CHANCERY DIVISION
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
||
B e f o r e :
____________________
(1) L'ORÉAL S.A (2) LANCOME PARFUMS ET BEAUTE & CIE (3) LABORATOIRE GARNIER & CIE (4) L'ORÉAL (U.K.) LIMITED |
Claimants |
|
- and - |
||
(1) EBAY INTERNATIONAL AG (2) EBAY EUROPE S.A.R.L. (3) EBAY (UK) LIMITED (4) STEPHEN POTTS (5) TRACY RATCHFORD (6) MARIE ORMSBY (7) JAMES CLARKE (8) JOANNA CLARKE (9) GLEN FOX (10) RUKHSANA BI |
Defendants |
____________________
Geoffrey Hobbs QC and Philip Roberts (instructed by Olswang) for the First-Third Defendants
The Fourth-Tenth Defendants did not appear and were not represented
Hearing dates: 9-12, 18-19 March 2009
Further written submissions: 27, 31 March, 7, 23, 27 April 2009
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
MR JUSTICE ARNOLD :
Topic | Para |
Introduction | 1 |
The parties | 2-4 |
The Trade Marks | 5-8 |
L'Oréal | 9-11 |
eBay | 12-16 |
L'Oréal's claims against the Fourth to Tenth Defendants | 17-23 |
The Fourth Defendant | 18 |
The Fifth Defendant | 19 |
The Sixth Defendant | 20 |
The Seventh and Eighth Defendants | 21 |
The Ninth Defendant | 22 |
The Tenth Defendant | 23 |
L'Oréal's claims against eBay Europe | 24-31 |
The issues | 32-33 |
The facts | 34-275 |
eBay Europe's activities | 35 |
Registration | 37-40 |
User Agreement | 41-43 |
Help pages and tutorials | 44 |
Sales formats | 45-48 |
Classified ads | 49 |
Listings | 50-54 |
Cross-promotion | 55 |
eBay Shops | 56 |
eBay Express | 57 |
PowerSellers | 58-60 |
International sellers | 61-65 |
Searching listings | 66 |
Completing a transaction | 67 |
PayPal | 68-70 |
Feedback | 71-72 |
Sellers' profiles | 73 |
Dispute resolution | 74-75 |
Fees earned by eBay Europe | 76 |
Filtering | 77-78 |
VeRO programme | 79-86 |
Community Watch | 87 |
Sanctions | 88-90 |
High Risk Brands | 91 |
The Fourth Defendant's activities | 92-114 |
The Fifth Defendant's activities | 115-148 |
The Sixth Defendant's activities | 149-172 |
The Seventh Defendant's activities | 173-192 |
The Eighth Defendant's activities | 193-214 |
The Ninth Defendant's activities | 215-225 |
The Tenth Defendant's activities | 226-245 |
The Fourth to Eighth Defendants' suppliers | 246 |
L'Oréal's evidence as to the scale of the problem | 247-256 |
IIS | 248-250 |
Envisional | 251 |
Lexsi | 252-253 |
French proceedings | 254 |
Complaints in Germany | 255 |
Commentaries | 256 |
The difficulty of identifying counterfeit products | 257-258 |
L'Oréal's objections to the VeRO programme | 259-265 |
L'Oréal's letter | 266 |
PriceMinister | 267-276 |
Could eBay Europe do more? | 277 |
The key provisions of the Trade Marks Directive | 278-282 |
Use within Article 5(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Directive | 283-293 |
The six conditions | 283-288 |
Use in relation to the trade mark proprietor's goods | 289-299 |
Other questions | 300-306 |
Were the goods sold by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants | |
infringing goods? | 307-342 |
Counterfeits | 312 |
Non-EEA goods | 313-317 |
Testers and dramming bottles | 318-326 |
Unboxed products | 327-342 |
Are eBay Europe jointly liable for infringements committed | |
by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants? | 343-382 |
Community law | 344-345 |
Domestic law | 346-352 |
Was there any release? | 353-358 |
Procurement | 359 |
Participation in a common design | 360-369 |
L'Oréal's contentions | 360-364 |
eBay Europe's contentions | 365-368 |
Discussion | 369-382 |
Are eBay Europe liable as primary infringers for the use of the Link Marks in relation to infringing goods? |
383-431 |
Use in sponsored links | 384-425 |
The complaint | 384-387 |
Use? | 388-392 |
In relation to? | 393-399 |
In the course of trade? | 400-401 |
In the United Kingdom? | 402-412 |
Infringing use? | 413-425 |
Use on the Site | 426-431 |
Use? | 427 |
In relation to? | 428 |
In the course of trade? | 429 |
In the United Kindom? | 430 |
Infringing use? | 431 |
Do eBay Europe have a defence under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive? |
432-465 |
Key provisions of the E-Commerce Directive | 433-435 |
Discussion | 436-443 |
Do L'Oréal have a remedy under Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive? | 444-452 |
Relevant provisions of the Enforcement Directive | 445-446 |
Domestic law | 447-454 |
What does Article 11 require? | 455-465 |
Are the Distance Selling Regulations relevant to any of the foregoing issues, and if so how? |
466-475 |
Selected provisions of the Distance Selling Regulations | 469-470 |
Application of the Distance Selling Regulations to eBay Europe | 471-474 |
Relevance? | 475 |
A reference to the ECJ? | 476-480 |
Conclusions | 481 |
Introduction
The parties
The Trade Marks
i) UK Registration No. 476691 for L'OREAL in class 3, in respect of hair dyes and other preparations for the hair;
ii) UK Registration No. 655072 for LANCOME in class 3 in respect of non-medicated toilet preparations, cosmetic preparations, perfumes and perfumed soap;
iii) UK Registration No. 692680 for MAYBELLINE in class 3, in respect of cosmetics and non-medicated toilet preparations;
iv) UK Registration No. 1034105 for KERASTASE in class 3, in respect of perfumes, non-medicated toilet preparations, cosmetics, dentifrices, depilatory preparations, toilet articles, preparations for the hair, and soaps;
v) UK Registration No. 1099431 for MAGIE NOIRE in class 3, in respect of non-medicated toilet preparations, perfumes, soaps and cosmetics;
vi) UK Registration No. 1228643 for MATRIX in class 3, in respect of non-medicated toilet preparations; cosmetics; perfumes; preparations for the hair; soaps; cleansing preparations for toilet purposes; bath additives, hand creams, body massage creams, body lotions and face creams, all being non-medicated preparations for the care of the skin;
vii) UK Registration No. 1270710 for SHU UEMURA in class 3, in respect of soaps; perfumes; essential oils; cosmetics; hair lotions;
viii) UK Registration No. 1288684 for SOFT SHEEN in class 3, in respect of preparations and substances, all for the hair;
ix) UK Registration No. 1382742 for TRESOR in class 3, in respect of perfumes; toilet waters; non-medicated toilet lotions; soaps; cosmetics; make-up; oils, creams and liquids, all being perfumed lathering and softening products for use in the bath; non-medicated foaming preparations for use in the bath; toothpastes;
x) UK Registration No. 1444126 for KIEHL'S in class 3, in respect of cosmetics; soaps; preparations for the hair and scalp; essential oils; non-medicated toilet preparations; facial scrubs and facial masks; perfumes, colognes and toilet waters; shampoos; deodorants for use on the person; anti-perspirants; sun-tanning preparations; shaving preparations; skin care preparations; talcum powders; lipsticks and lip balms; make-up and make-up removing preparations; cosmetic preparations for baths and showers;
xi) UK Registration No. 1453116 for DEFINICILS in class 3, in respect of make-up products and products for the care of eyelashes;
xii) UK Registration No. 1458930 for GARNIER in class 3, in respect of preparations for the maintenance, caring for and embellishing of the hair and the scalp, beards and moustaches, eyelashes and eyebrows, skin and nails; shampoos; hair sprays; hair dyes and bleaching agents; preparations for perming and setting hair; essential oils; cosmetics; non-medicated toilet preparations; toilet waters; soaps;
xiii) UK Registration No. 1485613 for RENERGIE in class 3, in respect of perfumes, toilet waters and lotions, soaps, shampoos, creams; foaming and/or softening bath gels and liquids; dentifrices; make-up; cosmetics; deodorants for personal use;
xiv) UK Registration No. 1564858 for POEME in class 3, in respect of perfume, toilet water; gels, salts for the bath and the shower; toilet soaps; body deodorants; creams, milks, lotions, gels and powders, all for the face, the body and the hands; sun care preparations; make-up preparations; shampoos;
xv) CTM Registration No. 3115607 for AMOR AMOR in class 3 in respect of perfumes, eaux de toilette; bath and shower gels and salts not for medical purposes; toilet soaps; deodorants for personal use; cosmetics, in particular creams, milks, lotions, gels and powders for the face, body and hands; sun-tanning milks, gels and oils and after-sun preparations (cosmetics); make-up preparations; shampoos; gels, mousses, balms and preparations in aerosol form for hairdressing and haircare; hair lacquers; hair-colouring and hair-decolorizing preparations; preparations for waving and setting hair; essential oils;
xvi) CTM Registration No. 4046785 for AMOR AMOR in class 3 in respect of perfumes, eaux de toilette; bath and shower gels and salts not for medical purposes; toilet soaps; deodorants for personal use; cosmetics, in particular creams, milks, lotions, gels and powders for the face, body and hands; sun-tanning milks, gels and oils and after-sun preparations (cosmetics); make-up preparations; shampoos; gels, mousses and balms, preparations in aerosol form for hairdressing and haircare; hair lacquers; hair-colouring and hair-decolorizing preparations; permanent waving and curling preparations; essential oils.
L'Oréal
eBay
L'Oréal's claims against the Fourth to Tenth Defendants
The Fourth Defendant
The Fifth Defendant
The Sixth Defendant
The Seventh and Eighth Defendants
The Ninth Defendant
The Tenth Defendant
L'Oréal's claims against eBay Europe
i) A search on www.google.co.uk for "shu uemura" carried out on 27 March 2007 resulted in a sponsored link being displayed which read as follows:
"Shu Uemura
Great deals on Shu uemura
Shop on eBay and Save!
www.ebay.co.uk"
Clicking on the hyperlink at the top of the sponsored link (i.e. the underlined words "Shu Uemura" – note that the URL at the bottom of the sponsored link is not a hyperlink) led to a page from the Site showing a search for "shu uemura" in "All Categories" with the result "96 items found for shu uemura". In other words, the click-through did not merely lead to the home page of the Site, but triggered a search using the sign in question. The print-out in Annex 7 includes about half of the 96 items found by the search, and L'Oréal allege that most of those shown are for infringing goods. The basis for this allegation is that most of items are expressly stated to be "From Hong Kong" or (in one case) "From USA". In each case the price of the item is given in sterling and the postage "to SE21 2NJ" (i.e. the postal code for the address where the user's computer was situated) is given in sterling. For clarity when comparing this example with the next three, I should say that the print-out in Annex 7 does not reveal the result, if any, of the search with regard to eBay Shops or from eBay international sellers.
ii) A search on www.google.co.uk for "matrix hair" carried out on 27 March 2007 resulted in a sponsored link being displayed which read as follows:
"Matrix hair
Fantastic low prices here
Feed your passion on eBay.co.uk!
www.ebay.co.uk"
Clicking on the hyperlink at the top of the sponsored link led to a page from the Site showing a search for "matrix hair" in "All Categories" with the results (a) "5 items found for matrix hair", (b) "20 items found for matrix hair in eBay Shops" and (c) "24 items found for matrix hair from eBay international sellers". The print-out in Annex 7 shows 6 of the 24 items from international sellers. L'Oréal allege that all of these are for infringing goods. The basis of this allegation is that the "country/region" is stated to be "United States" in five cases and "Australia" in one case, and the items are priced in sterling.
iii) A search on www.google.co.uk for "softsheen-carson hair" carried out on 27 March 2007 resulted in a sponsored link being displayed which read as follows:
"Soft Sheen
Great prices on hair care products
Feed your passion on eBay.co.uk!
www.ebay.co.uk.haircare"
Clicking on the hyperlink at the top of the sponsored link led to a page from the Site showing a search for "soft sheen" in "All Categories" with the results (a) "9 items found for soft sheen", (b) "17 items found for soft sheen in eBay Shops" and (c) "12 items found for soft sheen from eBay international sellers". The print-out in Annex 7 shows 3 of the 12 items from international sellers. L'Oréal allege that all of these are for infringing goods. The basis of this allegation is that the "country/region" is stated to be "United States" in two cases and "Canada" in one case, and the items are priced in sterling.
iv) A search on www.google.co.uk for "magie noire" carried out on 28 March 2007 resulted in a sponsored link being displayed which read as follows:
"Magie Noire
Fantastic low prices on fragrances
Buy it. Sell it. Love it. eBay.
www.ebay.co.uk/fragrances"
Clicking on the hyperlink at the top of the sponsored link led to a page from the Site showing a search for "matrix hair" in "All Categories" with the results (a) "4 items found for magie noire", (b) "2 magie noire items on eBay Express" and (c) "48 items found for magie noire from eBay international sellers". The print out in Annex 7 shows 6 of the 48 items from international sellers. L'Oréal allege that all of these are for infringing goods. The basis of this allegation is that the "country/region" is stated to be "United States" in all cases, and the items are priced in sterling.
i) A search for "Shampoo & Conditioner" by reference to the brand "Kerastase" carried out on 31 July 2007 found 72 items. The print-out indicates that the user had also selected the search option "Location: Worldwide". The print-out shows about half of the 72 items. Among the items shown on the print-out are four "KERASTASE" products stated to be "From Israel", in each case priced in sterling and with "postage to GBR" given in sterling. All four items were Buy It Now listings.
ii) A search for "Skin/Face Care" by reference to the brand "Garnier Skin" carried out on 31 July 2007 found 101 items. The print-out indicates that the user had also selected the search option "Location: Worldwide". The print-out shows about a third of the 101 items. Among the items shown on the print-out is one "Rosebud-Garnier" product stated to be "From Singapore" priced in sterling and with "postage to GBR" given in sterling. This item was a Buy It Now listing.
"...if and in so far as I am being invited at this stage to restrict L'Oreal to the 17 particular instances, I decline to do so. That said, there will, in my judgment, be a limit to the extent to which the court is in a position to reach a conclusion upon abstract allegations of infringement as opposed to sufficiently particularised ones.
That as it seems to me at this stage is a hurdle that will need to be crossed by L'Oreal, but it does not mean that they should be summarily shut out from attempting to do so."
The issues
i) Were the goods sold by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants infringing goods? This issue divides into four sub-issues concerning (a) counterfeits, (b) non-EEA goods, (c) tester and dramming products and (d) unboxed products.
ii) Are eBay Europe jointly liable for any infringements committed by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants?
iii) Are eBay Europe liable as primary infringers for use of the Link Marks in relation to infringing goods?
iv) Do eBay Europe have a defence under Article 14 of the E-Commence Directive?
v) Do L'Oréal have a remedy under Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive?
vi) Are the Distance Selling Regulations relevant to any of the foregoing issues, and if so how?
The facts
eBay Europe's activities
"Introduction
Welcome to eBay. These terms and conditions apply to the services available from the domain and sub-domains of eBay.co.uk (which include, but are not limited to, ebaymotors.co.uk), and from all other eBay-branded websites provided for U.K. users. If you reside in the U.K. or another country that is a member of the E.U., by using the services on the eBay websites (eBay.co.uk, eBay.com and other related websites where this agreement appears) you are agreeing to the following terms including those available by hyperlink, with eBay Europe S.à.r.l. ..., and the general principles for the websites of our subsidiaries and international affiliates. If you reside within the United States, you are contracting with eBay, Inc. In all other countries, your contract is with eBay International AG. ...
Before you may become a member of eBay, you must read and accept all of the terms and conditions in, and linked to, this User Agreement. We strongly recommend that, as you read this User Agreement, you also access and read the linked information. By accepting this user agreement, you also agree that your use of some eBay-branded website or websites we operate may be governed by separate user agreements and privacy policies. The agreement that applies on any of our domains and subdomains is always the agreement that appears in the footer of each website. The User Agreement constitutes a legally binding agreement between you and eBay.
...
Using eBay
You may not use our sites and services if you are under the age of 18 or you are not able to form legally binding contracts, or if your eBay membership has been suspended.
While using eBay you will not:
- post list or upload content or items in an inappropriate category or areas on our sites;
- breach any laws, sell any counterfeit items or otherwise infringe the copyright, trademark or other rights of third parties;
- breach our policies including, without limitation, the Prohibited and Restricted Items policies and the other policies linked to from the "Additional terms" section below;
- fail to deliver payment for items purchased by you, unless the seller has materially changed the item's description after you bid, a clear typographical error is made, or you cannot authenticate the sender's identity;
- fail to deliver items purchased from you, unless the buyer fails to meet the posted terms, or you cannot authenticate the buyer's identity;
…
- post false, inaccurate, misleading, defamatory, or libellous content (including personal information);
...
If you are registering with eBay as a business entity, you represent that you have the authority to legally bind that entity. If you are trading as a business on eBay, you must comply with all applicable laws relating to online trading (please see Business Selling Explained for more information).
…
Abusing eBay
eBay and the eBay community work together to keep our sites and services working properly in the community safe. Please report problems, offensive content and policy breaches to us.
eBay's Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) program works to ensure that listed items do not infringe upon the copyright trademark or other rights of third parties. If you believe your rights have been infringed, please notified our VeRO team through our Verified Rights Owner (VeRO) programme and we will investigate.
Without limiting other remedies, we may issue you with warnings, limit, suspend, all terminate our service and user accounts, restrict or prohibit access to, and your activities on, the sites (including, without limitation, cancelling bids and removing listings), delay or remove hosted content, and take technical and legal steps to keep you off our sites if:
- we think that you are creating problems (including without limitation by harassing eBay style for other users or making unreasonable legal threats against eBay), or exposing us or another eBay user to financial loss or legal liabilities;
- we think that you are acting inconsistency with the letter or spirit of this Agreement or our policies;
- despite our reasonable endeavours we are unable to verify or authenticate any information you provide to us; or
- you earn in a feedback rating of -4.
...
You agree not to hold eBay responsible for any loss you may occur as a result of eBay taking any of the actions described above.
...
Compensation
You agree that you will only use our sites and services in accordance with this Agreement. You will compensate us in full … for any losses or costs, including reasonable legal fees, we incur arising out of any breach by you of this Agreement or your violation of any law or the rights of a third party.
No agency
No agency, partnership, joint venture, employee-employer or franchisor-franchisee relationship is intended or created by this Agreement.
Resolution of disputes
… This agreement shall be governed and construed in all respects by the laws of England and Wales. You and eBay both agree to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts; ….
Additional terms
The following policies (together with all further policies that can be access via click-through links contained in such policies) are part of this Agreement and provide additional terms and conditions related to specific services offered on our sites. We expect you to read all of the linked documents carefully:
- Prohibited and Restricted Items
- Identity
- Rules for Buyers
- Rules for Sellers
- Rules for Everyone
... "
i) How do I sell? This tutorial consists of five steps which explain to sellers how to list items so that they sell more successfully. Steps 2-5 are described in sub-paragraphs (ii)-(v) below.
ii) How to Prepare your item for sale. This page advises the user to research the item he or she is selling by looking at what other sellers have done through completed item searches and to take a photograph of the item for inclusion in the listing.
iii) How to List your Item. This page provides help on how to list, including choosing the sales format (auction-style or fixed price), selecting what categories to list in, writing an effective title and description, pricing, duration of listing and using optional features. The section headed Write an effective Title & Description advises the user how to choose a title and write a description so as to ensure that listings are found and items sold effectively. The advice includes making sure that the description includes the item's brand.
iv) Pricing, Payment & Postage. This page contains advice on pricing, suggesting that in the auction-style format a low starting price and no reserve encourage a greater number of buyers. It also contains advice on what payment options to accept, recommending acceptance of an online payment system such as PayPal, and on postage and returns and international shipping details. The latter section states:
"If you are only making your item available to buyers within your country, be sure to state this clearly in the listing. … If you are making your item available to eBay buyers outside your country, be sure to also include international postage costs."
v) How to Manage and Complete your Sales. This page explains how sellers can keep track of their complete sales history using My eBay's All Selling Page. It also advises users how to complete sales, including reminding them not to post the item before receiving payment and to leave feedback.
vi) Guidelines for Creating Legally Compliant Listings. This page provides general advice on how to create listings that do not infringe third party intellectual property rights. It advises sellers, for example, to create their own listings, use brand names appropriately and make sure the item is authentic.
vii) About selling internationally. This page states that "Choosing to offer your item internationally as well as to the United Kingdom or Ireland may significantly increase the number of potential buyers you reach". It goes to explain the three ways in which sellers can expose their listings to buyers in other countries (by selecting International Site Visibility (as to which, see below), by listing directly on other eBay websites and by allowing postage to other countries). More information about International Site Visibility is provided on the page Showing your items in search results on other eBay sites.
viii) How do I Buy? This tutorial gives advice about buying items.
i) an option for the seller to list the item in more than one category, thus causing the item to come up on more buyer searches;
ii) Gallery, which provides buyers with a photograph of the item when searching and browsing;
iii) Featured First, which means that the item appears on the first page of search results in the Featured Items section;
iv) International Site Visibility, which ensures that the listing automatically appears in searches on other eBay sites selected by the seller (a specific fee is payable for each country selected);
v) the provision of highlighting, borders, bold or subtitles; and
vi) the use of Listing Designer software to customise the visual appearance of the listing in more sophisticated ways.
i) Build and Customise Your Shop. This page explains how sellers can create an eBay Shop using Manage My Shop.
ii) Promote Your Shop. This page gives advice on a number of ways to increase sales, including listing strategies, cross-promotions, email marketing and keyword management. The latter two are described below.
iii) An email marketing tool which enables sellers to send email newsletters to buyers. Sellers can get 1000, 2,500 or 5,000 free emails a month depending on the level of shop and buy more for a penny each.
iv) A tool for customising search engine keywords so as to improve the shop page rankings in search engines.
v) A listing feeds tool enables sellers automatically to distribute listings to buyers, search engines and comparison sites.
vi) A promotional flyers tool enables shops to create their own flyers.
vii) Templates for creating business stationery.
i) Users of other eBay websites may register on the Site and then list items on the Site.ii) Users of www.ebay.com and www.ebay.ca may pay for the International Site Visibility upgrade specifying the Site, so that their listings appear in the search results when a user of the Site searches using the default search options. In order to qualify for International Site Visibility both seller and listing must satisfy certain requirements: in particular, the seller must have a PayPal account and be PayPal Verified and the listing must specify international postage and payment by PayPal. Mr Chesnut's evidence was that this feature was introduced in May 2008, but he appeared to accept that international visibility may have been possible through a different mechanism prior to that date (as suggested by e.g. the MATRIX HAIR search in Annex 7 to the Re-Amended Particulars of Claim).
iii) Users of other eBay websites may indicate in their listings that they are prepared to deliver items located in the European Union to the UK, in which case their listings appear in the search results when a user of the Site searches using the European Union search option.
iv) Users of other eBay websites may indicate in their listings that they are prepared to deliver items located worldwide to the UK, in which case their listings appear in the search results when a user of the Site searches using the worldwide search option
"Important: When selling internationally please verify you're complying with foreign laws, which can differ from your local laws and restrict sales of authentic products. Get details about international trading."
My attention was not drawn, however, to any warning to sellers located outside the EEA that selling genuine products marketed outside the EEA to buyers in the EEA may amount to trade mark infringement.
"Currencies
There are two key features that help international buyers convert the price of your item to the currencies they understand:
Bids and prices on the item page automatically display in both the currency you specify and the approximate home currency equivalent for the site from which the buyer is viewing the item.
A buyer can convert all Search and Listings prices to local site currency by clicking the Show all prices in local currency (for example, US dollars on the US site) link in the Show box on the Search and Listings pages of all non-UK eBay sites.
For information about how to allow your international buyers to pay for items using different currencies, see Using PayPal Internatonally."
"Items that are listed in a currency other than Pounds Sterling display the converted amount in italicized text. Converted amounts shown are estimates based on Bloomberg's conversion rates. If you need to get recent exchange rates, please use the Universal Currency Converter."
i) Insertion Fees. For example, for a cosmetic product listed for auction-style sale with a starting price of 99p, a 10p insertion fee is payable. These fees are charged when items are listed on the Site. They are stated to be non-refundable, but in practice eBay Europe do refund insertion fees when listings are cancelled by eBay Europe.
ii) Optional Feature Fees. These fees are charged for the use of optional features such as those described above.
iii) Final Value Fees. These fees are charged if and when the item is sold. The fee charged is a percentage of the final sale price. For example, a cosmetic selling at £10 attracts a final value fee of 8.75%.
"I am the owner, or any agent authorised to act on behalf of the owner, of certain intellectual property rights ('IP Owner');
I have a good faith belief that the listings identified below (by item) offer items or contain materials that are not authorised by the IP Owner, its agent, or the law, and therefore infringe the IP Owner's rights according to English law; and
I make this declaration conscientiously believing it to be true and correct and in accordance with English law."
The Fourth Defendant's activities
The Fifth Defendant's activities
"Unboxed & untested
Sorry due to country restrictions there will be no sales to Germany on this item
Anyone from Germany who purchases this item will have the transaction cancelled and the item relisted
All other European countries are welcome to purchase".
The Sixth Defendant's activities
The Seventh Defendant's activities
"… some of the items I sell are GWP [gift with purchase] products" and may have 'Not for individual resale or something similar printed on them…."
In fact this item was marked "Tester", but this was not visible from the photograph.
The Eighth Defendant's activities
The Ninth Defendant's activities
"Please note that in order to comply with German law I cannot ship to Germany."
The Tenth Defendant's activities
The Fourth to Eighth Defendants' suppliers
L'Oréal's evidence as to the scale of the problem
The difficulty of identifying counterfeit products
L'Oréal's objections to the VeRO programme
L'Oréal's letter
PriceMinister
Could eBay Europe do more?
The key provisions of the Trade Marks Directive
"Article 5
Rights conferred by a trade mark
1. The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with those for which the trade mark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the identity or similarity of goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark
2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
3. The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2:
…
(b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for these purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder;
(c) importing or exporting the goods under the sign;
(d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising.
…
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not affect provisions in any Member State relating to the protection against the use of a sign other than for the purpose of distinguishing goods or services, where use of that sign without due cause take unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
Article 6
Limitation of the effects of a trade mark
1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of trade,
…
(b) indications concerning the kind, quality, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services;
(c) the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts;
provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.
…
1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market."
Use within Article 5(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Directive
The six conditions
Use in relation to the trade mark proprietor's goods
(a) use of the sign in relation to goods put on the market outside the EEA by or with the consent of the trade mark proprietor, but which have not been put on the market inside the EEA by or with the consent of the proprietor; and(b) use of the sign in relation to goods have been put on the market within the EEA by or with the consent of the proprietor, but which the proprietor has legitimate reasons for opposing the further commercialisation of.
"26. In addition, on the basis of the BMW judgment, the referring court asks whether there may be use by Autec of the Opel logo in its capacity as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles
27. In that respect, it is true that BMW concerned the use of a sign identical to the trade mark for services which were not identical to those for which that trade mark was registered, since the BMW trade mark, at issue in the main proceedings, was registered for vehicles but not for vehicle repair services. However, the vehicles marketed under the BMW trade mark by the proprietor of that mark constituted the subject-matter of the services – the repairing of vehicles – supplied by the third party, so that it was essential to identify the origin of the BMW cars, the subject-matter of those services. It was having regard to that specific and indissociable link between the products bearing the trade mark and the services provided by the third party that the Court of Justice held that, in the specific circumstances of the BMW case, use by the third party of the sign identical to the trade mark in respect of goods marketed not by the third party but by the holder of the trade mark fell within Article 5(1)(a) of the directive.
28. Apart from that specific case of use of a trade mark by a third-party provider of services having as subject-matter the products bearing that trade mark, Article 5(1)(a) of the directive must be interpreted as covering the use of a sign identical to the trade mark in respect of goods marketed or services supplied by the third party which are identical to those in respect of which the trade mark is registered.
29. First of all, the interpretation whereby the goods or services referred to in Article 5(1)(a) of the directive are those marketed or supplied by the third party follows from the wording of that provision itself, particularly the words 'using … in relation to goods or services'. Secondly, the contrary interpretation could lead to the words 'goods' and 'services' used in Article 5(1)(a) of the directive designating goods or services of the trade mark proprietor, whereas the words 'goods' and 'service' appearing in Article 6(1)(b) and (c) of the directive necessarily refer to those marketed or supplied by the third party, thereby leading, contrary to the scheme of the directive, to interpreting the same words in a different way according to whether they appear in Article 5 or in Article 6.
30. In the main proceedings, since Autec does not sell vehicles, there is no use of the Opel logo by Autec as a trade mark registered for motor vehicles, for the purposes of Article 5(1)(a) of the directive."
"33. Use by an advertiser, in a comparative advertisement, of a sign identical with, or similar to, a competitor's mark may constitute use within the meaning of Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 89/104.
34. First, Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 89/104 must be interpreted as covering the use of a sign identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in respect of goods marketed or services supplied by the third party (see, to that effect, as regards Article 5(1)(a) of Directive 89/104, Case C-48/05 Adam Opel [2007] ECR I-1017, paragraph 28).
35. Second, an advertisement in which the advertiser compares the goods and services which he markets with those of a competitor is aimed, evidently, at promoting the goods and services of that advertiser. With such an advertisement the advertiser seeks to distinguish his goods and services by comparing their characteristics with those of competing goods and services. That analysis is confirmed by recital 15 in the preamble to Directive 97/55, in which the Community legislature pointed out that the aim of comparative advertising is to distinguish between the goods and services of the advertiser and those of his competitor (see Case C-112/99 Toshiba Europe [2001] ECR I-7945, paragraph 53).
36. Therefore, the use by an advertiser, in a comparative advertisement, of a sign identical with, or similar to, the mark of a competitor for the purposes of identifying the goods and services offered by the latter can be regarded as use for the advertiser's own goods and services for the purposes of Article 5(1) and (2) of Directive 89/104."
"Accordingly, the Court has already held that damage done to the reputation of a trade mark may, in principle, be a legitimate reason, within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Directive, allowing the proprietor of the mark to oppose further commercialisation of luxury goods which have been put on the market in the EEA by him or with his consent (see Parfums Christian Dior, paragraph 43, and Case C-63/97 BMW [1999] ECR I-905, paragraph 49)."
Other questions
"51. It follows that the exclusive right under Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive was conferred in order to enable the trade mark proprietor to protect his specific interests as proprietor, that is, to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions. The exercise of that right must therefore be reserved to cases in which a third party's use of the sign affects or is liable to affect the functions of the trade mark, in particular its essential function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods.
52. The exclusive nature of the right conferred by a registered trade mark on its proprietor under Article 5(1)(a) of the Directive can be justified only within the limits of the application of that article.
53. It should be noted that Article 5(5) of the Directive provides that Article 5(1) to (4) does not affect provisions in a Member State relating to protection against the use of a sign for purposes other than that of distinguishing goods or services.
54. The proprietor may not prohibit the use of a sign identical to the trade mark for goods identical to those for which the mark is registered if that use cannot affect his own interests as proprietor of the mark, having regard to its functions. Thus certain uses for purely descriptive purposes are excluded from the scope of Article 5(1) of the Directive because they do not affect any of the interests which that provision aims to protect, and do not therefore fall within the concept of use within the meaning of that provision (see, with respect to a use for purely descriptive purposes relating to the characteristics of the product offered, Case C-2/00 Hölterhoff [2002] ECR I-4187, paragraph 16).
55. In this respect, it is clear that the situation in question in the main proceedings is fundamentally different from that in Hölterhoff. In the present case, the use of the sign takes place in the context of sales to consumers and is obviously not intended for purely descriptive purposes.
56. Having regard to the presentation of the word 'Arsenal' on the goods at issue in the main proceedings and the other secondary markings on them (see paragraph 39 above), the use of that sign is such as to create the impression that there is a material link in the course of trade between the goods concerned and the trade mark proprietor.
…
59. The goods at issue are in fact supplied outside the control of Arsenal FC as trade mark proprietor, it being common ground that they do not come from Arsenal FC or from its approved resellers.
60. In those circumstances, the use of a sign which is identical to the trade mark at issue in the main proceedings is liable to jeopardise the guarantee of origin which constitutes the essential function of the mark, as is apparent from the Court's case-law cited in paragraph 48 above. It is consequently a use which the trade mark proprietor may prevent in accordance with Article 5(1) of the Directive."
Were the goods sold by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants infringing goods?
i) In the case of items (16) and (17), L'Oréal say that the goods were counterfeits.
ii) In the remaining 15 cases, L'Oréal say that the goods had been put on the market outside the European Economic Area, but had not been put on the market in the EEA with their consent.
iii) In the case of items (7), (8), (13) and (14), L'Oréal say that the goods had not been put on the market at all, but were tester or dramming products which were not for sale to consumers. (The evidence of Mr Delassus was that item (6) was a tester as well, but this was not pleaded.)
iv) In the case of items (1), (4), (5), (12) and (15), L'Oréal say that, even if the goods had been placed on the market in the EEA with their consent, they had legitimate reasons to oppose further commercialisation since they were sold without external packaging and hence in contravention of the Cosmetic Products (Safety) Regulations 2004. (Items (3), (6) and (7) were also sold unboxed, but L'Oréal did not plead this as a ground of complaint in respect of these items.)
Counterfeits
Non-EEA goods
"i) Articles 5 to 7 of the Directive must be construed as embodying a complete harmonisation of the rules relating to the rights conferred by a trade mark and accordingly define the rights of proprietors of trade marks in the Community/EEA;ii) national rules providing for exhaustion of trade mark rights in respect of goods put on the market outside the EEA by the proprietor or with his consent are contrary to Article 7(1) of the Directive as amended by the EEA Agreement;
iii) for there to be consent within the meaning of Article 7(1) such consent must relate to each individual item of the product in respect of which exhaustion of rights is pleaded;
iv) the trade mark proprietor's consent to the marketing of goods within the EEA may be implied where it is to be inferred from facts and circumstances which unequivocally demonstrate that the proprietor has renounced his right to oppose placing of the goods on the market within the EEA.
v) Implied consent cannot be inferred from:
a) the fact that the proprietor has not communicated his opposition to marketing within the EEA to all subsequent purchasers of goods placed on the market outside the EEA; orb) from the fact that the goods carry no warning of a prohibition on their being placed on the market within the EEA;c) or from the fact that the proprietor has transferred the ownership of the goods without imposing a contractual reservation and that, according to the law governing the contract, the rights transferred includes, in the absence of such a reservation, an unlimited right of resale or at least a right to market the goods within the EEA."
Testers and dramming bottles
"39. In the present case, it is not disputed that, where he sells goods bearing his trade mark to a third party in the EEA, the proprietor puts those goods on the market within the meaning of Art.7(1) of the Directive.
40. A sale which allows the proprietor to realise the economic value of his trade mark exhausts the exclusive rights conferred by the Directive, more particularly the right to prohibit the acquiring third party from reselling the goods.
41. On the other hand, where the proprietor imports his goods with a view to selling them in the EEA or offers them for sale in the EEA, he does not put them on the market within the meaning of Art.7(1) of the Directive.
42. Such acts do not transfer to third parties the right to dispose of the goods bearing the trade mark. They do not allow the proprietor to realise the economic value of the trade mark. Even after such acts, the proprietor retains his interest in maintaining complete control over the goods bearing his trade mark, in order in particular to ensure their quality.
43. Moreover, it should be noted that Art.5(3)(b) and (c) of the Directive, relating to the content of the proprietor's exclusive rights, distinguishes inter alia between offering the goods, putting them on the market, stocking them for those purposes and importing them. The wording of that provision therefore also confirms that importing the goods or offering them for sale in the EEA cannot be equated to putting them on the market there.
44. The answer to the first question must therefore be that Art.7(1) of the Directive must be interpreted as meaning that goods bearing a trade mark cannot be regarded as having been put on the market in the EEA where the proprietor of the trade mark has imported them into the EEA with a view to selling them there or where he has offered them for sale to consumers in the EEA, in his own shops or those of an associated company, without actually selling them."
"I.a) … The proprietor of the mark is thereby granted the opportunity to realise the economic value of his trade mark. For that reason, 'putting on the market' is deemed to have taken place if the proprietor of the mark has transferred to a third party the right to dispose of the goods bearing the mark, and has thereby realised the economic value of the mark (ECJ judgment of November 30, 2004 – Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB (C-16/03) [2004] ECR I-11313; [2005] 1 CMLR 45; [2005] GRUR, 507 at [40-[42]+Marken R 2005, 41). Therefore, a transfer of the right to dispose of the goods does not only take place if the proprietor of the mark has sold the goods bearing the mark to a third party within the European Community, but also if he has passed them on to customers within the European Community for the use of any third party, as in the case at issue. In so far as the claimant has given the tester bottles of perfume to the depositaries for the purpose of further passing on the essence of the product to consumers, it has transferred the right to dispose of the goods bearing the trade mark to third parties and has realised the economic value of the trade mark through distribution for use for advertising purposes. It has thereby relinquished the possibility of controlling the further distribution of the trade marked goods within the European Community. As the Appeal Court has correctly accepted, neither the claimant's selective distribution system, nor the agreement in no. 5(2) of the standard form distribution contract change that in any way. The same applies where the claimant is not the proprietor of the mark itself, but rather gives the trade marked goods to its customers as a licensee.b) In the case law it is however recognised that putting on the market does not take place through the mere movement of goods within one undertaking between different establishments of the trade mark proprietor, or by trade in goods within a group of companies, by means of which the goods are made available for sale to a linked undertaking within the group (ECJ [2005] GRUR, 507, para.44— Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB (cited above); BGH, judgment of April 27, 2006— I ZR 162/03, [2006] GRUR, 863, para.15 = WRP 2006, 1233— Ex works). However, there is no group company relationship between the claimant and its depositaries, and the supply relationship between them is not comparable to the management authority exercised within a group of companies. The depositaries are third-party undertakings independent of the claimant, which are only subject to any obligations within the framework of contractual arrangements.
c) Rule no. 5(2) in the standard form distribution contract equally does not prevent the loss by the claimant, with the giving of the tester bottles of perfume to the depositaries, of the chance to control the product by means of a further supply of the trade marked goods. In that context the provisions agreed by the claimant with its depositaries are not of decisive significance. The deciding factor is rather the purpose for which it has left the tester bottles of perfume with its depositaries, and which includes the consumption of the scent by the public. The agreement restricting the purpose for which the perfumes may be used by the depositaries for testing by the general public is comparable to an agreement on territorial restrictions on distribution. Such restrictions only affect the relationship between the parties to the distribution contract and cannot exclude exhaustion of rights (ECJ [2005] GRUR, 507, para.54 et seq.— Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB (cited above); BGH [2006] GRUR, 863, para.16— Ex works). The agreement in no. 5(2) of the standard form contract does not present an obstacle to a finding that the product has been put on the market within the meaning of §24(1) of the Trade Mark Act if it is to be interpreted as meaning that the claimant does not transfer the property in the tester bottles of perfume to its customers. This gives the proprietor of the mark just as little control over trade marked goods given to customers who are not part of its group of companies as a contractual agreement restricting distribution.
d) The appeal in cassation is unsuccessful in asserting that the character of the products which are given solely for consumption is changed in a way that excludes exhaustion by the fact that these are turned into goods for sale. It argues that sale is an act of exploitation which is not relinquished by the proprietor of the mark in the first grant of the goods solely for use. We cannot follow that view.
Putting the trade marked goods on the market involves exhaustion of all rights of use (cf. on Art.7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive (EEC Directive 89/104): ECJ [2005] GRUR, 507, para.53— Peak Holding AB v Axolin-Elinor AB (cited above). …
3. There is no need to request a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice of the European Communities, because there is no reasonable doubt as to the interpretation of the concept of putting on the market under Art.7(1) of the EEC Trade Mark Directive…"
Unboxed products
"Member States shall take all measures necessary to ensure that cosmetic products may be marketed only if their packaging, containers or labels bear the following information in indelible, easily legible and visible lettering; …
…
(c) the date of minimum durability shall be indicated by the words: 'best used before the end of' followed by either:
— the date itself, or
— details of where it appears on the packaging.
The date shall be clearly expressed and shall consist of either the month and year or the day, month and year in that order. If necessary, this information shall be supplemented by an indication of the conditions which must be satisfied to guarantee the stated durability….
…
(g) a list of ingredients in descending order of weight at the time they are added. That list shall be preceded by the word 'ingredients'. Where that is impossible for practical reasons, an enclosed leaflet, label, tape or card must contain the ingredients to which the consumer is referred either by abbreviated information or the symbol given in Annex VIII, which must appear on the packaging…."
"(1) Subject to paragraphs (5)(b) and (9) to (12) below, no person shall supply a cosmetic product unless the packaging in which it is supplied bears, in lettering which is visible, indelible and easily legible, a list of its cosmetics ingredients (preceded by the word 'ingredients') in descending order of weight, the weight to be determined at the time the ingredients are added to the product.
(2) Subject to paragraphs (3), (4), (5)(a), (6) to (8), (13) and (14) below, no person shall supply a cosmetic product unless the container and packaging in which it is supplied bear the following particulars in lettering and other symbols (where appropriate) which is visible, indelible and easily legible –
…
(b) in the case of a cosmetic product likely before the end of 30 months from the manufacture thereof to cease either to comply with the requirements of regulation 4 or to fulfil the purpose for which it was intended, the words 'Best before….' immediately followed by -
(i) the earliest date on which it is likely so to cease; or
(ii) an indication of where that date appears on the labelling,
and any particular precautions to be observed to ensure that the product does not so cease before that date."
"offering to supply, agreeing to supply, exposing for supply and possessing for supply, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly".
"(4) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include any actions by a third party which affect to a substantial extent the value, allure or image of the trade mark or the goods to which it is applied?(5) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include the removal or obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of any markings on the goods where such removal or obliteration is not likely to cause any serious or substantial damage to the reputation of the trade mark or the goods bearing the mark?
(6) Is Article 7(2) of the Directive to be interpreted in such a way that legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of his goods include the removal or obliteration by third parties (in whole or in part) of batch code numbers on the goods where such removal or obliteration results in the goods in question
(i) offending against any part of the criminal code of a Member State (other than a part concerned with trade marks) or(ii) offending against the provisions of Directive 76/768/EEC?"
"1. Damage to the reputation of the trade mark
109. In its judgment in Parfums Christian Dior the Court held that 'the damage done to the reputation of a trade mark may, in principle, be a legitimate reason, within the meaning of Article 7(2) of the Directive, allowing the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of goods which have been put on the market in the Community by him or with his consent. According to the case-law of the Court concerning the repackaging of trade-marked goods, the owner of a trade mark has a legitimate interest, related to the specific subject-matter of the trade mark right, in being able to oppose the commercialisation of those goods if the presentation of the repackaged goods is liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark ... As regards the instant case, which concerns prestigious, luxury goods, the reseller must not act unfairly in relation to the legitimate interests of the trade mark owner. He must therefore endeavour to prevent his advertising from affecting the value of the trade mark by detracting from the allure and prestigious image of the goods in question and from their aura of luxury'.
110. The judgment in Parfums Christian Dior concerned the use of a trade mark for advertising purposes. In Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others, the Court followed the same line of reasoning in regard to the repackaging of products for purposes of sale:
'Even if the person who carried out the repackaging is indicated on the packaging of the product, there remains the possibility that the reputation of the trade mark, and thus of its owner, may nevertheless suffer from an inappropriate presentation of the repackaged product. In such a case, the trade mark owner has a legitimate interest, related to the specific subject-matter of the trade mark right, in being able to oppose the marketing of the product. In assessing whether the presentation of the repackaged product is liable to damage the reputation of the trade mark, account must be taken of the nature of the product and the market for which it is intended.'
111. It may further be inferred from the judgment in Parfums Christian Dior that damage to reputation will be treated as a legitimate reason only if it is serious.
112. Serious damage to the reputation of a trade mark is thus recognised in the Court's case-law as constituting a legitimate reason for the purposes of Article 7(2).
2. Removal or obliteration of batch code numbers
113. The essential question here is whether Article 7(2) of the Trade Marks Directive covers removal or obliteration of batch code numbers, which, it would appear, must be affixed pursuant to the provisions implementing Directive 76/768/EEC on pain of criminal proceedings.
114. The Court has already had the opportunity to set out its views on a similar issue in the Loendersloot judgment. In comparable fashion to the national proceedings here in Case C-414/99, the trade mark proprietor in Loendersloot invoked a labelling obligation under Community law, whereas the parallel importer stressed the need to remove or obliterate the identification numbers in order to carry out the parallel imports. The Court commented as follows on those issues:
'It must also be acknowledged, however, that for the producers application of identification numbers may be necessary to comply with a legal obligation, in particular under Council Directive 89/396/EEC of 14 June 1989 on indications or marks identifying the lot to which a foodstuff belongs (OJ 1989 L 186, p. 21), or to realise other important objectives which are legitimate from the point of view of Community law, such as the recall of faulty products and measures to combat counterfeiting.
... where identification numbers have been applied for [specified] purposes ..., the fact that an owner of trade mark rights makes use of those rights to prevent a third party from removing and then reaffixing or replacing labels bearing his trade mark in order to eliminate those numbers does not contribute to artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States. In such situations there is no reason to limit the rights which the trade mark owner may rely on under Article 36 of the Treaty.'
115. Here also transposition of the assessment would appear to merit discussion since the legal framework in the present cases is to be sought in Article 7 of the Trade Marks Directive and not in Article 36 of the EC Treaty (now, after amendment, Article 30 EC). The Commission does not regard this as being an obstacle and refers in this connection to the established case-law of the Court which has already been discussed. However, in so far as that case-law focuses on the restriction of trade between the Member States and on the intention artificially to partition markets, a direct application of the points there held to be conclusive to the circumstances obtaining in the present proceedings would not appear to be possible.
116. In accordance with the relationship outlined between the free movement of goods and the exercise of the rights deriving from the trade mark, the exercise of these latter rights under Article 7(2) in the context of trade within the Community is understood as an exception to the free movement of goods which is permissible only so long as it is justified for the safeguarding of rights constituting the specific subject-matter of the right conferred by the trade mark. To that extent the national court is also required to examine whether the exercise of the right conferred by the trade mark pursues a justified objective with proportionate means.
117. This argument appears to be transposable to parallel imports of branded goods from non-member countries. In the conflict between the rights of the trade mark proprietor and the interest of the person purchasing the products, exercise of the trade mark rights would appear to be justified only if it is necessary in order to safeguard the rights which form the specific subject-matter of the right conferred by the trade mark. Consequently, it would also be necessary in the present case, in accordance with the evaluation carried out in the Loendersloot judgment, to examine how far removal or obliteration of the batch code numbers affects the guarantee of origin, impacts adversely on the original condition of the products concerned, and damages the reputation of the trade mark. As the case-law stands at present, there must in these cases be a corresponding degree of seriousness. Examination as to whether these conditions have been satisfied in an individual case is, however, a matter for national courts.
118. Finally, a question arises as to how the removal or obliteration of the batch code numbers is to be assessed in isolation. So far as can be ascertained, these numbers must be affixed in order to ensure compliance with a statutory obligation deriving from a directive, and the removal or obliteration of these numbers was not accompanied by any further measure, such as, for instance, relabelling or repackaging.
119. In his Opinion in Loendersloot, Advocate General Jacobs noted: 'It is clear that the removal of such identification numbers cannot be resisted by virtue of trade-mark rights taken alone.' The Court, however, focused conclusively on the fact that the affixing of an identification number in compliance with a statutory obligation or pursuant to some other - from the Community-law perspective - legitimate objective cannot constitute an artificial partitioning of the markets between Member States.
120. Since in the present case the last-mentioned factor cannot play any role, the removal or obliteration of batch code numbers affixed in compliance with a statutory obligation may be of relevance for purposes of trade mark rights only if it would have a disproportionately adverse effect on the specific subject-matter of the trade mark right.
121. As the Commission has correctly pointed out, there is none the less an unmistakable connection between the reputation of a trade mark meriting protection and a recall of potentially defective or sub-standard products which is facilitated by the obligation to affix batch code numbers. In the interests of the good reputation of the trade-marked products, the trade mark proprietor has a legitimate interest in being able to remove such products from circulation. Consequently, it would also be necessary in the national proceedings to examine whether the damage to the reputation of the trade mark is rendered - sufficiently - serious by the removal or obliteration of the prescribed batch code numbers. An infringement of the cosmetics directive would be relevant in the context of trade mark rights only under this aspect.
122. It must remain open whether the legitimate reasons which would justify a trade mark proprietor in opposing further commercialisation within the EEA of products bearing the trade mark may include third-party removal or obliteration (in whole or in part) of marks identifying the products only because this constitutes a criminal offence. So far as can be ascertained, the order for reference does not indicate whether the trade mark proprietor would incur criminal liability if the identifying mark prescribed by the cosmetics directive were absent and he had not himself brought the trade-marked products into circulation within the EEA."
"(4) On a proper construction of Article 7(2) of the Trade Marks Directive, the legitimate reasons which justify a trade mark proprietor in opposing further commercialisation of products bearing the trade mark include any actions of third parties which seriously affect the value, allure or image of the trade mark or the products which bear that mark.(5) On a proper construction of Article 7(2) of the Trade Marks Directive, the legitimate reasons which justify a trade mark proprietor in opposing further commercialisation of products bearing the trade mark do not include the actions of third parties or circumstances which do not affect the rights constituting the specific subject-matter and essential function of the rights conferred by the trade mark."
Are eBay Europe jointly liable for infringements committed by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants?
Community law
Domestic law
"What were the consequences in law, first of Amstrad knowing that the majority of those who bought their machines would use them to copy unlawfully pre-recorded cassettes protected by copyright and, secondly, of their intention to supply that market? … I am satisfied that mere knowledge on the part of the supplier of equipment that it would probably be used to infringe someone's copyright does not make the supply unlawful; nor does an intention to supply the market for such user.".
"… mere supplying with knowledge and intent will not be enough to make the supplier himself an infringer or a joint tortfeasor with someone who is. ... the law relating both to patents and copyrights is in restraint of trade. Patentees and the owners of copyright have the rights given to them by statute and no others. Those who infringe those rights are penalised. Acts short of infringement are not. Amstrad's supplying therefore was not an act of infringement."
For similar reasons to those expressed in these passages, Slade LJ and Glidewell LJJ held that Amstrad were not liable as joint tortfeasors.
"B.P.I. next submitted that Amstrad were joint infringers; they became joint infringers if and as soon as a purchaser decided to copy a record in which copyright subsisted; Amstrad could become joint infringers not only with the immediate purchaser of an Amstrad model but also with anyone else who at any time in the future used the model to copy records. My Lords, Amstrad sell models which include facilities for receiving and recording broadcasts, disc records and taped records. All these facilities are lawful although the recording device is capable of being used for unlawful purposes. Once a model is sold Amstrad have no control over or interest in its use. In these circumstances the allegation that Amstrad is a joint infringer is untenable."
"My Lords, joint infringers are two or more persons who act in concert with one another pursuant to a common design in the infringement. In the present case there was no common design. Amstrad sold a machine and the purchaser or the operator of the machine decided the purpose for which the machine should from time to time be used. The machine was capable of being used for lawful or unlawful purposes. All recording machines and many other machines are capable of being used for unlawful purposes but manufacturers and retailers are not joint infringers if purchasers choose to break the law. Since Amstrad did not make or authorise other persons to make a record embodying a recording in which copyright subsisted, Amstrad did not entrench upon the exclusive rights granted by the Act of 1956 to copyright owners and Amstrad were not in breach of the duties imposed by the Act."
"My Lords, I accept that a defendant who procures a breach of copyright is liable jointly and severally with the infringer for the damages suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the infringement. The defendant is a joint infringer; he intends and procures and shares a common design that infringement shall take place. A defendant may procure an infringement by inducement, incitement or persuasion. But in the present case Amstrad do not procure an infringement by offering for sale a machine which may be used for lawful or unlawful copying and they do not procure infringement by advertising the attractions of their machine to any purchaser who may decide to copy unlawfully. … The purchaser will not make unlawful copies because he has been induced or incited or persuaded to do so by Amstrad. The purchaser will make unlawful copies for his own use because he chooses to do so. Amstrad's advertisements may persuade the purchaser to buy an Amstrad machine but will not influence the purchaser's later decision to infringe copyright. Buckley LJ observed in Belegging-en Exploitatiemaatschappij Lavender BV v Witten Industrial Diamonds Ltd, at p. 65, that 'Facilitating the doing of an act is obviously different from procuring the doing of an act.' ... Generally speaking, inducement, incitement or persuasion to infringe must be by a defendant to an individual infringer and must identifiably procure a particular infringement in order to make the defendant liable as a joint infringer."
"Under and by virtue of [the Copyright Act 1956] Amstrad owed a duty not to infringe copyright and not to authorise an infringement of copyright. They did not owe a duty to prevent or discourage or warn against infringement."
"I have set out these cases in some detail in deference to the care with which they were analysed during the argument on this appeal. In truth, however, I believe that they do little more than illustrate how in various factual situations the courts have applied principles which are no longer in doubt, save perhaps as regards the relationship between indirect infringements by procuring and by participation in a common design. There may still be a question whether these are distinct ways of infringing, or different aspects of a single way. I prefer the former view, although of course a procurement may lead to a common design, and hence qualify under both heads. We need not however explore this question, since Mr. Gratwick has (rightly, in my judgment) disclaimed any reliance on that part of his clients' pleaded case which is founded on procurement, and has concentrated his arguments on the allegation of a common design. As to the authorities on this subject, if I am right in the view just expressed that they are really cases on the facts, I suggest that little is to be gained by matching the circumstances of each case against each of the allegations in the draft amended statement of claim.
For my part I prefer to take the relevant part of the amendment as a whole, and to ask whether, if the allegations therein are proved to be true (and there seems no dispute that they will be), and if they are set in the context of the relationship between the companies in the Gillette Group, when that has emerged at the trial, a judge directing himself correctly could reasonably come to the conclusion that - (a) there was a common design between Boston and G.U.K. to do acts which, if the patent is upheld, amounted to infringements, and (b) Boston has acted in furtherance of that design. I use the words 'common design' because they are readily to hand, but there are other expressions in the cases, such as 'concerted action' or 'agreed on common action' which will serve just as well. The words are not to be construed as if they formed part of a statute. They all convey the same idea. This idea does not, as it seems to me, call for any finding that the secondary party has explicitly mapped out a plan with the primary offender. Their tacit agreement will be sufficient. Nor, as it seems to me, is there any need for a common design to infringe. It is enough if the parties combine to secure the doing of acts which in the event prove to be infringements."
"The overall effect of these cases is clear. It is only conduct which comes into the first or the third of the categories I have set out above which constitute the commission of a tort. The criminal law for obvious policy reasons goes further than the civil law. Acts which knowingly facilitate the commission of a crime amount to the crime of aiding and abetting but they do not amount to a tort or make the aider liable as a joint tortfeasor.
…
Accordingly, in my judgment there is no second category in the law of tort. Mere assistance, even knowing assistance, does not suffice to make the 'secondary' party liable as a joint tortfeasor with the primary party. What he does must go further. He must have conspired with the primary party or procured or induced his commission of the tort (my first category); or he must have joined in the common design pursuant to which the tort was committed (my third category)."
"The underlying concept for joint tortfeasance must be that the joint tortfeasor has been so involved in the commission of the tort as to make himself liable for the tort. Unless he has made the infringing act his own, he has not himself committed the tort. That notion seems to us what underlies all the decisions to which we were referred. If there is a common design or concerted action or otherwise a combination to secure the doing of the infringing acts, then each of the combiners has made the act his own and will be liable. Like the judge, we do not think that what was done by Meneghetti was sufficient. It was merely acting as a supplier of goods to a purchaser which was free to do what it wanted with the goods. Meneghetti did not thereby make MFI's infringing acts its own."
Was there any release?
"The circumstances which justified the making of the unappealed order for disclosure raised an issue as to whether there is any subsisting liability for acts on the part of D4 to D8 in respect of which the eBay Defendants could be said to be jointly liable as alleged in paragraph 36 of the Particulars of Claim. L'Oréal could easily have provided documents and evidence as to the subsistence of such liability. They have not done so. The Court should not speculate as to whether the disclosure and evidence which has not been provided would have established the subsistence of such liability."
Procurement
Participation in a common design
i) eBay Europe actively promote the listing of items upon the Site in a variety of ways as described above. These include encouraging sellers to register and to list items for sale, assisting sellers to list items for sale by various methods and providing facilities such as eBay Shops and eBay Express.
ii) eBay Europe exercise some degree of control over the content of listings. In particular, eBay Europe use software filters to detect listings of prohibited or suspicious listings and employ CSRs to review such listings.
iii) eBay Europe also exercise some degree of control over the behaviour of sellers through the application of sanctions for breach of policies as discussed above. Although sanctions are often applied as a result of complaints through the VeRO programme, sanctions are also imposed unilaterally by eBay Europe. Nevertheless, the evidence in relation to the activities of the Fourth to Tenth Defendants demonstrates that sellers can repeatedly commit acts which lead to complaints by rights owners and/or buyers and yet be permitted by eBay Europe to continue trading.
iv) eBay Europe control the sale process both technically and legally. From a technical point of view, each step of the sale process is controlled by eBay's software apart from the actual delivery of and payment for the item. From a legal perspective, eBay Europe have a contract with both the seller and buyer, which requires each party to complete the transaction as well as imposing other terms and conditions.
v) eBay Europe are intimately involved in the sales transaction. Although eBay Europe arrange their business so that they do not sell the goods as agent in the way that an auctioneer does, where an item is sold by the auction-style format their role is close to that of an auctioneer. This is particularly true where the buyer makes use of the proxy bidding facility.
vi) eBay Europe profit directly from both the listing and the sale of items.
"The question that arises is the usual one: which of the two innocent persons is to suffer? Is the loss to fall on the owners? … Or on the auctioneers? … In answering that question in cases such as this, the common law has always acted on the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. It has protected the property rights of the true owner. It has enforced them strictly as against anyone who deals with the goods inconsistently with the dominion of the true owner. Even though the true owner may have been very negligent and the defendant may have acted in complete innocence, nevertheless the common law held him liable in conversion. Both the 'innocent acquirer' and the 'innocent handler' have been hit hard. That state of the law has often been criticised. It has been proposed that the law should protect a person who buys goods or handles them in good faith without notice of any adverse title, at any rate where the claimant by his own negligence or otherwise has largely contributed to the outcome. Such proposals have however been effectively blocked by the decisions of the House of Lords in the last century of Hollins v Fowler (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 757, and in this century of Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd v Twitchings [1977] A.C. 890, to which I may add the decision of this court in Central Newbury Car Auctions Ltd v Unity Finance Ltd [1957] 1 Q.B. 371.
In some instances the strictness of the law has been mitigated by statute, as for instance, by the protection given to private purchasers by the Hire-Purchase Acts. But in other cases the only way in which the innocent acquirers or handlers have been able to protect themselves is by insurance. They insure themselves against their potential liability. This is the usual method nowadays. When men of business or professional men find themselves hit by the law with new and increasing liabilities, they take steps to insure themselves, so that the loss may not fall on one alone, but be spread among many. It is a factor of which we must take account: see Post Office v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1967] 2 Q.B. 363, 375 and Morris v Ford Motor Co. Ltd [1973] 1 Q.B. 792, 801."
"It is clear that the auctioneers insure against both kinds of sale equally. On every one of the sales, under the hammer or on provisional bids, the auctioneers charge an 'indemnity fee' to the purchaser. He has to pay a premium of £2 on each vehicle purchased. In return for it the auctioneers … through an associate company … insure the purchaser against any loss he may suffer through any defect in title of the seller. So if the true owner comes along and re-takes the goods from the purchaser or makes him pay damages for conversion, the auctioneers (through their associate company) indemnify the purchaser against the loss. The premium thus charged by the auctioneers (through their associate company) is calculated to cover the risk of the seller having no title or a defective title. That risk is the same no matter whether the true owner sues the auctioneer or the purchaser. … This system is the commercial way of doing justice between the parties. It means that all concerned are protected. The true owner is protected by the strict law of conversion. He can recover against the innocent acquirer and the innocent handler. But those innocents are covered by insurance so that the loss is not borne by any single individual but is spread through the community at large. The insurance factor had a considerable influence on the Law Reform Committee. In view of it they did not recommend any change in the law see the 18th Report, paragraph 48 and note 2. So also it may properly have an influence on the courts in deciding issues which come before them."
Counsel submitted that eBay Europe already provided insurance for buyers through PayPal and could insure their own liability in the same way as described in that case.
Are eBay Europe liable as primary infringers for the use of the Link Marks in relation to infringing goods?
Use in sponsored links
"The use of signs identical to the Link Marks on advertising links sponsored by eBay appearing on popular and well-known third party search websites. These link to products appearing on the Site from time to time which use such signs. Examples showing the use of such links are attached hereto as Annex 7."
"This does not involve use of any L'Oreal trade marks 'in relation to' any particular goods offered for sale or supply by any of the eBay Defendants 'in the course of trade.' Moreover, to the extent that it involves use of any L'Oreal trade marks 'in relation to' any particular goods offered for sale or supply by any particular seller 'in the course of trade', the use cannot be stigmatised as infringing use except and unless it is directly hypothecated to infringing products."
"So, no placing on the market, no infringement. The touchstone is clear.'"
Use on the Site
Do eBay Europe have a defence under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive?
Key provisions of the E-Commerce Directive
"(42) The exemptions from liability established in this Directive cover only cases where the activity of the information society service provider is limited to the technical process of operating and giving access to a communication network over which information made available by third parties is transmitted or temporarily stored, for the sole purpose of making the transmission more efficient; this activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive nature, which implies that the information society service provider has neither knowledge of nor control over the information which is transmitted or stored.
(45) The limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers established in this Directive do not affect the possibility of injunctions of different kinds; such injunctions can in particular consist of orders by courts or administrative authorities requiring the termination or prevention of any infringement, including the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it.
(46) In order to benefit from a limitation of liability, the provider of an information society service, consisting of the storage of information, upon obtaining actual knowledge or awareness of illegal activities has to act expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information concerned; the removal or disabling of access has to be undertaken in the observance of the principle of freedom of expression and of procedures established for this purpose at national level; this Directive does not affect Member States' possibility of establishing specific requirements which must be fulfilled expeditiously prior to the removal or disabling of information.
(47) Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring obligation on service providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by national authorities in accordance with national legislation.
(48) This Directive does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, who host information provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and prevent certain types of illegal activities"
"Article 13
'Caching'
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the transmission in a communication network of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the automatic, intermediate and temporary storage of that information, performed for the sole purpose of making more efficient the information's onward transmission to other recipients of the service upon their request, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not modify the information;
(b) the provider complies with conditions on access to the information;
(c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the information, specified in a manner widely recognised and used by industry;
(d) the provider does not interfere with the lawful use of technology, widely recognised and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and
(e) the provider acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to it has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement.
2. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement.
Article 14
Hosting
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service, Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the service, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is acting under the authority or the control of the provider.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of access to information
Article 15
No general obligation to monitor
1. Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity.
2. Member States may establish obligations for information society service providers promptly to inform the competent public authorities of alleged illegal activities undertaken or information provided by recipients of their service or obligations to communicate to the competent authorities, at their request, information enabling the identification of recipients of their service with whom they have storage agreements"
Discussion
Do L'Oréal have a remedy under Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive?
Relevant provisions of the Enforcement Directive
"Injunctions
Member States shall ensure that, where a judicial decision is taken finding an infringement of an intellectual property right, the judicial authorities may issue against the infringer an injunction aimed at prohibiting the continuation of the infringement. Where provided for by national law, non-compliance with an injunction shall, where appropriate, be subject to a recurring penalty payment, with a view to ensuring compliance. Member States shall also ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC."
"This Directive shall not affect:
(a) the Community provisions governing the substantive law on intellectual property, Directive 95/46/EC, Directive 1999/93/EC or Directive 2000/31/EC, in general, and Articles 12 to 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC in particular".
Domestic law
"The High Court may by order (whether interlocutory or final) grant an injunction or appoint a receiver in all cases in which it appears to be just and convenient to do so."
"The powers of courts with equitable jurisdiction to grant injunctions are, subject to any relevant statutory restrictions, unlimited. Injunctions are granted only when to do so accords with equitable principles, but this restriction involves, not a defect of powers, but an adoption of doctrines and practices that change in their application from time to time. Unfortunately, there have sometimes been made observations by judges that tend to confuse questions of jurisdiction or of powers with questions of discretions or of practice. The preferable analysis involves a recognition of the great width of equitable powers, an historical appraisal of the categories of injunctions that have been established and an acceptance that pursuant to general equitable principles injunctions may issue in new categories when this course appears appropriate."
"Where, as in most jurisdictions, superior courts now exercise the powers of the former Court of Chancery, whether or not they are also able to grant legal injunctions or are affected by special Judicature Act provisions, their powers of granting injunctions are unlimited, provided that they have jurisdiction over the defendant in the circumstances in question. These powers are however exercised in accordance with the principles set out here under.
First, an injunction may issue in the protection of any legal right whatever, save for an applicable statutory provision provides to the contrary. For these purposes the relevant legal right must ordinarily be a present right of the plaintiff, as opposed to a right that he merely expects or hopes to acquire in the future.
Secondly, an injunction may issue in the enforcement of any equitable right. Here on a strict analysis the right to the injunction itself represents pro tanto the equitable right in question. Hence in ascertaining whether an injunction may be obtained on this basis it is necessary to determine whether injunctions of the relevant kind were formally granted in the exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction of courts of equity, and if not, whether the principles underlying those jurisdictions should nonetheless now be treated as rendering the grant of the injunction appropriate.
Thirdly, an injunction may issue pursuant to its natural power to grant injunctions conferred in respect of a particular subject matter, such as family law or trade practises law.
Fourthly, an injunction may issue in the protection of a legal privilege or freedom. So an injunction may be obtained to prevent a person from harassing the plaintiff. Likewise even if, on the principles that have been set out here, an injunction is not otherwise obtainable to enjoying the bringing or continuation of proceedings in another court - whether in an inferior court, a court of special jurisdiction or a foreign court - it may nevertheless be obtained if the bringing or continuation of those proceedings would be unconscionable. Injunctions of these kinds may be granted whether or not inconsistent proceedings have been or will be commenced in the forum.
Fifthly, an injunction (such as a Mareva injunction or freezing order) may issue in other cases in which, on miscellaneous grounds, the conduct restraint would be unconscionable. It has been said in the House of Lords that this term includes conduct which is oppressive or vexatious or which interferes with the due process of the court. Here s. 37 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and other such provisions merely confirm the width of the court's inherent powers. "
"If a man has in his possession or control goods the dissemination of which, whether in the way of trade or, possibly, merely by way of gifts (see Upmann v Forester, 24 ChD 231) will infringe another's patent or trade mark, he becomes, as soon as he is aware of this fact, subject to a duty, an equitable duty, not to allow those goods to pass out of his possession or control at any rate in circumstances in which the proprietor of the patent or mark might be injured by infringement ensuing. The man having the goods in his possession or control must not aid the infringement by letting the goods get into the hands of those who may use them or deal with them in a way which will invade the proprietor's rights. Even though by doing so he might not himself infringe the patent or trade mark, he would be in dereliction of his duty to the proprietor. This duty is one which will, if necessary, be enforced in equity by way of injunction: see Upmann v Elkan, L.R. 12 Eq. 140, 7 Ch App 130."
What does Article 11 require?
"It is, however, consistent practice of German courts that whenever an absolute right, i.e. a right which is enforceable against everyone, is in question a third person who has neither committed an infringement in his own right nor has aided and abetted the infringement of a principal infringer can be asked to stop any interference ('Störung') he has caused in the past. Sec. 1004 of the German Civil Code grants such a right to (permanent) injunctive relief to the proprietor against anybody who was caused an interference with the property. German courts apply this provision to interferences as with any other absolute right, i.e. intellectual property. This liability of the 'interferer' ('Störer') is related to a rule of reason, which takes into account that even such a liability limited to injunctive relief involves a duty to take care. Nobody shall be held liable as an interferer (Störer) if it would be unreasonable to burden him with a duty to examine whether or not his behaviour could interfere with the (intellectual) property of a third person. For example, a carrier who transports counterfeit goods from A to B may be an important link in the chain of causation leading to the infringing sales of the goods in B. Still he could not be held liable as an interferer (Störer) because it will be unreasonable to burden him with a duty to examine the goods he has to carry in regard to possible trademark infringements.
Applying this doctrine to a host provider like RICARDO or eBay, that opens a platform for an internet auction, leads to the conclusion that there can be no ex ante examination of any infringing content of the vendors may want to put up for sale. If the host provider was expected to screen and control any contents before it is offered on the internet, this would clearly mean the end of such a business model. Taking into account the number of individual sales taking place on a platform of this kind, it can only be operated in a way that individual offers are put up the sale by the vendor without the assistance of the host provider. A duty to react in the case of infringement would, however, be reasonable once a clear infringement has been shown by the right holder. In this case the host provider should indeed be obliged to remove the infringing object from the platform and to install measures in order to prevent a repetition of such an infringement."
"The solution found in the RICARDO judgment of the Bundesgerichtshof strikes a fair balance between intellectual property rights and the interests of host providers. On the one hand, it does not impose an unreasonable burden on the provider. On the other hand, it makes sure that the provider takes all reasonable steps to prevent further infringements of the same kind. It seems only fair that a provider, who would who would profit from the sales of counterfeit goods, does everything in his power to prevent such infringements. The balance struck by the German courts is in accordance with European law, but European law only allows such a balance without stipulating it. Hence there is room for further harmonisation, which would not only allow member states to strike such a balance but which would also would ask such a balance in order to give adequate protection to intellectual property rights."
"… its requirements and scope have not yet been determined. This is particularly true with respect to legal offences committed online, i.e. through services provided by Internet Service Providers…"
Are the Distance Selling Regulations relevant to any of the foregoing issues, and if so how?
"The Distance Selling Regulations provide protection to consumers in relation to any consumer distance contract. 'Buy It Now' sales advertised on the Site are covered by the scope of the Distance Selling Regulations. Accordingly, under the Distance Selling Regulations, 'Buy It Now' offers on the Site should provide the consumer with information in respect of the identity of the supplier and the supplier's address where the contract requires payment in advance. Relevant sellers on the Site do not provide such information, including the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Defendants."
Selected provisions of the Distance Selling Regulations
"Interpretation
3. (1) In these Regulations -
"breach" means contravention by a supplier of a prohibition in, or failure to comply with a requirement of, these Regulations;
"business" includes a trade or profession;
"consumer" means any natural person who, in contracts to which these Regulations apply, is acting for purposes which are outside his business;
…
"distance contract" means any contract concerning goods or services concluded between a supplier and a consumer under an organised distance sales or service provision scheme run by the supplier who, for the purpose of the contract, makes exclusive use of one or more means of distance communication up to and including the moment at which the contract is concluded;
…
"excepted contract" means a contract such as is mentioned in regulation 5(1);
"means of distance communication" means any means which, without the simultaneous physical presence of the supplier and the consumer, may be used for the conclusion of a contract between those parties; and an indicative list of such means is contained in Schedule 1;
…
"operator of a means of communication" means any public or private person whose business involves making one or more means of distance communication available to suppliers;
"period for performance" has the meaning given by regulation 19(2);
…
"supplier" means any person who, in contracts to which these Regulations apply, is acting in his commercial or professional capacity; and
…
Contracts to which these Regulations apply
4. These Regulations apply, subject to regulation 6, to distance contracts other than excepted contracts.
Excepted contracts
5.(1) The following are excepted contracts, namely any contract -
…
(f) concluded at an auction.
…
Information required prior to the conclusion of the contract
7.(1) Subject to paragraph (4), in good time prior to the conclusion of the contract the supplier shall -
(a) provide to the consumer the following information -
(i) the identity of the supplier and, where the contract requires payment in advance, the supplier's address;
(ii) a description of the main characteristics of the goods or services;
(iii) the price of the goods or services including all taxes;
(iv) delivery costs where appropriate;
(v) the arrangements for payment, delivery or performance;
(vi) the existence of a right of cancellation except in the cases referred to in regulation 13;
(vii) the cost of using the means of distance communication where it is calculated other than at the basic rate;
(viii) the period for which the offer or the price remains valid; and
(ix) where appropriate, the minimum duration of the contract, in the case of contracts for the supply of goods or services to be performed permanently or recurrently;
(b) inform the consumer if he proposes, in the event of the goods or services ordered by the consumer being unavailable, to provide substitute goods or services (as the case may be) of equivalent quality and price; and
(c) inform the consumer that the cost of returning any such substitute goods to the supplier in the event of cancellation by the consumer would be met by the supplier."
Application of the Distance Selling Regulations to eBay Europe
Relevance?
A reference to the ECJ?
Conclusions
i) The Fourth to Tenth Defendants have infringed the Trade Marks. In the case of the Fourth to Eighth Defendants the goods they sold were put on the market outside the EEA and L'Oréal did not consent to those goods being put on the market within the EEA. In the case of the Ninth and Tenth Defendants the goods they sold were counterfeits.
ii) Whether the sale by sellers on the Site of testers and dramming products and of unboxed products amounts to an infringement of the Trade Marks depends upon questions of interpretation of the Trade Marks Directive as to which the law is unclear (see paragraphs 319-326 and 331-342 above). Although these questions are academic so far as the acts committed by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants are concerned, they are potentially relevant to the question of what relief, if any, L'Oréal are entitled to. Accordingly, guidance from the ECJ is required on these points.
iii) eBay Europe are not jointly liable for the infringements committed by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants.
iv) Whether eBay Europe have infringed the Link Marks by use in sponsored links and on the Site in relation to infringing goods again depends upon a number of questions of interpretation of the Trade Marks Directive upon which guidance from the ECJ is required (see paragraphs 388-392, 393-398 and 413-418 above).
v) Whether eBay Europe have a defence under Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive is another matter upon which guidance from the ECJ is needed (see paragraphs 436-443 above).
vi) As a matter of domestic law the court has power to grant an injunction against eBay Europe by virtue of the infringements committed by the Fourth to Tenth Defendants, but the scope of the relief which Article 11 requires national courts to grant in such circumstances is another matter upon which guidance from the ECJ is required (see paragraphs 455-465 above).
Note 1 In the translation in ETMR the word “perpetrator” is used and in the translation in IIC the word “accessory” is used, neither of which is accurate. [Back]