CHANCERY DIVISION
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
BUSINESS LIST (CHD)
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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MR KEVIN RALPH WILLIAM RILEY MRS PAULINE CHRISTIANE RILEY |
Claimants |
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NATIONAL WESTMINSTER BANK PLC |
Defendant |
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Paul Sinclair KC (instructed by TLT LLP) for the Defendant/Applicant
Hearing dates: 10 & 11 May 2023, Additional written evidence submitted on 19 May 2023
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Justice Freedman :
I Introduction 1-2 II Background to the settlement/release issue and to limitation 3-24 III The alleged fraud and the Claimant's case about the discovery of the fraud 25-33 IV Submissions of the parties about knowledge of core and non-core business 34-35 V The Settlement Deed 36-44 VI The law 45-60 VII The Settlement Deed and whether or not the instant claim is barred by it 61-84 VIII Is the settlement of the action arguably ineffective due to sharp practice? 85-92 IX The submission that the Settlement Deed was procured by fraud 93-103 X Alternative argument that rescission barred by affirmation 104-107 XI The RHL argument 108-110 XII Limitation 111-126 XIII Counterclaim 127-129 XIV Conclusion 130-131
I Introduction
(i) the claims have been compromised and released by reason of the Settlement Deed (the "Settlement/Release Issue") and/or
(ii) if the claims have not been released, they are statute barred (the "Limitation Issue").
II Background to the Settlement/Release Issue and the Limitation Issue
(a) The allegations of the Claimants
(i) a strategy of exiting the relationship, by no later than 2013, if possible, by an ultimate disposal of the River Crescent development, and further property charged in connection with the 2008 Facility, to the Bank's subsidiary, West Register (Property Investments) Limited ("West Register"); and
(ii) pending exit, deriving significant financial benefit, including in particular from the receipt of (a) payments made by NDA to fund fit out and furnishing of approximately 120 apartments in the River Crescent Development, (b) rents from lettings of the apartments and (c) other fees and charges levied.
(b) The Nabarro Correspondence
(i) the purpose of the letter was to "place on record, the inappropriate and cavalier way in which RBS, as agent for [the Bank], has dealt with our clients culminating in the administration of [RHL]." It accused RBS as agent of the Bank of "irrational, precipitous decisions, misstatements, malpractice and poor customer service";
(ii) it expressly stated that the complaints identified were not an exhaustive list and that investigations continued (paras 2.2 and 12.2).
(iii) it complained of the failure of GRG to release NDA from the cross-guarantee and about a failure to proceed with a proposal put forward by Jones Day in December 2010 which would have enabled the cross-guarantee to be released with consequent damage to the business of NDA which was forced to disclose the cross-guarantee in its accounts. This was said to demonstrate a "total lack of understanding by RBS as to the fundamental security within its debenture";
(iv) it complained about onerous and unreasonable heads of terms for a potential restructuring of the group facilities made on short notice and its effects on NDA especially as regards equity participation (under which West Register an associated company of the Bank would receive a 20% share of the equity in NDA) and the cross guarantee. This affected the financial due diligence undertaken by the financial partners of NDA and in the end led to NDA ceasing to be a very successful business;
(v) it caused a valuer to be used, which in the estimation of the Claimants, had a significant conflict of interest. It ignored the protestations about conflict and relied upon their valuation. The River Crescent Development of RHL was then sold for £21m which the Claimants believe to have been at an undervalue, and the sale of RHL was to West Register, the Bank's investment property company;
(vi) RHL was forced into an insolvency process when it was not insolvent. This caused RHL to go into administration "on misconceived grounds" and/or "on a misconceived basis". As a result, it was alleged that Nabarro's clients had suffered significant loss and damage to their interest in NDA.
(i) RHL had been placed into administration "without good reason" and the Bank had "destroyed the value and reputation of RHL" thereby causing Nabarro's clients to suffer "significant loss and damage";
(ii) The Bank had "destroyed the value of the NDA" through "irresponsible, negligent and reckless conduct";
(iii) Following the debt having been serviced until July 2011 through the NDA by investing millions of pounds into the River Crescent Development, the Bank failed to apply sale proceeds from certain apartments for a period of over a year, it ignored the commercial benefit to itself, RHL and the NDA of the funds committed into the development and applied unreasonable levels of charges thereby destroying an extremely profitable business built up over a period of 23 years;
(iv) The Swap sold to RHL and partly funded by the NDA was in breach of RBS/the Bank's statutory duty. There was "significant criticism of RBS/Natwest employees' actions in relation to the sale of such complex products and the FSA review into the conduct of RBS/Natwest and others";
(v) there was criticism of the approach taken to West Register, stating that "given the increasing public concern in relation to West Register, our clients are concerned that this was a thinly disguised ploy by RBS/Natwest to take on to its books, an incredibly profitable asset at a cut price". (That said, the West Register option was withdrawn);
(vi) Repeated allegations of "irrational and irresponsible decisions, misstatements, malpractice and poor customer service".
(i) It rejected numerous aspects of a report of MCR, insolvency practitioners, who had been appointed to assist RHL with providing profit forecast figures for the Bank in December 2010. It was of concern that the report had been sent to the Bank before the Claimants knew about it. The motives of MCR in producing such a report were questioned, as was the wisdom of the Bank in relying on the report 12 months later in its decision to put RHL into administration.
(ii) It referred at length to the numerous matters referred to in the earlier letters answering the points made by the Bank.
(iii) It referred to LIBOR manipulation and connected this to RBS insisting that the obligations were by reference to LIBOR in the following terms, namely:
(vii) "...as you will be aware from the decision of the FSA... on 6 February 2013, RBS along with other banks has been found to have been complicit in the manipulation of various LIBOR rates between January 2006 and November 2010. When the RHL facility was restructured in December 2008, the obligations under the facility, at the insistence of the Bank, were altered to be by reference to LIBOR.
(viii) Our clients were entitled to assume, and did assume, that the LIBOR rate being applied to the RHL facility was a genuine benchmark reference rate and not one which was being artificially set by the panel banks. RHL believed, as did our clients, who were funding the arrangements that the LIBOR rate was genuine."
(iv) By its final paragraphs:
(1) contrasted what the Bank had stated in its response dated 28 May 2013 in relation to GRG with what (it was said) GRG had actually done, including (allegedly) "putting a viable business into administration at a time when our clients had put significant funds into making the River Crescent apartments suitable for rental and producing a substantial rental." It stated that "[a]ccordingly, our clients have a legitimate claim against the Bank for losses caused by the Bank's actions and inactions"; and
(2) repeated an invitation for a meeting with the Bank to resolve matters including the Swap claim, to set the record straight and avoid litigation.
(c) The Tomlinson Report
(i) The Foreword referred to the need for banks to "remove bad debt from their books, to downsize parts of their portfolio and rid themselves of risky lends". It suggested there was evidence that RBS was "unnecessarily engineering a default to move the business out of local management and into their turnaround divisions, generating revenue through fees…and devalued assets" and that the Bank was extracting "maximum revenue" from businesses which was a "key contributing factor to the business' financial deterioration".
(ii) The Introduction alleged that GRG was not being used as a turnaround division but as a profit centre for the Bank.
(iii) Section 3 summarised Dr Tomlinson's "[f]indings" including that:
(1) The bank artificially distresses an otherwise viable business and through their actions puts them on a journey towards administration, receivership, and liquidation.
(2) Once transferred into the business support division of the bank the business is not supported in a manner consistent with good turnaround practice and this has a catalytic effect on the business' journey to insolvency.
…it became very clear, very quickly that this process is systematic and institutional…[t]his suggests an element of intent in the bank's decision to distress those businesses.
(iv) Section 4:
(1) suggested the Bank looked to engineer defaults by manipulating re-valuations;
(2) reported evidence that no business entering GRG had come back into local management;
(3) reported a perception of an intention by the Bank to purposefully distress businesses to put them into GRG and then take their assets for West Register at a discounted price;
(4) suggested that the Bank should be more transparent if there was an entire sector that the Bank was no longer "in" and wanted to get rid of customers;
(v) among other things, section 5 alleged there were few examples of businesses going into GRG and returning into local management and suggested GRG charged excessive fees, including by requiring independent business reviews.
(vi) Section 6 contained several complaints about West Register including the Bank's alleged conflict of interest and the alleged deliberate undervaluation of property then acquired by West Register at a discounted price.
(vii) The Conclusion stated that :
(ix) "…the findings of the report do clearly show heavy handed, profiteering and abhorrent behaviour of some of the banks towards businesses…it is undeniable that some of the banks, RBS in particular, are harming their customers through their decisions and causing their financial downfall."
(i) The Claimants were aware of the Tomlinson Report shortly after its publication. Mr Riley wrote to his MP the day after publication referring to the Tomlinson Report and to the UK banking industry as "an international laughing stock of fraud and corruption".
(ii) It is now clear that Mr Riley had been carrying out research into allegations of misconduct by GRG in November and December 2013. In particular, Mr Riley sent an email on 20 December 2013 which showed that he had done research into the identities and roles of various people connected with GRG and had reviewed articles on the website ianfraser.org. Various articles on that website, which had been published by December 2013, included allegations of "systemic institutionalised fraud" inside GRG and referred to an alleged strategy by the Bank to shift billions of pounds of commercial property assets from its books.
(d) Other developments in late 2013/early 2014
III The alleged fraud and the Claimant's case about the discovery of the fraud
(i) First, taking the alleged representations pleaded in paragraphs 94(1) and 94(2) of the Particulars of Claim together, that GRG's role was and/or the Bank was willing and/or intended to support the Riley Group with a view towards returning it to the Mainstream Bank (the "Support/Return Representations"). The Claimants say that these representations were false and dishonest because in fact the Bank wished and/or intended to 'exit' the relationship by 2013 and to profit from the Riley Group in the meantime.
(ii) Second, that the Bank did not intend the River Crescent Development to be sold to West Register (the "West Register Representation"). The Claimants say that this representation was false and dishonest because a sale of the development to West Register was the Bank's intention throughout and indeed this was the true reason for the GRG Transfer.
(iii) Third, that the Bank had credit approval for and/or intended to release the sum of £100,000 to one of RHL's creditors, Clegg Construction ("Clegg") if RHL signed a standstill agreement with Clegg (the "£100,000 Representation"). The Claimants say that this representation was false and dishonest because the Bank had no such approval and/or intention.
(i) Emails, manuals and other internal (i.e. GRG) documents which, they say, show that GRG was (or was regarded or treated as) a "profit centre" for the Bank whose aim or purpose was to extract value from (rather than to rehabilitate and/or support) customers and that West Register was one vehicle through which the Bank sought to do so by acquiring 'distressed' assets at an undervalue; and (as the culmination of the series of documents relied on).
(ii) The Promontory Report referred to above, a summary of which was published by the FCA in November 2016, and which was published in full in February 2018.
(i) following the global financial crisis, the Bank had established the Non-Core Division for those of its assets which were no longer considered 'core' to the Bank's business and/or lending model, which assets included, in significant part, commercial real estate assets.
(ii) the key purpose, or one of the key purposes, of the Non-Core Division was to 'run-down' or 'manage down' these assets over a five-year period;
(iii) as such, the Bank's (including GRG's) internal 'strategy' as regards assets and/or customers within the Non-Core Division was to seek an 'exit' within 5 years, that is by the end of 2013.
(i) "RBS did not set out to artificially engineer a position to cause or facilitate the transfer of a customer to GRG; …
(ii) There was not a widespread practice of identifying customers for transfer for inappropriate reasons, such as their potential value to GRG rather than their level of distress; …
(iii) There was no evidence that an intention for West Register to purchase assets had been formed prior to the transfer of the customer to GRG".
(i) the "widespread inappropriate treatment" referred to in the Promontory Report was of a much lower order than that alleged by Dr Tomlinson.
(ii) There was no evidence that assets were systematically undervalued or valuations manipulated to achieve a transfer to GRG.
(iii) There was no evidence that when West Register acquired assets it paid clearly below market price or that West Register made "huge profits" as alleged by the Tomlinson Report.
(iv) Debello's letter of 6 September 2018, despite being sent after, and expressly referring to, the Promontory Report, did not articulate any case based on, or even make any reference to, the Bank's 'Non-Core' division. On the contrary, it largely repeated the content of Nabarro's February 2013 Letter. However, it stated:
(iii) "4.2 Our clients' position, broadly, is that RBS was culpable of systematic and institutional behaviour in artificially distressing their business and pushing them towards liquidation. Evidence is now available, post the Settlement Agreement, to substantiate these claims, and on this basis our clients' intention is now to i) make an application to the court to set aside the Settlement Agreement and ii) instigate legal proceedings against RBS.
(iv) 4.3 We note that the facts of our clients' case reflect the findings in both the Lawrence Tomlinson Report and the s:166 Report."
(v) The Debello letter of 6 September 2018 complained that the Bank's true agenda, from in or about 2009, was to extract maximum value from customers over that period and then dispose of the assets by no later than 2013 – including, if it was financially advantageous to the Bank, by a transfer to West Register. Thus, the Claimants contend that the Alleged Representations were made fraudulently.
(vi) Debello conceded at para 15 of its letter dated 3 May 2022 on behalf of the Claimants that "the Promontory Report does not support alleged systematic fraud" and claimed that the "key point arising from it" was that it provided strong support for the idea that RHL had been identified and classified as 'Non-Core'.
(i) The establishment and purpose of the Non-Core Division was publicly announced (and was the subject of press coverage) in 2008 and 2009 and was (for example) commented upon in the Bank's annual report for 2009.
(ii) The 2013 Treasury Report included extensive discussion in relation to these matters, including in relation to the progress which had been made by the Non-Core Division in achieving its principal purpose.
(iii) In this regard, as to the existence (on the Claimants' own case) of relevant publicly available materials prior to the publication of the Promontory Report, the Bank notes the contents of paragraphs 65 to 72 of the Claimants' Pre-Action Letter dated 23 November 2021.
(iv) Further, as to the existence in the public domain by 2013/2014 of (on the Claimants' case) highly relevant material specifically linking the establishment and/or purpose of the Non-Core Division with the (alleged) activities of GRG, the Bank relies on paragraphs 88(1), 88(4)(d) and 90 of the Particulars of Claim.
(i) GRG's refusal and/or unwillingness to release NDA from the Cross-Guarantee, which it is said resulted in NDA being "effectively lost to the Rileys and/or RHL": see paragraphs 33 to 45 of the Particulars of Claim. A particular complaint is made about the Bank's failure to proceed with a proposal put forward by Jones Day in December 2010, which it is said would have enabled the Cross-Guarantee to be released.
(ii) GRG's insistence on a re-valuation of RHL's assets (including the River Crescent Development) being carried out by King Sturge, who it is said were conflicted and/or prejudiced against the Claimants, and GRG's use of and/or reliance upon that re-valuation to declare that RHL was in breach of covenant and/or otherwise apply pressure to RHL: see paragraphs 46 to 50 of the Particulars of Claim.
(iii) GRG putting forward onerous and/or unreasonable heads of terms for a potential restructuring of the Riley Group's facilities at short notice: see paragraphs 53 to 57 of the Particulars of Claim. Particular complaints are made about the Bank's proposal that under the potential restructure it would, via a subsidiary company called West Register, receive 20% of the share equity in NDA under an 'Equity Participation Agreement' ("the EPA"), which it is said would not have been acceptable to the universities with whom NDA dealt.
(iv) GRG's unreasonable rejection of a restructuring proposal from the Riley Group's auditors, RSM Tenon ("Tenon") and its proposal instead that RHL's properties (except Rufford Hall which is the Claimants' home) be sold to West Register: see paragraphs 61 and 64 to 71 of the Particulars of Claim. It is alleged in this regard that GRG had in fact always intended for the River Crescent Development to be acquired by West Register at a reduced price with a view to the Bank profiting in due course and that this was the true reason for the GRG Transfer.
(v) GRG's decision to cause RHL to enter administration by making a demand for immediate repayment in March 2012, even though it is said that: (a) RHL had sufficient income from lettings at the River Crescent Development to cover its interest costs; and (b) the value of the River Crescent Development exceeded the amount owed by RHL to the Bank: see paragraphs 68 to 69 and 74 to 77 of the Particulars of Claim.
IV Submissions of the parties about knowledge of core and non-core business
(i) the establishment and purpose of the Non-Core Division was publicly announced (and was the subject of press coverage) in 2008 and 2009 and was commented upon in the Bank's annual report for 2009.
(ii) the fact that Dr Tomlinson gave evidence to the body which published the 2013 Treasury Report. This included discussion in relation to these matters, including in relation to the progress which had been made by the Non-Core Division in achieving its principal purpose.
(iii) other press articles relating to allegedly fraudulent practices including sales of properties at an undervalue and being acquired by West Register.
V The Settlement Deed
(i) the allegations in the Nabarro Correspondence;
(ii) the allegations in the Tomlinson Report, the Claimants' contact with Dr Tomlinson and research on the internet; and
(iii) the public statements made by and about the Bank including about its 'Core' and 'Non-Core' divisions.
(iv) "7.1 The terms of this Deed and payment of the Settlement Sum are in full and final settlement of, and each Borrower hereby releases and forever discharges, any and/or all actions, claims, rights, demands, disputes and set-offs or other matters, whether in this jurisdiction or any other, whether or not presently known to the Parties or the law, and whether in law or equity, that it may have or hereafter can, shall or may have against the Bank or any Connected Party of the Bank arising from, out of or in connection with (i) the Facility Agreements, the Personal Guarantee or the Legal Charge; (ii) NDA; or (iii) Riley Holdings and all properties owned or formerly owned by Riley Holdings (collectively the "Released Claims").
(v) 7.2 The Borrowers agree that they will not bring or commence any proceedings whatsoever in any jurisdiction against the Bank or any Connected Party or of the Bank arising out of or in any way connected with the Released Claims save for the purposes of enforcing their rights under this Deed."
(a) The allegations in the Nabarro correspondence
(i) the allegations made included: (i) misstatements and/or malpractice on the part of the Bank; (ii) reckless conduct on the part of the Bank; and (iii) references to conduct which was said to be dishonest and/or deliberately pursued with profit in mind. Reference is made in particular to the involvement in LIBOR manipulation and the "thinly disguised ploy" to take on its books "an incredibly profitable asset at a cut price". Further, a direct contrast was drawn between the way GRG had been described and the way it had (allegedly) behaved.
(ii) a significant number of the allegations made in the Nabarro Correspondence related to RHL, and express reference was made to the value of RHL as having been "decimated" or "destroyed" and the potential future quantification of a claim relating thereto.
(iii) more than one reference was made to publicly available material and/or publicly known issues relating to aspects of the Bank's conduct, including swap mis-selling, LIBOR manipulation and the role of West Register.
(i) the current action involves allegations of specific misrepresentations which did not feature in the Nabarro correspondence;
(ii) the current action involves specific accusations of dishonesty in the nature of making representations known to be false made intentionally or recklessly. There are no allegations of deceit in the Nabarro correspondence;
(iii) there is reference to some common subject matter in a table of the material in the Nabarro correspondence and the factual matters set out in the Particulars of Claim in the instant action. However, this material does not contain any allegations of fraudulent misrepresentations or other dishonest conduct.
(i) the allegations of misstatements and malpractice were not specifically of dishonest conduct, but take their character from the words used e.g. "irrational, precipitous decisions, misstatements, malpractice and poor customer service". These were not specifically words about fraud, but rather acting in an unacceptable manner vis-à-vis their customer. Those particular words themselves were in very general terms: they were not the allegations in the current proceedings without the allegation of fraud or dishonesty.
(ii) the reference to reckless conduct on the part of the Bank was not to the tort of deceit or intentional torts. They take their character from the words used, namely "irresponsible, negligent and reckless conduct".
(iii) the reference to the value of RHL having been decimated or destroyed is a reference not to intentional or dishonest conduct but to the extent of the losses.
(iv) the references to conduct which was said to be dishonest and/or deliberately pursued with profit in mind were not to allegations of dishonesty, because none were made. In particular:
(a) whilst there was a concern that there was a "thinly designed ploy" to earn a profit for West Register at the expense of RHL and the Claimants, this was a concern rather than an allegation, and the particular concern was not about a specific allegation because West Register did not purchase the assets of RHL;
(b) the reference to LIBOR was said to appear "to lay the groundwork" for a potential claim by RHL in relation to alleged LIBOR manipulation. This was not the same as making such a claim (and no claim ensued or was notified): it was not alleging that the relevant representatives of the Bank were involved in swap mis-selling.
(b) The allegations in the Tomlinson Report
(c) The public statements made by and about the Bank including about its 'Core' and 'Non-Core' division
VI The law
(vi) "The contract should be given the meaning it would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which is reasonably available to the person or class of persons to whom the document is addressed."
(a) The appropriate approach to contractual releases
(vii) "8. I consider first the proper construction of this release. In construing this provision, as any other contractual provision, the object of the court is to give effect to what the contracting parties intended. To ascertain the intention of the parties the court reads the terms of the contract as a whole, giving the words used their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of the agreement, the parties' relationship and all the relevant facts surrounding the transaction so far as known to the parties. To ascertain the parties' intentions the court does not of course inquire into the parties' subjective states of mind but makes an objective judgment based on the materials already identified. The general principles summarised by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896,912-913 apply in a case such as this.
(viii) 9. A party may, at any rate in a compromise agreement supported by valuable consideration, agree to release claims or rights of which he is unaware and of which he could not be aware, even claims which could not on the facts known to the parties have been imagined, if appropriate language is used to make plain that that is his intention. … This seems to me to be both good law and good sense: it is no part of the court's function to frustrate the intentions of contracting parties once those have been objectively ascertained.
(ix) 10. But a long and in my view salutary line of authority shows that, in the absence of clear language, the court will be very slow to infer that a party intended to surrender rights and claims of which he was unaware and could not have been aware.…"
At paragraph 17, Lord Bingham described this not as a rule of law but as "a cautionary principle".
(x) "26. [T]here is no room today for the application of any special 'rules' of interpretation in the case of general releases. There is no room for any special rules because there is now no occasion for them. A general release is a term in a contract. The meaning to be given to the words used in a contract is the meaning which ought reasonably to be ascribed to those words having due regard to the purpose of the contract and the circumstances in which the contract was made. This general principle is as much applicable to a general release as to any other contractual term. Why ever should it not be?
(xi) 27. That said, the typical problem, as I have described it, which arises regarding general releases poses a particular difficulty of its own. Courts are accustomed to deciding how an agreement should be interpreted and applied when unforeseen circumstances arise, for which the agreement has made no provision. That is not the problem which typically arises regarding a general release. The wording of a general release and the context in which it was given commonly make plain that the parties intended that the release should not be confined to known claims. On the contrary, part of the object was that the release should extend to any claims which might later come to light. The parties wanted to achieve finality. When, therefore, a claim whose existence was not appreciated does come to light, on the face of the general words of the release and consistently with the purpose for which the release was given the release is applicable. The mere fact that the parties were unaware of the particular claim is not a reason for excluding it from the scope of the release. The risk that further claims might later emerge was a risk the person giving the release took upon himself. It was against this very risk that the release was intended to protect the person in whose favour the release was made. For instance, a mutual general release on a settlement of final partnership accounts might well preclude an erstwhile partner from bringing a claim if it subsequently came to light that inadvertently his share of profits had been understated in the agreed accounts.
(xii) 28. This approach, however, should not be pressed too far. It does not mean that, once the possibility of further claims has been foreseen, a newly emergent claim will always be regarded as caught by a general release, whatever the circumstances in which it arises and whatever its subject matter may be. However widely drawn the language, the circumstances in which release was given may suggest, and frequently they do suggest, that the parties intended, or, more precisely, the parties are reasonably to be taken to have intended, that the release should apply only to claims, known or unknown, relating to a particular subject matter. The court has to consider, therefore, what was the type of claims at which the release was directed … Echoing judicial language used in the past, that would be regarded as outside the "contemplation" of the parties at the time the release was entered into, not because it was an unknown claim, but because it related to a subject matter which was not "under consideration".
(xiii) 29. This approach, which is an orthodox application of the ordinary principles of interpretation, is now well established. Over the years different judges have used different language when referring to what is now commonly described as the context, or the matrix of facts, in which a contract was made. But, although expressed in different words, the constant theme is that the scope of general words of a release depends upon the context furnished by the surrounding circumstances in which the release was given. The generality of the wording has no greater reach than this context indicates[emphasis added]."
"… Generally people will say what they mean. Generally if they intend their agreement to cover the unknown or the unforeseeable, they will make it clear that their intention is to extend the agreement to cover such cases. If an agreement seeks to curtail the possible liabilities of one party, he, if not both of them, will generally be concerned to secure that the writing clearly covers that curtailment."
(b) May a general release extend to fraud claims?
209. …I find it more difficult to say that they intended to release Western Star from liability for claims arising out of its own fraud, however. I am satisfied that neither party had the possibility of fraud in mind. As Rix LJ said in HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd v Chase Manhattan Bank [2001] EWCA Civ 1250, [2001] 2 Lloyd's Rep 483 at page 512, fraud is a thing apart because parties contract with one another in the expectation of honest dealing. Moreover, the manner in which fraud is treated in Article 12 of the Share Purchase Agreement reinforces the conclusion that the parties in this case regarded it as giving rise to fundamentally different considerations. If, therefore, Mr. Ellis's knowledge is to be imputed to Western Star so as to render any of the representations not only false but fraudulent, I do not think that the settlement agreement was intended to deprive MN of its right to pursue a claim in respect of them."
"84. I do not accept this submission. I would agree that the exclusion clause cases should not be automatically imported into the area of releases, but that is not what either Moore-Bick LJ did in MAN Neufahrzeuge AG v Ernst & Young [sic], or what Flaux J did in the present case. Lord Bingham said (Bank of Credit and Commerce International (in liquidation) v Ali (at [10]) that 'a long and … salutary line of authority shows that, in the absence of clear language, the court will be very slow to infer that a party intended to surrender rights and claims of which he was unaware and could not have been aware.' Lord Browne-Wilkinson agreed, and Lord Clyde (at [86]) expressed substantially the same view. It seems to me to be clear that the same principle must apply to fraud-based claims. If a party seeking a release asked the other party to confirm that it would apply to claims based on fraud, it would not, in most cases, be difficult to anticipate the answer.
85. It is not, I think, very helpful to consider whether the release/covenant not to sue applies in the abstract to unknown claims, and then separately whether it applies to fraud-based claims. The true question is whether on its proper construction it applies to claims of the type made in the Texas proceedings, namely that, unknown to Upaid when the Settlement Agreement was entered into, Upaid was supplied by Satyam with forged assignments. To that question it seems to me that there is only one possible answer. In my judgment, express words would be necessary for such a release…"
"This appeal raises the familiar issue of whether an agreement for the settlement of "all and any claims" between the parties (whether or not known to them at the time), had the effect of compromising claims in fraud and dishonesty (and, in the present case, conspiracy), notwithstanding that claims of that nature were not expressly mentioned in the agreement."
In referring to the case, it is important not to lose sight of the need to interpret each contract of release separately having regard to the particular words of the contract and the different factual matrix in each case.
"I agree with the Judge's understanding, expressed at [94] and [97], that neither Moore-Bick LJ nor Lawrence Collins LJ was suggesting any departure from the application of the ordinary principles of contractual construction in the case of fraud claims. Rather, consistently with those principles, they recognised that part of the commercial context to be taken into account was that parties would generally proceed on the basis of honest dealing and would not readily release unknown claims in respect of the fraud of their counterparty. Both decisions reflect that the specific release under consideration did not demonstrate an intention to settle claims in fraud. As the claims in Satyam were based on the fact that assignments had been forged, the release would have only been effective in respect of such claims if express words had been used: that should not be read as support (even obiter) for the proposition that express words are always or even generally required to release a claim in fraud." (emphasis added)
"44. It was agreed that the 2014 Releases must be construed in accordance with the principles in Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619. Those principles were endorsed by the Supreme Court in Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] AC 1173. As Lord Hodge explained at [10] of his judgment, the court must ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have used and in doing so 'must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning.' He also reiterated the principle that the interpretation of contracts is a unitary exercise, stated that the process is an iterative one and added at [12]:
'To my mind once one has read the language in dispute and the relevant parts of the contract that provide its context, it does not matter whether the more detailed analysis commences with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract, so long as the court balances the indications given by each.'
…
49. It seems to me that the definition of 'Claims' in clause 2(a) viewed in the context of the Revised Redress Offer as a whole and clause 2(a) in particular, and in the light of its relevant factual context, is extremely wide and is sufficient to include the claim of unlawful means conspiracy. 'Claims' are defined to include 'all complaints, claims and causes of action in any way connected to the sale of the IRHPs' (emphasis added). The language used is broad and unambiguous and it seems to me to be inescapable that it is sufficiently wide to include the claim as pleaded in the proposed amended pleading which contains numerous references to the sale of the IRHPs and their effects upon the Appellants."
"58. In my judgment there is no merit in the suggestion that the Judge's approach to construction of the Settlement Agreement was overly-literalist or otherwise wrong, for the following reasons:
i) The Judge undertook a detailed and careful consideration of both the wording of the relevant clauses and the factual matrix, reaching the conclusion that both pointed to the release covering all claims relating to the subject matter in existence as at its date, including those now alleged by MRL. In so doing, he carried out the unitary exercise identified and explained in Wood v Capita Insurance Service Ltd [2017] AC 1181; [2017] UKSC 24 by Lord Hodge at [12], it being unimportant whether the Judge started "with the factual background and the implications of rival constructions or a close examination of the relevant language in the contract".
ii) In the course of the above exercise, the Judge (as he was both entitled and obliged to) had regard to the nature of the drafting, placing particular weight on the text due to the fact that it was formal and high quality. His detailed consideration of the precise words used by the parties reflected the approach adopted by Asplin LJ in Elite, as did his conclusion.
iii) The Judge had full regard to the "cautionary principle", reflected in his recognition in [117] that, in the absence of express words one will not readily conclude that a reasonable person would understand a release to refer to fraud or dishonesty claims. His reference in that paragraph to the words of the release being "unequivocal and unambiguous" and evincing a plain intention to omit nothing and leave no loopholes was not the sole justification for his decision, but was the second of three reasons for rejecting the submission that the absence of express words was determinative against the release of claims in fraud. The first reason was that the absence of express words was not determinative given that he had already reached the conclusion, on ordinary principles of construction, that fraud was included in the release (see [116]), and that there was no rule of law that it should be determinative. The third was that the release was framed in terms of subject matter, further explaining why express words were not necessary to incorporate claims in fraud. Again, that third reason was expressed to be an element in the Judge's overall assessment, not a determinative factor. (emphasis added)
59. I am also in full agreement with the Judge's conclusion as to the proper construction of the Settlement Agreement, essentially for the reasons he gave, but perhaps looking at matters in a different order as follows:
i) I would start by considering the nature of the dispute which was being settled. The Spring Law letter, although framing claims in terms of breach of contract and negligence, made clear and express allegations amounting to breach of fiduciary duty by Bonhams in its role as agent for MRL. The letter asserted repeated and deliberate steps taken by Bonhams to profit considerably at MRL's expense, including accusations of illegality and duress, to which can be added evidence that Mr Brooks had threatened to "destroy" Mr Sullivan. The connection between Bonhams and Lohomij was referenced numerous times, the clear implication being that that link had been or could be used to prejudice MRL's position. Combined with the assumption in the without prejudice letter that Bonhams could procure agreement by Lohomij and the subsequent joinder of Lohomij as a party to the Settlement Agreement (recognising that no separate allegations had been made against it), it was clearly envisaged that Lohomij might be said to be liable for MRL's alleged wrongdoings.
ii) In that factual and commercial context, the widely worded release of all claims, no matter the cause of action, arising out of the above matters would naturally and obviously include claims that Bonhams' actions amounted to deliberate and dishonest breaches of fiduciary duty in combination with others, including in particular Lohomij. I consider that to be the case with full regard to any cautionary principle that applies. To apply the test referred to in Satyam, if the parties, on entering the Settlement Agreement, had been asked whether MRL could thereafter bring claims for the matters referred to in the Spring Law letter, but reformulated as being part of an unlawful means conspiracy, the answer would surely have been that they could not. It would have been uncommercial and surely not intended that MRL would benefit from the waiver of a fee of €13.6m and the extension of its loan facility from Lohomij, but remain free to pursue the very same accusations merely by recasting them as having been unlawful acts carried out in combination.
iii) It is true that the Settlement Agreement contained a standard "entire agreement" clause which excluded claims in fraudulent misrepresentation from its scope. Such a clause addresses a very different question than the scope of the release. But in any event, as Arnold LJ pointed out in the course of argument, the inclusion of that clause demonstrates that the parties were perfectly able to exclude fraud from the scope of the provisions if they intended to do so.
iv) It follows, in my judgment, that the proper unitary exercise of construing the Settlement Agreement leads to the inevitable conclusion that claims in fraud, dishonesty and conspiracy were released."
(c) General principles
(i) the interpretation of a release is a matter of construction according to usual principles, there being no special rules of interpretation in respect of deeds of release;
(ii) the task is to ascertain the intention of the parties from the terms of the contract as a whole giving the words used their natural and ordinary meaning in the context of the agreement the parties' relationship and all the relevant facts surrounding the transaction as known to the parties;
(iii) as Lord Hodge explained in Wood v Capita [2017] AC 1173 at para.10 the Court must ascertain the objective meaning of the language which the parties have used and in doing so "must consider the contract as a whole and, depending on the nature, formality and quality of drafting of the contract, give more or less weight to elements of the wider context in reaching its view as to that objective meaning."
(iv) the Court must read the language in dispute and the relevant parts of the contract that provide its context. Then it does not matter which the Court considers first, the factual background and the implications of the rival constructions, or a close examination of the relevant language of the contract: see Wood v Capita at para. 12. It is an iterative process going from language to context or the other way around and to and fro, balancing the indications given by each.
(v) the true question is whether on its proper construction the release applies to claims of the type made in the proceedings. It is not a helpful approach to consider whether the release applies in the abstract to unknown claims and then separately whether it applies to fraud-based claims: see Satyam at para. 85 as quoted above.
(vi) the cautionary principle identified by Lord Bingham in BCCI v Ali, is that in the absence of express words one will not readily conclude that a reasonable person would understand a release to refer to fraud or dishonesty claims. This is not a rule of law. The absence of express words is not determinative: see Maranello at first instance at para. 117 and in the Court of Appeal at paras. 44 and 58(iii) (as quoted respectively at paras. 55 and 57 above), and particularly the statement that Satyam is not authority, even obiter, for "the proposition that express words are always or even generally required to release a claim in fraud".
(b) The law relating to summary judgment/strike out
(i) Power to strike out a statement of case
(xiv) "3.4
(1) In this rule and rule 3.5, reference to a statement of case includes reference to part of a statement of case.
(2) The court may strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court –
(a) that the statement of case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim;
(b) that the statement of case is an abuse of the court's process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just disposal of the proceedings; or
(c) that there has been a failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order."
(ii) Grounds for summary judgment
"24.2 The court may give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a particular issue if –
(a) it considers that –
(i) that claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or
(ii) that defendant has no real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and
(b) there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial."
(Rule 3.4 makes provision for the court to strike out a statement of case or part of a statement of case if it appears that it discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending a claim)"
"The correct approach on applications by defendants is, in my judgment, as follows:
i) The court must consider whether the claimant has a "realistic" as opposed to a "fanciful" prospect of success: Swain v Hillman [2001] 2 All ER 91;
ii) A "realistic" claim is one that carries some degree of conviction. This means a claim that is more than merely arguable: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel [2003] EWCA Civ 472 at [8]
iii) In reaching its conclusion the court must not conduct a "mini-trial": Swain v Hillman
iv) This does not mean that the court must take at face value and without analysis everything that a claimant says in his statements before the court. In some cases it may be clear that there is no real substance in factual assertions made, particularly if contradicted by contemporaneous documents: ED & F Man Liquid Products v Patel at [10]
v) However, in reaching its conclusion the court must take into account not only the evidence actually placed before it on the application for summary judgment, but also the evidence that can reasonably be expected to be available at trial: Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v Hammond (No 5) [2001] EWCA Civ 550 ;
vi) Although a case may turn out at trial not to be really complicated, it does not follow that it should be decided without the fuller investigation into the facts at trial than is possible or permissible on summary judgment. Thus the court should hesitate about making a final decision without a trial, even where there is no obvious conflict of fact at the time of the application, where reasonable grounds exist for believing that a fuller investigation into the facts of the case would add to or alter the evidence available to a trial judge and so affect the outcome of the case: Doncaster Pharmaceuticals Group Ltd v Bolton Pharmaceutical Co 100 Ltd [2007] FSR 63 ;
vii)On the other hand it is not uncommon for an application under Part 24 to give rise to a short point of law or construction and, if the court is satisfied that it has before it all the evidence necessary for the proper determination of the question and that the parties have had an adequate opportunity to address it in argument, it should grasp the nettle and decide it. The reason is quite simple: if the respondent's case is bad in law, he will in truth have no real prospect of succeeding on his claim or successfully defending the claim against him, as the case may be. Similarly, if the applicant's case is bad in law, the sooner that is determined, the better. If it is possible to show by evidence that although material in the form of documents or oral evidence that would put the documents in another light is not currently before the court, such material is likely to exist and can be expected to be available at trial, it would be wrong to give summary judgment because there would be a real, as opposed to a fanciful, prospect of success. However, it is not enough simply to argue that the case should be allowed to go to trial because something may turn up which would have a bearing on the question of construction: ICI Chemicals & Polymers Ltd v TTE Training Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 725."
VII The Settlement Deed and whether or not the instant claim was barred by it
"7.1 The terms of this Deed and payment of the Settlement Sum are in full and final settlement of, and each Borrower hereby releases and forever discharges, any and/or all actions, claims, rights, demands, disputes and set-offs or other matters, whether in this jurisdiction or any other, whether or not presently known to the Parties or the law, and whether in law or equity, that it may have or hereafter can, shall or may have against the Bank or any Connected Party of the Bank arising from, out of or in connection with (i) the Facility Agreements, the Personal Guarantee or the Legal Charge; (ii) NDA; or (iii) Riley Holdings and all properties owned or formerly owned by Riley Holdings (collectively the "Released Claims").
7.2 The Borrowers agree that they will not bring or commence any proceedings whatsoever in any jurisdiction against the Bank or any Connected Party of the Bank arising out of or in any way connected with the Released Claims save for the purposes of enforcing their rights under this Deed."
(a) "any and/or all actions, claims, rights, demands, disputes and set-offs"
(b) "whether or not presently known to the Parties or the law" (in other words, it refers expressly to unknown claims);
(c) "it may have or hereafter can, shall or may have against the Bank or any Connected Party" (in other words, it refers to present and future claims)
(d) it has a connection with subject matter through the words "arising from, out of or in connection with (i) the Facility Agreements, the Personal Guarantee or the Legal Charge; (ii) NDA; or (iii) Riley Holdings and all properties owned or formerly owned by Riley Holdings."
Clause 7.2 widens the effect of the Released Claims by an obligation not to bring "any proceedings whatsoever" in any jurisdiction "arising out of or in any way connected" with the Released Claims.
"The Parties expressly agree that they will not have any right of action in relation to any statement or representations made by or on behalf of any other Party in the course of any negotiations which preceded the execution of this deed, unless such statements or representations were made fraudulently".
(a) The Bank's submissions
(a) an early settlement sum within a year of the Settlement Deed comprising a sum of £1,100,000: see Clauses 2.2.1(a), 1.4.7 and 1.4.8; or
(b) a deferred settlement sum in accordance with deferred settlement terms comprising a sum of £1,250,000 plus interest at a rate of 2 per cent over Base Rate, compounding quarterly with deferred settlement terms agreed for monthly payments, minimum annual payments and a final payment: see Clauses 2.2.1(b), 1.4.5, 1.4.6, 1.4.10, 1.4.11, 1.4.13 and 1.4.14.
This shows that there was a very substantial reduction in the indebtedness conditional on payment either on the basis of the early settlement terms or the deferred settlement sum. The Settlement Deed provided for events of default and acceleration at Clause 5.
(b) The Claimants' submissions
(i) however widely drawn the contract was as regards the terms of the release, there was no express provision to the effect that the release extends to claims in respect of fraud. (Since the close of oral argument, the Claimants have provided a redacted agreement in an unrelated matter which expressly discharged fraud claims);
(ii) the Court should apply the cautionary principle and infer that the parties would not generally have intended to include fraud being practised by one party on the other which was unknown to the other party as being covered by the settlement;
(iii) in the event that there had been a request from the Bank to the Claimants as to whether the release could extend to fraudulent misrepresentation, the answer would have been in the negative;
(iv) the agreement was predicated upon breach of contract and negligence and the like, but it was not intended to wash away fraud;
(v) the correspondence of the Claimants' solicitors, despite being the obvious product of considerable thought and the matters being set out in detail did not allege expressly the tort of deceit. The submissions of the Claimants at para. 35 as regards the lack of knowledge of the Bank's characterisation of core and non-core business and at paras.39-41 above as regards the Nabarro correspondence are repeated;
(vi) the Tomlinson Report did not make reference to the fraud by reference to the core and non-core business differentiation. The submissions of the Claimants summarised at para.43 above as regards the Tomlinson Report are repeated;
(vii) the Court at this summary judgment stage should operate on the basis that the Claimants did not know about the core and non-core business differentiation until the Promontory Report in 2018.
(c) Discussion
(i) the references in the Nabarro Correspondence to LIBOR manipulation. I do not accept that this is simply laying the ground for a possible future claim. It is stronger than that, at least in the letter of 21 November 2013. That is by its nature an allegation of deliberate misconduct.
(ii) the references in the Nabarro Correspondence to "a thinly disguised ploy by RBS/Natwest to take on to its books, an incredibly profitable asset at a cut price" for the benefit of West Register and contrary to the interests of RHL and the Claimants. This is to be seen in the context of other allegations such as misstatements and malpractice. Although the term "concern" was used, it is not an answer, if it was the case, that this was a concern rather than an allegation. In my judgment, whichever of the two it was, it shows that the context of the Settlement Deed was either a claim to this effect or an intimation of a possible claim. Whichever it was, its effect is that deliberate wrongdoing was a part of the backdrop to the Settlement Deed.
(iii) the references in the Tomlinson Report to systematic and institutional transfer of a business from being viable to a journey towards insolvency where the Bank manipulates valuation, distresses the business to take the assets for West Register at a discounted price.
(iv) the adoption of this report by the Claimants who referred to the same being autobiographical and made more general references to fraud and corruption in the UK banking industry.
(i) The allegation of forcing a profitable company into insolvency and a thinly disguised ploy with a view to acquiring them for the benefit of an associated company West Register is to the effect that there was deliberate misconduct to look after the Bank's interests at the expense of RHL or the Claimants. This is very close to the particular deceit of promising to look after the interests of RHL and the Claimants whilst having decided to treat the assets as non-core assets and to exit the relationship.
(ii) It is in this context that expressions like "irrational, precipitous decisions, misstatements, malpractice and poor customer service" do not connote simply breach of contract or negligence but are broad enough also to connote deliberate misconduct.
(iii) There was a lot of concentration on whether the Tomlinson Report had provided a basis for pleading fraud. As regards the question of construction, whether it did provide a basis is not to the point. The point is that there were allegations of deliberate misconduct of a closely related kind to the allegations later to appear in the Particulars of Claim, namely artificially distressing an otherwise viable business and causing them to become insolvent in a systematic and institutional way. The alleged purpose was to distress businesses to put them into GRG and then take their assets for West Register at a discounted price.
(iv) If there was any doubt as to what this meant or as to the knowledge of the Claimants of the Tomlinson Report, the Claimants identified themselves with it by referring to the Report as being autobiographical and the adoption of the Report as exposing "fraud and corruption".
(v) All of this is captured by the wide wording in Clauses 7.1 (the Released Claims) and 7.2 (the covenant not to sue). It arose from or out of the banking relationship referred to in the subject matter of the release mentioned in Clause 7.1 of the Settlement Deed. Alternatively, it was in connection with the banking relationship there referred to. It came within the scope of the covenant not to sue in Clause 7.2 in that it arose out of was "in any way connected with" the Released Claims (as defined in Clause 7.1).
(i) GRG's refusal to allow the cross guarantee to be released from NDA;
(ii) the insistence on the re-valuation of RHL's assets and using conflicted valuers;
(iii) putting forward onerous and/or unreasonable heads of terms for a potential restructuring of the Riley Group's facilities at short notice;
(iv) the proposal that RHL's properties be sold to West Register, an associated company of the Bank at a reduced price;
(v) GRG's decision to cause RHL to enter administration by demanding payment in March 2012 despite RHL having money to pay interest costs and the value of the development exceeding the amount owed by RHL to the Bank.
(i) The Tomlinson Report referred to banks including RBS artificially distressing viable businesses enabling West Register to take the assets at a discounted price. Mr Riley regarded these allegations as autobiographical, in other words reflecting their experience of dealing with the Bank;
(ii) Mr Riley wrote to his MP the day after publication referring to the Tomlinson Report and to the UK banking industry as "an international laughing stock of fraud and corruption".
(iii) Mr Riley had been carrying out thorough research into allegations of misconduct by GRG including a website ianfraser.org which referred to "systemic institutionalised fraud" inside GRG.
(iv) The Nabarro letters had expressed a concern that the conduct of the Bank was a "a thinly disguised ploy by RBS/Natwest to take on to its books, an incredibly profitable asset at a cut price". This concern in the context of everything else was to the effect that the Bank was involved in deliberate activity to make the Claimants and their companies fail so that they could obtain profitable assets at a large discount.
(v) The allegations made in the Nabarro letters included: (i) misstatements and/or malpractice on the part of the Bank; (ii) reckless conduct on the part of the Bank; and (iii) references to conduct which was said to be deliberately pursued with profit in mind.
VIII Is the settlement of the action arguably ineffective due to sharp practice?
"Thus far I have been considering the case where both parties were unaware of a claim which subsequently came to light. Materially different is the case where the party to whom the release was given knew that the other party had or might have a claim and knew also that the other party was ignorant of this. In some circumstances seeking and taking a general release in such a case, without disclosing the existence of the claim or possible claim, could be unacceptable sharp practice. When this is so, the law would be defective if it did not provide a remedy."
"70. …a person cannot be allowed to rely upon a release in general terms if he knew that the other party had a claim and knew that the other party was not aware that he had a claim. I do not propose any wider principle: there is obviously room in the dealings of the market for legitimately taking advantage of the known ignorance of the other party. But, both on principle and authority, I think that a release of rights is a situation in which the court should not allow a party to do so. On the other hand, if the context shows that the parties intended a general release for good consideration of rights unknown to both of them, I can see nothing unfair in such a transaction."
"119. …If there is any unconscionability, it seems to me rather to lie with MRL's attempt to make substantially the same complaints under a very slightly different guise—and, moreover, when by the Settlement Agreement it freely gave up the opportunity of learning more about the background to the self-interested conduct of which it complained. Its complaints regarding the acquisition of the Collection, the financing of that acquisition, the Commercial Agreement and the sale of the Collection were all settled for substantial value in a contract reached by commercial parties with equal bargaining positions and legal representation. And that settlement expressly included a release of unknown claims in circumstances where MRL had (on its own case) objective grounds of knowledge of deliberate wrongdoing by the Bonhams Defendants and a combination involving Lohomij. Yet now it seeks to sue for precisely the same matters because of what it says is new information concerning the defendants' motivations for doing the very things previously complained of. I regard this as a simple attempt to avoid the effect of a commercial contract freely entered into, and I unhesitatingly reject the suggestion that equity should relieve MRL of the consequences of its contract."
"65. MRL argues on this appeal that the Judge's reasoning failed to recognise the (necessarily assumed) fact that the respondents knew that they had unlawfully conspired against MRL and that MRL was unaware of that conspiracy. MRL contends that several of the factors referenced by the Judge, such as MRL "freely" giving up the opportunity to learn more about the background, the substantial value obtained by MRL and the equality of bargaining power, are all undermined by the assumed fact that the respondents were taking advantage of the ignorance of their victim. MRL's submission is that the full background should properly be examined at a trial and that the application of the sharp practice principle (itself a developing area of law and equity) could then be considered in the light of the full facts.
66. In my judgment MRL's contention fails to address the core of the Judge's reasoning, namely, that it was not arguable that it was unconscionable for the respondents to rely on the release as having settled claims in fraud and conspiracy. This is not a case where the respondents knew that MRL had claims of which it was totally unaware and took advantage of that ignorance by obtaining a release which settled those claims surreptitiously. As the Judge explained in some detail, MRL was fully aware, and had alleged, that Bonhams had damaged MRL by acting (deliberately) in breach of its duties as agent, leveraging its connection with Lohomij to do so. MRL had chosen not to investigate the full background to that wrongdoing and the extent to which the respondents had acted together, but chose to settle those claims for very valuable consideration. Far from it being unconscionable for the respondents to rely on the release, it was obviously unconscionable for MRL to seek to avoid the release by re-asserting the very same factual contentions, but arguing that they were unlawful acts pursuant to a conspiracy. I see no basis for overturning the Judge's decision in that regard.
67. I would add that, where a release is construed as covering unknown claims in fraud, dishonesty and conspiracy relating to a defined subject matter (as in this case), such construction entails a finding that the parties mutually intended to settle such claims. That would seem to leave little scope for a finding that one of the parties was guilty of sharp practice in relation to the existence of such a claim."
IX The submission that the Settlement Deed was procured by fraud
"Another problem is that the matters complained of, and actually pleaded in paragraph 60, if proved to have taken place, must have taken place in 2007-2008, some five or six years before the settlement agreement was entered into. Yet the settlement agreement was entered into in order to compromise the claims arising out of the events of 2007 and 2008. As I have already held, on the true construction of the release of 2013, all claims arising out of or relating to those events were given up, even if they were not then known to the defendant. In my judgment, it is not possible to rely on claims which are being given up by a particular settlement agreement as a basis for rescinding that settlement agreement. It would be like pulling yourself up with your own bootstraps."
X Alternative argument that rescission barred by affirmation
(i) It is to be assumed for this purpose that until sight of the Promontory Report, the Claimants did not know or arguably did not know about the alleged deceit by reference to core and non-core business. The Promontory Report did not come to the attention of the Claimants until June 2018: its date was 2016 and it is possible that it was not published until 2018. After the Report came to the attention of the Claimants, they took legal advice from Debello. It was in this context that the letter of 6 September 2018 is to be seen. It was asking the Bank to agree to the setting aside of the Settlement Deed by reference to the Zurich case.
(ii) Against that background, it is at least arguable that it was not clear and unequivocal that any payments made thereafter were a statement that the Claimants should not exercise a right to rescind. In the first instance, there was an attempt to make the setting aside by agreement rather than using the self-help remedy of rescission with the risks which that entailed. Thereafter, some time for advice and for thinking through the consequences was required before electing to rescind.
(iii) With the consequences attaching to missed payments under the Settlement Deed, it is arguable that an opportunity to agree the position about setting aside the Settlement Deed should be allowed to elapse with payments being made so as to protect the position in the interim. There is an argument that paying during this period should not amount to a clear and unequivocal affirmation.
"where a party to a contract was faced with the choice whether to affirm or rescind the contract, in order to render his election irrevocable he had to have knowledge not only of the facts which gave rise to the election but also of the right of election itself; that a person could not be treated as having elected to affirm a contract unless he had unequivocally demonstrated to the other party that he intended to proceed with it; that the issue of election was a question of fact to be decided on the evidence"
XI The RHL argument
XII Limitation
"(1) …where in the case of any action for which a period of limitation is prescribed by this Act, either -
(a) the action is based upon the fraud of the defendant; or
(b) any fact relevant to the [claimant's] right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant; or
(c) the action is for relief from the consequences of a mistake; the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the [claimant] has discovered the fraud, concealment or mistake (as the case may be) or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above, deliberate commission of a breach of duty in circumstances in which it is unlikely to be discovered for some time amounts to deliberate concealment of the facts involved in that breach of duty."
The Claimants rely both on section 32(1)(a) and 32(1)(b).
(i) As Section 32 constitutes an exception to the ordinary regime, the burden of proof is on the claimant - Millett LJ in Paragon Finance v Thakerar [1999] 1 All ER 400 at 418.
(ii) 'Fraud' is a wide concept, but it applies to the tort of deceit: see Kitchen v RAF Association [1958] 2 All ER 241 at p.249C per Lord Evershed MR.
(iii) Whilst there is an assumption within Section 32 that the claimant desires to discover whether a fraud has been committed (or whether a matter has been concealed from him), the claimant is not simply assumed to be 'on notice' that this is the case. Rather, there must be something (a 'trigger') which can be said to have put the claimant 'on notice' of the need to investigate whether there has been fraud and/or concealment: see DSG Retail Ltd v Mastercard [2020] EWCA Civ 671; [2021] 1 All ER (Comm) 63.
(iv) Thus, in recent authorities the approach has often been to approach issues arising under Section 32 in two stages: (i) when (if at all) was there a 'trigger' which put the claimant on notice; and (ii) when would a reasonably diligent investigation by the claimant have revealed enough to start the limitation period running. However, it has been noted that, whilst this is a helpful analytical structure, it is not the statutory test, and the requirement of reasonable diligence applies at both stages and/or throughout – see Males LJ in OT Computers v Infineon Technologies AG [2021] EWCA Civ 501 at [47]:
"…although the question what reasonable diligence requires may have to be asked at two different stages, (1) whether there is anything to put the claimant on notice of a need to investigate and (2) what a reasonably diligent investigation would then reveal, there is a single statutory issue, which is whether the claimant could with reasonable diligence have discovered (in this case) the concealment. Although some of the cases have spoken in terms of reasonable diligence only being required once the claimant is on notice that there is something to investigate (the "trigger"), it is more accurate to say that the requirement of reasonable diligence applies throughout. At the first stage the claimant must be reasonably attentive so that he becomes aware (or is treated as becoming aware) of the things which a reasonably attentive person in his position would learn. At the second stage, he is taken to know those things which a reasonably diligent investigation would then reveal. Both questions are questions of fact and will depend on the evidence. To that extent, an element of uncertainty is inherent in the section."
(v) The words "could with reasonable diligence" in Section 32 connote an objective standard. Accordingly, the subjective knowledge of the claimant is irrelevant. However, it was decided in OT Computers (this being the key ratio of that appeal) that the objective standard is informed by the position of the actual claimant – i.e. the question is whether the actual claimant (and not a hypothetical claimant) could objectively have discovered the fraud or concealment, save that certain (potential) characteristics of the particular claimant such as slothfulness, naivety or incuriousness are ignored: see OT at paras. 38 and 48.
(vi) So far as the 'statement of claim' test is concerned, in terms of what the claimant must be in a position to plead:
(a) What is required is an ability on the part of the claimant to plead a complete cause of action; that is to say, a viable claim. In a fraud case, that means that the claimant must be able (in the sense of having the necessary actual or constructive knowledge) to plead the precise case that is ultimately alleged at least as regards the critical allegations which comprise the tort of deceit, namely that a representation has been made, that it was false and that the representor knew it was false: see Barnstaple Boat Co, v Jones [2007] EWCA Civ 727 at [34].
(b) This does not require the claimant to have been able to plead all of the evidence which it later decides to plead; it must merely know (or have been objectively capable of discovering) each of the facts without which the cause of action is incomplete: see LIA v Credit Suisse [2021] EWHC 2684 (Comm) at para. 33, in which HHJ Pelling QC referred to the following statement by Bryan J in LIA v JP Morgan Markets [2019] EWHC 1452 (comm) at para. 34:
"at the point at which the claimant can plead the complete cause of action, however weak or strong, time starts to run. Not every detail needs to be known and a realistic view must be taken by the court."
(c) The authorities suggest that regard must be had to the professional obligations on counsel when it comes to pleading allegations of fraud. In particular, the claimant (and counsel in particular) must have material before them which makes it professionally proper for a plea of fraud to be advanced (see Sephton at para.44), described in the Bar Code of Conduct at rC9.2.c as "reasonably credible material which establishes an arguable case of fraud". However, in this regard, it is important to note the comments of Lord Bingham (with whom the majority agreed) in Medcalf v Mardell [2002] UKHL 27; [2003] 1 AC 120 on a previous version of the Bar Code of Conduct rule referred to above at para. 22:
"…I would however agree with Wilson J that at the preparatory stage the requirement is not that counsel should necessarily have before him evidence in admissible form but that he should have material of such a character as to lead responsible counsel to conclude that serious allegations could properly be based upon it. I could not think, for example, that it would be professionally improper for counsel to plead allegations, however serious, based on the documented conclusions of a DTI inspector or public inquiry, even though counsel had no access to the documents referred to and the findings were inadmissible hearsay."
The mental element of "concealment" requires proof of active and intentional concealment or a deliberate decision to withhold information but does not require proof of 'dishonesty' as such. A conscious decision to withhold information which the defendant has a duty to impart may be sufficient: see per Mance LJ in Williams v Fanshaw Porter & Hazelhurst [2004] EWCA Civ 157 at paras. 34 – 39.
(a) The Claimants' submissions
(i) The precise claim was only discovered following consideration of the Promontory Report which was not seen by the Claimants until June 2018. It is based on the discovery that there was an intention of the Bank alone not to back non-core businesses, the businesses of the Claimants being of that kind. Non-core businesses were not mentioned in the Nabarro letters or in the Tomlinson Report. Although it was mentioned in 2009 accounts and in the 2013 Treasury Report, they were not seen by the Claimants until after sight of the Promontory Report.
(ii) It was therefore only after June 2018 that the Claimants were able to plead a case by reference to misrepresentations about backing the businesses of the Claimants, being made falsely and known to be false because at the time the representations were made, the Bank intended to wind down non-core businesses including those of the Claimants. Even then, advice had to be obtained from lawyers, Debello, which only unravelled after consideration of the materials in 2021, such as to enable a letter of claim to make the precise allegations now pursued.
(iii) The intention of the Bank about non-core businesses could not reasonably have been discovered at an earlier stage. That is said to be evidenced by the fact that Nabarro did not identify the claim for the fraudulent representations now being pursued. Nor did the administrators in control of RHL from 2012 to 2015 identify the allegations of fraud.
(iv) Bearing in mind the strictures on pleading fraud without reasonably credible material, a claim alleging that the representations about backing the business of the Claimants being fraudulent was not available to the Claimants until discovery of the plans of the Bank to wind down non-core businesses. An inferential case that it could have been pleaded based on the conduct of the Bank vis-à-vis the Claimants' businesses alleged in the Nabarro letters and the Tomlinson Report or the ianfraser.org blogs would have infringed the requirements of having reasonably credible material on which to plead fraud. In any event, since none of that included the information about the intention of the Bank vis-à-vis non-core businesses, an essential plank of the case was missing.
(v) The first information emanating from the Bank about the designation of non-core businesses only came in the Defence to this action and in internal "Advice" documents such as one in 2010.
(vi) In the submission of the Claimants (skeleton argument para. 53), "it is important as a matter of public policy that the court does not enforce a high standard for pleadings of fraud and yet at the same time apply a low threshold under s.32, otherwise, necessarily, encouragement will be given to pleading claims of fraud at a time earlier than they properly could and should be made."
(b) The Bank's submissions
(i) Given the background of the Nabarro correspondence and the Tomlinson Report in 2013 and 2014, the Rileys were on notice of a need to investigate. The key question is whether they had the actual knowledge, or they could with reasonable diligence have acquired the required knowledge to plead the claim before 7 October 2016.
(ii) The vast majority of the facts and matters required to plead the claim were known or capable of being known to the Claimants by 2014 at the latest. Much of the Particulars of Claim is in very similar terms to the Nabarro Correspondence, the Tomlinson Report and the articles in the ianfraser.org website. By way of example, the 1 February 2013 letter of Nabarro made complaints in sections 3, 4, 5, 9, 10 and 11 which very closely align with the allegations in paras 33-50, 53-57 and 61-77 of the Particulars of Claim. The May 2013 Nabarro letter closely aligns with the matters raised in paras. 52-54 of the Particulars of Claim.
(iii) The core and non-core business point was not essential to the claims. The points which established the falsity of the representations were the course of conduct of the Bank in wishing to distress RHL and/or with a view to making profit and exiting the relationship. Dishonesty of the representations could have been pleaded long before. In this light, the non-core business point improved the claims, but was simply additional evidence rather than an essential element of the claim.
(c) Discussion
(i) without the non-core business categorisation, they could not plead the specific case which they now have pleaded, and the very similar inferential case might not have been available to the level required for Counsel to plead such a case, bearing in mind the strictures applying in respect of a claim in fraud;
(ii) they did not have knowledge of the non-core business categorisation until the dissolution (as regards RHL) or 7 October 2016 or thereafter, and nor could they with reasonable diligence have made that discovery. They could not reasonably have been expected to find the 2009 Accounts or the 2013 HM Treasury Report, or, if they did, to have drawn the same inferences about the non-core business categorisation prior to 7 October 2016.
(i) Fraud claims are frequently based on inferences. The published pronouncements of Mr Riley prior to the time of the Settlement Deed indicate that he believed that he and his wife and their businesses had been the victims of the Bank's fraud. If it is the case that the Claimants did not know at that stage about the non-core business point, it appears that Mr Riley got there through the broad picture of the Nabarro correspondence, the Tomlinson Report and their other enquiries.
(ii) Despite this, there is a substantial argument that as a matter of inference, fraud could not have been pleaded without knowledge of the non-core categorisation. If it was an available inference, it is worth noting that Nabarro in their wide-ranging allegations did not expressly allege the deceit now relied upon or the inferential case said to be available with reasonable diligence (albeit that their letters were before the publication of the Tomlinson Report). The point made for the Claimants is about the danger of having "a high standard for pleadings of fraud and yet at the same time apply a low threshold under s.32". This is a point which should not be determined finally without a fuller investigation.
(iii) There are questions which have been raised as to how far Counsel could plead a case in deceit on the basis of the Tomlinson Report (combined with the matters set out in the Nabarro correspondence) and with such other inquiries as were made. This gave rise to a belief on the part of the Claimants that they had been the victims of fraud. Nevertheless, there is a serious question which is not fanciful as to whether there was a sufficiently credible basis for a pleading of inferential fraud if the Claimants did not know of the non-core business point.
(iv) It may be that there was a sufficiently credible basis, but in order to reach a conclusion in respect of questions of actual and constructive knowledge and involving inferences to be drawn by references to inquiries which ought to have been carried out, there are dangers in reaching a summary conclusion without a fuller investigation.
(v) There are questions as to whether further inquiries could with reasonable diligence have been made which would have given rise to finding out about the non-core business point whether by reference to the 2009 accounts or the Treasury Report or otherwise. Although it appears that this could have been discovered, a deeper understanding of all the relevant circumstances is required in order to reach a conclusion with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the Claimants would have discovered the non-core business differentiation.
XIII Counterclaim
(i) the Settlement Deed should be rescinded consequent upon the claim of the Claimants for misrepresentation: the claim to misrepresentation of the Settlement Deed fails for the reasons set out above.
(ii) there is an equitable set off of damages against the Counterclaim: the consequence of the result on the summary judgment/strike out application is that this defence falls away. It is accepted by the Claimants (see para. 57 of their skeleton argument) that in the event that there is summary judgment/strike out because the claims of fraudulent misrepresentation are released and discharged, the claim for set off must fall away. As the Claimants put it to this extent only "The Application in this regard in part stands or falls with the court's adjudication in relation to the Settlement Deed and Limitation Issues." In the event that the Claimants had succeeded in respect of the Settlement Deed but not on the limitation issues, the arguments about set off still arose. In the event, using the language of the Claimants at para. 57 of their skeleton argument, the claims in fraudulent misrepresentation are "caught by the Settlement Deed", and accordingly the set off issue "falls with the court's adjudication".
(iii) This is then reflected at para.7(1) of the note of the Bank's Supplementary Note on Equitable Set Off of 10 May 2023 as follows:
"If the Bank wins on the settlement issue (whether or not it also wins on the limitation issue) it appears to be common ground that the Rileys cannot pursue their set off as a defence to the Counterclaim."
XIV Conclusion