joined the syndicate in late 1976 it was called syndicate 772. The number was changed to 799 about one year later. Mr. Jackson ceased underwriting on syndicate 799 at the end of the 1988 account, but stayed on at the managing agency for a further two years full time to assist his successors. The 1990 year of syndicate 799 was left open.

Mr. Jackson was Chairman of LUNMA in 1986. He was also a member of the AWP from its inception in 1980 until 1996. From 1984 until 1996 he served as Chairman of the AWP. He was also a Director (and Chairman) of Toplis & Harding (Asbestos Services) Ltd, the service company established by the AWP in 1984 through which the AWP ultimately carried out its administrative functions. The name was later changed to Toplis & Harding (Market Services) Ltd. Mr. Jackson was a Director and Chairman of LMCS from 1990 until October 1998.

From 1994 to 1996 Mr. Jackson worked on the Equitas Project as one of a handful of people making up the Core Group of the Reserving Project. Between 1992 and 1994 Mr. Jackson was the Chairman and Chief Executive of Centrewrite, the first Lloyd's owned operation designed to underwrite (and therefore determine) members' obligations on syndicates in run-off. He was Chairman of and set up the Specialist Claims Unit, established by Lloyd's to handle asbestos, pollution and health hazard claims. This body became the basis for the Equitas Claims Department.

In short, Mr. Jackson has spent nearly forty years handling US liability business in some form or other. Mr. Jackson said that among the underwriting community only Mr. Ayliffe and Mr. Rayment knew as much as he did about asbestos-related claims, adding that they probably knew a bit more.

Mr. Jackson addressed the following topics in his witness statement:-

(a) his career in the insurance industry; (b) his experience of US liability business; (c) asbestos claims and the London Market; (d) the AWP; (e) the Johns Manville settlement; (f) the Wellington Agreement and the Asbestos Claims Facility; (g) DES and other claims; (h) the development of asbestos claims; (i) reinsurance; (j) the Global Accounts; (k) reinsurance to close; (l) expansion of capacity by syndicate 799; (m) disclosure of asbestos by syndicate 799; and (n) his personal underwriting details.

As to asbestos-related claims, Mr. Jackson said that the unique and unprecedented features of the way in which such claims unfolded, was that they did not simply increase in number, peak, then subside, as with nearly all other claims. Instead, the claims reached a steady plateau between about 1982/83 and 1985, then just seemed to increase and increase in waves, facilitated by various inter-related factors. He added "I cannot emphasise enough how the Plaintiff Bar's extraordinary action in connection with asbestos was so fundamental to the development of these claims. ...Everyone recognised the contingency fee, ambulance chasing rationale which drove the Plaintiff Bar; but no one in the industry could have conceived that it would have the profound and grave effect it did."

In his witness statement Mr. Jackson said:-

"During the period 1979-1993 I cannot...remember anyone producing any hard statistical information on what share of asbestos claims was borne by the London market, let alone trying to work out what the relative exposure of the London market, as opposed to the US market, was to asbestos bodily injury claims. In July 1993...I gave a talk to the Association of Lloyd's Members in Boston. For the purposes of the speech I asked Peterson Consulting LP to try to obtain some statistical information as to the amounts paid by insurers and policy holders for asbestos bodily injury indemnity... On the figures which I presented to the meeting in 1993, Lloyd's share was approximately US$2.1 billion of a total of US$7 billion i.e. 30%. These figures made no allowance for outwards reinsurance placed by Lloyd's syndicates. They were not figures which would have been available during the period 1978-1988."

Mr. Jackson concluded his witness statement as follows:-

"It is difficult in a matter of pages to explain just how much time and effort I gave to the problem of asbestos... To be involved in this action after these efforts is insulting. ...Like others in the insurance industry, we at Lloyd's, in good faith, under-estimated the ultimate cost of asbestos losses... What I...strongly deny is any wrong doing in any of my dealings in asbestos matters."

Mr. Jackson pointed out that it doesn't follow that policy holders against whom asbestos-related claims were made had adequate insurance policy limits available to pay them. Mr. Jackson said that it was impossible to work out what the net exposure of Lloyd's would be to any particular risk.

As to his testimony given to Senator Nickles and others on 19 March 1985, Mr. Jackson said "I was perhaps over-egging a situation to try and get their attention."

Mr. Keith Rayment

Mr. Rayment was employed at R.W. Sturge from 1969 to May 1990 in their Claims Department. He was involved in the non-marine syndicates at Sturge, primarily syndicate 210. He became Claims Director of syndicate 210 in 1979. (Mr. Rokeby-Johnson was the underwriter of syndicate 210 from about 1974 to about the end of 1987). From 1983 Mr. Rayment was a member of the Asbestos Working Party. He was a member of the Claims Sub-Committee of the AWP from about 1981 onwards. He also sat on the Reinsurance Claims Sub-Committee of the AWP from 1983. In 1984 the AWP set up a service company called Toplis & Harding (Asbestos Services) Ltd. He was a director of this company from the outset. When the company's name was changed to Toplis & Harding (Market Services) Ltd he remained a director. Mr. Rayment was one of the two London Market representatives (the other being Mr. Ayliffe) asked to negotiate with the asbestos producers and their insurers to reach what ultimately became known as the Wellington Agreement. Mr. Rayment assisted with the setting up of the Asbestos Claims Facility which came about as a result of the Wellington Agreement. In October 1988 the ACF ceased operation and the Center for Claims Resolution was formed by certain asbestos producers to provide similar services. Since then Mr. Rayment has been a non-voting member of the Board of the CCR.

Mr. Rayment first wrote business as a Name in 1980. Syndicate 210 left its 1990 year open. This was the last year that Mr. Rayment was a member of the syndicate.

Mr. Rayment, Mr. Jackson and Mr. Ayliffe were probably the three most knowledgeable people in the Lloyd's market as to asbestos-related claims.

Mr. Rayment struck me as a highly conscientious Claims Man who worked tirelessly to assist the market in relation to the handling of asbestos-related and other long-tail claims. I was greatly assisted by his evidence.

In his main witness statement Mr. Rayment addressed the following topics:-

(a) syndicate 210: asbestos-related risks; (b) syndicate 210: the determination of the reinsurance to close premium; (c) an overview of the nature of asbestos-related claims; (d) the work of the AWP; (e) reserving and attorneys' reports; (f) market knowledge of asbestos; (g) reserving by the Lloyd's market generally; (h) the development of asbestos claims; (i) the Wellington Agreement; (j) asbestos property damage; (k) asbestos bodily injury claims compared with asbestos property damage claims, DES and Agent Orange; (l) impact on other insurers.

In his witness statement Mr. Rayment said:-

"It is true that the Lloyd's Market has learnt, to its detriment, that asbestos has proven to be a unique claim in terms of the volume of underlying claims and the extent of the impact on the Lloyd's Market. But the plain truth is that, notwithstanding the wealth of experience and expertise that the Lloyd's Market had, and the enormous resources and effort which the Market threw into dealing with the problem, asbestos claims developed in a way which was not expected or anticipated by even the most experienced professionals in the Lloyd's Market. The true scale and cost of the asbestos problem is still difficult to quantify and indeed claims are still coming in at a very high rate. No one in the early 1980's anticipated that; not the Lloyd's Market, nor the Company Market; not even the US insurance and reinsurance companies. Asbestos has defied the entire world-wide insurance industry. The whole purpose of the AWP was to get information to the Market, not to withhold or conceal it."

Syndicate 210 purchased a run-off policy from Kemper Re and Fireman's Fund in 1974. The run-off protected the syndicate's 1969 and prior years of account.

As to Mr. Roger Bradley's alleged conversations with Mr. Rokeby-Johnson in 1973, Mr. Rayment said that Mr. Rokeby-Johnson never expressed any such views to him.

Mr. Rayment said that one thing the AWP did not do was to make any IBNR recommendations. Decisions in respect of IBNR were matters for the individual syndicate or company concerned. Mr. Rayment pointed out that the AWP did not try to calculate a figure representing the total reserve requirement of Lloyd's as a whole in relation to asbestos-related claims, let alone to do so by the method adopted by the Names. "I firmly believe that the only way in which a reserve requirement could, and indeed should, have been worked out, was by each syndicate looking at its own inwards book of business, looking at its own reinsurance protections, working out its own outstanding figures, and forming its own view in the light of all the information available to it, as to what its IBNR estimate should be, and hence arriving at its own decision as to what its reinsurance to close should be."

Mr. Rayment said that the market had coped with Allied Crude, Hurricane Betsy, S.M.O.N. (a problem arising from Japanese people taking too many enteroviaform tablets), Computer Leasing and many other claims. During the 1980s the asbestos problem behaved in a way which was quite unprecedented and became much worse than people in the market had anticipated.

Mr. Rayment provided a helpful chart of the development of asbestos claims (see chapter 16, Table 2 below). He said that:-

"Between the Borel decision in 1973 and the beginning of 1981, there were probably something in the region of 8,000 to 10,000 claims in that 8 year period. In the period between 1981 and the Wellington Agreement, the filing pattern was... "remarkably steady at 500 new claims per month." The "opening inventory" of the ACF in mid-1985 was about 25,000 claims. In the 18 month period after the Wellington Agreement the rate of claims rose initially to 700 per month and then to around 1,000 per month. In 1987 the claims rose to 2,000 per month (a fourfold increase in the level of claims pre the Wellington Agreement), and then went up to 3,000 per month, before settling at 1,500 per month for a while. By 1990, this had risen again, so that in the early 1990's the rate was about 24,000 a year; an annual total which was broadly comparable to the entirety of claims in the 10 year period after Borel (1973 to 1983). To bring the picture up to date: the current rate of claims is around 60,000 a year. The current total volume of claims (including those that have been settled) is approximately 450,000."

Mr. Rayment set out in his witness statement some of the interlinked reasons why things looked so different at the end of the 1980s/early 1990s to the way in which they had looked in the early 1980s. He referred to a number of false dawns in connection with asbestos-related claims.

Mr. Rayment cited Johns Manville Corporation as an example of estimates of potential claims proving to be incorrect. In August 1986 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York signed an order pursuant to which Johns-Manville undertook an extensive campaign designed to provide the maximum amount of publicity, with respect to the confirmation process of the Plan before the court. The campaign provided for national television and radio advertisements, newspaper advertisements in the six leading US and Canadian newspapers and in the largest circulation daily newspaper in each State, the District of Columbia and each Canadian Province. This publicity campaign was designed to inform as many future asbestos claimants as possible of the impact of the Manville reorganisation, upon whatever rights they might have against Manville as Debtor. I refer to the decision of Judge Lifland dated 18 December 1986 and the subsequent appeals. In his judgment dated 19 January 1995 Senior District Judge Weinstein of the United States District Court E and SD New York said:-

"When the distribution plan was confirmed in 1986, it was established that the Trust would receive approximately 83,000 to 100,000 claims over the course of its life into the middle of the next century. To date, the Trust has received approximately 240,000 claims and it is expected to receive hundreds of thousands more."

Mrs. Catherine Stynes

Mrs. Stynes qualified as a Chartered Accountant in 1979. After working for Baker Sutton & Co and Ernst & Whinney Mrs. Stynes joined the Corporation of Lloyd's in February 1984 in the AARD. The AARD was the Secretariat to the AASC and provided administrative support to AASC. Mrs. Stynes was appointed Manager of the AARD towards the end of 1984 and became Secretary to AASC. In October 1987 she moved to the Underwriting Agents Department as Manager. In 1989 she became Manager of the Policy Development and Review Department. Mrs. Stynes left Lloyd's in November 1991. While at Lloyd's she was known by her previous married name, Mrs. Cathy Shorthouse.

In her first witness statement Mrs. Stynes addressed the following matters:- (a) the role and responsibilities of the AASC and the AARD; (b) the Global Reports and Accounts; (c) accounting and audit issues.

Mr. Alan Pollard

Mr. Pollard is the Run-Off Operations Director of Equitas Ltd. Before joining Equitas in 1996, Mr. Pollard worked for the Corporation of Lloyd's for over 40 years. He was the Senior Manager of the Membership Group of Lloyd's between 1977 and 1983. In 1983 Mr. Pollard moved to the Lloyd's Policy Signing Office. In October 1988 Mr. Pollard was appointed Director of Administration of AUA 4 Ltd, a specialist company formed by Lloyd's to administer the run-off of certain syndicates. In 1989 the company changed its name to Syndicate Underwriting Management Ltd and in 1990 Mr. Pollard was appointed its Managing Director. SUM was responsible for the run-off of Lioncover which in 1987 had reinsured the PCW syndicates.

In his witness statement Mr. Pollard addressed the following topics:-

(a) information to applicants; (b) Rota Committee interviews; (c) Brochures; (d) regulation of admission procedure; and (e) growth in membership.

Mr. Simon Tovey

Mr. Tovey worked for the Corporation of Lloyd's between 1984 and 1989, latterly as the Manager of the MSSD.

Mr. Tovey joined Lloyd's in April 1984 as an Assistant Manager in the MSSD. He remained as Assistant Manager to Mr. Tony Parkington until August 1985. He was then seconded to work for Mr. David McWilliam, who was head of the Regulatory Services Group, as successor to Mr. Randall. Mr. Tovey stayed there for no more than a year, and then went back to the MSSD as Manager, succeeding Mr. Parkington. He stayed there until March 1989 when he was offered a job by the Sturge Group.

Mr. Tovey addressed the following topics in his witness statement:-

(a) the organisation of the MSSD; (b) alleged concealment of asbestos problems; (c) the Annual Solvency Test; (d) the work of the MSSC; (e) MPRs; and (f) the Statement of Facts on the Regulatory Background.

Mr. Ian Simister

In 1982 Mr. Simister was working as Project Manager of the Management Service Group at Lloyd's. He gave evidence of the postal distribution system within Lloyd's in 1982.

Mr. John Garner

Mr. Garner was called to respond to the evidence of Mr. Steel (see above).

Mr. Garner joined the LIBC in 1986. He remained on the LIBC until the end of 1990. He was Deputy Chairman in 1988 and 1989 and Chairman in 1990.

Mr. Garner referred to the comments which Mr. Steel alleged were made by Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Cockell during a LIBC dinner. Mr. Garner did not recall any such remarks being made by Mr. Lawrence or by Mr. Cockell at a dinner at which he was present, or on any other occasion.

Mr. Alastair Clark

Mr. Clark is the Executive Director, Financial Stability, at the Bank of England. He has line responsibility for the Bank's relationship with Lloyd's. He had some involvement in matters relating to Lloyd's in previous posts in the Bank, but not before 1987.

Mr. Clark referred to references in Names' witnesses statements to a letter from the Bank of England to major banks, purporting to have warned banks of risks and losses associated with underwriting at Lloyd's. Further the Bank of England has had a number of enquiries in the last two years from various individuals alluding to the existence of a report (sometimes referred to as the Armageddon Report), or in one or two instances a letter. In response to these approaches Mr. Clark commissioned a number of reviews of the Bank's records in those areas of the Bank where he would have expected any such report or letter to have been prepared. Nothing found gives any indication that such a report was prepared or that such a letter was written. In addition, Mr. Clark has spoken to a number of those who were at the time Directors or senior staff of the Bank and who would have expected to see, or have been involved in the preparation of, a report or letter on this subject. None of them recalls any such report or letter. In addition the issue has been discussed with Lord Richardson, who has no recollection of a report or letter on this subject.

Statements admitted under CPR Part 33.2

Statements were admitted under CPR Part 33.2 from Mr. Patrick Bird, Mrs. Mary Hitchcock, Mr. Thomas Hitchcock, the Treasury Solicitor, Lord Kingsdown, Mr. Paul Morris, Sir Jeremy Morse, Mr. Ralph Rokeby-Johnson, Mr. Joseph Hodges and Mr. Robert Keville.

Mr. Robin Aaronson

Mr. Aaronson is Director of the London office of LECG, which is the economics and policy practice of Navigant Consulting, an international consultancy firm. Mr. Aaronson has been a consulting economist for about 14 years. Prior to joining LECG, he was a partner in the firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers. Before that he was a member of the Government Economic Service, first at H.M. Treasury, and then at the Monopolies & Mergers Commission.

Mr. Aaronson was instructed as an expert to analyse whether there was any economic evidence that the changes in Lloyd's capacity during the Relevant Period, resulted from exposure to asbestos losses, which did not affect the London market as a whole. In his report he said:-

"I have discovered no evidence that the changes in Lloyd's capacity resulted from exposure to asbestos losses, whether they affected the rest of the London market or not. It might fairly be argued that there is no economic evidence which, even in principle, could prove or disprove the hypothesis. If the hypothesis were true, however, I would have expected to find some pointers to it in the data, for example in Lloyd's capacity expansion during the Relevant Period being particularly concentrated in certain markets, or being unrelated to capacity increases elsewhere. The economic evidence I do have points to alternative explanations for the changes in Lloyd's capacity, and does not support the proposition as stated above. In my view, the changes in capacity experienced at Lloyd's can be adequately explained in terms of external economic and commercial forces."

Mr. Aaronson accepted and emphasised the limited contribution he could make to the issues that I have to decide, as reflected in the passage quoted above.

Witnesses not Called by Lloyd's

Lloyd's did not call a number of witnesses whose witness statements were exchanged. In reaching the conclusions set out in this judgment I have had regard to the fact that Lloyd's did not call these witnesses and I have considered whether any adverse inferences should be drawn.

Appendix 3 contains a Chronology of certain information relevant to asbestos-related claims for the Relevant Period. The keys (SI = syndicates at interest or interested insurers; SS = syndicate specific; PA = Panel Auditors; AWP = Asbestos Working Party) represent an attempt to identify recipients of a document, but do not constitute a finding that any particular individual or syndicate received or was aware of the document or its content. Although Appendix 3 contains extracts from documents, I have of course had regard to the whole of each of the documents referred to (and all other material before the court). Appendix 2 contains a list of US cases concerning coverage etc for asbestos losses for the Relevant Period.

Introduction

Although there have been a variety of mass toxic tort claims in the United States, none have had or continue to have the profound and lasting impact on the global insurance industry that asbestos-related claims have had.

The first problems perceived in relation to asbestos were in respect of asbestos-related bodily injury claims. The first wave of workers bringing asbestos bodily injury claims tended to be those exposed to asbestos in the 1940's and 1950's, often in the shipbuilding industry. The claims which workers brought against policyholders were then presented to the London market under third party general liability policies extending to cover products liability. The products liability sections of such policies were usually written in the aggregate. When Lloyd's issued these policies it was not anticipated that occupational injury claims, let alone asbestos bodily injury claims, would be covered by these policies. In fact, until asbestos claims, these were policies which had rarely been claimed upon. They had previously been profitable policies to write.

The main diseases alleged by claimants to have been caused by exposure to asbestos were (in order of severity of injury) mesothelioma, lung and other cancers, asbestosis and pleural plaques. A typical asbestos claimant would inhale the airborne asbestos particles usually in his workplace. The majority of asbestos claimants over the years have alleged either asbestosis or pleural diseases both of which are dose-related i.e. dependent upon exposure over a significant period of time. Mesothelioma, and certain other cancers, on the other hand, may be contracted after much shorter doses, perhaps even a single short exposure to asbestos.

In 1964 Dr. Selikoff published the first epidemiological study of insulation workers and asbestos diseases; and since then, studies have appeared in medical journals documenting the relationships between asbestos exposure and disease. According to Mr. Rayment, to the extent that insurers would have had asbestos in mind as a potential claim, that would only have been in respect of occupational disease and employer liability policies.

In 1980 the London market's US attorneys, referred to Dr. Selikoff's prediction of 20,000 asbestos-related deaths per year. There are now something like 60,000 claims a year being made, but it was not until towards the end of the 1980's that the insurance industry began to receive anything approaching 20,000 claims a year in total. The majority of the claims over the years have been in respect of asbestosis and pleural diseases. On the whole (apart from the most severe asbestosis claims), these illnesses have not caused deaths. The claims which are more likely to be linked to deaths are those which are cancer-related. But the claims arising from the severe mesothelioma (which is a cancer claim) have remained fairly constant at around 4%, and cancers overall have accounted for around 10-20% of the claims. In the early 1980's the volume of claims was much lower: around 6,000 a year in the period up to the Wellington Agreement. The number of cancer claims was again only a small percentage of that figure: in the hundreds, not the thousands. The insurance industry has never in fact seen anything like 20,000 cancer-related claims a year.

In the case of asbestos-related claims the exposure which the individual has suffered is not as a purchaser of goods on the open market for his own private use, but rather exposure to the product within, usually, the occupational workplace. The majority of these claims involve people who have been exposed to asbestos fibres in their environment, usually their working environment.

Asbestos-related bodily injury claims arising out of workplace exposures started to develop at a time when the products liability laws in the United States were undergoing change. Originally, these types of claim, to the extent that they were even advised to Lloyd's, came through as workers' compensation claims.

Claimants had to undergo medical examinations before the compensation boards prior to having a claim accepted. Even assuming that a claimant could produce the necessary medical and factual evidence required to qualify for workers compensation, the benefit received by an individual was normally expressed as a percentage of their basic income. In most cases, the top benefit would be two-thirds of their average weekly income. In practice, given that the type of worker who might bring a claim in respect of injury caused by asbestos exposure could usually be classified as a low income earner, even the highest compensation available was, in real terms, modest to a person who was totally disabled or whose life expectancy was severely shortened.

Prior to 1965, if a claimant wanted compensation outside the workers compensation laws, he would have to bring a legal action for bodily injury caused by exposure to asbestos based on theories of negligence or breach of warranty. Until 1965, only the actual purchaser of a product could bring a products liability claim against the producer.

In 1965, the American Law Institute issued the second edition of Restatement of the Law of Torts, which significantly enlarged the categories of persons potentially eligible to bring a products liability claim. The new rule ("Rule 402A") eliminated the "privity of contract" requirement for a products liability claim. Thus, not only the direct purchaser, but also any individual who might foreseeably be injured by a product, could bring products liability claims.

One of the first products liability lawsuits which successfully used "Rule 402A" and involved an asbestos bodily injury claim was Borel vs. Fibreboard et al. The case was filed in 1971 in US District Court, Eastern District of Texas. Clarence Borel's asbestos-related injury was due to workplace exposures to asbestos products. These products were supplied to his employer company by a number of asbestos suppliers or producers, of which one was Fibreboard. The case, having reached the appellate courts in 1973, was the first major US case where the courts found liability on the part of the manufacturers on the basis of products liability.

Following Borel, asbestos claims against producers, in time, became more common. A typical case would involve a group of claimants alleging injury against a number of asbestos products manufacturers. A typical claimant was often a transient worker. These workers would have various skills and would be based at a local union hall. Employers who required people for particular projects would go to the union hall to employ the workers needed. These workers would then be employed for the particular project. On completion of the project, they would return to the union hall and await their next employment. Therefore, a typical claimant, who would work for a number of different employers during the course of his working life, would have been exposed to many different asbestos products at different work-sites or projects. Thus, by naming as many of the asbestos producers as possible, the claimant would increase his likelihood of success at trial. In turn, the producers who were being sued might issue a cross-complaint against other producers so as to reduce their potential liability. Workers' compensation had brought only modest compensation. The Borel ruling meant that there was now a way of obtaining compensation which did not require workers to establish negligence, to avoid the worker's compensation route. However, during the 1970's asbestos-related claims remained relatively few, compared with what was to happen later. Prior to 1980 there were only about 950 asbestos cases filed in the US Federal courts.

The number of filings has continually increased since then, with the most significant increase from the late 1980's and through the 1990's. To date there have been about 450,000 individual claims filed. At the end of 1988, (the end of the Relevant Period), there had only been about 100,000 claims filed. The claims are filed in State and Federal courts in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States.

Manifestation Versus Exposure Debate

Whilst the decision in Borel meant that claimants could bring products liability suits against producers, it did not necessarily follow that the producers' products liability insurance policies provided coverage for these claims. Initially, insurers raised a number of defences against the claims made under these policies.

These defences were:

(1) "Expected/Intended". Most modern policy definitions of the term "occurrence" include an exception if the injury or damage was "expected or intended" by the policyholder. However it was not often possible to prove this.

(2) "Non-disclosure/Misrepresentation". However, as many policies were placed in the 1940's through to the 1970's, policyholders could argue that asbestos claims were minimal at the time and would not have impacted insurance policies.

(3) "Known Loss/Known Risk". Courts had generally held that it is not possible to insure against a loss in progress or a known loss. These defences were unsuccessful, due in no small part to the fact that courts which were considering asbestos cases were under significant social pressure to find in favour of coverage.

Prior to asbestos-related claims, it was rare for the London market to become involved in substantial litigation with their policyholders. However, one of the major issues as between the policyholder and its insurers (and indeed amongst the insurers themselves) was the basis on which coverage for asbestos-related claims would be provided; namely, which policies and which insurers would respond to a claim, or what was the "trigger" for coverage.

By the late 1970's, the London market insurers had to consider the basis upon which policies would respond to the 'date of loss' issue. For example, the loss could have occurred at any point during the whole period in which the claimant was exposed to asbestos (the 'exposure' theory); or it could be argued that the loss occurred when the disease resulting from the claimant's asbestos exposure manifested itself or was diagnosed (the 'manifestation' theory).

Bell Asbestos, a Canadian mining company and its primary insurers eventually came to an agreement in 1977 as to the basis on which insurers would respond to the current and future claims. The London market was asked to support the agreement (which adopted an exposure basis) even though, at this stage, the London market had no financial involvement with the claims. This request caused some concern to the market in general. A number of underwriters did not consider the exposure theory allocation to be valid under the terms of the policy. Nevertheless, as a result of the negotiations that took place between Bell and the London market, the London insurers decided to accept the agreement, albeit on a without prejudice basis. (The London market did not pay any losses under policies in respect of Bell until the early 1990's).

Notwithstanding the Bell agreement, it was not until the Eagle Picher and, more importantly the GAF declaratory actions which were filed in 1978 and 1979 respectively, that a large part of the London market became familiar with the manifestation versus exposure debate. Accordingly, it was not until around 1979 that the London market really had to address and take a position in that debate.

Proponents of the exposure theory, which in 1979 included most policyholders and some members of the insurance industry, argued that each injurious inhalation of asbestos fibre causes injury. Accordingly, it was argued, each insurer who provided coverage during the period of time that the claimant was exposed to asbestos fibres should pay a proportion of the damages. Supporters of this theory were able to point to the Borel case, as well as to expert medical testimony that confirmed the progressive nature of asbestos-related diseases.

Those who, on the other hand, supported the manifestation theory, argued that bodily injury did not occur until the continuous and progressive injury process had overcome the body's natural defences and the individual evidenced some symptoms of an asbestos-related disease or some form of dysfunction. Therefore, the date when the claimant became aware of an asbestos-related disease, or the date when the disease was diagnosed (whichever occurred first), was the controlling date for determining which insurance policy should respond.

By the end of 1979, six declaratory actions had been filed. This coverage litigation caused much concern in the insurance markets in both the US and London, not least because of the legal costs involved.

The London market and, in particular, claims men were troubled about the market split in respect of coverage which was apparent in the responses to the increased number of declaratory actions. The fact that the market was split in terms of coverage meant that there was not a co-ordinated response from those involved; on the contrary, the uncertainty over the application of insurance policies lent itself to an inconsistent and impractical approach to the handling of asbestos-related claims within the London market.

The Work of the AWP

I have already referred briefly to the AWP in chapter 10. The AWP's principal aim was to gather information and get it to the market as soon as possible. There was no question of the AWP concealing information nor of downplaying its importance or significance.

There were a number of factors which combined to provide the impetus for the formation of a market body, the AWP, to provide co-ordination and consistency in the handling of asbestos claims by the London market. One of the factors was the manifestation versus exposure argument.

The AWP was established in August 1980. Initially its membership comprised five leading underwriters and four claims personnel from the Lloyd's and Company markets, whose organisations all had interests in US casualty business. Mr. Robin Jackson, Mr. Rokeby-Johnson, Mr. Charles Skey, Mr. Don Tayler and Mr. Ted Nelson (the first chairman) sat on the AWP. The claims sub-committee of the AWP was initially made up of Mr. Philip Froude, Mr. Leslie Kemp, Mr. John Heath and Mr. Jim Ayliffe. Mr. John Heath was the claims manager for H.S.Weavers and represented the Company market from the outset. This claims committee was the driving force behind AWP activities.

For the first two years of operation, the AWP's claims committee, dealt primarily with direct insurance matters only. Later, the AWP created a reinsurance claims committee to deal with the increasing number of reinsurance claims being advised (the original claims committee then became known as the direct claims committee). Mr. Rayment was a member of both. The members of both AWP claims committees were drawn from the senior claims managers of leading Lloyd's and Company market insurers; they were very often leaders of policies written in the London market. These leaders had day-to-day involvement in handling asbestos claims for the accounts which they led. In addition to the claims committees of the AWP, when notifications were received in respect of claims presented against policyholders, specific working claims committees were set up to deal with the policies at issue in respect of each policyholder. As these 'working' or 'ad hoc' claims committees were established for the purpose of claims processing, negotiating and if needs be, providing support in asbestos claims litigation, the leading underwriters on the policies would be invited to serve on the committees on an ad hoc basis, for the purpose of dealing with the claims in question, irrespective of whether they were on the AWP or one of its formal committees. This meant that claims were handled in accordance with the usual market practice (that is by the leaders of the policies in conjunction with their attorneys), with the added assistance provided by members of the appropriate (i.e. direct or reinsurance) AWP claims committee.

The AWP claims committees met on a much more frequent basis than the full AWP in order to discuss individual claims, evaluate the overall claim trends in the United States and consider general issues. Claims committee members were aware of the developments in the United States law relating to both coverage issues and claims handling issues. This knowledge was acquired not only through membership of the AWP claims committees but as a result of hands on experience of day-to-day syndicate matters.

Participation in the AWP was sought from all sectors of the London market and the working party grew. There were representatives from marine and non-marine syndicates; from the Company market including a representative from the Institute of London Underwriters and from the Reinsurers' Offices Association. Although these representatives did not have authority to represent the other members of their organisations, their involvement was sought to bring as wide a perspective as possible from the various sectors of the London market when considering the problems arising from asbestos claims.

The AWP was formed, primarily, with the objective of co-ordinating activity in the area of asbestos-related claims. The AWP liaised with the various entities involved regarding the collation and circulation of information to the London market. The distribution of information to the market was probably the AWP's principal preoccupation. However, the AWP had other functions, one of which was to provide a forum for discussing the problems relating to asbestos claims. It was also the aim of the AWP to explore solutions which might be available to resolve some of the issues raised by asbestos-related claims.

The AWP had no involvement in the resolution of the manifestation versus exposure debate.

The AWP did not make any IBNR recommendations. The AWP considered that decisions in respect of IBNR were matters for the individual syndicate or company concerned. I find that the decision of the AWP not to make IBNR recommendations was an honest decision taken for understandable commercial reasons.

Prior to the establishment of the AWP, attorneys were retained usually by the leaders on the slips to advise on the liability claims presented either by policyholders ("servicing attorneys") or in respect of coverage litigation commenced by policyholders against insurers ("litigation attorneys").

Both the servicing and litigation attorneys reported to the London market. The servicing reports dealt with reserve recommendations in respect of insured claims. The litigation reports contained no reserving information but reported on the progress of litigation from either a manifestation or exposure standpoint. Servicing reports provided underwriters with information to assist both syndicates and companies in setting their reserves. That information was in respect of known claims, such as the number and nature of claims; the average settlement costs of the claims; how the indemnity and expense costs could be allocated over the policies and years on risk; and what the recommended reserve figure would be. The attorneys writing the servicing reports (at the AWP's request) began to try to estimate the likely numbers of claims per insured to the end of each accounting year.

Attorneys began sending the servicing reports in draft and these would be discussed by the claims committee.

As the number of both claims and insureds increased significantly over the years, the number of reports that each syndicate or company in the market would receive per year grew enormously. The servicing reports would go to those syndicates and companies which were on the policies at risk for a particular insured. In order to give an overview to every syndicate and company in the market, the AWP decided to ask attorneys to provide an annual overview report in respect of asbestos claims generally. The insured-specific year-end servicing reports focused on information such as reserve recommendations and increases in claims against that particular insured.

In addition to the attorneys' reports, Mr. Jim Ayliffe or the chairman of the AWP sent

out a market circular in respect of major developments or particular asbestos claims issues.

The AWP recognised that the traditional method by which attorneys' reports were obtained and distributed within the market was not appropriate for the handling of asbestos claims.

The London market's standard practice for adjusting claims made under their policies was as follows. The first stamp or participant of the slip is known as the leading underwriter (sometimes there is more than one leader) and it is this company or syndicate which makes the main decisions and recommendations to the other participants on the slip (the "following market"). Invariably, the leader on a slip had negotiated the premium for the policy and would generally be considered expert in the type of business written. The lead syndicates or companies would handle asbestos claims, as they would all potentially serious liability claims, in conjunction with experienced lawyers. The leader would appoint an attorney to advise on the claim. When a claim was made under a particular policy, the claim would be notified to the broker who originally placed the policy and the broker would prepare a claims file. This file would contain all the claims documentation and a copy of the relevant slips. The file would be shown to the leading underwriter for his review and comments. Then, the file would be presented to the following market for review. Each participant would 'scratch' the file to indicate sight of the documents. Comments might also be made on the file, for instance, syndicates or companies might comment as to whether they agreed with the leader's actions or not. All following syndicates and companies do have the right not to agree to a particular course of action or settlement proposed by the leader. However, in the great majority of situations, the following market tended to adopt the position taken by the leader. This was the standard market practice. Attorneys' reports advising on the claims were traditionally addressed to "Underwriters at Interest" and were sent care of the London broker. The attorneys' report would be placed in the claims file prepared by the broker and circulated around the market. This had been done for many years; albeit, there were exceptions to this system if warranted in individual circumstances or, if due to matters of privacy or concern over litigation and discovery, it was thought that the London broker should not be involved.

There were a number of problems with adopting the usual claims handling procedure for asbestos-related claims. First, the leaders on slips for asbestos-related claims might have espoused 'manifestation', whilst participants further down the slip might have been 'exposure' proponents.

As regards the actual coverage litigation between policyholders and their insurers, two sets of litigation attorneys would have to be appointed because of the market split. One attorney would be retained to advise on the course of the litigation from a manifestation perspective, another attorney would advise on the litigation from an exposure viewpoint. Each 'litigation report' would be privileged as between the attorneys and their respective clients; syndicates who supported manifestation as the basis of coverage could not see exposure litigation reports and vice versa.

There was also another privilege issue. The London market insurers recognised that brokers were the agents of the policyholders. This caused the market some concern. Insurers would not wish brokers to reveal details contained in the attorneys' reports, but, as agents of the policyholders, brokers were obliged to pass on information which might be of interest to the policyholders. This meant that circulation of the attorneys' reports by the brokers was not practical.

Further, as both the number of claims against policyholders and actions for declaratory relief by those policyholders increased, so did the volume of attorneys' reports coming into the market. The pressure on the brokers in respect of the distribution of the reports around the market was very great. There was concern that there might be a delay in some participants on the slip being advised of the asbestos claims. The brokers might not always be able to circulate the claim files to the smaller participants at the end of the slips efficiently due to the sheer volume of claims coming in to the market. An asbestos claim might spread over a 20 year span of insurance coverage (in later years it became evident that there might be 30 or 40 years of insurance coverage targeted). In addition, coverage was usually purchased in layers. Each layer might have 50 Lloyd's syndicates and companies subscribing. Often a syndicate or company would write the policy for a number of years. Therefore, an asbestos producer with a claim could have 200 syndicates and 100 companies insuring it. The attorneys' reports (and claims files) would have to be seen by all those participants. Those near the end of the slips might not see the report for months. This was considered to be a serious problem and it soon became apparent to the AWP that a different method of circulation was required.

Initially, the AWP retained Elborne Mitchell, a firm of solicitors, to hold any reports of a confidential nature. The market was asked to visit Elborne Mitchell's office in order to review documents retained there.

By the end of 1981, when the AWP had been in operation for a full year, it was decided that office space ought to be retained by the AWP. This was the start of the more stream-lined distribution process undertaken by the Toplis & Harding service companies and, ultimately, LMCS. Space was obtained from LUNCO and an AWP office established. Ms Ann Seavers was employed to run the office and to carry out and oversee the distribution of information to the market.

One of the first things Ms Seavers did was carry on the process (originally undertaken by the AWP claims committee members) of locating all slips with asbestos exposure. This was part of building up the coverage picture of every insured. She contacted the brokers and obtained slips from which she could ascertain the identity of every participant on every slip for every year in issue.

The fact that asbestos-related claims potentially affected policies written many decades earlier gave rise to problems in identifying the policies which had been written. The starting point for a claim is when the policyholder puts the underwriter on notice. But this notification process had happened in the past in different ways, for example, a notification through a broker or perhaps a claim on US attorneys. In some cases, more than one broker would be involved, and this might result in notification to two different sets of underwriters and the appointment of two sets of attorneys.

These notifications might themselves not identify all the potential coverage that was available. In some cases, insureds had destroyed or mislaid their documentation, or the documentation pointed to one broker's involvement whereas another broker had been used on different years.

These problems were addressed by sharing information, obtaining the more detailed information required (for example, on the coverage which had been written) and appointing one attorney for each insured so as to avoid duplication.

The AWP (and eventually the Toplis & Harding service companies) spent considerable time unearthing the other policies to which London may have subscribed in order to complete the 'jigsaw' of coverage for each insured. Once details of the policies were found, this was provided to attorneys in order for them to build the coverage profile. As more coverage was identified for each insured, a more precise reserve evaluation could be recommended. Ms Seavers would also then contact the underwriters subscribing to those additional policies to put them on notice of the potential asbestos claims. Often, when the AWP claims committee reviewed the policies, the committee discovered there were coverage issues with the original policyholder; generally these were over the cost clauses or the period and limits of the policy if the policy was not an annual policy.

The building up of the complete coverage profiles for each insured was a complex process. The signing of the Wellington Agreement and the setting up of the ACF enabled the claims committee to resolve virtually all of the coverage disputes regarding the policy wordings for the policyholders subscribing to the ACF. Potential signatories to the Wellington Agreement, as a pre-requisite, had to agree a document known as a 'Schedule D' which recorded all known applicable coverages for each policyholder.

In order to facilitate the distribution of information, the AWP claims committee, or appropriate members of the committee, would pass to Ms Seavers copies of any attorneys' reports which they had received. She would be asked to copy and distribute the report to all the participants on all the slips for all years at issue (in respect of claims presented to insurers), or to either the manifestation or exposure participants who had insured particular insureds (in the case of litigation reports).

Thus each participant received a copy of the attorneys' report and, importantly, received it as soon as was practicable after receipt of the report by the leaders/claims committee.

As time went on and the number of reports to be disseminated to the London market increased, the AWP realised that it needed to establish a company through which it could manage administrative matters. The AWP borrowed the Toplis & Harding name to set up Toplis & Harding (Asbestos Services) Limited in 1984. Toplis & Harding (Asbestos Services) Limited in due course became Toplis & Harding (Market Services) Limited to reflect the fact that the AWP's operations had by 1986 expanded to deal with pollution and other health hazards.

In 1981, following the formation of the AWP, the AWP claims committee, on behalf of the London market, retained Alexander Grant & Company to develop and implement the Claims Information System. The heart of the system was its database. The primary purpose of this database was to provide timely and relevant information to the servicing attorneys.

The numerous complaints being filed in the US against policyholders were reviewed and analysed. The information from that review was fed into the database, which captured over 40 categories of information for each claim, including:

 claimant name and related parties

 jurisdiction(s)

 all defendants named

 local plaintiff law firm(s)

 employer(s)

 the dates of exposure

 diagnosis/manifestation and death

 smoker data

 settlements, etc.

There were a number of key facts that the AWP claims committee together with the servicing attorneys wanted to capture for each claimant, whether the claim was still pending or settled: for example, the dates on which the claimant was first exposed to asbestos; the manifestation date; the various producers filed against; the type of disease alleged; and the amounts paid both for indemnity and defence.

From the database, a number of reports could be obtained:-