ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE, FAMILY DIVISION
MR JUSTICE SIMON
BF10P1092
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE McCOMBE
and
LORD JUSTICE FLOYD
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ANUSHIKA SHARMA |
Petitioner at trial/Respondent to Appeal |
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(1) JAGESH KUMAR SHARMA (2) KESHBALA SHARMA |
Respondents at trial/Appellants |
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(3) JAGDISH SHARMA |
Respondent at trial |
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(4) RAJESH SHARMA |
Respondent at trial/Appellant |
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(5) ASPIRE DENTAL CARE LIMITED (6) ASPIRE DENTAL CARE (UK) LIMITED |
Respondents at trial |
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Mr Alan Gourgey QC and Mr Tom Shepherd (instructed by Mackenzie & Co) for the Respondents
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Jackson:
Part 1. Introduction,
Part 2. The facts,
Part 3. The preliminary issues trial,
Part 4. The appeal to the Court of Appeal,
Part 5. The law,
Part 6. Decision.
"Duty to avoid conflicts of interest
This sectionnoteType=Explanatory Notes has no associated
(1) A director of a company must avoid a situation in which he has, or can have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the interests of the company.
(2) This applies in particular to the exploitation of any property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could take advantage of the property, information or opportunity)."
"Civil consequences of breach of general duties
This sectionnoteType=Explanatory Notes has no associated
(1) The consequences of breach (or threatened breach) of sections 171 to 177 are the same as would apply if the corresponding common law rule or equitable principle applied.
(2) The duties in those sections (with the exception of section 174 (duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence)) are, accordingly, enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors."
"Power of court to grant relief in certain cases
This sectionnoteType=Explanatory Notes has no associated
(1) If in proceedings for negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust against —
(a) an officer of a company, or
(b) a person employed by a company as auditor (whether he is or is not an officer of the company),
it appears to the court hearing the case that the officer or person is or may be liable but that he acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances of the case (including those connected with his appointment) he ought fairly to be excused, the court may relieve him, either wholly or in part, from his liability on such terms as it thinks fit."
"I asked Kesh during the July 2007 Meeting in Sunny's, Raj's and Hina's presence that if I wanted to buy practices in my own name (for example if my expenses were higher and I wanted to take more money out), would that have any adverse tax consequences? She told me that it would be less tax efficient as I would have to pay more tax on the income and not just on the dividends I would take out, but yes it would be ok (or words to that effect). I did not really understand what she was saying about dividends and tax at the time as I did not have a complete grasp of these concepts, but Kesh certainly did tell me that I could acquire further practices in my own name in the future, if I wished. Neither Sunny nor Raj raised any objections to this."
The judge accepted that paragraph as an accurate summary of what was said at the meeting.
i) Jagdish and Kesh owned JKK and JKP. They did not hold their shares in those companies on trust for Sunny and Raj.ii) Sunny, Kesh and Raj did not hold their shares in ADC on trust for Anushika. The shareholdings in ADC represented the legal and beneficial ownership of that company.
iii) It was agreed between Anushika, Sunny, Kesh and Raj that Anushika alone would run ADC. Anushika would have entire control of the company without any interference from them. (Judgment paragraphs 65, 66 and 81).
iv) The sum of £573,000 which Up Design paid to ADC in December 2007 was not a gift. It was an interest-free loan, repayable on reasonable notice.
v) Anushika did not act in breach of her duty as a director of ADC by acquiring five dental practices for herself or ADCUK after June 2007. This was because the other shareholders had consented to her so doing at the July meeting, as set out in paragraph 50 of her witness statement. Accordingly Anushika and ADCUK are the legal and beneficial owners of those five dental practices.
i) As a director of ADC Anushika had opportunities to acquire the disputed dental practices. She exploited those opportunities for her own benefit, rather than ADC's benefit.ii) In so doing Anushika acted in breach of her fiduciary duty and/or her statutory duty under section 175 of the 2006 Act.
iii) In holding that the appellants had agreed to release Anushika from those duties, the judge erred for three reasons:
a) Leading counsel had abandoned that part of Anushika's case during his closing speech.b) The judge ought not to have accepted the evidence contained in paragraph 50 of Anushika's witness statement. It was not properly explored at trial or put in cross-examination to the appellants. Furthermore it was undermined by a concession which Anushika made in cross-examination.c) Even accepting the facts narrated in paragraph 50 of Anushika's witness statement as correct, her defence still fails. The discussion at the July meeting did not absolve Anushika from her fiduciary and statutory duties to ADC. She remained under a duty to exploit any opportunity to acquire dental practices for the company's benefit, not her own.iv) Since Anushika acquired the disputed dental practices in breach of her fiduciary and/or statutory duty, she and ADCUK hold those practices on trust for ADC.
i) Kesh and Sunny knew about and did not object to Anushika acquiring Hampshire Health and Bridge Street in her own name.ii) If Anushika acted in breach of her fiduciary or statutory duty, she ought to be granted relief under section 1157 of the 2006 Act.
"The Directors are a body to whom is delegated the duty of managing the general affairs of the Company. A corporate body can only act by agents, and it is of course the duty of those agents so to act as best to promote the interests of the corporation whose affairs they are conducting. Such agents have duties to discharge of a fiduciary nature towards their principal. And it is a rule of universal application, that no one, having such duties to discharge, shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect."
"If a director of a company informs shareholders of an intended action (or a past action) on the part of the directors, in circumstances in which neither the directors nor the shareholders are aware that the consent of the shareholders is required to that action, I do not think it is right, at least without more, to conclude that the shareholders have assented to that action for Duomatic purposes. As a matter of both ordinary language and legal concept, it does not seem to me that, in such circumstances, it could be said that the shareholders have 'assent[ed]' to that action. The shareholders have simply been told about the action or intended action, on the basis that it is something which can be, and has been or will be, left to the directors to decide on, and no question of 'assent' arises."
i) A company director is in breach of his fiduciary or statutory duty if he exploits for his personal gain (a) opportunities which come to his attention through his role as director or (b) any other opportunities which he could and should exploit for the benefit of the company.ii) If the shareholders with full knowledge of the relevant facts consent to the director exploiting those opportunities for his own personal gain, then that conduct is not a breach of the fiduciary or statutory duty.
iii) If the shareholders with full knowledge of the relevant facts acquiesce in the director's proposed conduct, then that may constitute consent. However, consent cannot be inferred from silence unless:
a) the shareholders know that their consent is required, orb) the circumstances are such that it would be unconscionable for the shareholders to remain silent at the time and object after the event.iv) For the purposes of propositions (ii) and (iii) full knowledge of the relevant facts does not entail an understanding of their legal incidents. In other words the shareholders need not appreciate that the proposed action would be characterised as a breach of fiduciary or statutory duty.
i) Sunny and Raj invariably deferred to the business decisions made by their mother. The natural inference was that they would both abide by this decision as well.
ii) If Sunny and Raj were minded to disagree, this would be such an unusual situation that one would expect them to speak up and say so.
iii) Sunny was going to acquire shares in the new company and it was later agreed that Raj would as well. If they objected to Anushika acquiring any dental practices outside the company, it behoved them to say so promptly. It would be unconscionable for them to keep quiet initially, then to receive a large shareholding in the company (effectively as a gift) and finally to raise objections after Anushika had purchased a cluster of new dental practices, some for herself and some for the company.
Lord Justice Floyd:
Lord Justice McCombe: