Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
KOKOTT
delivered on 22 May 2025 (1)
Case C‑219/25 PPU [Kamekris] (i)
Ministère public (Public Prosecutor's Office, France)
v
KN
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Cour d'appel de Montpellier (Court of Appeal, Montpellier, France))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling - Urgent preliminary ruling procedure - Judicial cooperation in criminal matters - Extradition to a third State with a view to serving a prison sentence there - Recognition of the decision of a court of another Member State ruling on the extradition request - Citizenship of the European Union - Free movement of persons - Charter of Fundamental Rights - Serious risk of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment - Effective legal protection - Fair trial )
I. Introduction
1. When a court of a Member State (in this case, France) decides on the extradition of an EU citizen who is a national of another Member State (in this case, Greece) to a third State (in this case, Georgia) with a view to serving a prison sentence there, is it bound by the decision of the court of another Member State (in this case Belgium) on the same extradition request? This is the question that must be answered in the present case.
II. Legal framework
A. International law
2. Article 1 of the European Convention on Extradition signed in Paris on 13 December 1957 ('the European Convention on Extradition') determines:
'The Contracting Parties undertake to surrender to each other, subject to the provisions and conditions laid down in this Convention, all persons against whom the competent authorities of the requesting Party are proceeding for an offence or who are wanted by the said authorities for the carrying out of a sentence or detention order.'
3. The European Convention on Extradition entered into force for France on 11 May 1986, for Georgia on 13 September 2001 and for Greece on 27 August 1961. France has reserved the right (in accordance with Article 26(1) of the Convention) to refuse extradition where a conviction has been handed down in the context of judicial proceedings in which fundamental procedural guarantees and the rights of the defence have not been guaranteed, or where extradition is likely to have particularly serious consequences for the requested person. Greece has reserved the right, inter alia, not to extradite its own citizens. (2)
B. European Union law
1. TFEU
4. Article 67 TFEU describes the objectives of the area of freedom, security and justice. Article 67(3) refers to mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters:
'The Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia, and through measures for coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.'
5. The regulatory powers of the European Union in the field of cooperation in criminal matters are set out in Article 82 TFEU:
'1. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 and in Article 83.
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures to:
(a) lay down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the Union of all forms of judgments and judicial decisions;
…
(d) facilitate cooperation between judicial or equivalent authorities of the Member States in relation to proceedings in criminal matters and the enforcement of decisions.
2. To the extent necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross-border dimension, the European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into account the differences between the legal traditions and systems of the Member States.
They shall concern:
(a) mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States;
(b) the rights of individuals in criminal procedure;
(c) the rights of victims of crime;
(d) any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance by a decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
Adoption of the minimum rules referred to in this paragraph shall not prevent Member States from maintaining or introducing a higher level of protection for individuals.'
2. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
6. Article 19(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union provides protection in the event of extraditions:
'No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'
7. The right to effective judicial protection is enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter:
'Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, defended and represented.
…'
C. French law
8. Under the first paragraph of Article 696-4 of the code de procedure pénale (Code of Criminal Procedure), extradition is not permitted if, at the time of the offence, the requested person had French nationality.
III. Facts and request for a preliminary ruling
9. KN is a Georgian and Greek national. In 2011 the Georgian courts sentenced him in absentia to life imprisonment for having ordered, in 2008 and 2009, a homicide (ultimately not carried out) to conceal other offences and for having committed arms and drugs offences in connection with organised crime.
10. On 4 October 2021, KN had been provisionally arrested in Belgium on the ground that the Georgian authorities had reported him to Interpol with a view to his arrest (the so-called 'Red Notice'). Having initially been detained pending extradition, he was placed under non-custodial judicial supervision on 29 October 2021.
11. On 20 January 2025, KN was arrested in France on the basis of the same Red Notice. The Georgian authorities then formally requested his extradition also in France on the basis of the European Convention on Extradition.
12. The extradition procedure before the Belgian courts had not yet been concluded at the time of his arrest in France, but by judgment of 19 February 2025, the cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels, Belgium) refused Georgia's extradition request to Belgium. Sufficient assurance could not be provided that KN would not risk being subject to flagrant denial of justice or to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment in Georgia.
13. The referring court, the cour d'appel de Montpellier (Court of Appeal, Montpellier, France), must now rule on the extradition request addressed to France. In the context of those proceedings, both the Public Prosecutor and KN request that the referring court refuse extradition in accordance with the judgment of the Belgian court.
14. The referring court asks the Court of Justice whether it is bound by the decision of the Belgian court:
Must Articles 67(3) and 82(1) TFEU, in conjunction with Articles 19 and 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights [of the European Union], be interpreted as meaning that a Member State is obliged to refuse to execute an extradition request for a citizen of the European Union to a third country when another Member State has previously refused to execute the same extradition request on the grounds that the surrender of the person concerned may infringe the fundamental right not to be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment enshrined in Article 19 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the right to a fair trial enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union?
15. In addition, the referring court requested the application of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
16. On 3 April 2025, the Third Chamber of the Court decided to deal with the present request for a preliminary ruling under the urgent preliminary ruling procedure provided for in Article 23a of the Statute of the Court of Justice and Article 107 et seq. of the Rules of Procedure. Written observations were subsequently submitted by KN, the French Republic and the European Commission. At the hearing on 8 May 2025, in addition to those interested parties, the Czech Republic and Germany participated.
IV. Legal assessment
17. Should the Court reply to the request for a preliminary ruling, the answer is, in my view, clear: neither Article 67(3) TFEU nor Article 82(1) TFEU requires a court of a Member State to recognise a decision of a court of another Member State not to extradite to a third country a national of a third Member State for the purpose of enforcing a custodial sentence, on account of the risk of infringement of Articles 19 and 47 of the Charter, to the effect that the first-mentioned court should also refuse extradition without carrying out its own examination. Nevertheless, in so far as EU law is applicable, that court must take due account of the grounds on which the other court's refusal decision is based in its own examination of the extradition.
18. However, it is less clear whether EU law and, therefore, the Charter are applicable in the main proceedings, that is to say, whether the Court has jurisdiction (see A). The conditions for the application of an urgent preliminary ruling procedure also deserve further consideration (see B).
A. Application of EU law and the Charter
19. In the absence of an international agreement between the European Union and a third country on extradition in criminal matters, the rules on extradition fall within the competence of the Member States. (3) Nonetheless, the Member States when applying the national rules concerned in situations covered by EU law, must have due regard for the latter. (4)
20. The referring court wishes to know what obligations derive in the present case from Article 67(3) and Article 82(1) TFEU. However, as France, the Czech Republic, Germany and the Commission also point out, those provisions are rather programmatic and, in particular, do not govern the extradition of EU citizens to third countries with a view to serving a prison sentence there (see 1). Rather, the application of EU law and the Charter may result from the exercise of freedom of movement by the EU citizen concerned (see 2).
1. Rules on judicial cooperation in criminal matters
21. KN contends that it follows from Article 67(3) and Article 82(1) TFEU and from the principle of mutual trust that a court of a Member State must recognise the refusal by a court of another Member State to extradite an EU citizen to a third State, based on a risk of infringement of a fundamental right, without carrying out its own examination of the obstacles to extradition.
22. Under Article 67(3) TFEU, the European Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of security through measures to prevent and combat crime, and through measures for coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgments in criminal matters. This objective of security, as well as the guarantee of freedom (Article 67(2)) and facilitated access to justice (Article 67(4)) is the basis of the area of freedom, security and justice with respect for fundamental rights and the different legal systems and traditions of the Member States within the meaning of Article 67(1).
23. However, the task of the European Union to promote the objective of a high level of security through the mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters does not entail a directly applicable obligation of compliance for the Member States in the context of the decision to extradite an EU citizen to a third country. In particular, it does not follow from Article 67(3) TFEU that the decision of a court of another Member State on that issue must be recognised.
24. By contrast, Article 82(1) TFEU enshrines the regulatory powers of the European Union in the field of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Under point (a), the European Union may, inter alia, lay down rules and procedures for ensuring recognition throughout the European Union of all types of judgments and judicial decisions. However, the European Union has not adopted any rule on the recognition of judicial decisions relating to extradition to third countries and, even if Article 82(1)(a) were to constitute a legal basis for it, it does not follow that there is an obligation of recognition. Consequently, nor does Article 82(1) TFEU contain an obligation to recognise the decision of the court of another Member State not to extradite the person concerned to a third State.
25. The situation is different in a judgment cited by KN, according to which a Member State cannot extradite a person to whom another Member State has granted refugee status to his or her country of origin provided that that refugee status continues to exist. (5) However, that blocking effect does not follow from the provisions of primary law of the TFEU, but from the rules of secondary EU law on refugee protection and from the principle of sincere cooperation. (6) In the present case, on the other hand, there are no comparable provisions of secondary law which would oblige France to give binding effect to the decision of the Belgian court.
26. The principle of mutual trust invoked by KN does not alter this.
27. It is true that that principle requires each Member State, save in exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law. (7) It follows that, where the court of a Member State correctly finds that there is a risk of an infringement of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter in the event of extradition, the courts of other Member States, when ruling on the same extradition, must give due consideration of the decision made by the first court. (8) However, that is not an obligation to recognise the decision of the first court. (9) That should be the subject of an explicit provision – which has not yet been achieved. (10)
28. Moreover, the principle of mutual trust applies in that form only if the fundamental rights of the Charter are applicable. In accordance with the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter, the provisions of the Charter are addressed to the Member States only when they are implementing EU law.
29. The concept of 'implementing Union law', within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 51(1) of the Charter, presupposes a connection between an act of EU law and the national measure in question, above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters having an indirect impact on the other. (11) Fundamental EU rights therefore apply in relation to national legislation only if the provisions of EU law in the subject area concerned impose specific obligations on Member States with regard to the situation at issue in the main proceedings. (12)
30. Since neither Article 67(3) TFEU nor Article 82(1) TFEU creates such obligations, they do not entail the application of the Charter or the principle of mutual trust.
2. The freedom of movement of an EU citizen
31. However, the right to freedom of movement within the European Union, provided for in Article 21(1) TFEU, may form the basis for the application of the Charter in the main proceedings. KN, a Greek national, exercised that fundamental freedom as a citizen of the European Union by going to another Member State, namely from Greece to France.
32. A restriction on that fundamental freedom does not appear to be imperative, since KN would have to expect to be extradited to Georgia in his Member State, Greece, just as he would in France.
33. However, when adopting the European Convention on Extradition, Greece reserved the right not to extradite its own nationals. In Greece, KN would therefore probably not have to fear extradition.
34. In most cases concerning extradition to third States due to criminal proceedings, the Court has presumed the existence of a restriction on free movement due to a difference in treatment compared to nationals of the Member States concerned. (13) Those Member States provided that their own nationals would not be extradited or surrendered. As the Commission underlines and France points out, this corresponds to the French legal situation, so that they presume that there is a restriction on the free movement of persons.
35. The question that arises is to what extent the scope of protection of the right to equal treatment in the exercise of freedom of movement extends, for example, the national right to vote and to stand as a candidate which is not guaranteed by the specific prohibition of discrimination laid down in Article 22 TFEU as regards the electoral rights of EU citizens. (14)
36. Most extradition cases were characterised by the fact that the nationals concerned from other Member States were integrated into the requested State. (15) In the absence of such integration – as in the present case – it is therefore doubtful whether there is comparability with nationals of the requested State, who are not extradited.
37. In general, comparability must be examined having regard to the objective pursued by the national provisions. (16) It is excluded where there are objective differences between the comparison groups. (17)
38. As regards extradition bans, both criteria militate against comparability between transiting EU citizens and own nationals.
39. The bedrock bond of nationality of a Member State is formed by the special relationship of solidarity and good faith between that State and its nationals and the reciprocity of rights and duties. (18) The Member States must therefore particularly protect their own nationals and the prohibition on extradition serves that protection. At the same time, a State has, as a general rule, a broad power to impose sanctions on its own nationals, including for offences committed abroad. It is therefore easier to avoid impunity in relation to its own nationals. Therefore, while Member States may not be obliged to prosecute offences committed abroad by their own citizens, they will examine whether such prosecution is appropriate. This allows them to avoid impunity while protecting their own citizens from the disproportionate consequences of criminal prosecution in third countries. (19)
40. Settled, integrated EU citizens are entitled to expect to be treated in the same way as nationals of the Member State concerned. They are quite comparable in some respects to citizens in relation to the State in which they have established themselves, but not all of them. Thus, as regards the right to vote and to stand as a candidate, exceptions are still made, (20) and also in tax law (in this case, residence 'replaces' nationality), the question as to whether the State of activity, instead of the State of residence, must grant privileges comparable to those granted to residents depends on the amount of income from that activity. (21)
41. However, the issue is different in the present case. The question here is whether every EU citizen in transit is comparable, in the State of transit, to citizens residing in the State of transit for the purpose of executing an arrest warrant from a third country. As regards citizenship of the European Union, it could be answered in the affirmative. According to the case-law of the Court, national citizenship is increasingly being superimposed by citizenship of the European Union. (22)
42. However, as regards the power of a Member State to impose penalties, the question above must be answered in the negative. For EU citizens in transit, there is no comparable relationship of solidarity and loyalty for the State of transit. On the contrary, for the latter, even the power of the State of transit to impose penalties for offences committed in third States is often doubtful, which is why non-execution of the arrest warrant increases the chances of the requested person going unpunished.
43. I therefore propose that the Court draw a distinction in that regard, as is also the case in social law, (23) between EU citizens who are integrated in the Member State and EU citizens who are merely transiting. Given that it is an EU citizen in transit who is at issue in this case, I am of the view that EU law does not cover that situation. The execution of an arrest warrant issued by a third State does not therefore fall within the scope of the implementation of EU law. Fundamental freedoms within the area of freedom, security and justice are not intended to release States from their responsibility towards their citizens for the effective execution of sentences of convicted offenders and, therefore, to increase their chances of impunity. Nor are the fundamental freedoms intended to relieve the Member State of responsibility towards a third State (an international link which provides a reciprocal guarantee that convicted nationals cannot evade their sentence by absconding to the other Contracting State). The question whether the person concerned may therefore be extradited to a third State is consequently governed by national law and its guarantees of fundamental rights, as well as by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
44. Should the Court nonetheless consider that there is a restriction on the fundamental freedoms, I shall examine, in the alternative, the justification for that restriction.
45. While there is equality in principle between a Member State's own nationals and nationals of other Member States, preventing impunity can be examined at the justification level. (24) As the Commission underlined at the hearing, that objective also reflects the protection of the fundamental rights of victims of crime. (25) Nevertheless, the case-law requires due account to be taken of the fundamental rights of the offender when extraditing an EU citizen to a third State. (26)
3. The risk of violation of fundamental rights
46. Article 19(2) of the Charter specifically concerns extradition. Under that provision, no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
47. It follows that, in so far as the competent authority of the requested Member State has evidence of a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment in the requesting third State, it is required to assess the existence of that risk when it is called upon to decide on the extradition of a person to that third State. (27)
48. For that purpose, that Member State cannot restrict itself to taking into consideration solely the declarations of the requesting third State or the accession, by the latter State, to international treaties guaranteeing, in principle, respect for fundamental rights. On the contrary, the competent authority of the requested Member State must rely, for the purposes of that verification, on information that is objective, reliable, specific and properly updated from, inter alia, judgments of international courts, such as judgments of the European Court of Human Rights ('ECtHR'), judgments of courts of the requesting third State, and also decisions, reports and other documents produced by bodies of the Council of Europe or under the aegis of the United Nations. (28) According to documents published by the Council of Europe in recent years, there appears to be scope for improvement as regards detention conditions, although no serious systematic violations have been identified. (29)
49. Decisions of other Member States ruling on an identical or similar extradition request from the third State concerned containing findings relating to a risk of infringement of fundamental rights, in this case the judgment of the Cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels) of 19 February 2025, is also part of this information. (30) This follows from the principle of mutual trust. (31)
50. However, according to the ECtHR, the burden of proof of a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment lies with the person concerned. (32) Consequently, Article 19(2) of the Charter does not preclude extradition where, although a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment cannot be ruled out on the basis of the information available, it cannot be established either.
51. Similar considerations apply, in principle, to a risk of infringement of the fundamental right to a fair trial, enshrined in the second paragraph of Article 47 of the Charter, also relied on by the Cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels). (33)
52. It will therefore be for the referring court to ascertain whether the information before it involves a risk of infringement of those fundamental rights, in particular as regards detention conditions and/or conviction in absentia. (34)
53. For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that, contrary to KN's contention, there is no evidence of an infringement of the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter or in Article 54 of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA). The judgment of 19 February 2025 of the Cour d'appel de Bruxelles (Court of Appeal, Brussels), which refused to extradite to Georgia, is not a criminal conviction capable of triggering that prohibition. (35)
B. Urgent preliminary ruling procedure
54. The referring court requested that this request for a preliminary ruling be dealt with under the urgent procedure provided for in Article 107 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice.
55. This request for a preliminary ruling concerns, inter alia, Article 67(3) TFEU and Article 82(1) TFEU, which appear in Title V of Part Three of the TFEU Treaty, relating to the area of freedom, security and justice, a condition for the applicability of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure, in accordance with Article 107(1) of the Rules of Procedure.
56. As I have just explained, those provisions ultimately have no direct bearing on the outcome of the main proceedings. The fact remains that the request for a preliminary ruling is specifically intended to clarify precisely that point.
57. Consequently, the scope of the urgent preliminary ruling procedure is open.
58. In support of its request, the referring court argued, inter alia, that there was an urgent need to reply to the request for a preliminary ruling, given that KN was detained only because of the extradition procedure to Georgia.
59. If the Court did not answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling as provided for in the present case, but to the effect that the decision of the Belgian court should be recognised, that ground for detention would disappear.
60. Admittedly, it cannot be ruled out that, subsequently, the French courts would keep KN in custody in order to enforce the Georgian judgment in France (36) or to conduct criminal proceedings in respect of the acts judged in Georgia. Neither the ne bis in idem principle of Article 14(7) of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights precludes such new criminal proceedings, since it does not apply to proceedings brought by different States, (37) nor do the corresponding prohibitions of EU law preclude such new criminal proceedings, since those prohibitions are not applicable to third States.
61. There is nothing in the request for a preliminary ruling to indicate that such an approach is envisaged in France, however, or that the competent Belgian authorities have taken such steps. On the contrary, at the hearing, France explained that, if extradition were unlawful, KN would be released.
62. Furthermore, the answer to the request for a preliminary ruling proposed here could also have an impact on the duration of the detention. It amounts to requiring the French court to examine, on its own responsibility, whether extradition to Georgia entails significant risks of infringement of fundamental rights. Should KN continue to be detained in the course of that examination, it would be appropriate for the French court to start that examination as soon as possible.
63. Therefore, KN's continued detention depends on the date on which the Court responds to the request for a preliminary ruling.
64. The Court is therefore right to apply the urgent preliminary ruling procedure in the present case.
V. Conclusion
65. I therefore propose that the Court of Justice's answer to the request for a preliminary ruling should be as follows:
Neither Article 67(3) TFEU, nor Article 82(1) TFEU, nor the free movement of EU citizens under Articles 21 and 18 TFEU entail the applicability of EU law to a request for the extradition of a national of another Member State to a third State where that person was only in transit in the requested Member State when he or she was arrested.
1 Original language: German.
i The present case is designated by a fictitious name which does not correspond to the actual name of a party to the proceedings.
2 https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions.
3 Judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 26).
4 Judgment of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 26 and 27), and of 18 June 2024, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm (Request for the extradition of a refugee to Türkiye) (C‑352/22, EU:C:2024:521, paragraph 38).
5 Judgment of 18 June 2024, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm (Request for the extradition of a refugee to Türkiye) (C‑352/22, EU:C:2024:521, paragraph 71).
6 Judgment of 18 June 2024, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm (Request for the extradition of a refugee to Türkiye) (C‑352/22, EU:C:2024:521, paragraphs 64 to 70).
7 Opinion 2/13 (Accession of the European Union to the ECHR) of 18 December 2014 (ECHR II) (EU:C:2014:2454, paragraph 191), and judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 46).
8 Judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 46). See also judgment of 14 September 2023, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura and Others (Successive arrest warrants) (C‑71/21, EU:C:2023:668, paragraph 55).
9 In this spirit, judgment of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 43).
10 Concerning the establishment of refugee status, see judgments of 18 June 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Effect of a decision granting refugee status) (C‑753/22, EU:C:2024:524, paragraph 68), and Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm (Request for the extradition of a refugee to Türkiye) (C‑352/22, EU:C:2024:521, paragraph 43).
11 Judgments of 6 March 2014, Siragusa (C‑206/13, EU:C:2014:126, paragraph 24); of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others (C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 34); and of 28 November 2024, PT (Agreement concluded between the prosecutor and the perpetrator of an offence) (C‑432/22, EU:C:2024:987, paragraph 35).
12 Judgments of 6 March 2014, Siragusa (C‑206/13, EU:C:2014:126, paragraph 26); of 10 July 2014, Julián Hernández and Others (C‑198/13, EU:C:2014:2055, paragraph 35); and of 28 November 2024, PT (Agreement between the public prosecutor and the perpetrator of an offence) (C‑432/22, EU:C:2024:987, paragraph 36).
13 Judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 33); of 10 April 2018, Pisciotti (C‑191/16, EU:C:2018:222, paragraph 45); of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius (C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 27); of 17 December 2020, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Extradition to Ukraine) (C‑398/19, EU:C:2020:1032, paragraph 30); and of 22 December 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Request for extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina) (C‑237/21, EU:C:2022:1017, paragraph 34).
14 Judgment of 19 November 2024, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraph 154), and Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraph 155).
15 Judgments of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius (C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 19); of 17 December 2020, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Extradition to Ukraine) (C‑398/19, EU:C:2020:1032, paragraph 16); and of 22 December 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Request for extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina) (C‑237/21, EU:C:2022:1017, paragraph 13). The situation in the judgment of 10 April 2018, Pisciotti (C‑191/16, EU:C:2018:222, paragraph 34) is different but incidental.
16 Judgment of 1 April 2014, Felixstowe Dock and Railway Company and Others (C‑80/12, EU:C:2014:200, paragraph 25).
17 Judgment of 22 March 2007, Talotta (C‑383/05, EU:C:2007:181, paragraph 19).
18 Judgments of 17 December 1980, Commission v Belgium (149/79, EU:C:1980:297, paragraph 10); of 2 March 2010, Rottmann (C‑135/08, EU:C:2010:104, paragraph 51); and of 29 April 2025, Commission v Malta (Citizenship by investment) (C‑181/23, EU:C:2025:283, paragraph 96).
19 See judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 48 and 49), and of 17 December 2020, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Berlin (Extradition to Ukraine) (C‑398/19, EU:C:2020:1032, paragraph 52).
20 Thus, regarding Article 22 TFEU, judgments of 19 November 2024, Commission v Poland (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑814/21, EU:C:2024:963, paragraph 154), and Commission v Czech Republic (Ability to stand for election and membership of a political party) (C‑808/21, EU:C:2024:962, paragraph 155).
21 Judgment of 14 February 1995, Schumacker (C‑279/93, EU:C:1995:31, paragraphs 35 and 36).
22 Recent judgment of 29 April 2025, Commission v Malta (Citizenship by investment) (C‑181/23, EU:C:2025:283, paragraphs 100 and 101).
23 See judgment of 11 November 2014, Dano (C‑333/13, EU:C:2014:2358, paragraph 77 et seq.).
24 Judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 37 and 38), of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius (C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 32), and of 2 April 2020, Ruska Federacija (C‑897/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:262, paragraph 60).
25 As regards the right to life under Article 2 of the ECtHR, judgments of the European Court of Human Rights Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey (CE:ECHR:2019:0129JUD003692507, §§ 231 to 236), and of 9 July 2019, Romeo Castaño v. Belgium (CE:ECHR:2019:0709JUD000835117, § 81).
26 Judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 53 to 59), and of 22 December 2022, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft München (Request for extradition to Bosnia and Herzegovina) (C‑237/21, EU:C:2022:1017, paragraph 55), and judgments of the ECtHR of 7 July 1989, Soering v. United Kingdom (CE:ECHR:1989:0707JUD001403888, § 88), and of 25 March 2021, Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France (CE:ECHR:2021:0325JUD004032416, § 107).
27 Judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraph 58), of 2 April 2020, Ruska Federacija (C‑897/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:262, paragraph 64) and order of 6 September 2017, Peter Schotthöfer & Florian Steiner (C‑473/15, EU:C:2017:633, paragraph 24). See also judgments of the ECHR of 7 July 1989, Soering v. United Kingdom (CE:ECHR:1989:0707JUD001403888, § 88), of 26 July 2005, N. v. Finland (CE:ECHR:2003:0923DEC003888502, § 158), of 4 September 2014, Trabelsi v. Belgium (CE:ECHR:2014:0904JUD000014010, § 116), and of 25 March 2021, Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France (CE:ECHR:2021:0325JUD004032416, § 107).
28 Judgments of 6 September 2016, Petruhhin (C‑182/15, EU:C:2016:630, paragraphs 57 and 59); of 2 April 2020, Ruska Federacija (C‑897/19 PPU, EU:C:2020:262, paragraph 65); and of 18 June 2024, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft Hamm (Request for the extradition of a refugee to Türkiye) (C‑352/22, EU:C:2024:521, paragraph 63).
29 See Council of Europe Action Plan for Georgia 2024-2027 (CM(2023)168, p. 31), and Report to the Georgian Government on the visit to Georgia carried out by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 10 to 21 September 2018 (CPT/Inf (2019) 16, paragraphs 44 to 48).
30 In this spirit, judgments of 18 June 2024, Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Effect of a decision granting refugee status), (C‑753/22, EU:C:2024:524, paragraphs 77 and 78), and of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 46).
31 See point 27 of this Opinion.
32 Judgments of the ECtHR of 28 February 2008, Saadi v. Italy (CE:ECHR:2008:0228JUD003720106, § 129), of 23 August 2016, J.K. and Others v. Sweden (CE:ECHR:2016:0823JUD005916612, § 91), and of 25 March 2021, Bivolaru and Moldovan v. France (CE:ECHR:2021:0325JUD004032416, § 109).
33 In this spirit, judgment of 31 January 2023, Puig Gordi and Others (C‑158/21, EU:C:2023:57, paragraph 97), and of 29 July 2024, Breian (C‑318/24 PPU, EU:C:2024:658, paragraph 38).
34 See judgment of 26 February 2013, Melloni (C‑399/11, EU:C:2013:107, paragraph 49).
35 See judgment of 14 September 2023, Sofiyska gradska prokuratura and Others (Successive arrest warrants) (C‑71/21, EU:C:2023:668, paragraph 52).
36 See judgment of 13 November 2018, Raugevicius (C‑247/17, EU:C:2018:898, paragraph 39).
37 United Nations Human Rights Committee Communications No 692/1996, A.R.J. v. Australia, No 6.4, and No 204/1986, A.P. v. Italy, No 7.3. As regards Article 4 of Additional Protocol No 7 to the ECHR, this is already apparent from the wording of that provision.
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