ON APPEAL FROM the Crown Court sitting at Northampton
The Hon. Mr Justice Johnson
T20227261
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
THE HON. MR JUSTICE GOSS
and
THE HON. MRS JUSTICE CHEEMA-GRUBB
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Louis de Zoysa |
Applicant |
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Rex |
Respondent |
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Duncan Penny KC and Jocelyn Ledward KC (instructed by CPS Prosecution Unit) for the Crown
Hearing dates : 8 May 2025
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Crown Copyright ©
Dame Victoria Sharp, P.
The facts
Conviction
"8.13 The essential sequence of events spans 1 hour and 40 minutes. It is summarised at paragraph 2.3 above. The relevant events are captured on video, by means of a combination of CCTV and police officers' body worn video. The video is, generally, of high quality. Audio is also captured which, again, is generally of reasonable to high quality. The audio visual evidence has been compiled into a single chronological subtitled sequence which lasts for 1 hour and 20 minutes. In addition, there is evidence as to the items that were found at the defendant's home. There is no issue as to identity. There is no bad character evidence or hearsay evidence. There is no circumstantial evidence. There is no complex forensic evidence. There is no expert or scientific evidence save possibly (if an admission is not forthcoming) on an isolated issue of ballistics, and also on relatively straightforward topics such whether the defendant's self-control was substantially impaired by an autistic meltdown. There is unlikely to be any complex issue of law. Subject to the question of diminished responsibility, the prosecution's aim is to avoid calling any evidence beyond the compilation of audio-visual material. Whether that aim can be achieved depends on the admissions that are forthcoming, but it is unlikely that there will be a great deal of additional evidence. If diminished responsibility is a live issue, then an expert will be called on that issue, but it is unlikely that it would require the introduction of any other additional material.
8.14 The issues for the jury are likely to be whether the defendant fired the gun by accident (in circumstances where he had, whilst handcuffed with his hands behind his back, retrieved the gun from its holster, stood up when directed to do so, pointed the gun at PS Ratana's chest, and pulled the trigger), and whether (in those same circumstances) he had intended to kill PS Ratana or cause him really serious harm. In the event that the issue of diminished responsibility is raised, and taking Dr Maganty's report as a template, the additional issues that are likely to arise are whether the defendant set out to kill anyone that day, whether he was obsessed with firearms (as part and parcel of his autism), whether he had an autistic meltdown and whether his self-control (or judgement) was thereby substantially impaired."
"9.1 The defendant's capabilities (particularly in relation to communication, but also information processing) are significantly compromised by a combination of Asperger Syndrome and brain injury.
9.2 The issues in this case are straightforward. The evidence is limited and does not involve any complexity. Many adaptations have been made to assist the defendant. Further adaptations can be made.
9.3Taking account of the compass of the trial, and the adaptations that can be made, the defendant has not shown that any single one of the six Pritchard criteria are beyond his capabilities. Like Jeremy Baker J, I am satisfied that the defendant is fit to be tried."
"8.44 I have no doubt that the defendant does not have the capacity to comprehend, retain or articulate a detailed analysis of the law of diminished responsibility. Few defendants would be able to do so. In the particular circumstances of this case, however, the application of the law of diminished responsibility, as it impacts on the defendant, is straightforward.
8.45 First, there is the question of whether the defendant was suffering from an abnormality of mental function which arose from a recognised medical condition: section 2(1)(a) of the Homicide Act 1957. That is not in issue: Dr Maganty and Dr Blackwood both agree that the defendant satisfied this condition. It is not therefore relevant to the question of plea (in the sense of the defendant having to make a judgement about it). In any event, it is clear from the evidence (including the interview with Dr Deeley) that the defendant recalls and understands that he was diagnosed with Asperger Syndrome, and there is no evidence to suggest that he does not understand that this impacted on his mental functioning (albeit this would need to be expressed in a simpler way).
8.46 Second, there is the question of whether Asperger Syndrome substantially impaired his ability to exercise self-control (or, possibly, exercise a rational judgement or to understand his conduct): section 2(1)(b) and 2(1A) of the 1957 Act. Dr Maganty posits the possibility that the defendant had an "autistic meltdown" such that he lost his self-control. That is an easy enough concept to convey in simple language. The defendant now claims to have a recollection of the incident. He said that he shot PS Ratana as a result of "panic". As Dr Maganty accepts, this is a coherent explanation. It is not obviously redolent of impaired control or rational judgement. Dr Maganty said that the defendant was unable to explain his thought process. Asked in those terms, in the context of a 3 hour interview without an intermediary, it is perhaps not surprising that the defendant found it difficult to articulate his precise thought processes. I do not, however, accept that it has been shown that he is unable to communicate whether (for example) he got the gun when he was in the van, whether he hid he gun from the officers, whether he fired the shot deliberately, or whether he lost control."
"2.21 Accordingly, I do not consider that there is a material prospect that a site visit would significantly improve the jury's understanding of the evidence. If I had reached the contrary conclusion, I would have directed a site visit, irrespective of the disruption and cost.
2.22 The fact that I do not consider that a site visit would significantly assist the jury does not necessarily mean that a site visit should be refused. I have already said that the fact that the defendant's representatives have asked for a site visit is itself a factor (in the particular circumstances of this case) to be weighed in the balance. It is, however, a factor of limited weight. On the other side is the cost, operational impact on the police, the disruption, the inconvenience to the jury and the delay to the trial that a site visit would cause. Balancing those factors in the round, and applying the overriding objective, I consider that the interests of justice militate against holding a site visit.
2.23 For the reasons I have given, the subjective impressions of those who have visited the scene are not relevant to the issues in the case. Accordingly, the prosecution should not be permitted to adduce, from Dr Blackwood, his subjective impression of the size of holding area when he visited the scene. That deals with one of Mr Khan's concerns."
Sentence
"The judge conducted a thorough review of all the relevant matters and his approach was fully in accordance with the guidance in Stewart. The judge was required to assess whether the seriousness of this murder was "exceptionally high". He concluded it was. That assessment was not arguably wrong. He was required to assess whether there was nevertheless any justification for departing from the consequent starting point of a whole life order. He concluded there was not. That assessment was not arguably wrong. As was made clear in Stewart, at [19(xv)], the assessment of seriousness is solely for the sentencing judge. The judge was unarguably entitled to reach the conclusion he did."