CHANCERY DIVISION
Fetter Lane, London, EC4A 1NL |
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B e f o r e :
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GLOBAL ENERGY HORIZONS CORPORATION |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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MR ROBERT GRESHAM GRAY |
Defendant |
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(instructed by Rosenblatt Solicitors) for the Claimant
David Cavender QC, Conn MacEvilly and Joseph Wigley (instructed by MFB Solicitors) for the Defendant
Hearing dates: 16th17th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 27th 28th 29th 30th April 5th 7th 8th 11th 12th 13th 15th 20th 21st and 22nd May 2015
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Crown Copyright ©
Mrs Justice Asplin :
"(i) Mr Gray acted in breach of his fiduciary duty to GEHC and is liable to account to GEHC as a constructive trustee for all monies and benefits received by him directly or indirectly arising out of Mr Gray's actions in:-
a) putting himself in a position from 17th March 2006 onwards where his duties to GEHC conflicted or might possibly conflict with his personal interests in relation to the Acquisition Strategy and the ultrasound technology; and
b) taking advantage of a maturing business opportunity, namely the opportunity to participate in the Acquisition Strategy and to obtain rights in the ultrasound technology, belonging to GEHC, in breach of the no profit rule."
"3. GEHC is entitled to an enquiry as to the arrangements to which Mr Gray is party directly or indirectly providing for the said benefits.
4. Mr Gray is liable to transfer to GEHC any assets which it is determined on the enquiry that Mr Gray holds on constructive trust for GEHC."
Central Facts
"... the technology applies ultrasound stimulation to the wellbore area in order to diminish wellbore damage and restore or enhance production in low performing or late life wells. The tools delivering the AWS technology are inserted into the well bore area and apply a wide range of frequencies and power in continuous or pulse modes, designed to stimulate oil and gas production."
"We discussed the formalisation of our investments to date in CUT Services and Power US Russia (or the vehicle which will hold the IP and patents.)
Russian Proposed Terms
- RG to hold 30% in Power US Russia
- RG will take 49.5% in CUT Services until both:
a) loan of $150K, term 36 months, rate 6% fully repaid;
b) 25% earn-in of Saltikovs achieved;
at which time RG shareholding reduced to 24.5%
- Power US grants exclusive evergreen rights to RG to market and commercialise all technologies outside of Russian Federation in consideration of royalty and technical assistance fees. 24 months exclusive.
- All companies in which RG a shareholder granted full financial oversight. Commitment to implement mutually agreed budget.
- All future JVs and investment with third parties (i.e. Ivanko) through JVs. No further investment in company which holds IP.
Next steps
- Shareholder Agreement and Share Certificates in CUT Services
- Loan Agreement between CUT and RG as described above;
- Updated Shareholder Agreement in Power US Russia to cover future investment form third parties, potential JVs
- Agreement to enshrine marketing and commercialisation rights to all technologies outside Russia."
In cross examination, Mr Knight stated that the reference in the note to "RG" was to RegEnersys and not Mr Gray himself which I accept. Despite having been asked for comments at the time, Mr Kantor stated that he did not recall the email.
"The Investor—RegEnersys LP (established in 2007 by Mr R. Gray, who holds a 30% share in each company pursuant to the agreement), which issued a loan in the amount of 64,240,000 roubles at 6% interest per year (interest will start being charged on 1 January 2014).
. . .
In 2011, the Investor provided funds in the amount of 20,800,000 roubles"
"1. For the purposes of realisation of the scheduled plan of development of the group Viatex (later referred to as Company), the owners of the company are selling 25,1% of shares of the Company. Transaction amount is $3m (based on the value of 100% of shares $12 000 000.
2. The parent company is being created in offshore zone (potentially in Cyprus), which will become 100% owner of Viatex group. The shares in the parent company (later referred to as Cyprus) are divided as follows:
a. 25,1% - belongs to VIYM
b. 74,9% - belongs to the company in offshore zone (later BVI), owners of which are Abramov, Bayazitov and R. Gray (or another structure of current owners of the group of Companies based on internal agreement between the owners of the group).
3. Main assets of the company (but not exclusively) are 4 patents, +2 licencing agreements to non-reciprocally use the patents of the company Klamath Falls (belonging to R. Gray) on the territory of the CIS. R. Gray is also providing the company with generators necessary for realisation of the strategy of the company
[…]
6. Principals [sic] of working with R. Gray:
a. At the present moment newly created parent company (Cyprus) is concentrated on development of business in Russia and CIS. R. Gray is co-owner of the group (through his ownership of shares in BVI together with Abramov and Bayazitov)
b. In future Cyprus is cooperating with R. Gray as well as other companies (Yunaoil).
c. Form of cooperation of Cyprus with the "third party organisations" can be various (as for the contracts to provide other services as well as equity participation) and will be discussed in each particular matter. However, the parties agree that it is more beneficial to cooperate in relation to the equity participation in the new projects with the third parties rather than simple contracts for the provision of technological services.
d. R. Gray is additionally financing the projects abroad as pr share ownership belonging to him in each particular situation (provisionally agreed proportion 50/50)."
Witnesses of Fact
The specific issues in dispute and conduct relied upon by GEHC in more detail
(i) 2010 Restructuring
"Further to our discussions with Pieter Hereema and his meeting with me on February 16th, my understanding is that the format of ReEnersys as an investment vehicle of the Hereema family office will change.
…
PHH wishes to relinquish day to day control. You will continue to manage and monitor the RegEnersys fund activities along with Revysion.
The current 80/20 split of returns in excess of the carrying value of the investments as per the 2009 balance sheet will be changed to a 50/50 split. . . .
Capital released from agreed liquidation of selected fund assets or incoming funds from other investors will be shared 50/50. Hereema's 50% share of these incoming cash flows will be deducted from the current carrying value of the investments.
As from January 1, 2010 the hurdle interest rate (6%) will not be applicable anymore.
ReVysion will be entitled to the USD 10 million 2010 management fee as provided in the original agreements.
…"
It was not until 31 December 2010 that RegEnersys LP's assets itself was sold to RegEnersys UK LP for around $65m and a loan of that sum was made by RegEnersys Inc, now Celloteck, to RegEnersys UK, in the manner described at paragraph 29. By that stage it had been agreed that 51% of the shares in RegEnersys UK would be held by Mr Gray, or a company owned by him, and 49% by Celloteck. Mr Heerema stated in cross examination that it was never intended that Mr Gray pay the $65m personally and Mr Pronk accepted that any payment was expected to be received from Mr Gray's management company rather than directly from him. It was also accepted that by virtue of the Limited Partnership Agreement, 50% of the net realisation of any assets would go to the repayment of the Loan.
"This has enabled us to:
(a) negotiate compensation in shares for this amount, together with previous operation support payments ;
(b) obtain a licensing agreement for commercialisation of their technologies outside Russia."
The monies were duly despatched and thereafter, on around 5 July 2010, Mr Knight met with the Russian Scientists in Moscow once more. The meeting note is in the form set out at paragraph 21 above. It makes reference amongst other things to a 30% holding in Power US Russia to be held by "RG". I have already accepted Mr Knight's evidence that "RG" was a reference to RegEnersys.
"Considerable outside interest has become evident both from Russia and also the US for the technology and there is one Russian oil company keen to take a stake in the technology and apply it broadly with a view to an IPO. However, Russia remains a bandit country from a corporate governance perspective and we will have legal, ownership and management challenges to overcome.
The medium term goal is to settle the litigation, re-assemble all the strands of the technologies that Zolezzi tried to dissemble and potentially allow him a work out to recovery of our capital … He is, apparently, keen to do this and would be closely supervised and we would control the vehicle – Power US. . . "
"We have no formal agreement with Vladimir and Vadim on this project ahead of the outcome of the Chile arbitration but hopefully we can them [sic] re-combine the original patents and KF licence to operate with the new programme – with hopefully some recovered money. We will have 30% of Sonovita and 25% of CUT Services Russia and a majority in any overseas programme.
Could you please wire $250,000 from the ReVysion account … for our share ..."
Mr Pronk maintained that the monies advanced were on Mr Gray's behalf only. He denied that there was an agreement with the Russians and said that he had never seen one. In my judgment it was clear that in his evidence he was seeking to rely upon the fact that there was no written agreement. This was borne out when he went on to state that there was an "arrangement". When asked whether there was an oral agreement with the Russians prior to the outcome of the Chilean arbitration in which there were allegations that the technology and opportunity had been diverted to Russia and whether legal costs were being met because there was a basic agreement, Mr Pronk accepted that there must have been.
(ii) Personal connection
(iii) Use of private email accounts and faxes and payments through third parties
(iv) Chilean Arbitration Settlement - February/March 2012
"I think it would be optimal if Celloteck Holding Inc were the vehicle that ended up with all of the equity holdings. . . . My key question here is to confirm that Rob/ReVysion etc has absolutely no ownership or connection to this vehicle. . . "
(v) Secret Agreement?
"A....What seemed quite obvious was that Mr Gray told me that
the deal was done, or at least approved. I sent these documents..."
I accept his evidence in this regard.
"IS THIS ALSO A COMPANY PERTAINING TO "MY" GROUP OF COMPANIES?"
Mr Elias' evidence is that he assumed that the Heerema Group had been the owner of Celloteck and that Mr Pronk asked him to take Celloteck off the books of the Heerema Group for group consolidation purposes and that he was willing to transfer the shares back as a result of a gentlemen's agreement reached between September and December 2012 and would do so for $1. He was not aware that Celloteck had paid $1.5m to Mr Gray in March 2013 despite his position within the company at that stage. Mr Pronk stated that he had authorized the payments and that could not remember but must have mentioned them to Mr Elias. Mr Elias accepted that this was the only arrangement of this type in which he was involved. He also stated that he did not know Mr Gray although he knew of his involvement with the fund.
(vi) 2013
(vii) Treatment of the shareholding in Petrosound Ltd and Petrosound International
(viii) 2014 well treatment
Relevant Legal principles and approach to be adopted
"77. Again, for the policy reasons, on the taking of an account, the court lays the burden on the defaulting fiduciary to show that the profit is not one for which he should account: see, for example, Manley v Sartori [1927] Ch 157. This shifting of the onus of proof is consistent with the deterrent nature of the fiduciary's liability. The liability of the fiduciary becomes the default rule.
78. This principle was applied by the High Court of Australia in the Warman case:
'It is for the defendant to establish that it is inequitable to order an account of the entire profits. If the defendant does not establish that that would be so, then the defendant must bear the consequences of mingling the profits attributable to those earned by the defendant's efforts and investment, in the same way that a trustee of a mixed fund bears the onus of distinguishing what is his own.'
79. In the Warman case, the defaulting fiduciary was able to show that some of the profit was not attributable to his wrongful act, but to his own skill and effort. The Court limited the account accordingly. On the facts, the court was satisfied that the period of time for which profits were to be accounted should be limited to two years. I will come back to this point below."
"It has been contended that it would be enough if [the Defendant] now, without admitting, or not admitting, the right of the Plaintiff's claim, gave back the shares which he has; but that, in my opinion, would fall far short of the justice of the case. […] I can find no authority, and no case has been referred to except Hall v. Hallet, which I have mentioned, in which the Court has confined its power of relief to the mere restitution of the thing which has been taken away. […] Indeed, I can find no authority in any case which has been referred to for saying that the justice of such a case as this before me would be met, now that the shares which were once worth £80 are only worth 20s., by a mere restoration of these shares to the company."
". . . the centrally relevant point for present purposes is that, at least in some cases where an agent acquires a benefit which came to his notice as a result of his fiduciary position, or pursuant to an opportunity which results from his fiduciary position, the equitable rule ("the rule") is that he is to be treated as having acquired the benefit on behalf of his principal, so that it is beneficially owned by the principal. In such cases, the principal has a proprietary remedy in addition to his personal remedy against the agent, and the principal can elect between the two remedies."
"The measure of the trustee's liability is, instead, the current market value of the property that he should have had in his possession when the beneficiaries called on him to account for his stewardship of the trust fund."
He went on to take the value of the company at an earlier point at which a third party had invested in it as a proxy for the value of the business and to add to it the value of the opportunity diverted having drawn adverse inferences in particular as a result of the failure of the accounting party to give disclosure as ordered by the Court.
The Account in summary
Application of the test
(i) Does the asset fall within the scope of the Order?
(ii) Assets and Benefits
(a) Beneficial interest in Petrosound Ltd through Celloteck's subsidiary Chiloquin
Q. […] Can you look at paragraph 50 of your witness
statement. You are asked about your request for the
5 per cent equity and you say:
"At this time I was asking RegEnersys for their
agreement to provide me with 5 per cent equity in any
international company which may be formed."
But your request is not just about international,
it's about Sonovita Russia as well, and CUT Services.
You would not ask for that unless you thought Mr Gray
had an interest in those companies?
A. But that's never been in doubt, has it? The only thing
which has been in doubt is the fact that he was never
given that -- he was never formally given that equity.
He never received it and then in 2012, when VIYM came
in, it became moot anyway."
He therefore, accepted Mr Gray's interest in the companies, albeit that share certificates had not been issued. Mr Knight went on to state that Mr Gray had refused him a shareholding but that Professor Abramov had awarded him a 3.5% interest in the Russians' offshore company. There is no documentary evidence for this, nor did it appear in Mr Knight's witness statement. Further, Professor Abramov showed contempt for Mr Knight. It seems to me therefore, on the balance of probabilities that it is more likely than not that either Mr Gray awarded Mr Knight the shareholding or that Professor Abramov promised the shares/allotted them to Mr Knight because of the Professor's relationship with Mr Gray.
(b) Interest in Petrosound through nominees – Volchenkov, Ivanov and/or Professor Abramov
(c) 51% in any international company
(d) $5.1m paid by Klamath Falls to Celloteck under the Chilean Arbitration Settlement Agreement
(e) Annual management and performance bonus fees to 2010
(f) $10 million consultancy fee paid between 2 July 2010 and 10 October 2012 and its allegedly traceable proceeds (shares in Stratum Energy and Buried Hill)
(iii) Some causal connection
(iv) Allowance for skill and labour?
(v) Viability and Value
(a) Viability
"Q. So I think you would agree with me . . and you did yesterday . . that this is an experimental technology which needs more work on it to properly understand it and for it to begin to be applied commercially? "
he stated:
"A. Yes, I have to agree with that but there has been a lot of work. It has just been a lot of scattered work and things like that. So a focused programme over a period of years would probably help a lot."
Conclusion in relation to Viability:
(b) Value
Shareholding in Petrosound and interest in international business
"10. As its name implies, a DCF valuation seeks to attribute a present value to an assumed future cash flow arising from a business asset. To the arithmetical aggregate of the annual cashflows, there are applied discounts reflecting both the time value of money and certain types of risk which the valuer considers may impact upon the realisation of that cashflow. . . . . .the DCF of a business which has yet to commence has to be based upon a number of assumptions, one of which is that there are no impediments to the commencement and conduct of the business such as, for example, some defect in title to the relevant rights, or inability to comply with any contractual conditions upon which the exploitation of those rights is dependent. Mr. Haberman accepted, and the judge noted, that risks of defects or impediments of that kind could not generally be provided for as part of a DCF discount rate, unless they were of such little substance as to fall within a commonly used residual risk contingency discount of up to 5%.
11. Mr. Haberman also acknowledged in his oral evidence that if the aggregate discount (for time value of money and risk) which was required to be factored into a DCF valuation exceeded 40%, then this undermined the validity of a DCF valuation in relation to the business in question, so that some other type of valuation would then be required."
Conclusion in relation to valuation of shareholding in Petrosound and "Opco":
Management and Consultancy Fees and Stratum Energy and Buried Hill shareholding