England and Wales High Court (Administrative Court) Decisions

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		05/05/2015

Including Order

Mr Justice Mostyn:


 


1. On 15 October 2014 a Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) handed down an exhaustive judgment running to 58 pages in disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and Mr Boma Ellis-Dokubo. Serious allegations had been made against both of them. The appellant admitted all of the allegations against him. Mr Ellis-Dokubo admitted most of allegations against him, but not the allegations of dishonesty (which were not made against the appellant). All the allegations were found proved. The SDT ordered Mr Ellis-Dokubo to be struck off and to pay £25,000 in costs. It ordered the appellant to be suspended for two years from 3 September 2014 and to pay £4,000 in costs.
2. This is my judgment on the appellant's appeal against the sanction imposed on him. He argues that it is manifestly excessive and disproportionate. I heard the appeal on 24 April 2015, by which time the appellant had already served nearly 8 months of the suspension.
3. The allegations against the appellant were as follows:

1.1 The Respondents failed to act in the best interests of clients contrary to Rule 1.02, 1.04 and 1.06 of the Solicitors Code of Conduct 2007 ("SCC 2007") and/or were such conduct relates to a period after 6 October 2011, Principles 2, 4, 6 and 10 and Outcome 1.1 of the 2011 Code of Conduct ("2011 Code").
…

1.3 The Respondents have transferred client monies from client account to office account in respect of fees without sending a bill of costs or other written notification to the client contrary to Rule 19 of the Solicitors Accounts Rules 1998 ("SAR l998') and/or where such transfers were made after 6 October 2011, Rule 17 of the SR.A Accounts Rules 2011 ("AR 2011").

1 .4 The Respondents have retained, without proper reason, client monies, contrary to Rule 15 SAR 1998 and/or, where such conduct took place after 6 October 2011, Rule 14 AR 2011.
…

1.6 The Respondents failed to fully investigate a credit balance existing on office account in respect of a client matter in breach of Rule 29 SAR I 998 and the SRA Guidelines at paragraph 2 8 of appendix 3 and/or where such conduct took place after 6 October 2011, Rule 26 AR 2011 and the SRA Guidelines at paragraph 27 of appendix 3.

1.7 The Respondents have failed to cooperate fully with the SRA at all times and failed to comply promptly with a written notice from the SRA contrary to Principle 7 and Outcomes 10.6, 10.8 and 10.9 of the 2011 Code.

1.8 The Respondents have failed to report to the SRA the fact that they and thereby the firm, Beevers Solicitors, were in serious financial difficulty contrary to Rule 20.06 of the 2007 Code and. or where such conduct relates to a period after 6 October 2011, Outcome 10.3 of the 2011 Code

1.9 The Respondents have failed to maintain qualifying insurance in breach of Rules 4.1 and 5.1 of the SRA Indemnity Insurance Rules 2011.

Rules 1.02, 1.04, and 1.06 provide:


1.02 Integrity

You must act with integrity.

1.04 Best interests of clients

You must act in the best interests of each client.

1.06 Public confidence

You must not behave in a way that is likely to diminish the trust the public places in you or the legal profession

4. In order to understand the allegations it is necessary to set out some of the background. What follows derives in large measure from the skeleton of Mr McClelland which I consider sets out the history, derived from the judgment, largely disinterestedly.
5. The appellant was born in 1965 and was admitted to the Roll in October 1995. He joined Beevers Solicitors on 17 December 1998 as an Assistant Solicitor and then, on 8 November 1999, was appointed a salaried partner, remaining in that position throughout the relevant period. Throughout the appellant practised in criminal litigation.
6. Things started to go wrong in the firm in the mid 2000s and, after a serious downturn (particularly in the firm's private work), the partnership began to break up. As a result, as from 6 September 2010 only the appellant and Mr Ellis-Dokubo remained as partners.
7. During more than 12 years of partnership, the appellant took no interest in the firm's accounts. He had no access to, or knowledge of, the firm's books of account, and could provide to the SRA investigator neither the firm's statements, nor details of the accounts themselves. There were no partnership meetings; the appellant did not examine the firm's management accounts; and he signed the firm's annual accounts simply because "he was assured by [Mr Ellis-Dokubo] that the firm was run properly" (see judgment at para 142).
8. However, the appellant must have been aware that the firm's financial position, and therefore his own, was extremely grave.
9. From mid to late 2011 the firm's premises, which were owned by Mr Ellis-Dokubo, were the subject of possession proceedings brought by the mortgagee. A suspended possession order was obtained on 5 September 2011 and an initial eviction date was set for 13 January 2011. Various delays and adjournments supervened. By 25 May 2012 the mortgage arrears stood at some £84,842, and by July 2012 the terms of an order suspending possession had been breached, with the result that eviction was imminent. The firm was in fact evicted on 25 July 2012, after the Court rejected last minute applications by Mr Ellis-Dokubo on 24 and 25 July 2012. The appellant was aware of these developments but claims simply to have relied upon assurances given by Mr Ellis-Dokubo that "he would put it right" (see para 131). These developments posed an obvious, immediate and serious threat to clients' interests; however, it appears that no contingency plans of any kind were put in place to protect clients in the event of eviction. Further, the appellant failed to report these matters to the SRA, even though he was subject to a clear and continuing professional duty to do so and had every opportunity to fulfil that obligation during the many months over which the situation developed.
10. The appellant and Mr Ellis-Dokubo were subject to bankruptcy proceedings brought by HMRC in respect of unpaid taxes. A hearing was set for 30 July 2012, although it was later adjourned. A bankruptcy order was ultimately entered on 14 January 2013. Again the appellant did not inform the SRA about these developments and, again, his only explanation for not doing so was that he trusted Mr Ellis-Dokubo and he considered that it was "[Mr Ellis-Dokubo's] job to put things right" (see para 130).
11. Default judgments were entered against both the appellant and Mr Ellis-Dokubo in civil actions brought in the County Court. The appellant was aware that these judgments had been entered but, yet again, contented himself with Mr Ellis-Dokubo's explanation that he would deal with them.
12. The firm failed to pay its insurance premium and, in consequence, the appellant practised without cover, contrary to the interests of his clients and in breach of obvious professional duties to the SRA.
13. During this period of decline and fall Mr Ellis-Dokubo engaged in dishonest retention and misuse of client monies. He deliberately concealed from clients the fact that the firm had received damages on their behalf, and then dishonestly retained those funds at a time when the firm was in acute financial difficulty. By so doing Mr Ellis-Dokubo inflated the balance on the firm's accounts and distorted its financial position at the Bank. It appears that by the time of the intervention there were some 117 unexplained credit balances on the firm's accounts. There were three instances of this which do not need to be set out here. No-one is suggesting that the appellant was actively complicit in this disgraceful conduct.
14. On 10 July 2012 the SRA commenced a forensic investigation into the firm. On that day the Investigator and a lady (Ms AF) from the SRA's Supervision Department attended the firm. Mr Ellis-Dokubo was in Nigeria. The appellant explained that he had no access to, or knowledge of, the firm's books of account. He informed the Investigator that Mr Ellis-Dokubo owned the firm's premises. He did not explain that the firm's premises were on the verge of being repossessed. He also failed to mention that both he and Mr Ellis-Dokubo were facing imminent bankruptcy, and that civil judgments had been entered against them in the County Court.
15. The Investigator returned on 24 and 25 July 2012. On neither date did the appellant inform the Investigator that there was a possession hearing on 25 July 2012. He did not do so as he had been told by Mr Ellis-Dokubo that counsel had been instructed to seek an adjournment and that, as a result, he had no idea that the premises would be repossessed, or that the investigation would be disrupted.
16. On the latter day, the appellant contacted the Investigator at 08:30 and asked her not to attend the firm since he had to attend a Court appearance in Leeds and the cashier would be unavailable. Later that morning the Investigator received an anonymous telephone call from one of the firm's staff informing her that the premises had been repossessed and the firm's employees had been ejected. The following day the Investigator, the appellant and the bookkeeper attended the premises but could not obtain access. Only after an exchange of correspondence did the mortgagees provide limited access to the premises, which enabled the appellant to remove the practice papers and recover client files.
17. Following the repossession the SRA was unable to reach the appellant on the telephone numbers that had been provided to it. Further, when on 1 August 2012, Ms AF sent an email to the appellant and Mr Ellis-Dokubo seeking information on a number of matters arising out of the inspection; the appellant did not respond. Following correspondence with Mr Ellis-Dokubo, the SRA resolved to intervene on 29 November 2012. Having been asked on 26 March 2013 to explain his conduct and to respond to draft allegations, the Appellant made repeated requests for extensions of time but then failed substantively to respond. Finally, on 17 December 2013 the SRA lodged a Rule 5 statement with the Tribunal, in which it set out its allegations against both the appellant and Mr Ellis-Dokubo. In the event the appellant's first substantive explanation of his conduct came in the statement made in the proceedings before the Tribunal on 7 February 2014.
18. The disciplinary hearing before the SDT took place on 2 and 3 September 2014 and, at the conclusion of that hearing a suspension was imposed. The SDT's judgment followed on 15 October 2014.
19. It is important that I record that at the SDT and in this court the appellant is recognised as a man of good character who has always acted in the best interests of his own clients when conducting their cases. Further it important that I record that there is no suggestion that the appellant was ever to the smallest degree an active participant in the delinquencies concerning the client money. The case against him was that he was passively complicit. It was not that he knew, but that he ought to have known, what was going on. The same is true in relation to the lack of insurance. He was however an active actor in the failure to cooperate charge at 1.7.
20. In reaching its decision about sanction the SDT must be taken to have had in mind the seminal case of Bolton v Law Society [1994] 1 WLR 512, even if it did not actually mention it. There a solicitor was found to have misused money which should have been kept in client account. A SDT suspended him for two years; the Divisional Court allowed his appeal against sanction and substituted a fine; but for the passage of time the Court of Appeal would have allowed the appeal and reinstated the decision of the SDT. At pages 518B – 519C Sir Thomas Bingham MR stated:

"Any solicitor who is shown to have discharged his professional duties with anything less than complete integrity, probity and trustworthiness must expect severe sanctions to be imposed upon him by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Lapses from the required high standard may, of course, take different forms and be of varying degrees. The most serious involves proven dishonesty, whether or not leading to criminal proceedings and criminal penalties. In such cases the tribunal has almost invariably, no matter how strong the mitigation advanced for the solicitor, ordered that he be struck off the Roll of Solicitors. Only infrequently, particularly in recent years, has it been willing to order the restoration to the Roll of a solicitor against whom serious dishonesty had been established, even after a passage of years, and even where the solicitor had made every effort to re-establish himself and redeem his reputation. If a solicitor is not shown to have acted dishonestly, but is shown to have fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness, his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust. A striking off order will not necessarily follow in such a case, but it may well. The decision whether to strike off or to suspend will often involve a fine and difficult exercise of judgment, to be made by the tribunal as an informed and expert body on all the facts of the case. Only in a very unusual and venial case of this kind would the tribunal be likely to regard as appropriate any order less severe than one of suspension.

It is important that there should be full understanding of the reasons why the tribunal makes orders which might otherwise seem harsh. There is, in some of these orders, a punitive element: a penalty may be visited on a solicitor who has fallen below the standards required of his profession in order to punish him for what he has done and to deter any other solicitor tempted to behave in the same way. Those are traditional objects of punishment. But often the order is not punitive in intention. Particularly is this so where a criminal penalty has been imposed and satisfied. The solicitor has paid his debt to society. There is no need, and it would be unjust, to punish him again. In most cases the order of the tribunal will be primarily directed to one or other or both of two other purposes. One is to be sure that the offender does not have the opportunity to repeat the offence. This purpose is achieved for a limited period by an order of suspension; plainly it is hoped that experience of suspension will make the offender meticulous in his future compliance with the required standards. The purpose is achieved for a longer period, and quite possibly indefinitely, by an order of striking off. The second purpose is the most fundamental of all: to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth. To maintain this reputation and sustain public confidence in the integrity of the profession it is often necessary that those guilty of serious lapses are not only expelled but denied re-admission. If a member of the public sells his house, very often his largest asset, and entrusts the proceeds to his solicitor, pending re-investment in another house, he is ordinarily entitled to expect that the solicitor will be a person whose trustworthiness is not, and never has been, seriously in question. Otherwise, the whole profession, and the public as a whole, is injured. A profession's most valuable asset is its collective reputation and the confidence which that inspires.

Because orders made by the tribunal are not primarily punitive, it follows that considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on the ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases. It often happens that a solicitor appearing before the tribunal can adduce a wealth of glowing tributes from his professional brethren. He can often show that for him and his family the consequences of striking off or suspension would be little short of tragic. Often he will say, convincingly, that he has learned his lesson and will not offend again. On applying for restoration after striking off, all these points may be made, and the former solicitor may also be able to point to real efforts made to re-establish himself and redeem his reputation. All these matters are relevant and should be considered. But none of them touches the essential issue, which is the need to maintain among members of the public a well-founded confidence that any solicitor whom they instruct will be a person of unquestionable integrity, probity and trustworthiness. Thus it can never be an objection to an order of suspension in an appropriate case that the solicitor may be unable to re-establish his practice when the period of suspension is past. If that proves, or appears likely, to be so the consequence for the individual and his family may be deeply unfortunate and unintended. But it does not make suspension the wrong order if it is otherwise right. The reputation of the profession is more important than the fortunes of any individual member. Membership of a profession brings many benefits, but that is a part of the price."

21. So far as the appellant was concerned this was not a case of dishonesty. Rather this was a case where he had fallen below the required standards of integrity, probity and trustworthiness. Therefore "his lapse is less serious but it remains very serious indeed in a member of a profession whose reputation depends upon trust". This was not an "unusual and venial case" and therefore the appropriate order was likely, indeed almost certainly, to be one of suspension.
22. In determining the period of suspension "considerations which would ordinarily weigh in mitigation of punishment have less effect on the exercise of this jurisdiction than on the ordinary run of sentences imposed in criminal cases", as the object of the sentence is not primarily punitive. This, as Sir Thomas Bingham MR points out is for two reasons. First it is to prevent the opportunity of recurrence. Obviously where a suspension is ordered this is only for a finite period. It is said that the experience of suspension will make the offender meticulous in his future compliance with the required standards, although one might think that the shame and humiliation of the proceedings and the findings and the imposition of a lesser sanction (say of restrictions on practice and/or a fine) would have exactly the same effect.
23. The second reason, which is said to be "most fundamental of all" is to maintain the reputation of the solicitors' profession "as one in which every member, of whatever standing, may be trusted to the ends of the earth". The same reasoning underpins the guidelines in criminal cases where sentences for breach of trust are imposed. There, the crime will usually have been a one-off act, and there ample mitigation will be advanced, but the guidelines nonetheless suggest heavy penalties so that the confidence of the public in professionals and others in whom trust is reposed can be maintained. These penalties are designed to "encourage the others", but an extreme example of the principle, the execution of Admiral Byng in 1757, was scathingly satirised by Voltaire in Candide ("dans ce pays-ci, il est bon de tuer de temps en temps un amiral pour encourager les autres"). We have moved on since then.
24. Therefore an SDT will not shut its ears to all mitigation, or follow a modern day Black Act approach. There is still scope for mercy to drop as the gentle rain from heaven and for it to season justice.
25. The SDT's reasoning for the sanction it imposed on the appellant is at para 148 of the judgment which reads as follows:

"The Second Respondent had made early admissions in respect of all the allegations brought against him. He cooperated with the Applicant and complied with directions of the Tribunal. He had not been involved in the specific client matters where dishonesty had been found proved against the First Respondent. However the role of partner involved onerous responsibilities with regard to the management of the firm particularly of its finances. The Tribunal accepted that in 1999, the Second Respondent joined a well-run firm with five partners. Things clearly went wrong in the mid 2000s. The Second Respondent should have been aware of this and assumed his responsibility to inform himself of what was happening and to deal with the problems arising, as well as reporting matters to the Applicant at an early stage. The whole point of the rules was to ensure that problems of this nature were spotted and addressed early on. The problems should have been highlighted by his knowledge that the First Respondent was absent for what appeared to be significant periods when he was supposed to be running the firms. In determining sanction the Tribunal had to consider the respective culpability of the Respondents and carry out a balancing exercise. In doing so it had regard to the case of Weston. In all the circumstances the Tribunal did not feel that it would be appropriate to strike off the Second Respondent but that he should be suspended for a fixed term of two years because sanction must reflect the seriousness of the breaches of the rules in this case."

26. The appellant complains that in travelling straight to suspension, and in not considering a lesser sanction on the way, the SDT erred. I emphatically reject this submission. In the light of the findings, all of which were based on admissions, the starting point was plainly suspension. The only question was for how long, and a subsidiary question was (or should have been) whether after the conclusion of the suspension a restriction on practice should be imposed for a further period.
27. In Bolton v Law Society at 520A-B Sir Thomas Bingham MR emphasised that authority dictates that the appeal court should not substitute its own view on penalty for that of a professional tribunal. The same point is made in Salsbury v Law Society [2009] 1 WLR 1286 at para 30 where Jackson LJ stated:

"The correct analysis is that the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal comprises an expert and informed tribunal, which is particularly well placed in any case to assess what measures are required to deal with defaulting solicitors and to protect the public interest. Absent any error of law, the High Court must pay considerable respect to the sentencing decisions of the tribunal. Nevertheless if the High Court, despite paying such respect, is satisfied that the sentencing decision was clearly inappropriate, then the court will interfere."

28. There is not much appellate guidance about passive complicity. Obviously lack of knowledge is no defence. As Mr McClelland rightly says a core provision or obligation is Rule 6 of the Solicitors Accounts Rules 1998 and 2011 which states that "All the principals in a practice must ensure compliance with the rules by the principals themselves and by everyone employed in the practice". It is to state the obvious that it was a major dereliction of duty for the appellant not to have informed himself what was going on in the practice of which he was a partner. The warning signs could not have been clearer. Yet it appears that ostrich-like the appellant just stuck his head in the sand, and when the balloon went up he deliberately withheld material information from the investigators (although his motive for doing so is far from clear).
29. Like the SDT I have had regard to the case of Weston (unreported 29 July 1998) where a strong Divisional Court (Lord Bingham LCJ, Lightman and Thomas JJ) dealt with a case of asserted passive complicity. The firm in question had two equity partners, Mr North and the appellant Mr Weston, and a younger salaried partner Miss Macaskie. The firm had a deficit on client account: it owed some £110,000 to clients for whom the money was not there. The main component of the shortage was a sum of £100,000 transferred from the estate of a client Mr LTN. Mr North and Mr Weston were trustees of LTN's will trust and Miss Macaskie had acted in connection with that trust. A bogus bill for £100,000 had been raised against the estate, and that sum was transferred from client to office account in a series of transfers and then used to meet pressing liabilities of the firm including a debt to HM Customs and Excise (I assume for VAT) of £62,900.
30. In terms of culpability the principal actor was Mr North. The SDT found him guilty of dishonesty, which was not surprising as his conduct had given rise to a criminal prosecution where he had been found guilty and sent to prison. He was struck off. Miss Macaskie was found guilty of a serious breach of the Accounts Rules by making transfers which she knew to be wrong or reckless whether they were right or wrong. Further she had given misleading answers to the investigating accountant. She was suspended for a year. Mr Weston, in contrast, was struck off.
31. Why was there such a disparity of treatment as between Miss Macaskie and Mr Weston? The SDT placed significant emphasis on the fact that Mr Weston was an equity partner and that he was "well aware of the parlous financial position of the firm". As such he had paid "scant regard" to "the heavy burden of responsibility placed on a solicitor in private practice for the proper keeping of accounts and the fair an honest handling of clients' monies". That failure rendered him not a fit person to continue to be solicitor. In contrast Miss Macaskie was merely a younger, salaried partner, under the supervision of the equity partners, who was not privy to the financial affairs of the firm, let alone its parlous financial state. She did however admit responsibility for the improper transfers between the accounts.
32. Mr Weston's appeal was dismissed, reluctantly. Lord Bingham held that Mr Weston has violated the fundamental duty to exercise proper stewardship of the client's money. It would seem on careful reading of the judgment that the key factor was Mr Weston's equal status to Mr North as an equity partner, coupled with his knowledge that the firm was in dire straights financially .
33. In this case Mr Banham suggests that the appellant's position is very close to that of Miss Macaskie, while Mr McClelland says that it lies somewhere between that of Miss Macaskie and Mr Weston.
34. In my judgment the appellant's position here is very much closer to that of Miss Macaskie. Like her he was merely a salaried partner. As such they were both subject to rule 6 of the Accounts Rues and had an obligation to ensure that the firm was being run properly. Unlike her he was not an active participant in the wrongful transfer or use of the client's money. Like her he gave some misleading answers to the investigators. But unlike her he was aware of the dire position of the firm. Weighing the comparisons and making a judgment about culpability it seems to me that his conduct was no worse than hers. Her active participation in the defalcations is arguably worse, in terms of obloquy, than his knowledge of the looming financial disaster.
35. An order for suspension is a very serious sanction. In MacLeod v. The Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons (The Disciplinary Committee of the RCVS) [2006] UKPC 39 Lord Carswell at para 27 likened an 8 month period of suspension to "an extremely heavy fine".
36. The 2 year period of suspension in this case can be compared to suspensions ordered in other professional fields. In MacLeod the vet had allowed animals to be vaccinated by unsupervised nurses, which strikes me as a very serious offence. Yet the sentence of 8 months suspension was replaced by the Privy Council with a reprimand and warning. In Dad v. The General Dental Council (Dentists Act 1984) [2000] UKPC 17 the dentist had been convicted of serious drink driving offences. A sanction of 12 months' suspension was set aside. Lord Hope was of the view that postponement of judgment for two years would have been more appropriate.
37. In my opinion a suspension for as long as two years is an extremely severe sanction. A suspension of that length would only be appropriate where the facts were close to warranting an order striking the solicitor off.
38. In this case the appellant was without a practising certificate from October 2012 to March 2013 and from December 2013 to June 2014. The reasons for this were in part connected with the proceedings against him. Whatever the reason he was not able to work as a solicitor during those periods and suffered financially accordingly.
39. In my judgment the sanction awarded here was clearly excessive and inappropriate. In my judgment this was not a case where the penalty was close to striking off. The period of suspension was much too long. In my judgment the appropriate period of suspension is one year expiring on 3 September 2015. However having regard to the appellant's naïveté I am of the view that from that date until 3 September 2016 a condition to should be attached to his practising certificate in the same terms as that imposed by the SDT on 3 September 2014 namely:

"He may act as a solicitor only in employment; he may also act as an agent instructed by other solicitors as a police station representative or as an advocate in the Magistrate's court; he is not a recognised sole practitioner, sole director, manager, or owner of a recognised licensed or legal services body; he shall immediately inform any actual or prospective employer of these conditions and the reasons for their imposition, whereby Manager and Owner are defined in the SRA handbook glossary 2012."

40. I do not disturb the order for costs made by the SDT.
41. I am of the view that neither party has won this case. It is to be likened to a draw. In those circumstances I make an order nisi that there shall be no order as to costs. If either party wishes to challenge this provisional order then they must lodge written submissions within 7 days. If neither does the order will be come absolute. If either does I will deal with the application on paper.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CO/5047/2014

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

DIVISIONAL COURT

MR JUSTICE MOSTYN

B E T W E E N:

KARIBO LAWSON

Appellant

- and –
SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY

Respondent

ORDER

UPON reading the documents filed by the parties in connection with the appeal.

AND UPON hearing Counsel for the Appellant and Counsel for the Respondent.

It is ordered that:

42. The appeal is allowed.
43. The order of the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal ("SDT") made on 3.9.14 that the Appellant be suspended from practice as a solicitor for the period of two years commencing on 3.9.14 ("the Suspension Order") is set aside.
44. In substitution for the Suspension Order it is ordered that

a. The Appellant be suspended from practice as a solicitor for a period of one year commencing on 3.9.14 and expiring on 3.9.15; and

b. If the Appellant applies for and is granted a practising certificate for the period commencing after the expiry of his suspension, a condition will be applied to his practising certificate until 3.9.16 in the following terms:

"Mr Lawson may act as a solicitor only in employment; he may also act as an agent instructed by other solicitors as a police station representative or as an advocate in the Magistrate's court; he is not a recognised sole practitioner, sole director, manager, or owner of a recognised licensed or legal services body; he shall immediately inform any actual or prospective employer of these conditions and the reasons for their imposition, whereby Manager and Owner are defined in the SRA handbook glossary 2012."

45. For the avoidance of doubt:

a. Save insofar as it provided for the Appellant's suspension, no other part of the order made by the SDT on 3.9.14 is affected and (in particular but without limitation), the SDT's order in respect of costs is not disturbed; and

b. The order in paragraph 2 above is without prejudice to the SRA's statutory power to impose additional conditions on Mr Lawson's practising certificate in the event that the statutory requirements for imposing those conditions were to be met.

46. No order as to costs.