QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
(Sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
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THE QUEEN on the application of MOHAMMAD HASAN IMAM |
Claimant |
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- and - |
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SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT |
Defendant |
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Alan Payne (instructed by Government Legal Dept.) for the Defendant
Hearing date: 9 November 2017
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Crown Copyright ©
Mr Pushpinder Saini QC :
This judgment is in 7 parts as follows:
I. Overview: | para. 1-7 |
II. The Facts: | para. 8-15 |
III. The Statutory Framework: | para. 16-27 |
IV. Contractual Freedom and A1P1: | para. 28-34 |
V. Construction: | para. 35-38 |
VI. Ultra Vires: | para. 39-61 |
VII. Conclusion: | para. 62 |
I. Overview
II. The Facts
"The occupation you have applied to undertake is not considered a shortage because the job you are applying for leave to undertake was not on the list of shortage occupations published by the Home Office… at the time your [CoS] was assigned…
The reason for this is because under SOC code 5434 in Appendix K of the Immigration Rules it is stated that the job must not be in either a fast food outlet, a standard fare outlet, or an establishment which provides a take-away service. However, there is evidence available on the internet that your prospective employer, Alishaan Restaurant of West Street, Sompting, BN15 0AP does offer a take-away and delivery service.
…"
III. The Statutory Framework
"The Rules are not law (although they are treated as if they were law for the purposes of section 86(3)(a) of the 2002 Act: see para 8 above), but a statement of the Secretary of State's administrative practice: see Odelola v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] UKHL 25; [2009] 1 WLR 1230, paras 6 and 7; Munir, para 37; Mahad v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] UKSC 16; [2010] 1 WLR 48, para 10; R (Aguilar Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AIRE Centre intervening) [2011] UKSC 45; [2012] 1 AC 621, para 61; and R (Alvi) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 33; [2012] 1WLR 2208, paras 32 and 33. They do not therefore possess the same degree of democratic legitimacy as legislation made by Parliament: Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11; [2007] 2 AC 167, para 17. Nevertheless, they give effect to the policy of the Secretary of State, who has been entrusted by Parliament with responsibility for immigration control and is accountable to Parliament for her discharge of her responsibilities in this vital area. Furthermore, they are laid before Parliament, may be the subject of debate, and can be disapproved under the negative resolution procedure. They are therefore made in the exercise of powers which have been democratically conferred, and are subject, albeit to a limited extent, to democratic procedures of accountability".
"The points based system for determining whether to grant leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, which applies to students as well as a number of other categories of applicant, is designed to achieve predictability, administrative simplicity and certainty. It does so at the expense of discretion, that is to say it is prescriptive. The consequence is that failure to comply with all its detailed requirements will usually lead to a failure to earn the points in question and thus refusal: see e.g. Sullivan LJ in Alam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 960 at [44], Davis LJ in Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rodriguez [2014] EWCA Civ 2 at [100]; Sales LJ in EK (Ivory Coast) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 1517 at [28] and Briggs LJ at [59]. It was that important background which informed the decision in EK (Ivory Coast)."
i) Ensuring that applicants are only considered in areas where there is a genuine shortage of labour in the UK;
ii) Ensuring that wherever possible resident workers are used for jobs within the UK; and
iii) Reducing net migration.
"Requirements for leave to remain.
To qualify for entry clearance as a Tier 2 (General) Migrant … an applicant must meet the requirements listed below. If the applicant meets these requirements, entry clearance will be granted. If the applicant does not meet these requirements, the application will be refused.
Requirements:
(a) The applicant must not fall for refusal under the general grounds for refusal.
(b) If applying as a Tier 2 (General) Migrant, the applicant must have a minimum of 50 points under paragraphs 76 to 79D of Appendix A."
"Chef, cooks (5434):
ONLY the following job in this occupation code:
- skilled chef where: -
- Only the pay is at least £29,570 per year after deductions for accommodation, meals etc.; and
- the job requires five or more years' relevant experience in a role of at least equivalent status to the one they are entering; and
- the job is not in either a fast food outlet, a standard fare outlet, or an establishment which provides a take-away service; and
The job is in one of the following roles:
- executive chef - limited to one per establishment
- head chef - limited to one per establishment
- sous chef - limited to one for every four kitchen staff per establishment
- specialist chef - limited to one per speciality per establishment
A fast food outlet is one where food is prepared in bulk for speed of service, rather than to individual order.
A standard fare outlet is one where the menu is designed centrally for outlets in a chain / franchise, rather than by a chef or chefs in the individual restaurant. Standard fare outlets also include those where dishes and / or cooking sauces are bought in ready-made, rather than prepared from fresh/raw ingredients".
IV. Contractual Freedom and A1P1
"… freedom to contract between the subjects of this country is a fundamental right even today, and if Parliament intends to empower a third party to make conditions which regulate the terms of contracts to be made between others then even when there is an appeal to a court of law against such conditions, it must do so in quite clear terms".
V. Construction
VI. Unreasonableness/Ultra Vires
"This rule, unlike a statutory provision to which effect must be given however absurd, is amenable to the court's power under its review jurisdiction to condemn it, in whole or in part, as invalid for unreasonableness. This principle is well-established. In the leading case of Kruse v Johnson …., Russell LCJ, said this:
'I do not mean to say that there may not be cases in which it would be the duty of the Court to condemn by-laws, made under such authority as these were made, as invalid because unreasonable. But unreasonable in what sense? If, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes; if they were manifestly unjust; if they disclosed bad faith; if they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men, the Court might well say, 'Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires.'
'But it is in this sense, and in this sense only, as I conceive, that the question of unreasonableness can properly be regarded. A by-law is not unreasonable merely because judges may think that it goes further than is prudent or necessary or convenient, or because it is not accompanied by a qualification or an exception some judges may think ought to be there. Surely it is not too much to say that in matters which directly and mainly concern people of the country, who have the right to choose those whom they think best fitted to represent them in their local government bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand them in their local government bodies, such representatives may be trusted to understand their own requirements better than judges.'
That passage well expresses not only the court's power, but also its limitation…. It should be recognised that where the relevant power is given, as here, to a Minister responsible to Parliament, the court is even less willing to intervene, a fortiori where, as is also the case here, the rules in question were laid before Parliament and subject to a process akin to negative resolution".
"As Lord Reed has shown (Hesham Ali, paras 46f), although the tribunal must make its own judgment, it should attach considerable weight to judgments made by the Secretary of State in the exercise of her constitutional responsibility for immigration policy. He cites Lord Bingham's reference in Huang to the need to accord appropriate weight to the judgment of a person "with responsibility for a given subject matter and access to special sources of knowledge and advice". As that passage indicates, there are two aspects, logically distinct: first, the constitutional responsibility of the Secretary of State for setting national policy in this area; and secondly the expertise available to her and her department in setting and implementing that policy. Both are relevant in the present case, but the degree of respect which should be accorded to them may be different. The weight to be given to the rules or Departmental guidance will depend on the extent to which matters of policy or implementation have been informed by the special expertise available to the Department".
"It is apparent from the MAC report, and the evidence of Mr Peckover, that the reasons for adopting a stricter approach in the new rules were matters of practicality rather than wider policy, reflecting what the MAC acknowledged to be the relative uncertainty and difficulty of verification of such sources. That did not make it unreasonable or irrational for the Secretary of State to take them into account in formulating the rules. The MAC recognised the strength of the case for taking account of other sources, but it did not in terms advise against the approach ultimately adopted by the Secretary of State. In considering the legality of that approach, for the reasons already discussed (para 59 above) it is necessary to distinguish between two aspects: first, the rationality of this aspect of the rules or instructions under common law principles, and secondly the compatibility with the HRA of similar restrictions as part of consideration outside the rules. As to the first, while the application of these restrictions may seem harsh and even capricious in some cases, the matter was given careful consideration by both the MAC and the Secretary of State. As Aikens LJ said (para 154), the decision was "not taken on a whim". In our view, it was not irrational in the common law sense for the Secretary of State to give priority in the rules to simplicity of operation and ease of verification".
"This [the Exclusion] was a clear, objective and easily verifiable test. It was considered appropriate as take-away services were considered to be far less associated with the finest cuisine prepared by the top 5% to 8% of skilled chefs, and much more with establishments offering fast food or alternative fare. The offer of a take-away service was therefore considered to be a strong and clear indicator of the quality of cuisine on offer, and by association the level of skill needed in preparing it. The SSHD considered that this exclusion of restaurants offering a take-away service was consistent with the approach recommended by the MAC".
"The UK Border Agency added to our criteria in order to try and prevent abuse. They state that a highly skilled chef must also not be working in an establishment offering a take-away service. In addition, they must be an executive, head, sous or specialist chef and there is a limit on the numbers of each per establishment. We understand the basis for these additional requirements. We accept that there is an argument that the very best global talent should be recruited and, pragmatically, we believe the current definition adequately identifies the very best whilst providing measures for preventing abuse".
i) Those which did not deliver a take-away service. The concern was that this would allow chefs to apply for work in burger and fish and chips restaurants.ii) Those with a certain percentage of their business being take-away. The practical concern was the impossibility of verifying these percentages (and the resource implications).
iii) Those providing fine dining. The concern related to the element of subjectivity in applying this criterion and the lack of consistency in decision making.
i) There is a substantial value in the context of immigration control in having clear and accessible rules and cutting down individualised discretion.ii) The Government is entitled to limit the number of chefs entering the country by the application of strict criteria. There also exists the possibility of skilled chefs seeking admission through other routes and not just the via the SOL.
iii) The purpose of Code 5434 is to separate appropriately skilled from non-skilled chefs. So, the relevant question is whether the Secretary of State has shown an evidential basis for the proposition that excluding establishments which provide take-away services will further the purpose of sorting skilled from non-skilled chefs.
iv) Although the Exclusion is undoubtedly broad and will catch and thereby exclude, some skilled chefs, I have no reliable evidence as to the extent of that potentially unjust consequence. I have not overlooked here the evidence from the Claimant's tier 2 sponsor Mr. Shahin Ahmed as to the prevalence of the provision of some kind of take-away service in a substantial proportion of establishments within restaurant industry. That evidence is not however based on any reliable empirical data but I am willing to proceed on the basis in my rationality assessment that the Exclusion is likely to have an impact on very many establishments.
v) On the other hand, the actual evidence I have before me from the Secretary of State indicates that take-away establishments had been typically associated with abuses in the past; and more importantly there has not been any challenge by way of evidence to the statement from Mr. Jackson that "…[the Exclusion] was considered appropriate as take-away services were considered to be far less associated with the finest cuisine prepared by the top 5% to 8% of skilled chefs, and much more with establishments offering fast food or alternative fare. The offer of a take-away service was therefore considered to be a strong and clear indicator of the quality of cuisine on offer, and by association the level of skill needed in preparing it".
vi) As a matter of generality, the Secretary of State was here saying that certain take-away restaurants (which were not strictly fast food or standard fare outlets) also prepared food which was likely to be similar to the generally lower quality cuisine offered by fast food or standard fare outlets (and therefore would not need skilled chefs). As a matter of generality, and even though there will be exceptions, this is not a conclusion which strikes me as irrational. I would need counter-evidence to challenge this generalised conclusion. I have no reason to believe it was not based on the Secretary of State's experience.
vii) The MAC knew that the Secretary of State had added the Exclusion and expressly stated that they understood why the Secretary of State had added take-away establishments. This was an endorsement by an expert body. That, as explained by the Supreme Court in MM cited at para. 43 above is an important factor. Had the MAC considered there was something fundamentally unsound in the Secretary of State's expansion of the exclusions to include take-away establishments, it would surely have expressed that view.
viii) It is not open to me, by way of concepts such as taking judicial notice of the current markets in the commercial take-away industry, to second-guess these assessments even if it would appear as a matter of common sense that the Exclusion is likely to catch certain take-away providing establishments which need skilled chefs.
ix) The Secretary of State was aware of the fact that the Exclusion was very broad and that it might have this consequence. She also gave active consideration to formulating a more limited exclusion but was rightly concerned that it would require highly subjective views in relation to the nature and the quality of particular establishments (defeating the benefits of having an objective and easily administered rule). Using the words of the MM case cited at para 43 above, even though the application of the Exclusion may seem "harsh and even capricious", careful consideration has been given by the Secretary of State to its benefits and disadvantages and the MAC did not dissent.
VII. Conclusion.